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This study which i s  concerned p r im ar i ly  w ith  the p ro je c t  ev a lu a t io n  technique 
during tlie F i r s t  Five-Year Plan I 963- 67 , i s  d iv ided  in to  th ree  p a r t s .
P a r t  I examines the F i r s t  P lan in  re sp ec t  to i t s  major o b je c t iv e s ,  p roduction  
t a r g e t s ,  s e c to ra l  programming technique pursued in  the  fo rm u la tion  of the 
Development P lan . P a r t  IX d eals  w ith  the  market im perfec tions  in  developing 
co u n tr ie s  and the  basic  reasons which have led  to  the in t ro d u c t io n  of various  
t h e o r e t i c a l  investment c r i t e r i a .  P a r t  I I I  d iscu sses  the  p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  
technique of the  SPO and government investment agencies  by in troducing  two 
case s tu d ie s  taken  from the pub lic  s e c to r  and a p p ra ise s  them in  the l i g h t  of 
basic  p r in c ip le s  c i t e d  in  P a r t  I I .
The comprehensive planning  approach in  Turkey began in  1962 w ith the  l a u n c h i n g
of " "" ^ ^   ^ in  o b je c t iv e s  were to ach ieve ,
an o v e ra l l  7 p e r c e n t / r a te  (on average) to 
an o v e ra l l  / p e rc en u /ra ie  ^un average ; ^uo promote r a t e  of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ^
to  reduce d e f i c i t  in  the balance of payments, to  c re a te  g re a te r  employment
o p p o r tu n i t ie s  and to  reduce income d i s p a r i t i e s .  TliO SPO has followed the
"method of success ive  approximation" or "planning in  s ta g e s " .  This p lanning
methodology comprises macro-economic s tag e ,  s e c to ra l  s tag e  and p ro je c t
a p p ra is a l  s ta g e .  For the  macro-growth model aggregate  f ig u re s  on income,
consumption, sav ings , investm ent, exports  and imports were c o l le c te d  and the
in t e r r e l a t i o n s h ip  among these  v a r ia b le s  were examined. By the a p p l ic a t io n
of simple Ilarrod-Domar model, ah investment volume of 18.3 pe rcen t of GNP was
found necessa ry  to  a t t a i n  a 7 pe rcen t r a t e  of growth, c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o
being 2.6» A ccordingly, domestic savings and fo re ig n  savings rep resen ted
14.8 p e rcen t  and 3*3 percen t of GNP re s p e c t iv e ly .  T^e t o t a l  investment
requirem ents needed by the F i r s t  P lan were fo re c a s t  to  reach  59*7 b i l l i o n  T.L,
out of which 33*8 b i l l i o n  T.L, were to  be invested  by the  pub lic  s e c to r .
P u b l i c /
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Public  s e c to r ,  t h e re fo re ,  was expected to undertake 60 pe rcen t of the 
t o t a l  s iz e  of the  investm ent programme. The main reasons fo r  g iv ing  a 
g r e a te r  ro le  to  the  p ub lic  s ec to r  was due to  p re s s in g  and u rgen t needs fo r  
ensuring s t r u c t u r a l  changes in  the economy in  re s p e c t  of g ross  n a t io n a l  
product, fo re ig n  t r a d e ,  labour fo rce  and p a t t e r n  of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n .
The F i r s t  P lan put the  economy la r g e ly  in  the  hands of the  pub lic  s e c to r  
where the  government's  aim was to  achieve a l a r g e r  share  of m anufacturing 
in d u s try  in  the  GNP and thus to  a c c e le r a te  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  by in te n s i fy in g  
i t s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the l a rg e - s c a le  in d u s t r i e s  through i t s  S ta te  Economic 
E n te rp r ise s  (SEE).
The second s tage  of the p lanning  methodology was concerned w ith  the  d e te r ­
m ination  of p roduction  t a r g e t s  fo r  va rious  se c to rs  over the  f iv e -y e a r  period , 
This s tage  was based on an in p u t-o u tp u t  ta b le  and p a r t l y  on " p a r t i a l  s e c to r  
a n a ly s i s " .  The p roduc tion  p ro je c t io n s  fo r  s e c to r s  were made according to 
the  in c rease  in  f i n a l  demand which would a r i s e  from a 7 pe rcen t r a te  of 
growth in  the GNP. However, the  in p u t-o u tp u t  ta b le  which was worked out 
has no t even s a t i s f i e d  the  SPO p lanners  them selves. Some p lanners  m ain ta in  
th a t  the s e c to ra l  p roduc tion  t a r g e t s  were based p r im a r i ly  on th e " p a r t i a l  
s e c to r  a n a ly s is "  and le s s  on the in p u t-o u tp u t  model.
D eterm ination  of investment programmes a t  s e c to ra l  le v e l  was made on the 
b a s is  of p r o j e c t s ,  programmes and s e c to r  r e p o r t s .  In  a c tu a l  f a c t  Turkey 
has followed a "departm ental approach" in  i t s  investm ent a l lo c a t io n ,  namely 
th a t  s e c to ra l  a l lo c a t io n  of investment was in flu en ced  by the barga in ing  
power among various  m in i s t r i e s  and government departm ents.
D espite  the  remarkably high r a t e  of growth in  I 963 and 1966 ( i . e .  7*5 per 
cen t and 8 .8  p e rcen t)  the  o v e ra l l  r a te  of growth s e t  in  the Plan was not 
achieved in  the f i r s t  f iv e  years  of the P lan . The a c tu a l  in c rease  in  the 
GNP/
I l l
GNP was, on average , 6 .5  pe rcen t in  the period  1962-66 -  GNP r i s in g  from
6lo9 b i l l i o n  T.L. to 79»5 b i l l i o n  T.L.
P a r t  I I  has d iscussed  c r i t i c a l l y  the  va rious  investm ent c r i t e r i a  which have 
been advanced in  the l a s t  two decades. Therefore , t h i s  p a r t  has provided 
some enlightenm ent on the market im perfec tions  which have led  many economists 
to  suggest d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  fo r  s o c ia l  e v a lu a tio n  of investment p r o je c t s .  
Among a l l  those po in ted  out the most a p p ro p r ia te  c r i t e r i o n  i s  the s o c ia l  
p re sen t  value (SPV) ru le  which uses "accounting" p r ic e s  and which takes  in to  
account the e f f e c t  of investment p ro je c t  on v a rious  economic t a r g e t s ,  i . e .  
n a t io n a l  income, balance of payments, employment e t c .
The o b jec t  of P a r t  I I I  has been to  in v e s t ig a te  the t h e o r e t i c a l  investment 
c r i t e r i a  adopted in  Turkey and to  examine c r i t i c a l l y  the p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  
technique adopted in  the F i r s t  Ffve-Year P lan . The s o c ia l  p re sen t  value 
c r i t e r i o n  which takes  account of p re sen t  value of b e n e f i t  and cos t  streams 
by using a s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a t e ,  has been app lied  to  two in d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  
which a re  taken  from the pu b lic  s e c to r .
The Case Study No.l i s  a k r a f t  paper and c e l lu lo s e  p ro je c t  which has a lread y  
been executed by the SEKA o rg a n isa t io n  and the Case Study No.2 i s  Keban 
H ydro-E lec tr ic  p ro je c t  v s .  i t s  Thermal a l t e r n a t i v e .  The p resen t  value of 
b e n e f i t s  to  c o s ts  r a t i o  of the  Paper P ro je c t  i s  found to  be 2 .4  a t  12 percen t
d iscoun t r a te  and 2 .0  a t  14 percen t d iscount r a t e .  On the o th e r  hand, the
in te r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  of the  p ro je c t  has been found to  be 12.06 p e rcen t .
In the case study  n o .2, the E . I .E .  a p p lied  "eq u iv a len t annual cos t"  c r i t e r i o n
to the Keban h y d ro - e le c t r ic  v s .  Thermal a l t e r n a t i v e .  A lso, the  ev a lu a tio n
has been made on market p r ic e s  w ithout conside ring  s o c ia l  p r ic e s  of inpu ts
and o u tp u ts .  However, s in ce  the two p r o j e c t s '  l i f e  spans are  d i f f e r e n t
(Keban h y d ro - e le c t r ic  w ith  50 years  and Thermal w ith  55 y e a rs )  an accu ra te  
comparison/
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comparison between the two has been made by b ring ing  them to the same l i f e  
p e r io d . Wj t^h the  a id  of so c ia l  p re sen t  value (SPV) ru le  the  two p ro je c ts  
have been compared by the  "lowest Coimnon m u lt ip le "  method* They a re  a lso  
compared by assuming an i n f i n i t e  period  of renewal fo r  both p r o je c t s .
I t  has been showi th a t  the  choice between the h y d ro - e le c t r i c  and the 
Thermal i s  very  s e n s i t iv e  to  the v a r ia t io n s  in  the  s o c ia l  p r ic e  of fo re ig n  
exchange and s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a t e s .  I f  so c ia l  p r ic e  of fo re ig n  exchange 
i s  taken as 1.33 and so c ia l  d iscount r a t e  as 10 p e rc e n t ,  the  Keban Hydro­
e l e c t r i c  p ro je c t  lo ses  i t s  a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  and the choice becomes in  favour 
of the Thermal p r o je c t .
The main shortcomings of the  p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  technique in  Turkey can be 
summarises as fo llow s;
( i )  The c r i t e r i a  used in  the Plan p e riod  v a r ie d  between the simple 
accounting p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  (used by SMH\), s o c ia l  p re sen t  value 
(used by SPO in  Case Study N o .l) ;  and "equ iva len t annual cost"  c r i t e r i o n  
(ap p lied  by E .I .E .  in  Case Study No.2 ) .  Thus, th e re  has been no un ifo rm ity  
in  the a p p l ic a t io n  of investm ent c r i t e r i a  nor in  the p ro je c t  e v a lu a t io n  method 
While the SPO used "shadow" p r ic e s  fo r  c e r t a in  inpu ts  such as fo re ig n  ex­
change and wage r a t e s ,  the  E . I .E .  did  not cons ide r  "shadow" p r ic e s  in  any 
way. The d iscount r a t e  ap p lied  in  so c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  has v a r ie d  
between government agencies  where the SPO app lied  a 12 percen t r a te  of 
d iscoun t fo r  i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  and S . I .E .  6 pe rcen t r a te  of d iscoun t in
the ev a lu a t io n  of Keban h y d r o - e le c t r ic .  The f a c t  th a t  each planning agency 
was l e f t  f re e  to  apiply i t s  ov/n investment c r i t e r i a  i s  a m isleading  approach 
to  resource  a l lo c a t io n  and investment s e le c t io n .
( i i )  In  the ev a lu a t io n  of k r a f t  paper p ro je c t  the  SPO has taken in to  
account the  b e n e f i t s  r e s u l t in g  from the p ro je c t  such as value added, fo re ig n  
exchange sav ings , and b e n e f i t s  to  consumers, but ex te rn a l  e f f e c t s  of the 
p r o j e c t /
Vp ro je c t  on o th e r  s e c to rs  ( i . e .  f o r e s t r y  tim ber, t r a n s p o r t ,  cement e t c . )  
have been n eg lec ted .  This d e fe c t  i s  even more v iv id  in  the a p p ra isa l  
of Keban H y d ro -e le c t r ic  by the E . I .E .  Though the l a t t e r  i s  a m ulti-purpose  
p ro je c t  i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  such as flood c o n tro l ,  i r r i g a t i o n ,  nav ig a t io n ,  
f i s h in g  and e x te rn a l  b e n e f i t s  to  nearby mining in d u s try  have not been e s t i ­
mated and l e f t  o u ts id e  so c ia l  b e n e f i t  co s t  a n a ly s is .
( i i i )  Total b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  of the paper p ro je c t  a re  c a lc u la te d  on the 
b a s is  of s t a t i c  assumptions in  regard  to  sa le s  revenue, p r ic e s  received  fo r  
ou tpu ts ,  fu tu re  demand fo r  the  p roduct, opera ting  c o s ts  and economic l i f e  
of the  p r o j e c t .  No a ttem pt has been made to see how the choice w i l l  be 
a f fe c te d  by changes in  a l l  these  v a r ia b le s  where fo r  more accu ra te  a n a ly s is  
i t  i s  necessa ry  to  make some estim ate  of the p o ss ib le  outcomes and of the 
l ik e l ih o o d  of t h e i r  o ccu rr ing .
( iv )  A l te rn a t iv e  p ro je c ts  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  sca le  of p roduc tion , d i f f e r e n t  
p roduction  techniques and d i f f e r e n t  lo c a t io n  have not been made a v a i la b le  
during  the  F i r s t  Ffve Year P lan , For in s ta n ce ,  though Keban h y d ro -e le c t r ic  
was compared to i t s  Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e  t h i s  is  no t s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  provid ing  
a wide range of investment cho ices . In a c tu a l  f a c t ,  most of the i n d u s t r i a l  
p ro je c ts  did not have a s u f f i c i e n t  number of a l t e r n a t i v e s  and t h i s  drawback 
has been mainly due to the lack  of d a ta ,  time, and q u a l i f i e d  experts  who 
could c a r ry  out a l t e r n a t i v e  p ro je c t  s tu d ie s .
Despite a l l  i t s  d e fe c ts  the F i r s t  Five-Year P lan , however, has paved the 
way fo r  a planned economic development which encouraged the a p p l ic a t io n  of 
new planning  techniques and the c o l le c t io n  of more uniform da ta  fo r  s e c to ra l  
prograjnming and p ro je c t  e v a lu a t io n .
INTRODUCTION
This s tudy i s  mainly d i re c te d  towards an a p p ra is a l  of the 
p ro je c t  ev a lu a t io n  techn ique adopted during  the Turkish  F i r s t  Five-Year 
P lan , 1963- 67 .
The d is cu s s io n  has been conducted a t  the  fo llow ing  th re e  d i s t i n c t  
l e v e l s .  F i r s t ,  an a ttem pt hac been made to  analyse  the  macro and s e c to r a l  
a sp ec ts  o f  the p lann ing  methodology in  o rder to  provide a p roper 
background to  the  s tu d ie s  o f  investm ent p r o je c t  e v a lu a t io n .  Second, 
some e f f o r t s  have been made to  provide a c r i t i c a l  survey of genera l 
investm ent c r i t e r i a  which have been e x ten s iv e ly  d iscu ssed  in  the 
l a s t  two decadeso Of course , the  t h e o r e t i c a l  investm ent c r i t e r i a  
were d iscu ssed  w ith  the  b e l i e f  t h a t  th ese  w i l l  provide  a b e t t e r  under­
s tan d in g  and p e r t in e n t  g u id e l in e s  f o r  the p ro je c t  a p p ra i s a l  technique 
in  Turkey» A ccordingly, the  c r i t e r i a  o f  investm ent a l l o c a t io n  and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n  technique app lied  in  the  F i r s t  F ive- 
Year Plan have been a ssessed  by examination of some o f the  investment 
p ro je c ts  which a re  inc luded  in  the  investment programme o f the  F i r s t  
p lan .
The Turkish  F i r s t  F ive-Year Plan i s  probably  the  f i r s t  
comprehensive p lann ing  a ttem pt to  deal w ith  the v a r io u s  economic problems 
of the  Turkish  economy» A c tu a lly ,  the r a t e  of income growth in  the l a s t  
decade has been o f  an u n s a t i s f a c to r y  le v e l  and i t  has shown g re a t  
f l u c tu a t io n  from one y e a r  to  another* While the e f f e c t  o f  weather 
co n d itio n s  on a g r i c u l tu r e  was a major reason f o r  such o s c i l l a t i o n  one 
should no t ignore  the  f a c t  t h a t  re sou rces  a v a i la b le  f o r  i n d u s t r i e s  have 
been m isa l lo ca ted  on i n e f f i c i e n t  c r i t e r i a  which d id  no t  in c re a se  the 
p roductive  c a p a c i ty  of the  economy* The i n f l a t i o n  faced  during  1954**58 
was a consequence o f  the s o c ia l  overhead b ia s  resou rce  a l l o c a t io n  which 
stemmed from d e f i c i t  f in a n c in g  and remained the b a s ic  p o l ic y  a t  the  time*
I t  was then  b e liev ed  th a t  over investm ents in  s o c ia l  overhead c a p i t a l  
( i .e *  t r a n s p o r t  and communications, e le c tp io  power s t a t i o n s ,  hydro­
dams e tc*) would r e s u l t  in  s e l f - s u s ta in e d  economic grovfth. But th i s  
p o l ic y  has proved to  be a f a i l u r e .
Indeed towards the  end o f the l a s t  decade ( I 938- 60) the r a t e  
o f  growth dropped to  almost 2*5 p e r  cent per airium which was f a r  below 
the  r a t e  o f  p o p u la t io h  growth (*3 peh cent per.annum). There was a 
p re s s in g  need to  in c re ase  the  r a t e  o f  growth o f the  economy and to r a i s e  
the  s tandard  of l i v i n g  of the  people .
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As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  p o p u la t io n  exp losion  (a s  compared to  
world s tandards)  and low grovfbh in  n o n -a g r ic u l tu ra l  i n d u s t r i e s ,  a 
tremendous unemployment problem arose  and the number o f prop le  unemployed 
rose  to  1 ,5  m i l l io n  in  1962 p lu s  the  huge d isg u ised  unemployment in  
a g r ic u l tu r e  ( i . e .  one m i l l i o n ) .
The most im portan t problem which confron ted  the Turkish economy 
was th e  ba lance  of payments d e f i c i t  which p u t  Turkey under a  g re a t  
burden of debt to  the r e s t  of the world. Turkey' s fo re ig n  debt o b lig ­
a t io n s  rose  almost to  /  1 b i l l i o n  of which /  666 m il l io n  f e l l  i n to  the 
F i r s t  F ive-Y ear p lan  p e r io d .  Trade d e f i c i t  has a lso  been ano ther setback  
f o r  economic growth as T urkey 's  export s t r u c tu r e  remained more o r  l e s s  
s t a t i c  over 15 y e a r s .  Almost 77 p e r  cent of the  t o t a l  exports  derived  
from a g r i c u l tu r a l  p roducts  which are su b jec t  to  f lu c tu a t io n s  in  fo re ig n  
demand.
I t  was f e l t  f o r  a long  time th a t  th ese  problems could no t be 
ta c k le d  adequa te ly  un le ss  the  country  pursued comprehensive economic 
p lann ing , and adm itted  the  f a c t  th a t  p lann ing  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  balanced 
development. This w^ as f i n a l l y  aclcn owl edged in  Law No,91 of September 
i 960 , which c r e a te d  the State . P lanning O rgan isa tion  as the  government's 
p lann ing  and adv isory  body.
As i t s  f i r s t  ta sk  the  Planning O rgan isa tion  d ra f te d  the  long­
term development p la n  which i s  based on a f i f t e e n - y e a r  p e rsp e c t iv e  and 
in d ic a te s  t h a t  the  s o c ia l  and economic l i f e  in  Turkey over t h i s  p e r io d  w i l l  
be planned su b je c t  to  the  e s s e n t i a l  safeguards of a democratic system.
I t  was w ith in  t h i s  framework th a t  in  1962 i t  s e t  up the  F i r s t  Five-Year 
p la n ,  1965- 67.
The s u b je c t  of investm ent c r i t e r i a  i s  v a s t  and an extrem ely 
cha llen g in g  one. In  the  l a s t  two decades, th e re  has been some ex tensive  
work on the  su b jec t  and economists who s tu d ied  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  f i e l d ,  
have suggested  v a r io u s  investm ent c r i t e r i a  as be ing  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  
p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  which depend on market mechanism.
Since the  p r ic e  mechanism in  advanced c o u n tr ie s  op e ra tes  more 
p e r f e c t l y  than in  l e s s  developed c o u n tr ie s ;  the  problem of d ep a r t in g  from 
the  genera l commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ru le s  i s  n o t  as s e r io u s  as i t  would 
be in  developing c o u n t r ie s .  In  genera l  market im p erfec tio n s  are  so 
v a s t  in  l e s s  developed c o u n tr ie s  t h a t  i t  becomes n e ce ssa ry  to  d ig re ss  
from th e  simple commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ru le  to  some k ind  of investment
L a te r ,  t h i s  o rg a n is a t io n  was f u l l y  endorsed in  the  New Turkish  
C o n s t i tu t io n  of Ju ly  I 96I ,
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c r i t e r i a  which could  le ad  to  a more e f f i c i e n t  a l lo c a t io n  of investm ents ,
%hat a re  th e se  im perfec tions  in  the market mechanism which 
make the  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  a l e s s  d e s i r a b le  ru le?
As f a r  as developing c o u n tr ie s  are concerned these  could  be 
l i s t e d  b r i e f l y  as fo llow s: a ) ’ market p r ic e s  are  not com petitive
because of market im perfec tions  a r i s in g  from m onopolis tic  in f lu e n c e s ,  
ta x e s ,  t a r i f f s  and i n d i v i s i b i l i t i e s .  Consequently the  market p r ic e  
o f  a product or a se rv ice  does no t  r e f l e c t  i t s  r e a l  v a lue ; b) p r iv a te  
b e n e f i t  e s t im a te s  do no t taloe in to  account the n e t  b e n e f i t s  a r i s in g  from 
economic in te rdependenc ies ;  c) p r iv a te  r a te  of r e tu r n  c r i t e r i a  may le a d  
to  a choice of investm ent p r o je c t s  which though they  are  p r o f i t a b l e  
from a p r iv a te  p o in t  of view, may not be accep tab le  from the general 
economy's p o in t  of view; d) the  r a te  of r e tu rn  ru le  ap p lied  by the  
p r iv a te  s e c to r  i n  i t s  s t a t i c  s e t-u p  does no t  allow f o r  dynamic consid ­
e ra t io n s ;  e) l a c k  of experience and in fo rm ation  in  developing c o u n tr ie s  
malce i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the p r iv a te  s e c to r  a c t in g  in  a d e c e n t r a l i s e d  form 
to  f o r e c a s t  c o r r e c t ly  the  expected r a t e s  of r e tu r n .  This i s  in  a d d it io n  
to  the  la c k  of u n i f i e d  and system atic  accounting p rocedures . The Govern­
ment, however, through i t s  v a r io u s  p lann ing  and s t a t i s t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
has an adequate supply of re q u ire d  s k i l l s .
Most developing c o u n tr ie s  are  now fo rm u la t in g  t h e i r  development 
p lans  with the  hope of ach iev ing  a d e s ir a b le  p a th  of growth. Under such 
c ircum stances the  government "w il l  o f ten  wish to  modify consumers' power 
over the  p a t t e r n  of p roduc tion  in  the  i n t e r e s t  of v/hat i t  conside rs  a 
p re fe ra b le  p a th  of development* Consequently the  development Committees' 
welfare fu n c t io n  i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  t h a t  of consumers' a c t in g  independently" .
I t  i s  n o t  s u rp r i s in g  to  mention t h a t  the  e a r l i e r  d iscu ss io n  of 
investm ent c r i t e r i a  shows a m o d if ica t io n  of the  p r ic e  mechanism and i t s  
conven tional r u l e s .  The modem d iscu ss io n  of t h e o r e t i c a l  investment 
c r i t e r i a  can be d iv ided  in to  th re e  groups. F i r s t ,  Polak and Buchanan 
have d iscussed  investm ent methods of a l lo c a t io n  in  terms of ba lance  of 
payments and income e f f e c t s ,  suggesting  t h a t  given investm ent funds 
( in c lu d in g  foreign-exchange) should  be used e i t h e r  to  In c rease  export 
c ap a c i ty  o r  l e a d  to  import s u b s t i t u t i o n .  Second, some economists 
such as A,R,Kalin, R. Hurkse, R.A.Lewis, J ,  Tinbergen and H.B. Chenery 
have recommended th a t  investm ent p ro je c ts  should be chosen according to
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" the  s o c ia l  m arginal p r o d u c t iv i ty  (SMP)" method o f  a l lo c a t io n ,  provided the aim 
o f economic p o l ic y  i s  to maximize the  p re sen t  aggregate  l e v e l  o f  output 
Other development p lanners  such as H. L e ihens te in , ¥ .  Galenson, 0 E ckstein  
and A.Ko Sen suggest t h a t  investm ent p ro je c ts  should be s e le c te d  on the 
b a s is  of r e in v e s t i b lu  su rp lus  which the i n i t i a l  investm ent g ives r i s e  to ,  
provided the  goal i s  to  maximize the  r a t e  of c a p i t a l  form ation  and the 
r a t e  of growth of output over time*
Though some re fe ren ce  w i l l  be made to the  l a s t  groups of t h e o r e t i c a l  
investm ent c r i t e r i a ,  most of my emphasis w i l l  cen tre  on the f i r s t  and second 
groups of t h e o r e t i c a l  investm ent c r i t e r i a .  I t  must be noted th a t  the  th re e  
s e t s  of investm ent c r i t e r i a  mentioned above are  a p p ro p r ia te  w ith in  the 
c ond itions  to  which they  a re  a p p l ic a b le .  In  o th e r  words, each of these  
investm ent c r i t e r i a  aims a t  ach iev ing  a c e r t a in  goal in  the economy. Each 
i s  d i r e c te d  to  a s p e c i f ie d  p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e  which th a t  p a r t i c u l a r  country 
wants to maximizeo
I t  i s  im possib le  to  go in to  the  d e t a i l s  of each group of c r i t e r i a  
in  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  nor i s  t h i s  the  purpose of t h i s  study* However, given the 
co n d it io n s  p r e v a i l in g  in  the  Turkish economy and the  o b je c t iv e  fu n c tio n  
which i s  to  maximize output a t  p re se n t ,  I  f e e l  th a t  the  s o c ia l  marginal 
p ro d u c t iv i ty  c r i t e r i o n  which i s  suggested by P ro fe sso r  H.B.Ghenery would 
be the most r e le v a n t  one to consider* Therefore , I  s h a l l  be co n cen tra t in g  
more on i t  than o thers*  I t  i s ,  perhaps, p e r t in e n t  to  mention the f a c t  
th a t  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  analyses  which a re  r e c e n t ly  p resen ted  by 0*Eckstein, 
P re s t  and Turvey and I.M.D. L i t t l e  do n o t ,  in  p r in c ip l e ,  d i f f e r  from the 
s o c ia l  m arginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  ru le  which I  have mentioned above* The 
p r in c ip le s  governing the l a s t  two and the s i m i l a r i t i e s  between them, w i l l  
be explained  in  the re le v a n t  c h a p te rs .
The p lan  o f  t h i s  th e s i s  w i l l  be in  the fo llow ing  fa sh io n .  The 
th e s i s  i s  d iv ided  in to  th re e  p a r t s .  P a r t  I  of t h i s  th e s i s  i s  confined 
to  the  p r e s e n ta t io n  of the Turkish  F i r s t  Five-Year Plan (1963"67), which 
was inaugura ted  in  1963* This i s  tne  f i r s t  p lan  in  Turkey which i s
(2 )comprehensive  ^ -^in form and new in  p lanning  techn ique . The F i r s t  Plan 
w i l l  be examined in  re fe ren ce  to i t s  b as ic  o b je c t iv e s ,  p roduction  t a r g e t s ,  
t o t a l  s iz e  o f  investm ent programme and f i n a l l y ,  the a l l o c a t io n  of investm ent 
among sec to rs*  These a sp ec ts  of the F i r s t  Five-Year Plan w i l l  be d iscussed
' Here, maximizing p re sen t  le v e l  of output r e f e r s  to  no t a p o in t  of time 
but to sh o r t- t im e  horizon
( 2 ) ^  ^ Despite the f a c t  Turkey had launched two se p a ra te  Five-Year I n d u s t r i a l ­
i z a t io n  p lans  in  the  p a s t  (1934-38? 1939- 43 ; th e se  p lans  were simply
(contd . on p . 3
in  Chapter 1* Though my main ta sk  in  t h i s  th e s i s  i s  to co n cen tra te  on 
the  p r o je c t  e v a lu a t io n  technique in troduced  during the  F i r s t  P lan pe rio d , 
i t  has seemed reasonab le  to  me to  throw some l i g h t  on the  q uestion  of 
p roduction  p ro je c t io n ,  fo rm u la tion  and the  p a t t e r n  o f  investm ent 
a l l o c a t io n  in  the  F i r s t  P lan .
In  Chapter 2 the t o t a l  s iz e  of the  p lan  and the  p ro je c te d  p a t t e r n  
o f  a l lo c a t io n  a t  the s e c to r a l  l e v e l  are  c r i t i c a l l y  examined. The p lanning  
methodology o f the  S ta te  P lanning  O rgan ization , which i s  ap p lied  in  the 
F i r s t  P lan  has a lso  been o u t l in e d  and assessed  in  the  l i g h t  of more 
advanced p lann ing  techn ique .
Though I am more in c l in e d  to  deal w ith  the  micro a n a ly s is  of 
investm ent a l l o c a t io n ,  I  f e e l  i t  i s  necessary  to  co n cen tra te  s h o r t ly  on 
" s e c to ra l"  a l l o c a t io n  o f  investm ent. This may prov ide  a  comprehensive 
p ic tu re  o f  the  e n t i r e  investm ent a l lo c a t io n  technique employed in  the 
F i r s t  Plan#
I  f e e l  th a t  the  s e c to r a l - s t a g e  should be regarded  as an in sep ­
a ra b le  p a r t  o f the  m ic ro -s tage  s ince  both a re  c lo s e ly  i n t e r r e l a t e d  and 
a re  the  b a s ic  de term inan ts  of economic growth in  an economy* The p ro je c t  
a p p ra is a l  s tag e  may no t be meaningful so long as i t  i s  considered  sep­
a r a t e l y  from the  s e c to r a l  a l l o c a t io n  of investm ent and the  re v e rse  i s  
true*
The s e c to r a l  programming approach pursued by the  SPO p lanners  i s  
c r i t i c a l l y  examined in  the  l i g h t  of advanced methods o f  a l l o c a t io n  of 
investments* The f i n a l  s e c t io n  of Chapter 2 provides a  b r i e f  re fe ren ce  
to  the  im plem entation r e s u l t s  of the  F i r s t  Plan as  f a r  as r a t e  of growth 
o f  n a t io n a l  income, savings and investm ent a l lo c a t io n  a re  concerned. These 
r e s u l t s  a re  c r i t i c a l l y  surveyed*
P a r t  I I  i s  p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  the  fo llo w in g  problems:
a) the fundamental economic p r in c ip le s  of f r e e  market mechanism and the 
b a s ic  reasons f o r  d e p a r t in g  from the commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  l e s s  developed c o u n tr ie s ;  b) a broad view of the p re lim -
Note 2 continued from page J :
p a r t i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  p lans  which aimed a t  e s t a b l i s h in g  the  b a s ic  key indus- 
i e s  a t  the time; and they  can ha rd ly  be considered  as comprehensive in  
the  t ru e  sense o f  the word
in a ry  investm ent c r i t e r i a  suggested in  the e a r l i e r  w r i t in g s  on 
investm ent c r i t e r i a ;  c) e x p o s i t io n  of the s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  
and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  as the most a p p ro p r ia te  a l lo c a t io n a l  
device f o r  investment*
In more d e t a i l  Chapter 3 w i l l  deal- w ith  the  market mechanism and 
the  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ru le  which takes  v a rious  forms in  investment 
ap p ra isa l*  I t  i s  argued th a t  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  which 
p re sen t  themselves in  d i f f e r e n t  forms ( i . e .  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n ,  
accounting  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t e ,  p a y -o ff  pe r io d ,  p r iv a te  n e t  p re sen t  va lue) 
need some m o d if ica t io n  before  they can be used fo r  p r o je c t  ev a lu a tio n  and 
p ro je c t  s e le c t io n *  In o th e r  words, i f  the p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ru le  i s  
to  be used i t  i s  necessa ry  to  c o r r e c t  f o r  market im perfec tions  by u s in g  
s o c ia l  p r ic e s  and a lso  necessa ry  to  take in to  account e x te rn a l  economies 
which a r i s e  from economic in terdependencies*
Chapter 4 c r i t i c a l l y  d iscu sses  the c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  (or 
c a p i t a l  tu rn o v er  r u le )  which i s  the  f i r s t  c r i t e r i o n  in troduced  in  the f i e l d  
o f  investment c r i t e r i a .  I t s  shortcomings and i t s  p o s s ib le  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
w i l l  a lso  be examined*
Chapter 5 d iscu sses  the s o c ia l  m a rg in a lp ro d u c tiv i ty  c r i t e r i o n  
which i s  w e ll  advanced by H.B* Chenery. I t  i s  c r i t i c a l l y  examined and i t s  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  to underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s  i s  assessed* In  a d d i t io n ,  the  
r e l a t io n s h ip  between SMP and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  i s  emphasized 
and the  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between the two s o c ia l  c r i t e r i a  a re  sought in  o rder 
to - a v e r t  confusion a t  t h i s  s tag e .
I t  w i l l  be shown th a t  the two c r i t e r i a  a re  more o r  l e s s  id e n t i c a l  
and the b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  which a re  ap p l ic ab le  in  one, a re  a lso  a p p l ic ab le  
in  the other* I t  i s  the purpose of t h i s  chap ter  to  argue th a t  the s o c ia l  
marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  ru le  o r ,  b roadly , s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  i s  the 
most ap p ro p r ia te  device  f o r  investment e v a lu a tio n  and p ro je c t  se lec t io n *
This p o in t w i l l  be s t ro n g ly  s u b s ta n t ia te d  throughout the  th e s i s  by 
in tro d u c in g  v ar ious  th e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  evidences in  i t s  favour*
S oc ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s i s , which I  b r i e f l y  o u t l in e  in  Chapter 
5, i s  what I  s h a l l  be u s ing  in  the case s tu d ie s  in  P a r t  I I I ,  o f t h i s  t h e s i s .  
I t  i s  the  co n v ic t io n  o f the  p re sen t  au thor th a t  the t h e o r e t i c a l  background 
p resen ted  in  P a r t  I I  w i l l  be q u i te  u se fu l  in  p rov id ing  a good framework f o r
the  subsequent chap te rs  where p r o je c t  a n a ly s is  w i l l  be in troduced . I t  
i s  t ru e  th a t  the  b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  be ing  l a id  down here  a re  more re le v a n t  
to  developing c o u n tr ie s  than  advanced countries*  But i t  must be s t r e s s e d  
t h a t  many b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  remain the  same whether i t  i s  a developing 
o r  developed economy*
P r o je c t  a p p ra is a l  (micro a n a ly s is  of investm ent) and the choice 
o f  investm ent c r i t e r i a  w i l l  be re se rv ed  f o r  P a r t  I I I  c o n s is t in g  of fo u r  
c h ap te rs ,  th re e  of which dea l w ith  the  Caycuma paper and c e l lu lo se  p ro je c t  
and the fo u r th  which deals  w ith  the  Keban H ydro -E lec tr ic  P ro je c t  v s .
Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e *  P a r t  I I I  c o n s t i tu te s  the l a r g e s t  p a r t  of the  th e s i s  
and i t  con ta ins  the above case s tud ies*  Both p ro je c ts  a re  p ub lic  i n d u s t r i a l  
p ro je c ts  which a re  eva lua ted  by d i f f e r e n t  p lanning  agencies* This p a r t  
a lso  d ea ls  w ith  the  p ro je c ts  from the p o in t  of view of s o c ie ty  as a whole 
showing th a t  e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c t s  s o c ia l  o o s t -b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  
i s  both im portant and possib le*
(' ij
More s p e c i f i c a l l y  Chapter 6 o u t l in e s  SEKA's ^p re sen ta t io n  and 
ev a lu a tio n  o f the  Caycuma paper p r o je c t  (Case Study No.l)*  The ev a lu a tio n  
method of SEKA i s  l a t e r  c r i t i c a l l y  assessed*
Chapter 7 in tro d u ces  the  same p ro je c t ,  t h i s  time as p resen ted  and 
evalua ted  by the  SPO plaimers* This i s  followed, in  Chapter 8, by a com­
prehensive and d e ta i l e d  assessment of the SPO's p r o je c t  e v a lu a tio n  technique 
where I  s h a l l  examine the  b a s ic  shortcomings of t h e i r  e v a lu a t io n  method and 
s h a l l  a lso  q u es t io n  t h e i r  investm ent c r i t e r i a  which they  have ap p lied  to  a l l  
i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts*  Besides I  s h a l l  p re sen t  the various  v a r ia b le s  and 
parameters they have chosen in  the p ro je c t  e v a lu a t io n .  Where i t  i s  p o s s ib le  
I  s h a l l  a ttem pt to  in troduce  ray own parameters which seem reasonable  to  me 
in  view of the l im i te d  in fo rm ation  I  have obta ined  in  t h i s  f i e l d ,
I  s h a l l  a lso  t e s t  the SPO's investment d e c is io n  by apply ing  the 
i n t e r n a l  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  ru le  which I  f e e l  can be q u i te  u s e fu l  during  the  
f i n a l  d e c is io n  on in d u s t r i a l  p ro jec ts*
Case Study No*2, th a t  i s  the Keban H ydro -E lec tr ic  P ro je c t  vs* 
Thermal a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  d iscussed  in  Chapter 9* This case study i s  based
SEKA i s  a s t a t e  economic e n te r p r i s e  which i s  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  
undertak ing  paper and c e l lu lo s e  p ro jec ts*
Po
on avrious  r e p o r t s . I  have obta ined  from and the M in is try
o f Energy and N atu ra l  re so u rce s .  The H y d ro -e lec t r ic  P ro je c t  and the  Thermal
A lte rn a t iv e  are  f i r s t  d esc r ibed  and l a t e r  are  p re sen ted  as evalua ted  by the 
E .I.E* Following th e se ,  the  e v a lu a t io n  method and the investm ent c r i t e r i o n  
employed by the  E . I .E .  a re  app ra ised  and the b a s ic  shortcomings of t h e i r  e v a l­
u a t io n  system w i l l  be emphasized.
The same investment p ro je c t  i s  l a t e r  evalua ted  on the b a s is  of 
s o c ia l  p re sen t  value (SPV) which I  s h a l l  defend throughout th i s  s tudy . I  
complete my p r o je c t  a n a ly s is  by in tro d u c in g  "shadov/" o r  "accounting" p r ic e s  
e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  c a p i t a l  and foreign-exchange in p u ts .  By the s e n s i t i v i t y  
a n a ly s is ,  the  investm ent d e c is io n  w i l l  be checked and the s e le c t io n  of 
param eters ( i . e * ,  d iscoun t r a t e ,  fo re ig n  exchange r a t e )  w i l l  be ap p ra ised .
With i n s u f f i c i e n t  d a ta  and in fo rm ation  I  am unable to  make e s t im ates  f o r  
these  parameters* But as a p ro je c t -e v a lu a t io n ,  what I  am doing i s  to  approach 
the  problem of e s t im a t in g  these  param eters by in tro d u c in g  s e n s i t i v i t y  an a ly s id .
In a d d i t io n ,  the Keban H y d ro -e lec tr ic  and the Thermal p ro je c t  a re  
t e s t e d  by app ly ing  the in te r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  ru le  which I  a lso  app lied  
in  the  case s tudy B o .l ,  This provides a double-check on the f i n a l  in v e s t ­
ment d e c is io n  to be taken . This l a t t e r  a n a ly s is  i s  inc luded  in  Appendix B 
of Chapter 9»
The conclusion  (Chapter 10) aims a t  p rov id ing  a summary of the 
major shortcomings o f the p ro je c t  ev a lua tion  technique in  Turkey and i t  
p re sen ts  some g u id e l in e s  fo r  more e f f i c i e n t  and d e s i r a b le  economic ev a lu a tio n  
methods f o r  p u b l ic  investment p ro jec ts*
I t  must be s t r e s s e d  th a t ,  in  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  I  am not a ttem p ting  to  
come up w ith  any th e o r e t i c a l  c r i t e r i a  o f  my own; my purpose i s  simply to 
see the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of investment c r i t e r i a  th a t  a re  a lready  used in  the 
Turkish p lann ing  experience , p a r t i c u l a r l y  during  the F i r s t  Five-Year P lan.
In  o th e r  words, I  s h a l l  endeavour to  re a s se s s  the  investm ent p ro je c ts  which 
a re  a lread y  s e le c te d  and executed by apply ing  the most s u i ta b le  c r i t e r i a .
DSI i s  S ta te  Water Works Department a ttach ed  to  the M in is try  of Energy 
and N ational Resources.
E . I .E ,  i s  p lann ing  and re sea rc h  u n i t  of the M in is try  of Energy and 
N ationa l Resources,
PART I
ECONOMIC PLANNING IN TURKEY
CHAPTER 1
THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN -  1963-1967
In tro d u c t io n
Following the May I 96O Revolution in  Turkey, the S ta te  Planning 
O rgan ization  (SPO), was e s t a b l i s h e d ^ ^ \  and i t s  main ta sk  was to  draw up 
a F if teen -Y ear  development P lan  in  o rder to deal in  a system atic  way w ith 
the  c o u n try 's  more in t r a c t a b l e  long-term  problems.
I t  was f e l t  f o r  a long time th a t  the major economic problems of 
the  country; namely the p rospec ts  of ach iev ing  a h ig h e r  r a t e  of growth in  
output and income; c r e a t in g  h ig h e r  employment o p p o r tu n i t ie s ;  and f i n a l l y  to 
achieve a v ia b le  balance of payments; could only be solved by r e s o r t i n g  
to  a Comprehensive Plan embracing the n a t io n a l  economy as a whole. I t  was 
a lso  recognised  th a t  a p lann ing  approach was e s s e n t i a l  fo r  balanced dev e l­
opment ,
I t  was to t h i s  end th a t  in  I 962, the F i r s t  F ive -yea r  Plan I 963-  
1967, was launched w ith  a  f i f t e e n - y e a r  p e rsp ec tiv e  and approved by the 
parliam en t in  I 962 , The SPO made i t s  p ro je c t io n s  and fo r e c a s ts  fo r  the 
F i r s t  Five-Year Plan as well as the  F if teen -Y ear  Development Plan 1963-1977^^^ 
and l a id  down the genera l  d i r e c t io n s  fo r  o f f i c i a l  p o l i c i e s .
As in  many underdeveloped co u n tr ie s  the Turkish F if teen -Y ear  
Development P lan was no t e x c lu s iv e ly  p ro d u c t io n -o r ie n ta te d .  By t h i s  long-
('3)term p lan  Turkey aimed a t  ach iev ing  the fo llow ing  o b je c t iv e s ;^  ^
1 ) to  promote a h igh  r a t e  o f  growth with a h igh  le v e l  of employment;
2 ) to  achieve a balance in  e x te rn a l  payments;
3) to t r a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  numbers of h igh le v e l  s c i e n t i f i c  and te c h n ic a l  
personnel in  every f i e l d  as re q u ired  f o r  Turkey 's  development;
4 ) to  r e a l i s e  a l l  these  t a r g e t s  according to  the  p r in c ip le s  of equ ity
and s o c ia l  j u s t i c e ;  in  o th e r  words to  reduce e x i s t in g  in e q u a l i t i e s  in  
income and w ealth .
A -  More s p e c i f i c a l l y  Turkey proposed to achieve an annual 
r a t e  of growth of 7 pe r  cent w ith  Gross N ational Product in c re a s in g  from
'( 1 SPO was c rea ted  in  September I 96O with a s p e c ia l  Law as the government 




 ^ ' The F if teen -Y ear  Development was to embrace th re e  Five-Year P lan s .
See, The F i r s t  Five-Year Development Plan 1963- 67 , SPO, Ankara, I 963, 
Po31°
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T.L* 52*7 b i l l i o n  in  1962 to  T.L. 145°3 b i l l i o n  a t  the  end o f  1977^^^.
This im p lies  a r i s e  of 175 per cent du ring  the  F if teen -Y ear  p e r io d .  
A 7 per cen t annual r a t e  of growth in  GNP, given almost 3 per cent popu la tion  
growth, leaves  only a 4 per cent in c rease  in  per c a p i t a  income » Per c a p i ta  
income consequently  was es tim ated  to  in c rease  from /200  in  I 96I  to  ^355 in
1977 O
Bo Investment c o e f f i c i e n t  req u ire d  to  s u s ta in  t h i s  r a te  of 
growth was es tim ated  to  be, on average, 18*3 per cen t o f  GNP f o r  the 
F i r s t  Five-Year P lan and 21 pe r cent fo r  rhe nex t ten  years* In o rd e r  to  
in c re ase  investm ent from i t s  low le v e l  o f  l6*3 per cent in  I 962 to  19«4 
pe r  cent GNP a t  the  end of the  p lan ,  the share o f  p r iv a te  consumption 
expenditu re  in  the  GNP was expected to dec line  from 73*2 per cent to
(2 )67^9 pen cen t over the  same p e r io d  and a lso  to  63 p e r  cen t by 1977°
The volume o f r e a l  sav ings , was th e re fo re  to  in c rease  by r e s t r i c t ­
in g  consumption and r e - a l l o c a t i n g  these  re le a se d  re so u rces  in to  o th e r  f i e l d s  
which were conducive to  a h ig h e r  le v e l  of savings* In  o th e r  words the 
Development P lan  aims a t  deepening the c a p i t a l  base of the economy through 
ra p id  expansion of heavy in d u s t r i e s  such as ba s ic  product i n c u s t r i e s .  The 
main idea  here i s  to  r e ly  more on domestic sources r a t h e r  than fo re ig n  
savings*
Co The t h i r d  major goal of the Development Plan was to  ensure 
the  h ig h e s t  p o s s ib le  l e v e l  o f  employment o p p o r tu n i t ie s  a t  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
income lev e ls*
The p lan  e s tim ated  th a t  the t o t a l  a d d i t io n a l  employment th a t  
investm ent and production  t a r g e t s  could provide was 6 ,8  m i l l io n ;  but t h i s  
f a l l s  sh o r t  o f  the  e s tim ated  7o5 m il l io n  unemployed labour fo rce  (p lus  
1 m i l l io n  d isg u ised  unemployed in  a g r ic u l tu re )*
I t  was the  f o r e c a s t  o f  the F if teen -Y ear  Development p lan  th a t  
the  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  would absorb a no tab le  number and p ro p o r t io n  of 
unemployed labour fo rce  during  the F i r s t  and subsequent Five-Year plan
ClY
'   ^ For th ese  f ig u r e s ,  see P lanning  in  Turkey, S pec ia l  Is su e ,  Summary of 
the FFYP, SPO, Ankara, I 963 pp. I 6- I 7 (These f ig u r e s  a re  based on 
1961 p r i c e s ) .
( 2 ) ^ ' See, P lanning  in  Turkey, Spec ia l Is su e ,  p ,17
11,
periods* As can be seen from Table 1, the share of a c t iv e  popu la tion  
in  in d u s try  was planned to  r i s e  from 9<>8 per cent in  I 962 to  15*6 pe r  cent 
a t  the end of 1977o However, the l a r g e s t  p a r t  o f  tne  a c t iv e  popu la tion  
would be absorbed by s e rv ice s  r a t h e r  than industry*  The employment in  
a g r i c u l tu r e ,  on the o th e r  hand, v/as expected to  drop considerab ly  over the 
15-y ea r  pe riod  (from 77*4 pe r  cent to  580I  pe r  cent)*
TABLE I  -  ACTIVE POPULATION BY SECTORS 
1962-1967 -  PERCENTAGE
SECTORS 1962 1967 1972 1977
A g ricu ltu re 77,4 71c l 64*4 58*1
In d u s try 9 ,8 11*9 14.0 15.6
Services 12*8 I7o0 21*6 26*3
T ota l 100*0 100*0 100,0 100*0
Source; F i r s t  F ive-Year Plan 1963- 67 , p .  36, p . 400
Bo Another major o b je c t iv e  of the  Development Plan i s  to  reduce
Turkey 's  dependence on fo re ig n  sources o r  e l im in a t io n  o f  the d e f i c i t  in  
the  balance o f  payments.
According' to Development Plan p ro je c t io n ,  the  cu r re n t  e x te rn a l  
d e f i c i t ,  t h a t  was equal to  4 pen cent of the GNP in  I 962, was expected to 
drop to 2*8 per cent in  I 967 and probably d isappear  by the  end of the  
Second Five-Year P lan ( I 968- I 972)
Accordingly a g re a t  emphasis was to be p laced  on expanding exports  
du ring  the  F if teen -Y ear  p e r io d . The export p o l ic y  of Turkey would be to
d iv e r s i f y  export goods which, f o r  a long time, had been confined to  a small
number o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  i tem s. P r i o r i t y  was given to  promoting the  export
(2 \of manufactured goods and to  the  expansion of im p o r t - s u b s t i tu t in g  in d u s t r ie s ^  ’• 
The d e f i c i t  in  e x te rn a l  payments was a lso  a n t ic ip a te d  to  be remedied by 
in c re a se  o f  revenue from in v i s ib l e  items  ^ and by a change in  the
^  See FFYP I 963- I 967, p . 116, Tables 49 and 50
(2 ) ^  ^ A la rg e  amount o f  investm ents in  im p o r t - s u b s t i tu t in g  in d u s t r ie s  was
planned fo r  the  F i r s t - P la n  period  and the e f f e c t s  were expected to be f e l t  
by the end of 1967, FFYP, p . 38»
( 3 ) In v is ib le  revenues were expected to de r ive  from tourism  and in f r a s t r u n -  
tu re  investm ents w ith  FFYP and the expansion of sh ipping  in d u s try ,  
op* c i t . ,  p*38*
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p a t t e r n  and s t r u c tu r e  of imports*
b) O bjectives  and p roduc tion  p ro je c t io n s
In  what fo l lo w s ,  1 s h a l l  o u t l in e  the  raaih o b je c t iv e s  of the 
F i r s t  F ive-Y ear Plan and e x p la in  the  p ro je c t io n  of o u tp u t ,  and labour  
fo rce  in  v a rious  s e c to r s ;  and s t r u c t u r a l  change v i s u a l i s e d  during  the  
p la n  period*
The F i r s t  Five-Year Plan t h a t  was approved by th e  Grand N ationa l 
Assembly in  1$62 was to  be o p e ra t iv e  from January I 963 to  December 1967^^^, 
The F i r s t  P lan  dea ls  with the  economy from v a r io u s  a sp ec ts  w ith in  a 
macro- growth model* The F i r s t  Five-Y ear Plan aimed a t  achieving  the 
fo llow ing  o b je c t iv e s  :
1 , To a t t a i n  an annual 7 p e r  c en t  r a t e  of growth o f SmNP, t^ e  
p a t t e r n  of investm ent be ing  desigpied to  achieve t h i s  t a r g e t ;
2c To a c c e le r a te  i n d u s t r i a l  growth and r a i s e  th e  su rp lu s  of a g r ic u l ­
t u r a l  p roduc tion  with a view to  expanding exports  and meeting the  growing 
i n d u s t r i a l  demand f o r  raw m a te r ia ls ;
3c To prov ide  g r e a te r  eipployraent o p p o r tu n i t ie s ;
4* To s t a b i l i z e  and improve the  balance of payments p o s i t io n  by 
a d i v e r s i f i e d  p a t t e r n  of exports ;
3 . To r a i s e  the  p ro p o r t io n  o f  investment f in a n c e d  by domestic 
sav ings;
6* To m ain ta in  r e l a t i v e  p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y  through government c o n tro l  
and allow  th e  market mechanism to  plsy. a g r e a te r  p a r t  in  p r i c e  determ in­
a t io n ;
7, To ren d e r  th e  S ta te  Economic E n te rp r is e s  (SEE) able  to  provide 
f o r  t h e i r  investm ents  from t h e i r  own re so u rces .
A g r ic u l tu ra l  Sec to r
A g r ic u l tu r a l  p roduc tion  was expected to  in c re a s e  from 3^,6  
b i l l i o n  T .L ira s  in  I 962 to  3 ^ .4  b i l l i o n  T .L iras  in  19&3 and to  4 3 . b i l l i o n  
T .L ira s  in  1967 (See Table . This im plied  t h a t  t o t a l  a g r i c u l tu r a l
p roduc tion  would reco rd  an in c re a se  of 23*6 p e r  cen t over the  p lan  p e r i o d ^ ^ \  
I t  can be no ted  t h a t  the  l a r g e s t  p ro p o r t io n  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  output comes 
from l iv e s to c k  p ro d u c ts ,  c e re a ls  and f r u i t  and vegetab les*  This t r e n d  
seems to  be a t t a in e d  during  the  p lan  p e r io d  *
Over the  p lan  p e r io d  th e  composition of a g r ic u l tu r e  would
See P lanning  in  Turkey, S p e c ia l  I s su e ,  Summary of the FFYP. SPG,,
Ankara, I 963 , p . 8.
See FFYP 1963-67, p . 31, a lso  OECD, Turkey, Feb*1966, pp. 5, 24, 23 
( 3) For t h i s  no te  see nex t page
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only change m arg in a lly  s in ce  f i v e  y ea rs  i s  no t a s u f f i c i e n t  p e r io d  to  w itness 
r& dical change. Cereals  and l i v e s to c k  products  would s t i l l  c . n s t i t u t e  
a h a l f  of th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roducts  during  the  p lan  p e r io d ,  though the 
share of the form er in  the t o t a l  would f a l l  from 23.1 p e r  cen t to  21,3 
p e r  c e n t ( ^ ) .
In  p lann ing  an a g r i c u l tu r a l  programme the SPO have l a i d  the  
( 2)
fo l lo w in g  o b je c t iv e s ;  to  c o n tr ib u te  to  the maintenance of a 7 pe^ cen t 
r a t e  o f  growth in  GNP m th o u t  r e s o r t in g  to  i n f l a t i o n ;  to  r a i s e  a g r ic ­
u l t u r a l  p roduc tion  in  o rder  to  meet the  i n d u s t r i a l  demand f o r  raw mater­
i a l s ;  to  improve n u t r i t i o n a l  l e v e l s ;  to  c o n tr ib u te  to  the  re d u c tio n  of 
unemployment and to  avoid  unplanned u rb an iz a t io n  beyond th e  employment 
cap a c i ty  o f  n o n -a g r ic u l tu ra l  s e c to r s .
In  p lann ing  a g r i c u l tu r e ,  two broad  goals  were kept in  mind; 
f i r s t  to  f r e e  the  o v e ra l l  economy from the  s trongho ld  of a g r i c u l tu r e ,  and 
second, to  expand th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c to r  to  the  r u r a l  p o p u la t io n .
INDUSTRY.
Turkey w ith  the  F i r s t  P lan had aimed a t  g iv ing  a g r e a te r  ro le  
to  the  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  than  any o th e r  s e c to r  so t h a t  the economy could 
experience a h ig h e r  r a t e  of grovrth. I t  was b e l ie v e d  th a t  the  r e a l i z ­
a t io n  of a 7 p e r  cent r a t e  of growth in  the  o v e ra l l  economy would l a r g e ly  
depend on the  development t h a t  could  talce p lace  in  in d u s t ry  as comprising 
m anufacturing , energy and mining.
I t  i s  contem plated in  the  F i r s t  Plan t h a t  th e se  th ree  sectors^* • 
taken  to g e th e r  would provide a r i s e  in  i n d u s t r i a l  output from 21,2 
b i l l i o n  T, L i r a s  in  I 962 to  36.2 b i l l i o n  T, L i ra s  a t  the  end of the p lan  
peri.od. This re p re se n ts  a r i s e  of 70 p e r  cent over f i v e  y e a r s .  The 
major component o f  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r ,  manufacturing was expected to  
in c re a se  from 18*2 b i l l i o n  T.L, to  31.4- b i l l i o n  T. Mra>s over the  same
Note (3 ) from page 12:
A g r ic u l tu ra l  ou tpu t was expected to  in c rease  by 83 p e r  cent over the  
13 -yea r  Development p lan  amounting to  42,7  b i l l i o n  T.L. in  1977 
( in  terms of n e t  value added). This in d ic a te s  a  4 ,2  p e r  cen t growth 
p e r  annum.
See F i r s t  Five-Y ear Plan 1963-67. SPO, Ankara, I 963 , p p .148-9.
(2) g ^ p ^  1963- 67 . SPO, Ankara, I 963 , p . 129
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p e r io d  as r e p re se n t in g  72.8  p e r  cen t in c re a s e .  But the  l a r g e s t  in c re ase  
was a n t i c ip a te d  to  talce p la ce  in  Energy which was p ro je c te d  to  in c rease  
from 648.0 m i l l io n  T ,L ira s  to  1 ,187 b i l l i o n  T ,L ira s  a t  the  end of the  
p lan  p e r io d ,  (See, Table 3)*
The m anufacturing  in d u s t ry  which accounted f o r  almost 13 p e r  cen t
of the  GNP in  1962 was planned to  in c re a se  to  17 .7  p e r  cen t of the GNP by
the  end of th e  F i r s t  P lan ( in  terms of value  added) L a rg es t  emphasis
was p laced  on heavy in d u s t ry  b o th  in  terras of i t s  share  in  t o t a l  manu­
fa c tu r in g  output and a lso  in  the  t o t a l  investm en ts .
TABLE 3 -  PRODUCTION TARGETS OF BASIC DIDUSTEIES 
( m i l l io n  T.L. a t  196 l p r ic e s )
Sectors 1962 1963 1967
1967 index
(1962=100)
Annual r a t e  
of Growth 0^
A g ricu l tu re 34 , 690,0 36 , 470.0 43 , 360.0 123.6 4 .7
Mining and quarry 2 ,341 ,4 2 ,383.9 3 , 377.4 132.8 8 ,7
M anufacturing 18,203 .3 20,867.1 31,462,1 172.8 11.3
Energy 648,0 729.1 1 ,1 8 7 ,7 183.3 12,3
T ransport and 
Communications 3 ,378 ,2 3 ,744 .9 3 ,340.2 138.1 9 .6
T o ta l 39,261 64,393.0 83 ,127 .4 143,7 7,3
Source: The FFYP, 1962-67, p . 124
The share  of heavy in d u s t ry  in  t o t a l  va lue  added was expected to  
r i s e  from 38 p e r  cen t to  30 p e r  cen t over the p lan  p e r io d .  The share of 
l i g h t  in d u s t ry  in  c o n t r a s t  was expected to  drop from 62. p e r  cent to  
50 p e r  c en t  of m anufacturing va lue  added over th e  same p e r io d  (Table 4)
TABLE 4 -  COMPOSITION OF MANUFACTURING IlUDUSTRY
Share of M anufacturing 
output in  t o t a l  value 
added (percen tage)
In c re a se  in  Manufacturing 
output (va lue  added)
1963 -  1967 1963 1967 p e r io d
( 1) L igh t In d u s t ry







T otal 100 100 
Z3Z2Z:
(1) See FFYP 1963-67, p .183, Table 83.
(See n ex t page f o r  Sources and 
no tes  on Table 4)
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Source and no tes  f o r  Table 4:
Source: OECD. The Turkish EPYP 1963-67 by an ex p er t  group f o r  the
OECD Consortium f o r  Turkey, J u ly  1963, p . 64 and a lso  FFYP,
p . 185.
(1) L ig h t  in d u s t ry  comprises food, b ev erages ,tobacco , t e x t i l e s  and 
c lo th in g .
(2) Heavy in d u s t ry  in c lu d es  paper , rubber,  chem icals, b a s ic  m eta ls ,  
machinery, e l e c t r i c a l  machinery, t r a n s p o r t  equipment and o th e rs .
Table 3 and 4 in d ic a te  t h a t  Turkey has proposed to  t r a n s f e r  the 
b a s is  of the  economy from being consumer goods to  p roducer goods. The 
p roduc tion  of the  l a t t e r  in d u s t r i e s  was expected to  accord a r i s e  of 110 
p e r  cen t as compared to  the  fo rm er 's  33 p e r  cent in c re a se  over the  p lan 
p e r io d .
Over the  F i r s t  Five-Year P e r io d  a f a s t e r  r a t e  of growth in
producer-goods in d u s t r i e s  was expected in  order to  f i l l  the  gap r e s u l t i n g
from non-im porta tion  of s im i la r  goods from abroad. The purpose here 
was seen to  enable th e  economy to  s tan d  more on i t s  own f e e t  and to  depend 
l e s s  on im ported c a p i ta l -g o o d s ,
( l )The main p r in c ip le s  c i t e d  in  the  f i r s t  p lan  can be o u tl in e d  as:
to  r a i s e  n a t io n a l  income and output and l i v i n g  s tan d a rd s .  Thus to  achieve
a y e a r ly  average r a t e  of growth of over 11 p e r  c e n t ,  t o  encourage impoii:-
s u b s t i t u t in g  in d u s t r i e s  and provide p ro te c t io n  to  new, emerging in d u s t r ie s
during  a s p e c i f ie d  p e r io d  of adjustm ent; to  in c re ase  the  employed number
( 2 ) •by 5205,000 over the  p lan  p e r io d .
In  summary, the  b road  o b jec t iv e  of the i n d u s t r i a l  p o l ic y  v/as to  
achieve a co n s id e rab le  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  in  i n d u s t r i a l  products  p re v io u s ly  
im ported, to  expand in d u s t r i e s  the  p roducts  of which cou ld  be exported and 
to  s e t  up b a s ic  heavy in d u s t r i e s  to  change the s t r u c tu r e  of the  economy
T ransport and Communications
As an o th er  major s e c to r  t r a n s p o r t  and communications vfas a lso  
to  grow in  l i n e  with the  development in  o th e r  s e c to r s .  For t h i s  purpose 
the  output of t h i s  s e c to r  was p ro je c te d  to  in c re a se  from 3 ,378.2  b i l l i o n
(1) ppYp^ 1963-67, p.183 and p . 4 0 0 . '
( 2) ^ ' Employment in  in d u s t ry  was planned to  in c re ase  from 1,250,000 in  
1962 to  1 ,770,000 a t  the  end of the  p lan .  I b id ,  p . 400, Table 355
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T.Lirojs to  5 ,540 .2  b i l l i o n  T .L ira s  during  the f i v e - y e a r  p e r io d  (See 
Table 5)* These f ig u re s  r e p re se n te d  an in c re a se  of 58 p e r  cen t  or 
annual r a t e  of gro^vth of 9 .6  p e r  c en t .
The s e rv ic e s  as a whole were envisaged to  grow y e a r ly  by 
7o2 p e r  cen t .
From the f i r s t  F ive-Y ear Plan p ro je c t io n s  i t  can be n o t ic e d  
t h a t  the s t r u c tu r e  of the  economy was expected to  r e f l e c t  co n s id e rab le  
changes over t h i s  p e r io d .  The share of a g r ic u l tu r e  in  Gross N ational 
Product was to  drop from 43.8 p e r  c en t  in  1962 to  38.3  p e r  cent by 
th e  end of 1967, But the c o n tr ib u t io n  of i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  was to  
grow co n sid e rab ly  as a r e s u l t  o f the  f a l l  in  a g r i c u l tu r e .  The share 
of in d u s t ry  ( in c lu d in g  m anufacturing, mining and energy) would in c rease  
from 1608 p e r  cen t of GNP to  21 ,4  p e r  cen t a t  the  end of the  f i f t h  
y e a r .
S e rv ic e s ,  on the o th e r  hand was expected to  lo se  i t s  r e l a t i v e  
importance in  the  o v e ra l l  economy (See Table 5 ) «
TABLE 5 -  Percentage share of S ec to rs  in
th e  GNP, 1962-1967
1962 1963 1967
A g ric u ltu re 43,8 43.0 38.3
Mining and Quarry 3 .2 3 .3  . 3o6
M anufacturing 12 .8 13 .5 16,7
Energy- 0 ,8 0 .9 1 ,1
T ransport and Communications 3 ,9 4 .1 4.6
Other se rv ice s 35,5 35.2 35.7
T o ta l 100.0 100,0 100,0
Source: FFYP, 1963-67, p p .36 , 37, 125.
C le a r ly  th e  development i s  to  be achieved predom inantly  through 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  The p lan  had a lso  recognised  the importance of 
a g r i c u l tu r a l  expansion in  o rder  to  f o s t e r  i n d u s t r i a l  growth. The p lan  
s t a t e s  th a t ;  the i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r  can only develop i f  th e re  i s  s u b s ta n t i a l
FFYP, 1963-67, p . 125
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growth in  th e  a g r ic u l tu r a l  s e c to r ,  This p o in ts  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  a
b alanced  growth between the  two m ajor s e c to rs  was expected  during  the  
f i r s t  p la n . A nother im p o rtan t conclusion  here  i s  th a t  th e  o v e ra ll  
economy would depend more on commodity s e c to rs  ( i . e .  m anufacturing , 
m ining, a g r ic u l tu re  e t c . )  than  non-commodity s e c to r s .
As f a r  as fo re ig n  tra d e  i s  concerned i t  was a n t ic ip a te d  th a t  
expo rts  would in c re a se  by 31*4 p e r cen t over th e  p lan  p e r io d . Export 
p ro je c t io n  f o r  th e  p lan  p e rio d  i s  p re sen te d  in  Table 6, The m ajor 
item s o f ex p o rts  are  a g r ic u l tu r a l  p ro d u c ts , i n d u s t r ia l  p ro d u c ts , and 
mine and q uarry  p ro d u c ts .
A ccording to  th e  F i r s t  P lan  P ro je c tio n , ex p o rts  of a g r ic u l tu r a l
p ro d u c ts  as a whole would reco rd  an in c re a se  of alm ost 30 p e r c en t.
I n d u s t r ia l  c rops ( i . e ,  co tto n  tobacco , o i l )  which c o n s t i tu te d  the  l a r g e s t
p a r t  of ex p o rts  was expected  to  r i s e  by only  22 p e r  c e n t. Also the
r e la t iv e  im portance o f in d u s t r ia l  crops was to  drop from 37 p e r  cen t to
35 p e r  cen t a t  th e  end of 1967, This c o n sid e rab le  drop in  th e  exports
of th e se  item s was due to  the  f a c t  th a t  development of dom estic in d u s tr ie s
would le a d  to  in c re a se d  dom estic demand f o r  a  number of ex port item s
which were p re v io u s ly  ex p o rted  i . e ,  growth of v e g e ta b le  o i l  in d u s try ,
( 2)growth o f t e x t i l e  in d u s try  . '
Exporto o f in d u s t r ia l  p roducts  (m anufactured goods) on the 
o th e r  hand, was expected  to  in c re a se  by 47 p e r  c en t over th e  f iv e  y ears  
and a lso  in c re a s in g  t h e i r  share  in  t o t a l  expo rts  from l6  p e r  c en t to  
18 p e r  cen t in  th e  same p e rio d . Though exports  of mine ores would 
in c re a se  in  a b so lu te  te rm s, th e se  p roducts  would lo s e  t h e i r  r e l a t iv e  
im portance in  th e  s t ru c tu re  of exports  ( f a l l i n g  from 6 ,4  p e r  cen t to
5 .8  p e r  c e n t) .
(SEE NEXT PAGE FOR TABLE Q
(1) See FFYP, 1963-67, p . 463
(2) See FFYP, 1963-67, p . 463
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TABLE 6 -  Export P ro je c tio n s  fo r  th e  F i r s t
F ive-Y ear F lan  1963-67 -  M illio n  ^
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
1 . A g r ic u ltu ra l  p roducts 269.3 291.2 298.0 329.5 348,5
(a) c e r e a ls ,p u ls e s ,  
food crops 17 .8 180 2 18,6 19 .0 1 9 .4
(b) f r u i t  and v eg e tab le s 84 .2 93.7 86.5 103.5 105.4
(c) in d u s t r i a l  crops and 
f o r e s t r y  p roducts 131.0 138.2 146,1 152.9 160.7
(d) l iv e s to c k ,  hun ting  
and f i s h e r y 36 .8 41,1 46.9 54,1 63 .4
2* I n d u s t r ia l  p roducts 56.0 60.9 71,5 73 .4 82,3
3# Mine and q uarry  products 22.0 22,0 24,0 24.3 26.0
T o ta l 347.8 374.3 393.5 427,2 457,2
Source: The FFYP, 1963-67 p . 469
TABLE 7 -  Percen tage D is tr ib u t io n  of Main 
Export Item s -  1963-67
1963 1967
lo  A g r ic u ltu ra l  p roducts 77.5 76.2
2, I n d u s t r ia l  p roducts 16 .1 18 ,0
3. Mine and Q uarry p roducts 6 ,4 5 .8
T o ta l 100.0 100,0
Source: These are  computed from Table 6
As can be n o tic e d  from Table 7 , the  Plan seems to  have contem­
p la te d  a n o tab le  change in  th e  s t ru c tu re  of e x p o rts .
The a n tic ip a te d  change in  im ports during the F i r s t  P lan can 
be seen in  Tables 8 and 9* Im ports are given as th re e  main groups:
1) c a p i ta l  goods; 2) consumer goods and 3) raw m a te r ia ls .
T o ta l im port requirem ents of th e  F i r s t  P lan  were computed 
a f t e r  im port-rep lacem ent v a lu es  expected from nev/ investm en ts were 
deducted from th e se  f ig u r e s .
(SEE NEXT PAGE FOR TABLE 8)
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TABLE ô -  Import p ro je c t io n  o f the F i r s t  
p lan , 1963-67 m illio n  ^
Types o f Goods 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
1 , Investm ent goods 241,1 274,1 296,1 332,1 363.0
2o Raw m a te r ia ls 234*5 261,5 299.5 325,0 363.5
3 , Consumer Goods 71.4 76,4 84*5 87.5 93.5
T o tal 547*0 612,0 680,0 744.9 620.0
Ü. S 0 A g r ic u ltu ra l Surplus 60,0 60.0 60 .0 60.0 50,0
T otal 607.0 672,0 740,0 804*9 870,0
Import S u b s ti tu t io n ™40*o ■=»45« 0 "110,0 «130.0 - I 660O
T otal Import
requ irem ents 567.0 627.0 630,0 674.9 704.0
Source: The FFYP, 1963- 67 , 9,468
I f  im port s u b s t i tu t io n  i s  taken  in to  account im ports in  I 967 
would r i s e  by 26,5 per cen t over the I 962 e s tim a te s  The la r g e s t
in c re a se  was e stim ated  to  be in  the  im port of raw m a te r ia ls  (55 per cen t 
over 5 y e a rs )  fo llow ed by im ports of investm ent goods (50 per c e n t) ;  
and im ports o f consumer goods (3I  p e r c e n t) .  These f ig u re s  re p re se n t 
a co n sid e rab le  s h i f t  a g a in s t im p o rta tio n  of consiuner goods and more 
toward im p o rta tio n  o f raw m a te r ia ls  and c a p i ta l  goods. This tren d  
i s  due to  the  f a c t  th a t  im p o r t-s u b s ti tu t io n  in d u s tr ie s  would, du ring  
the  p lan  p e rio d , depend h e a v ily  on the raw m a te r ia ls  and c a p i ta l  
goods•
The s t r u c tu r a l  change im ports would undergo can be seen in  
Table 9 . The share  o f consumer goods in  t o t a l  im ports was expected to  
d ec lin e  from 13*2 per cen t to  11,5 p e r cen t; w hile the  p ro p o rtio n  of 
raw m a te r ia ls  in  t o t a l  would in c re a se  from 42,8  p e r  cen t to  4403 p e r 
c e n t. Though the volume of im ports of c a p i ta l  goods was expected 
to  in c re a se  co n sid e rab ly , the p ro p o rtio n  o f the l a t t e r  in  t o t a l  im ports 
would rem ain alm ost c o n s ta n t.
( 1 ) But i f  1963 i s  taken  as a base y ear, im ports would reco rd  a r i s e  of
24,1 p er cen t over the  f iv e -y e a r  p e riod  ( in c lu d in g  Import sub­
s t i t u t i o n ) .
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TABLE 9 - Percentage 
o f goods,
share  of Im ports by  Type 
1963-67 M illio n  ^
1963 1967
V alue fo Value %
1. Investm ent Goods 241.1 44.0 363.0 44.2
2. Raw m a te r ia ls 234.5 42.8 363*5 44.3
3. Consumer goods 71 .4 13 .2 93 .5 11.5
T o ta l 547.0 100.0 820.0 100.0
Source: I t  i s  computed from Table 8
Q)) T o ta l Investm ent Requirem ents
In  v/hat fo llo w s , I  s h a l l  examine th e  t o t a l  c a p i ta l  requirem ents 
o f the  F i r s t  P lan  com prising dom estic and e x te rn a l sav ings; a ls o , the  
com position and d i s t r ib u t io n  of investm ent re so u rces  among s e c to r s .
As we saw e a r l i e r ,  th e  f i r s t  o b je c tiv e  o f th e  p lan  was to  
m ain ta in  a  s u f f i c i e n t ly  h igh  r a te  of income growth. T herefore  th e  r a te  
o f growth was s e t  a t  7 p e r  c en t p e r  annum. This r a t e  shows an alm ost 
2 p e r  c en t in c re a se  over the  average annual r a te  of growth of 5*3 p e r  
c en t which was a t ta in e d  in  the  l a s t  decade*
I t  was n o ted  th a t  th e  growth of th e  economy i s  h e a v ily  dependent 
upon th e  perform ance of ag ric u ltu re -  which accounts f o r  about 40 p e r  c en t 
o f GNP. A g ric u ltu re  was th e re fo re  recognized  to  be th e  main determ inant 
o f th e  annual r a te  o f growth. The "Plan S tra teg y "  was th e re fo re  s ta te d  
th a t  th i s  r a te  o f growth must be an average r a te  over th e  F i r s t  P lan  
p e r io d . Though i t  has n o t been m entioned, i t  appears th a t  a compound 
r a te  of growth wan im p lied  by the  p lan n e rs  .
( l )  By app ly ing  compound r a te  of growth form ula th i s  a s s e r t io n  can be 
te s te d :
Pn = Po (1 + r ) ^  Pn = 73.9 b i l l i o n  TL
lo g  Pn = lo g  Po H- n lo g  (1 + r)  Po = 52 .7  b i l l i o n  TL
lo g  (1+r) = 0*1468 = 0.02936 n = 5 years
^ lo g  P^lL = log  73.9
1-M’ ~ I 0O69 = 1.8686
r  = "069 " lo g  Po = lo g  52.7
r  = 6 .9  p e r  cen t _ 1,7218
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As can be seen from Table ly , GNP was expected  to  r i s e  from 
52c7 b i l l i o n  T . l i r a s  in  I 962 to  73,9 b i l l io n  TL in  1967* This amounts 
to  £L.-40 p er cen t cum ulative in c re a se  by the end o f th e  p la n .
In  o rd e r to  achieve th i s  m ajor g o a l, o r more s p e c i f ic a l ly  a  7 
p e r cent annual r a t e  o f growth, the F i r s t  P lan devoted 18.3  per cen t o f 
GNP to  investm entSoOver the p lan  p eriod  to t a l  investm ent requirem ents 
were to  in c re a se  from 9*6 b i l l i o n  T .L ira s  to  14*5 b i l l i o n  T .L ira s , P u tt in g  
i t  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  t o t a l  investm ent o u tla y  p ro je c te d  fo r  th e  whole p e rio d , 
amounted to  59*6 b i l l i o n  T .L ira s  ( a t  I 96I  p r i c e s ) .
I t  was estim ated  by the  SPO th a t  an IGOR o f 2 ,6 :1  would be v a l id  
du rin g  the p lan  p e rio d , 1965- 67* Given the r a t e  o f  growth in  GNP and the  
increm en tal c a p i ta l -o u tp u t  r a t i o ,  the  in v e s tm e n t-c o e ff ic ie n t re q u ire d  fo r  
a t ta in in g  th i s  t a r g e t  was e s tim a te d . In  f a c t  th i s  i s  sim ply an a p p lic a tio n  
o f Harrod-Domar growth m o d e l w h i c h  shows the r e la t io n s h ip  between the 
r a t e  o f sav ings s ,  the  r a te  o f income growth g, and in c re m e n ta l-c a p ita l-o u tp u t 
r a t i o , «X .
The reason  why the IGOR was f a th e r  low in  the  F i r s t  P lan as 
compared to  the e a r l i e r  p e rio d  (5*9:1 fo r  the p e rio d  I 95O-60) can be 
a t t r ib u te d  to  the  p a s t perform ance o f the  investm ent ex p en d itu res  and to  
t h e i r  im pact on the  o v e r -a l l  p roduction  c a p a c ity . S evera l reasons can be 
l i s t e d ;  f i r s t ,  s o c ia l  overhead c a p i ta l  and in f r a s t r u c tu r e  investm ents in  the  
p e rio d  1950-60 were q u ite  h igh  and were e s p e c ia l ly  in  the  f i e ld s  of t r a n s ­
p o r ta t io n ,  h y d ro e lec tr ic -p o w er, educa tion  and h e a l th .  The p lanners  b e liev ed  
th a t  the  p rev ious investm ents would c o n tr ib u te  more to  p ro d u c tiv ity  du ring  
th e  p lan  p e rio d  because they  would be e n te r in g  the p ro d u c tio n  s tag e  by then ; 
Second, p r io r  to  the  F i r s t  P lan  th e re  was a lso  a c o n sid e rab le  amount o f id le  
C apacity  in  some, im portan t branches of in d u s try . For in s ta n c e  th e re  was
—
s r= ®g 
s = 2 ,6  X 7
= 18,2 p e r cen t o f GNP
The m arginal o r IGOR fo r  the whole economy i s  the  value of th e  
a d d itio n  to  c a p i ta l  (n e t investm ent) d iv ided  by the  a d d itio n  to  income 
(n e t n a tio n a l incom e). This concept which emerged w ith  th e  Harrod-Domar 
model i s  now w idely  used in  many development programmes as a to o l  to  d e t­
ermine th e  t o t a l  c a p i ta l  requ irem ents to  achieve a c e r ta in  r a t e  o f growth 
o f income,
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rem arkable u n u t i l iz e d  c ap a c ity  in  the m achinery, t e x t i l e ,  sugar and cement 
in d u s tr ie s  and p a r t i c u la r ly  those operated  by the  S ta te  Economic E n te rp r is e s .
In  t e x t i l e  and m achinery in d u s t r ie s ,  only 30 p ercen t and 35 p e rcen t of the 
e x is t in g  c a p a c i t ie s  were u t i l i z e d .  In  a d d itio n  to  th e se  th e re  was a lso  a 
n o tab le  id le  c a p a c ity  in  t r a n s p o r ta t io n .  T hird , in  th e  F i r s t  P lan , i t  was 
b e lie v ed , the c a p ita l-n iix  would be g iven  a s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  com position 
than  i t  was in  th e  l a s t  decade. • The p lan n ers  hoped th a t  a re d u c tio n  in  
housing c o n s tru c tio n  and in f r a s t r u c tu r e  investm ents w ith  high c a p ita l-o u tp u t  
r a t io s  would be achieved during  the  im plem entation of the P p rs t P lan . F in a l ly , 
i t  was f e l t  th a t  b e t te r  techn iques and management, and o rg a n iz a tio n  would have 
a co n sid e rab le  e f f e c t  on the c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t io
During 1950-1960 period  the average investm ent le v e l rep re se n te d  13 p e rcen t 
of GNP w ith  dom estic fin an ce  reach ing  10.6 p e rcen t and fo re ig n  c a p i ta l  2 .4  
p e rcen t of GJSQ^. P r io r  to  the  F i r s t  P lan , during  1957-61 p e rio d  the to ta l  
investm ent reached th e  le v e l of 14,8 p e rcen t of GNP, dom estic savings and 
fo re ig n  c a p i ta l  re p re se n tin g  12,8 p e rcen t and 2 p e rcen t re s p e c tiv e ly .
As Table 11 in d ic a te s ,  the  F p rs t P lan re q u ired  a s u b s ta n t ia l  in c rease  in  the 
to t a l  c a p i ta l  requ irem ents fo r  fin an c in g  developm ent. A ccordingly , the 
share of to t a l  investm ent in  the  GNP was expected to  in c re a se  from l6 .3  per 
cen t in  1962 to  19.4 p e rcen t a t  the  end of the  p lan  p e rio d . This im plied 
t h a t ,  on average , 18.3  p e rcen t of GNP was devoted to  c a p i ta l  fo rm ation .
Domestic and fo re ig n  sav in g s , on the o th e r hand, were to  c o n s t i tu te  14.8 per 
cen t and 3*5 p e rcen t of GNP re s p e c tiv e ly .
A gainst the  in c re ase  in  the investm ent ta rg e t  the r a t i o  of dom estic savings 
to ' income was expected  to  r i s e  from 12.9 p e rcen t to  I 6 .5  p e rcen t over the 
f iv e  y ea r p e rio d . In  o th e r words, dom estic savings rose  to  12.2 b i l l i o n  
T. L ira s  in  196? as compared to  7»3 b i l l i o n  T .L iras  in  I 963.
( 1 ) For th ese  d e ta i l s  see Y. Kucuk, IRe Macro-Model of the P lan , 
in  P lanning  in  Turkey, M iddle-E astern  Technical U n iv e rs ity  
P u b lic a tio n s , Ankara, June, 1967, p p .85, 86; K. B u lu to g lu , 
F inancing  T urkey 's  Development P lan  in  P lanning  in  Turkey, 
Ib id , p p .182, 183, 184; a ls o , see F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , 
1963- 1967, o p .c i t . ,  p . 126.
TABLE 10
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- E xpenditure  T argets  of th e  F ir  
Year P lan 1963-67 B il l io n  TL.
s t  F iv e - 
(1961 p r ic e s )
C urrent P ublic C urrent T o tal
P r iv a te P r iv a te p u b lic  In v e s t- Account In v e s t-
Years GNP Consumption Investm ent Expendi-turo ment D e f ic i t  ment
1962 52.7 = 38*6 + 3*5 4. 7 .6  + 5 .1  - 2 .1  8*6
1963 36 ,4 40.5 3 .8  ■ 8 .6  5 .8 2*3 9 .6
1964 60,3 43.0 4 .2 9.0  6 .6 2 .5  10*8
1965 64.5 45*4 4 .7 9 .5  7 .1 2 .2  11 .8
1966 69.0 47.6 5 .3 10 .5  7 .8 2.2 13.1
1967 73.9 50.2 5.9 11 .5  8 .4 2 .1  14.3
T o tal376 ,8 265.3 27 .4 40.8 68.2
Source: F i r s t  F ive-Y ear Development P lan , 1963-67, 
a lso  Tables 49 and 50, p . l l 6 .
p .108 ;
TABLE 11 - Investm en ts, Domestic and E x tern a l Savings 
as P ercen tage  of GNP
Years Investm ents Domestic
Savings
E x tern a l
Savings
1957 13.1 1 2 .4 0*7
1958 13.9 13.1 0 .8
1959 15 .7 12.6 3 .1
i 960 15 .9 13.5 2 .4
1961 15.2 1 2 .4 2 .8
1962 16.3 12*3 4.0
1963 17*0 12.9 4.1
1964 17*9 13.8 4.1
1965 18.3 14.9 3 .4
1966 19 .3 15.8 3.2
1967 1 9 .4 16*6 2*8
Source: I t  i s  computed from Table 10
24-.
The p ro sp ec ts  o f augmenting dom estic savings was r e la te d  to
the  in c re a se  expected in  p e r  c a p ita  income and to  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s
o f r e s t r a in in g  the  in c re a se  in  consumption ou t of a d d itio n a l incomes*
The r e a l i s a t io n  o f dom estic savings ta rg e ts  would give us a m arginal
( l )savings-incom e r a t i o  of 26*5 p e r  cen t , a r a t i o  th a t  was much g re a te r  
than  the  r a te  achieved  in  the  past*  The m arginal dom estic savings in  
the  p e rio d  1937-60 was c a lc u la te d  to  be 16*3 p e r c e n t.
P r iv a te  consum ption, as a r e s u l t ,  was a n t ic ip a te d  to  d ec lin e  
consid erab ly ^d u rin g  the  p lan  p e r io d ,( a  drop from 71.8 p e r c en t to  67.9
p . 24 -  paragraph 2, should read :
P r iv a te  consumption, as a r e s u l t ,  was a n tic ip a te d  to  declin e  
r e l a t i v e ly  during  th e  p lan  period  (a drop from 71,8?^ to  
67 . ^  of GNP)
p ro v id in g  in c e n tiv e s  f o r  p r iv a te  savings in  o rder to  absorb th e  in c re a se s
in  d isp o sab le  p r iv a te  incomes*
TABLE 12 -  A verago and M arginal Domestic Sav ings,





T o tal Account 









1962 52 .7 8 .6 -  2 .1 6 ,5 1 0 .4
1963 56.4 9.6 2,3 7.3 12.9 21.6
1964 60,3 10 .8 2 .5 8,3 13 ,7 25.6
1965 64.5 11 .8 2,2 9.6 14 .8 30.9
1966 69.0 13 .1 2.2 10,9 15 .7 28.0
1967 73o9 14,3 2 .1 12.2 16.5 26.5
Average M arginal Domestic Savings . . . . 26.5
I  have a rranged  th i s  Table from the  f ig u re s  g iven  in  Table l O  
(o r  EPYP, p .108 Table 50 ).
Domestic savings are  c a lc u la te d  by deducting  c u rre n t account 
d e f i c i t  from t o t a l  investm ents given f o r  each y e a r .
M arginal dom estic sav ings i s  the r a t i o  between th e  Increm ent in  
dom estic savings and th e  increm ent in  the  GNP. Average m arginal 
p ro p e n s ity  to  save can be found as 26,3* This im p lie s  th a t  eveiy  
100 ToLiras in c re a se  in  th e  GNP w ill  induce a sav ing  of 26,3  T ,L iras.
( 1 ) For the C c ic u la t io n  o f the  m arg in a l p ro p e n s ity  to  save, see Table 1,2.»
( 2) See FFYP, p.lOB, Table 30
( 3) See OECD, Turkey, May 1963 and I 966 , p .15; a lso  FFYP, p . 435
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For the r e a l i z a t io n  of the F i r s t  P lan  ta r g e ts  a s u b s ta n t ia l  
amount of fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  was needed. Foreign c a p i t a l  requirem ents 
were to  be p ro v id ed  by the  OECD Consortium e s ta b lis h e d  in  1963.
The d e f i c i t  to  be fin a n c ed  from e x te rn a l sources during  the 
p lan  p e rio d , amounted to  ^1 ,398  m ill io n  (o r  1 3 .4  b i l l i o n  T .L ir a s ) . This 
im p lie s  a fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  requ irem ent of 0280  m il l io n  p e r  annum*
However, i f  "net e r r o r  and om ission" item  of ^35 m ill io n  i s  in c lu d ed , 
annual f  o reign-exchange requ irem ents would in c re a se  by an o th er ^173 m il l io n . 
C onsequently , th e  t o t a l  fo re ig n  c a p i ta l  o u tla y  was expected  to  reach  
^ 1,373  m illio n  ( o r  an annual average of ^315 m illio n )
The amount of fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  re q u ire d  was computed as a 
re s id u a l  item . F i r s t ,  p r iv a te  sav ings and t h e i r  p o s s ib le  growbh during  
th e  f iv e  y e a rs  p e rio d  were c a lc u la te d  under th e  assum ption of a 7 p e r  c en t 
r a te  of growth of GNP. A lso , p u b lic  savings which cou ld  be o b ta ined  
through the  government were computed. F in a l ly ,  t o t a l  investm ent 
requ irem en ts which were no t covered by dom estic sav ings re p re se n te d  th e
( 2)share  of th e  fo re ig n  c a p i ta l  needed to  fin an ce  th e  p la n .^
As can be seen from Table 11, e x te rn a l sav ings which stood 
as 4*0 p e r  cen t o f GNP ip: 1962 were expected to  d e c lin e  co n s id e rab ly  , 
to  2.0  by 1967.  T his in d ic a te s  th a t  the  F i r s t  P lan  r e l i e d  h e a v ily  
on domestic sav ings r a th e r  than  e x te rn a l savings du rin g  i t s  im plem entation .
d) The P a tte rn  of Investm ent A llo c a tio n
The com position of investm ent may help  us to  see the  p lan  
s t r a te g y  adopted f o r  the f i r s t  f iv e  y ea rs  of th e  Development Programme, 
As we no ted  e a r l i e r ,  t o t a l  investm en ts (p u b lic  and p r iv a te )  re q u ire d  to
(1)
( 2)
T o ta l fo re ig n  aiô. requ irem ents were expected  to  d e c lin e  from J0349 
m ill io n  in  I 963 to  ^270 m ill io n  a t  th e  end of the  p la n  p e rio d . See 
FFYP, p . 467, Table 374; a lso  H. Ge t in ,  Foreign Economic R e la tio n s  in  
th e  P lan , in  P lann ing  in  Turkey, p . 242
FC = ( I - S ) A  FC = 3 . 3/Y  Y = 100
FC = [ r .  DC- (S^ + 8g) J  /Y  _ 3 . 5/IOO ®1 “ P r iv a te  saving
= (7 X 2 ,6  -  1 4 .7) / Y = government sav ing
<X = IGOR
r  = r a te  of growth
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a t t a in  an average r a te  of growth of 7 p e r  cen t p e r  annum were e stim ated  
to  amount to  59*6 b i l l i o n  T .L ira s .
The la r g e s t  p ro p o rtio n  of t o t a l  investm ent funds were a l lo c a te d  
in  o rder b f magnitude to  housing , a g r ic u l tu r e ,  m anufactu ring , t ra n s p o r t  
and communications, the  l a s t  be ing  devoted to  energy , education  and o th e r 
se rv ic e s  (See Table 13)*
The l a r g e s t  p ro p o rtio n  of t o t a l  c a p i ta l  was devoted to  housing 
which c o n s t i tu te d  20.3 p e r  c en t of the  t o t a l  (amounting to  12,1  b i l l i o n  
T. L i r a s ) . In  f a c t  tw o -th ird s  of th i s  investm ent was to  be undertaken 
by the  p r iv a te  s e c to r .  The dominance of t h i s  s e c to r  in  th e  o v e ra ll  
investm ent programme was the  main worry of th e  p la n n e rs  and red u c tio n  of 
i t  by c e r ta in  p o lic y  measures were to  be in tro d u ced  in  o rd e r to  change 
th e  com position of investm ent in  fav o u r of p ro d u c tiv e  s e c to r s .
f l )Out of the  t o t a l  c a p i ta l  o u tla y , 10 .3  b i l l i o n  TL, was 
a l lo c a te d  to  a g r ic u l tu re  which i s  the  predom inant s e c to r  in  the economy. 
A g r ic u ltu ra l  investm ent re p re se n te d  17 p e r cen t o f th e  t o t a l .  The reason 
f o r  g iv in g  such im portance to  a g r ic u l tu re  was a b a s ic  r e f le c t io n  of the  
p lan  s t r a te g y  which emphasized th e  duel im portance o f a g r ic u ltu re  and 
in d u s try .
The a g r ic u l tu r a l  s e c to r  was to  m ain ta in  a r a te  of growth of
4 .7  p e r  cen t ^^^per annum in  o rder to  meet the  growing in d u s t r ia l  demand f o r  
raw m a te r ia ls  ( i . e .  food  and a g r ic u l tu r a l  p roducts p ro c e ss in g  in d u s t r ie s ) ;  
to  expand ex p o rts  and to  absorb more of th e  unemployed la b o u r fo rc e . In  
o th e r words, a  26 p e r  c en t r i s e  was contem plated in  th e  t o t a l  a g r ic u l tu r a l  
ou tpu t and t h i s  was b e lie v e d  to  be achieved by an e f f i c i e n t  a l lo c a tio n  of 
in v estm en ts . Given th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  l im i t  of c u l t iv a b le  land  was reached 
by 1939 the most e f f e c t iv e  in strum ent was to  s h i f t  from ex ten siv e  farm ing
(^^In  f a c t  investm en ts in  a g r ic u l tu re  amounted to  11 .3  b i l l i o n  T .L ira s , 
i f  non-m onetized c o n tr ib u tio n  of farm ers was in c lu d ed . This l a t t e r  
v/as e s tim a ted  to  reach  723 m illio n  TL during  the  p la n  p e rio d .
Total, a g r ic u l tu r a l  investm ents were planned to  r i s e  from 1,273 m ill io n  TL 
in  1963 to  3,063  m illio n  TL a t  the end of the  p lan  p e rio d . See OECD 
F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  1963-67. Consortium f o r  Turkey, Ju ly  I 963, p . 47.
( 2)'  * Aiinual r a te  of growth in  a g r ic u ltu re  was 4 .1  p e r  cen t during  the  
p e rio d  1932- 39* FFYP, op. c i t . ,  p . 148
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a t ta in  an average r a te  of growth of 7 p e r  cen t p e r  annum were e s tim ated  
to  amount to  39*6 b i l l i o n  T .L iras*
The la r g e s t  p ro p o rtio n  of t o t a l  investm ent funds were a llo c a te d  
in  o rder b f magnitude to  housing , a g r ic u l tu r e ,  m anufactu ring , t ra n s p o r t  
and communications, the l a s t  be in g  devoted to  energy , education  and o th e r 
se rv ic e s  (See Table 1 3 ).
The l a r g e s t  p ro p o rtio n  of t o t a l  c a p i ta l  was devoted to  housing 
which c o n s t i tu te d  20.3 p e r  c en t of the  t o t a l  (amounting to  12 .1  b i l l i o n  
T. L i r a s ) . In  f a c t  tw o -th ird s  of th i s  investm ent was to  be undertalcen 
by the  p r iv a te  s e c to r .  The dominance o f th i s  s e c to r  in  th e  o v e ra ll  
investm ent programme was the  main worry of th e  p lan n e rs  and red u c tio n  of 
i t  by c e r ta in  p o lic y  measures were to  be in tro d u ced  in  o rd e r to  change 
th e  com position o f investm ent in  fav o u r of p ro d u c tiv e  s e c to r s .
Out o f the  t o t a l  c a p i ta l  o u tla y , 10 .3  b i l l i o n  TL.^^^ was 
a l lo c a te d  to  a g r ic u l tu re  which i s  the  predom inant s e c to r  in  the economy. 
A g r ic u ltu ra l  investm ent re p re se n te d  17 p e r cen t o f th e  t o t a l .  The reason 
f o r  g iv in g  such im portance to  a g r ic u l tu re  was a b a s ic  r e f le c t io n  o f th e  
p lan  s t r a te g y  which emphasized th e  duel im portance o f a g r ic u ltu re  and 
in d u s try .
The a g r ic u l tu r a l  s e c to r  was to  m ain ta in  a r a te  o f growth of
( 2)4 .7  p e r  cen t '  'p e r  annum in  o rd er to  meet the  growing in d u s t r ia l  demand f o r  
raw m a te r ia ls  ( i . e .  food  and a g r ic u l tu r a l  p roducts p ro c e ss in g  in d u s t r ie s ) ;  
to  expand ex p o rts  and to  absorb more of th e  unemployed la b o u r fo rc e .  In  
o th e r words, a 26 p e r  c en t r i s e  was contem plated in  th e  t o t a l  a g r ic u l tu r a l  
outpu t and t h i s  was b e lie v e d  to  be achieved by an e f f i c i e n t  a l lo c a t io n  of 
in v estm en ts . Given th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  l im i t  of c u l t iv a b le  land  v/as reached 
by 1959 the most e f f e c t iv e  in strum en t was to  s h i f t  from ex ten siv e  farm ing
(1 )'  ' I n  f a c t  investm ents in  a g r ic u l tu re  emoimted to  11 ,3  b i l l i o n  T .L ira s , 
i f  non-m onetized c o n tr ib u tio n  of farm ers was in c lu d ed . This l a t t e r  
v/as e s tim ated  to  reach  723 m illio n  TL during  the  p lan  p e rio d .
T o ta l a g r ic u l tu r a l  investm ents were p lanned to  r i s e  from 1,273 m il l io n  TL 
in  1963 to  3,063  m ill io n  TL a t  the  end of the  p lan  p e rio d . See OECD 
F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  1963-67. Consortium f o r  Turkey, Ju ly  I 963 , p . 47.
( 2) Annual r a te  of growth in  a g r ic u ltu re  was 4 .1  p e r c en t during  the  
p e rio d  1932- 39 . FFYP, op. c i t . ,  p . 148
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TABLE 13 GROSS' IWES%miT8' 1963 -  1967
S ec to rs M illio n  TL As p ercen tag e  o f T o ta l a t  1961 p r ic e s  Gross Investraehts;
A g ric u ltu re  • 10!,548.4 17*7
Mining and Q uarrying 3 ,233 .0 3 .4
M anufacturing 10,089*2 16 .9
Energy 3 , 134.0 8 .6
T ransport and Communications 8*139 ,4 13*7
S erv ices 3 , 963.9 6.6
Housing 12 , 116.0 20.3
Education 4,227 .0 7 .1
H ealth 1 ,346 .9 2.3
Tourism 827.0 1 .4
T o tal 39,646*8 100.0
Source: FFYP, 1963-1967, SPO, Ankara 1963, p .121
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in to  in te n s iv e  farm ing  technique* To th i s  end the F i r s t  l^ an  d is t r ib u te d
th e  A g ric u ltu ra l investm ent in  the  fo llow ing  manner: out of t o t a l
a g r ic u l tu r a l  c a p i ta l  o u tla y  45*3 p e r  cen t was devoted to  i r r i g a t io n  works
fo llow ed  by 1 3 .0  p e r  cen t in  t r a c to r s  and farm equipment; 6 .1  p e r cen t
in  la n d  improvement; 8 .8  p e r  c en t in  f o r e s t r y ;  4 ,2  p e r  cen t in  animal
husbandry; 2 .6  p e r  cen t in  f i s h e r ie s  and th e  rem aining 18 p e r cen t in
( l )o th e r  a g r ic u l tu r a l  b ra n c h e s . '
As can be seen , the  f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  was given to  p ro je c ts  aim ing 
a t  c o n s tru c tin g  and expanding i r r i g a t io n  wchemes. Investm ent devoted 
to  i r r i g a t io n  p ro je c ts  amoimted to  3=4 b i l l i o n  TL. in  th e  f i r s t  
f iv e  y e a r p e r io d  (an  in c re a se  from 36I  m illio n  TL, to  1 ,624 b i l l i o n  TL.)
Investm ent in  i r r i g a t i o n  p ro je c ts  was regarded  to  be of v i t a l  
im portance f o r  a g r ic u l tu r a l  p ro d uction  in  the  P lan  p e r io d  as w ell as in  
th e  fu tu r e .  I t  was e s tim ated  th a t  such c a p i ta l  in te n s iv e  p ro je c ts  would 
p u t an a d d itio n a l a re a  of 313,000 h e c ta re s  under i r r i g a t i o n  and a lso  im­
prove th e  e x is t in g  i r r i g a t i o n  scheme.
Most o f th e  in c re a se  in  p lanned a g r ic u l tu r a l  ou tpu t i s  to  come 
from v e r t i c a l  expansion r a th e r  than  h o r iz o n ta l  expansion sin ce  the  l a t t e r  
had a lread y  reached  i t s  l i m i t s . I t  was f o r  t h i s  reason  th a t  utmost 
im portance was given to  i r r i g a t io n  and drainage p r o je c t s ,  f e r t i l i z e r  
schemes and o th e r complementary p ro je c ts  (complementary investm ents in  
canal d i s t r ib u t io n  systems and farm  i r r i g a t io n  w orks).
The second p r i o r i t y  in  a g r ic u l tu re  was given to  t r a c to r s  and farm  
equipment which was e s tim ated  to  re c e iv e  I 3 p e r cen t of t o t a l  investm ents 
( t o t a l  o f 1,690  m i l l ,  TL), The aim was here to  in c re a se  the  number of 
t r a c to r s  to  48,000 by 1967, Land improvement p ro je c ts  ranked th i r d  in  
th e  sca le  o f p r i o r i t i e s ,  re c e iv in g  684 m illio n  TL. in  th e  f iv e  y ear p e r io d .
(1) See th e  FFYP 1963-67, SPO, Ankara, I 963 , p .143, Table 39
( 2) The t o t a l  a re a  under i r r i g a t io n  b e fo re  the  p la n  was estim ated
to  be 1 , 115,000  h e c ta re s . Over the p lan  p e r io d  (1963-67) an add­
i t i o n a l  a re a  of 313,000 h e c ta re s  were to  be ir r ig a te d *
(3) Ik-- f a c t  Turkey reached  the  l im i t  of c u l t iv a b le  la n d  in  I 963 , where
i t  amounted to  23.5 m il l ,  h e c ta re s . The c u l t iv a b le  lan d  in  1967 was 
expected to  in c re a se  to  23 .4  m illio n  hecta res*  See FFYP op, c i t . ,  
p .134 , Table 63* T herefore the  Plan s ta t e d  th a t  the problem in  
tu rk ey  was how to  decrease  th e  amount of la n d  under c u l t iv a t io n ,  to  
c o n tro l e ro sio n  and to  a r r iv e  a t  a ba lanced  p a t te rn  of lan d  use,
FFYP, 1963- 67 , p .133 .
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This group in c lu d e s  p ro je c ts  on improvement of p a s tu re s , p rev en tio n
(1)of e ro s io n , re c lam a tio n  and d ra inage  o f marshes and swamps.
The r e s t  o f c a p i ta l  investm ent in c lu d ed  p ro je c ts  on a g r ic u l tu r a l  
ex ten sio n  and t r a in in g  se rv ic e s  and f o r e s t r y  p ro d u c ts . The investm ent 
on a g r ic u l tu r a l  t r a in in g  and ex ten sio n  was plcnned to  amount to  409 m ill io n  
TL.
An im p o rtan t natiaro o f investm ents in  a g r ic u l tu r a l  i s  th a t  67.3
p e r  cen t o f t o t a l  would be undertalcen by th e  p u b lic  s e c to r  w hile  the
rem aining 32 .7  p e r  c en t would be by th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r .  This la rg e
share  o f p u b lic  investm ent was due to  i r r i g a t io n  p r o je c ts  which a re  to
be undertaken by the government because they  a re  of a s o c ia l  overhead
la rg e  ( x)
n a tu re  which re q u ire s /  c a p i ta l  o u tlay .
The th i r d  m ajor a l lo c a t io n  of t o t a l  c a p i ta l  investm ent was made by the  
m anufacturing  in d u s try  t o t a l l i n g  10 .0  b i l l i o n  T .L ira s . This o u tla y , on 
average, re p re se n te d  alm ost 17 p e r cen t o f th e  t o t a l  investm ent needed 
by th e  P lan .
As was p o in te d  out e a r l i e r ,  Turkey had a ss ig n ed  an im portan t ro le  
to  th e  m anufacturing  in d u s try  d u ring  the  f i r s t  p lan  p e r io d . M anufacturing 
which accounted f o r  alm ost 13 p e r  cen t of GNP in  1962 was expected to  grow 
sh a rp ly , re p re sè n tin g  17 .7  p e r  c en t of GNP by th e  end of the  f i r s t  p la n .
W ithin the  manuf a c tu r in g  in d u s try , a p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis v/as 
p laced  upon heavy in d u s try  bo th  in  term s of i t s  share  in  t o t a l  m anufacturing  
ou tpu t and in  t o t a l  m anufacturing  investm ents* The sh are  of heavy in d u s try  
in  t o t a l  v a lu e  added was expected  to  r i s e  from 38 p e r c e n t to  50 p e r cen t 
over the  f iv e  y e a r s .  On the  o th e r  hand the share  of l i g h t  in d u s try  was 
p ro je c te d  to  d ec lin e  from 62 p e r  c en t to  50 p e r  cen t of va lu e  added in  th e  
same p e rio d . (See Table 4)
(1)PPYP, 1963- 67 , p .145
( 2) I b id . . p . 146
( 3) I r r i g a t io n  p ro je c ts  took  the  la r g e s t  p ro p o rtio n  of fo re ig n  exchange 
requ irem ents v/ith 3Ô.1 p e r  cent du ring  the p lan  p e r io d  fo llow ed by 
t r a c to r s  and equipment (2 2 .5  p e r c e n t) ,  f o r e s t r y  (7 .5  p e r  cen t) and 
f i s h e r i e s  (5 ,8  p e r  c e n t ) , PPYP, p p .146-7
(4) See FFYP 1963-67, p* IS6  ^ .
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With th e  emphasis p u t on the  heavy in d u s try  th e  p lan  
co rresp o n d in g ly  a l lo c a te d  81 p e r  cen t of to taJ. m anufacturing  c a p i t a l  
o u tlay  to  heavy in d u s try  v/hile the  rem aining 19 p e r  cen t went to  l i g h t  
in d u s try , This was an ex p ress io n  of a d e l ib e ra te  s h i f t  in  the  p lan
s tra te g y  as f a r  as in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  i s  concerned.
Heavy in d u stry , v^hich req u ires la r g e  p la n ts  and tech n iq u es, 
i s  not so common in  Turkey; th ere fo re  thq f i r s t  p lan  r e l ie d  more on the  
r o le  o f fo r e ig n  e n te r p r ise  fo r  in trod u cin g  knov/'-how and a lso  on the SEE 
which cou ld  undertalce la r g e  s c a le  in d u s tr ia l  u n it s .
As can be  seen from Table l4  and Chart 2 ,  th e  tim e p a t te rn  of 
m anufacturing investm en ts appears to  be s tra n g e . On the one hand, the  
m anufacturing  ou tp u t in  GNP was expected  to  r i s e  from 12 ,8  p e r  c en t to  
18 p e r  cen t over the  p lan  p e rio d  and on the o th e r  hand th e  share  of 
m anufacturing  investm ent in  t o t a l  was to  d ec lin e  sh a rp ly  th roughout the  
p lan  p e rio d  ( a  d e c lin e  from 23 p e r  cen t to  11 p e r c e n t) .
B o th .in  term s o f a b so lu te  and percen tage  share  m anufacturing
investm ent was p ro je c te d  to  be ve ry  h igh  in  th e  f i r s t  th re e  years  v/here
annual investm ent c o n s t i tu te d  23 p e r c e n t, 21*8 p e r c en t and 18*9 p e r cen t
r e s p e c t iv e ly .  T his p a ttern  of a l lo c a t io n  can be exp la in ed  by the la r g e
investm ents requ ired  fo r  EREGLI S te e l and Iron P lan ts which were scheduled
( 2)fo r  the f i r s t  th re e  y e a rs .
In more d e t a i l ,  the d is tr ib u t io n  o f manuf actu r in g  investm ents  
was as fo llo w s ;
Food, beverages and tobacco which in  1962 accounted fo r  l / 3  
o f  m anufacturing va lu e added r e c e iv ed  10 per cen t; t e x t i l e s  and c lo th in g  
which generate another l / 3  of m anufacturing output was to  re c e iv e  9 per  
cen t o f m anufacturing in vestm en ts, B asic  m etals which amounted to  9 
per cen t o f m anufacturing output rece iv ed  21 per cen t; chem icals which 
rep resen ted  3 .3  P®r cen t o f m anufacturing output were planned to  take 27 
per cen t o f  m anufacturing c a p ita l  o u tla y . The rem aining 33 per cent of
(1 ) See OECD F ir s t  F ive-Y ear P lan, 1963-67. By aai expert group fo r  the  
OECD. Ccnsortiums fo r  Turkey, Ju ly  I 963 , p * 6 i. L igh t in d u stry  in c lu d es  
food , b everages, tob acco , t e x t i l e s  and c lo th in g . Heavy in d u stry  
com prises in  order o f magnitude, chemica3.s, b a s ic  m eta ls , machinery, 
paper, tran sp ort equipment, rubber and oth er in d u s tr ie s ,  Ib id , p .64
(2) FFYP, 1963-67, p p .120-121
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th e  t o t a l  m anufacturing  investm ent was a l lo c a te d  to  m achinery,
( l )paper, rubber, t r a n s p o r t  equipment and others*  '
Investm ents i n - t e x t i l e s  and th e  c lo th in g  in d u s try  in  th e  
p la n  p e rio d  were to  bo d ire c te d  towards m odern ization , replacem ent 
and b a lan c in g  of e x is t in g  p ro d u c tiv e  f a c i l i t i e s  as w ell as to  a d d itio n s  
to  th e  a lre ad y  e s ta b lis h e d  c a p a c ity . I t  was though t by th e  SPO th a t  
tn e se  investm ents would ensure b e t t e r  u t i l i s a t i o n  of p ro d u c tio n  c ap a c ity  
and by reducing  c o s ts  would have g re a te r  export p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
I t  i s  a  loiown f a c t  in  Turkey th a t  p r iv a te  en trep ren eu rs  a re
u s u a lly  in v e s t in g  in  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  l i g h t  sca le  in d u s t r ie s  such as
c lo th in g  and t e x t i l e s  r a th e r  than  la rg e - s c a le  heavy in d u s t r ie s .  This
a t t i t u d e  o f the  p r iv a te  firm s  i s  co n d itio n ed  by th e  s p e c if ic  requirem ents
of heavy in d u s try  which c a l l s  fo r  g re a te r  p la n ts ,  more c a p i t a l  and
u n fa m ilia r  e x p e r t is e .  Thus d iv e rs io n  o f p r iv a te  investm en ts from l i g h t
in to  heavy in d u s try  was to  be encouraged by c e r ta in  p o lic y  measures such
as w arning en trep ren eu rs  in  l i g h t  in d u s try  of o v e r-c a p a c ity , re fu s in g  them
s p e c ia l  investm ent allow ances and im port l ic e n c e s  f o r  t h e i r  m achinery and 
( 2)equ ipm ent,' '
Next in  o rd er of magnitude comes investm ents made in  tra n s p o r t  
and communications and energy which c o n s t i tu te  s o c ia l  overhead s e c to r s .
Both s e c to rs  during  th e  p lan  p erio d  re ce iv ed  8 .1  b i l l i o n  TL, “^ and
3 .1  b i l l i o n  TL, r e s p e c t iv e ly  (see  Table 14)0 The p e rcen tag e  share  of 
investm ents in  tra n s p o r t  and communication c o n s t i tu te d  13 .7  p e r c e n t , (4-) 
o f t o t a l  investm ent o u tlay  of th e  p lan  w hile energy only c o n s t i tu te d  8 .6  
p e r  cen t of th e  to ta l*  Both taken to g e th e r  re p re se n te d  22 p e r  c en t of the 
t o t a l .
60 p e r  cen t of the t o t a l  c a p i ta l  o u tla y  in  tr a n s p o r t  was devoted 
to  highways by which the aim was to  connect la rg e  towns and a lso  to  b u ild  
r u r a l  ro ad s . The rem ainder was a l lo t t e d  30 p e r  cen t to  ra ilw ay s  and
( 1) FFYP, 1963-67  op. c i t . ,  p .186
( 2) OECD, T urkish  FFYP. Ah' ex p ert group f o r  OECD consortium  f o r  Turkey,
Ju ly , 1963. ÿ ÿ .88-90).
( 3) Out o f t h i s  amount 3 .3  b i l l i o n  TL, was a l lo c a te d  to  communication system s, 
FFYP
( 4) In  the  f i r s t  h a l f  o f th e  1930*s Turkey devoted about 24 p e r c en t of t o t a l  
investm ents to  tra n s p o r t  and comraujiications
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10 p e r c en t to  sea p o rts  and a i r p o r t s ,  (2*8 b i l l i o n  T L ., 1*3 b i l l i o n  TL, |
and 411 m ill io n  TL* re s p e c tiv e ly )  , |
The c a p i ta l  expend itu re  in  th e  energy s e c to r  was p ro je c te d  f o r
the  c o n s tru c tio n  of h y d ro -e le c tr ic  power and therm al s t a t io n s ,  th e  expansion
6B e x is t in g  g e n e ra tin g  c a p a c ity  and f o r  th e  ex tension  of th e  d is t r ib u t io n
netw ork to  supply  power to  towns and v i l la g e s  w ith no e l e c t r i c i t y , The
investm ent in  energy during  the p lan  p e rio d  was expected  to  reach  3 .0
b i l l i o n  T .L ira s  which was to  be d iv id ed  about h a l f  and h a l f  between power
( 2)p la n ts  and tra n sm iss io n  d is t r ib u t io n  system s.
As' f a r  as edu ca tio n  was concerned, investm ent p ro je c ts  aimed 
a t  ach iev ing  a r i s e  in  th e  g en era l le v e l  of educa tion  and th e  supply of 
s k i l l e d  manpov/er f o r  economic and so c ia l  development o f the  coun try .
The le v e l  of c a p i ta l  investm ent a l l o t t e d  to  th i s  s e c to r  during  th e  p lan  
p e rio d  stood a t  4 .2  b i l l i o n  TL. re p re se n tin g  7 ,1  p e r cen t of the t o t a l  
investm ents o f th e  p la n .
In  m ining which in c lu d es  petro leum  e x tra c t io n  and re f in in g  th e re  
was an a l lo c a t io n  of 3 ,2  b i l l i o n  TL in  o rd er to  meet th e  p ro d u c tio n  ta r g e t  
th a t  was to  be doubled over th e  p lan  period* In  o th e r  words th e  mining 
in d u s try  th a t  accounts f o r  3 .2  p e r  cen t of the GNP was ass igned  3 .4  p e r 
c en t of t o t a l  o v e ra ll  investm ents*
Investm ents in  h e a lth  p ro je c ts  ha,d aimed a t  im proving h e a lth  
co n d itio n s  and ensu ring  a more e f f i c i e n t  use of re so u rc e s . The investm ents 
in  th i s  s e c to r  c o n s t i tu te d  2 .5  p e r  cent of the g ross t o t a l  investm ent amounting 
to  1 .3  b i l l i o n  T .L ira s  during  the f iv e  y e a r p e r io d .
F in a l ly  th e  l e a s t  amount of investm ent out o f the  t o t a l  was 
devoted to  tou rism  which was planned to  rece iv e  827 m il l io n  TTj . which 
re p re se n te d  1 .4  p e r  cent o f th e  t o t a l  (an in c rease  of 33% over the p lan  
p e r io d .)  This co n sid e rab le  in c re a se  in  tou rism  investm ent was owing to  
the f a c t  th a t  tou rism  was expected  to  be the f a s t e s t  growing s e c to r  in  th e
(1) OECD, T urk ish  FFYP 1963- 67 , op. c i t . ,  p . 89
( 2) The main h y d ro -p lan ts  in c lu d ed  in  the f i r s t  p la n  a re  the
Keban Hydro-dam and Giceroz which are com pleted now.
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TABLE 14 - Gross Investm ents 1963-1967 
(m ill io n  TL. a t  I 96I  p r ic e s )
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 T otal
A g ric u ltu re 1 ,2 1 3 .2 1 ,7 1 2 .2 2 , 182.0 2 ,590 .0 2 ,851 .0  10 ,548 ,4
Mining and 
q uarry ing 457.8 735.2 794.6 809,9 435.5 3 , 233.0
M anufacturing 2 ,166 .3 2 ,359.9 2 ,276,9 1 ,7 2 6 .4 1 ,5 5 9 .7  10 ,089 .2
Energy 706.4 850.0 1 , 057.9 1 , 233.5 1 , 286,2 5 , 134,0
T ransport and 
Communications 1 , 298.0 1 ,355 .9 1 ,482 .3 1 ,851 .9 2 ,171 .3 8 , 159,4
Serv ices 581.0 426.1 637.0 1 , 030.0 1 , 291.8 3 , 965.9
Housing 2 ,085 .0 2 , 229.0 2 , 390.0 2 , 594.0 2 ,818 .0 12,116.0
Education 660.0 783.0 795.0 836,0 1 , 153.0 4 ,227 .0
H ealth 200.5 230.1 278,2 320.2 317.9 1 , 346.9
Tourism 145.5 148.2 164.7 175.6 193.0 827.0
T o ta l 9, 513.7 1 0 ,829 .6  12 ,058 .6  13 ,167 .5  14 ,0 7 7 .4  59 ,646 .8
Source: FIRST Five Year Development P lan , 1963-67 SPO, Ankara,
1963, p . 121
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economy p ro v id in g  th e  g re a te s t  improvement in  th e  ba lan ce  of payments# (1 )
TABLE 13 S ec to r Investm ent in  R e la tio n  to  T o ta l 
Annual Investm ents (as  p e rcen tages)
1963 1964 1963 1966 1967 T otal
A g ric u ltu re 12 ,8 15 .8 18 .1 19 .7 20.2 17 .7
Mining and 
quarry ing 4 .8 6 ,8 6 .6 6 ,1 3 .1 5 .4
anuf ac t  u rin g 22.8 21.8 18.9 13.1 11.1 16.9
Energy 7 .4 7.9 8 .8 9 .4 9 ,1 8 .6
T ransport and 
Communications 13 .7 12 ,5 12,3 14 .1 1 5 .4 13 .7
S erv ices 6 .1 3 .9 5 .3 7 .9 9 .2 6.6
Housing 21.9 20.6 1 9 .8 19 .7 20.0 20.3
Education 6 .9 7 .2 6 .6 6 ,4 8.2 7.1
H ealth 2 .1 2,1 2 .3 2 .4 2.3 2.3
Tourism 1 .5 1 .4 1 .3 1 ,3 1 .4 1 .4
100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FFYDP, 1963-1967, Op. c i t . ,  p .133. I t  i s
computed from Table I 6 .
(1 ) The a c tu a l  number of v i s i t o r s  in  I 966 reached  th e  le v e l  of 440,000
and t h i s  number v/as expected  to  in c re a se  by 30 p e r  cen t a t  the  end of
the  p lan  period* reach in g  the  le v e l  of 620 ,OOC. A ccordingly to u rism
revenue in  1967 was expected to  reach  %48 m il l io n , th a t  i s  6 tim es
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CH/iPTER 2
APPRAISAL OP THE FIRST PIVP-YEAR ELiOî (1963-67)
(a) INTRODUCTION
The f i r s t  f iv e -y e a r  p lan  vvdll be examined here  in  r e la t io n  
to  the  s iz e  of investm ent and the  d e te rm in a tio n  of the r a t e  o f grovrth; 
to  the  com position o f o v e ra ll  investm ent and i t s  d is t r ib u t io n  between 
p u b lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to r s .  Second, th e  investm ent programme w ill 
be ap p ra ised  in  the l ig h t  of d i f f e r e n t  c la s s i f i c a t io n  system s which a re  
w idely used in  le s s  developed c o u n tr ie s . The investm ent s tra te g y  endorsed 
by the  p la n  w ill  a lso  be compared to  th e  s tr a te g y  adopted  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s . 
T hird , the p lann ing  methodology th a t  was adopted d u ring  the fo rm u la tio n  of 
the  p lan  w il l  be c r i t i c a l l y  a p p ra ised . This in c lu d es  macro-model and 
s e c to ra l  programming s ta g e s . (The p ro je c t  stage which in c lu d es  economic 
e v a lu a tio n  of p ro je c ts  w il l  be the s u b je c t-m a tte r  of p a r t  I I I ,  o f th i s  
th e s is )  . F in a l ly ,  th e  im plem entation res_ults o f the  f i r s t  f iv e -y e a r  
p lan  w ill  be exposed in  o rd er to  see what le sso n s  cou ld  be drawn from 
i t  fo r  f u r th e r  p lan n in g  p ro cess  in  Turkey.
M j Æ SjalZfejQ M B B  Pt-ÆK
As I  have p o in te d  out e a r l i e r ,  t o t a l  investm en ts re q u ire d  by 
th e  f i r s t  p lan  reached  59*7 b i l l i o n  TL. out of which 33 .8  b i l l i o n  TL. 
were to  be in v e s te d  by th e  p u b lic  s e c to r .  For ach iev in g  an annual 
growth r a te  of 7 p e r  cen t the f i r s t  p la n  devoted 18.3  p e r  cen t of GNP 
to  investm en ts .
D uring 1930-60 p e rio d  g ross investm ent re p re se n te d  13 p e r  cen t 
o f G-NP, g ross dom estic sav ings being  10 .6  p e r cen t and e x te rn a l reso u rces
2 .4  p e r  c e n t. L a te r  in  p e r io d  1937-61 to t a l  c a p i t a l  requ irem ents ro se  
to  14,8  p e r  cen t o f G-NP, dom estic savings and fo re ig n  sources c o n s t i tu t ­
in g  12 ,8  p e r  cen t and 2 p e r cen t re s p e c tiv e ly . (See C hapter l ) ,
I t  fo llo w s th a t  the f i r s t  p la n  brought a co n sid e rab le  in c re a se  
in  t o t a l  c a p i ta l  requ irem ents (alm ost 4 p e r  cen t h ig h er) in  o rder to  a t t a in  
a 7 p e r  cen t growth r a t e .  The above f ig u re s  do n o t mean th a t  Turkey had 
reached i t s  maximum c a p a c ity  o f p ro v id in g  f in a n c ia l  re so u rces  through 
dom estic sav in g s . As we n o tic e d  in  C hapter 1 , the  m arginal r a te  o f 
sav ing  w^ as computed to  be 26.5 p e r  c e n t. Though t h i s  r a te  was q u ite  a 
b i t  h ig h e r than  th e  p rev ious p e rio d  ( l9 3 7 -6 l)  Turkey cou ld  have achieved 
a much h ig h e r dom estic savings/G-NP r a t i o  as w ell as m arginal r a te  of
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s a v i n g , H o w e v e r ,  as compared w ith  o th e r c o u n tr ie s ,  th i s  r a te  
does no t appear v e ry  am bitious. For in s ta n c e  P a k is ta n 's  th i r d  
f iv e -y e a r  p la n  (1963-70) aimed a t  a m arginal r a te  of sav ing  of about 
27 p e r  cen t.^^^
Domestic savings which c o n s t i tu te d  14 .8  p e r  c en t of GNP should  
have been p u t a t  l e a s t  a t  16 p e r  cen t of G-NP so th a t , to g e th e r  w ith  3*3 
p e r c en t fo re ig n  s a v in g s , to ta l  investm ent re p re se n te d  20 p e r  cen t of 
GNP. The r a t i o  of gross investm en t to  GNP may a t  f i r s t  look  q u ite  
a reasonab le  t a r g e t  compared w ith  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .  But in  my thinJ^ing 
the  problem of r a is in g  the average investment/GNP r a t i o  should  be 
decided  w ith in  th e  co n tex t of each in d iv id u a l oountcy's ta x a tio n  po ten­
t i a l i t y .  A ccordingly  in  Turkey, had the proposed f i s c a l  reform s been 
accep ted  during  the fo m u la t io j i  of the p la n , t o t a l  investm ent cou ld  have 
reached 20 p e r  cen t of Gross N a tio n a l P roduct, As a  m a tte r  of f a c t  
du ring  th e  d iscu ss io n  of the  p lan  some members of the  SPG in s i s t e d  th a t  
the ta r g e t  r a te  of growth be r a is e d  to  8 p e r  c en t in s te a d  of the p re se n t
7 p e r c e n t. I f  th e  form er r a te  was chosen, the  t o t a l  investm ent of the
(3)p la n  would have come to  20 p e r  c e n t. '
E s tim a tio n  o f t o t a l  investm ents was proceeded a t  two le v e ls  
of approxim ation . At m a cro -le v e l, . the experience reg a rd in g  the  o v e ra ll  
c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t i o  in  the  1930-1960 decade was ev a lu a ted . According to  
a p re lim in a ry  e v a lu a tio n , g ross c a p i ta l /o u tp u t  r a t i o  tu rn ed  out to  be 
2. 6 : 1 ,
T e n ta tiv e ly , t o t a l  c a p i ta l  requ irem ents were c a lc u la te d  on th e  
b a s is  o f th i s  g ross c a p i ta l /o u tp u t  r a t io  to  o b ta in  the  re q u ire d  r a te s  of 
growth in  n a t io n a l  income.
(1) There are reasons to  b e lie v e  th a t  Turkey w ith  the  in tro d u c tio n  of 
more r a d ic a l  f i s c a l  and ta x a t io n  reform s could  have achieved  a 
h ig h e r average domestic sav ings o r/and  h ig h e r m arginal r a te  of 
sav ing .
( 2) See, Mahbub U1 Hag, Problems of fo rm u la tin g  a Development S tra te g y  
in  P a k is ta n , OECD. Development F lans and Programmes, 1964, p . l l 6 .
( 3) From sim ple Harrod-Domar Growth model th i s  can be c le a n ly  seen;
I
® = 276 
=: 20.8 p e r  cen t of GNP
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There i s  some evidence to  show th a t  the  SPO Was fo rce d  to  
r e f r a in  from a choice of a more am bitious r a te  of grovrbh because of the 
c o n f l ic t  th a t  a rose  between them selves and p a r t ic u la i 'ly  M in is try  o f 
F inance. In  a c tu a l f a c t  th e  c o n f l ic t  was so se r io u s  th a t  some eminent 
members o f the  SPO had to  re s ig n  from t h e i r  departm ents#
One may ask:was a 7 p e r  cen t r a te  of growth a f e a s ib le  choice?
The answer can be "no" f o r  the fo llo w in g  reasons:
i )  During the  p e rio d  1930-62 average annual r a te  of growth had 
reached th e - le v e l  of 3 .3  p e r  c e n t, and some y ears  annual r a te  exceeded 
even 6 p e r  cen t.^^^  W ithout a  sy stem atic  trea tm en t o f f i s c a l  and monetary 
p o l ic ie s  and w ithout s u b s ta n t ia l  commitment from a id -g iv in g  agencies
a 6 p e r  cen t r a te  of growth was su rpassed ; th i s  im p lie s  th a t  the ta rg e t  
r a te  of growth of 7 p e r  cen t was an a t ta in a b le  r a te  writh l i t t l e  e f fo r t#
i i )  Second, compared \»/ith o th e r c o u n tr ie s , a 7 p e r c en t growth r a te  
does no t appear to  be h igh  enough i f  we c o n sid e r the  p o p u la tio n  ra te  of 
growth which i s  alm ost 3 po r cen t p e r  annum. This obv iously  would leav e  
a  4 p e r  cen t growth r a te  which Avas accepted  as a minimum ra te  by OECD
f o r  le s s  developed c o u n tr ie s  f o r  the  1960-1970 p e rio d ; (Development 
decade). Turkey th en  seemed to  have aimed a t  ach iev in g  only  a minimum 
ta r g e t  r a te  of growth th a t  Avas s p e c if ie d  f o r  developing  c o u n tr ie s .
i i i )  T h ird , to  determ ine the  r a te  of grovrbh on th e  b a s is  of the 
p a s t  perform ance only  cannot be a p la u s ib le  method* For, i f  th e  t o t a l  
investm ent re so u rces  in  1930-60 p e rio d  were a llo c a te d  on more r a t io n a l  
investm ent c r i t e r i a  a growth r a te  h ig h e r than  6-7 p e r  cen t could  have 
been e a s i ly  a tta in e d ^ . The argument in  the p e rio d  1930-60, as s h a l l
(3)be seen below, had c en tred  around the so c ia l overhead c a p i t a l - f i r s t   ^
th e s is  which proved to  be a f u t i l e  one as was supported  by the experiences 
in  many developing c o u n tr ie s . Heavy investm ent in  s o c ia l  oA^erhead c a p i ta l
( A )
supported  by d e f i c i t  f in a n c in g  had re s u l te d  in  a v e ry  low ra te  of growth^ '
(1) See J .T in b e rg en , M ethodological background o f the- Plan in  P lann ing  
in  Turkey, METU P u b lic , No.9, Ankara, 1967, p .77
( 2) In  y ea rs  1953, 1936 and 1937 the annual r a te  of growth was 7 ,4
p e r  c e n t, 6 ,8  p e r  cen t and 6 ,3  p e r  cen t re s p e c t iv e ly .  From f ig u re s  
in  FFYP 1963- 67 , p .14-108
(3) U ti l iz e d  c a p a c ity  of highAvays and ra ilw ays was 63 p e r  cen t and 20 
p e r  cen t re s p e c tiv e ly . A lso th e re  vms a s u b s ta n t ia l  id le  c a p a c ity  
in  Energy.
( 4) Average ra te  of growth was 3 .2  p e r cen t f o r  p e r io d  1954-58 and
3.3  p e r  cen t f o r  p e rio d  1939-62# Computed from th e  FîTP^ 1963- 67 ,
p p .14 , 108 .
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(3 p e r  cen t) in  the  second h a l f  of th e  1930's ;  th a t  was a m a n ife s ta tio n  
of th e  f a i l u r e  of th e  S O C -first"  argument.
The p a t te rn  of a l lo c a t io n  by then  was an in d ic a t io n  of the  waste 
of re so u rces  due to  unplanned atid in c o n s is te n t  a l lo c a t io n  o f investm ent. 
Those reso u rces  would have ob ta ined  a h ig h e r r a te  o f grovrbh i f  th ey  were 
d ire c te d  toward p ro d u c tiv e  s e c to rs  such as a g r ic u l tu r e ,  and m anufacturing  
in d u s try ,
iv ) F in a lly , as v d ll  be seen in  the l a s t  s e c t io n , th e  a c tu a l 
r a te  o f growth over th e  f i r s t  4  y ears  of the p lan  im plem entation reached
6 ,4  p e r  c en t which in d ic a te s  th a t  the 7 p e r  cen t r a te  of growth cou ld  be 
e a s i ly  m ain tained .
(o) COMPOSITION OF THE INVESTMENT PROGRAvOffî
At th e  o u ts e t  i t  may be u se fu l to  d is t in g u is h  th e  re sp e c tiv e
ro le s  given in  the F i r s t  P lan  to  p u b lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to r s .  The types 
of a c t i v i t y  th a t  were p lanned  to  f a l l  w ith in  the domain of p u b lic  s e c to r  
can be u se fu l f o r  p ro v id in g  a framework f o r  p u b lic  p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  
in  P a rt I I I ,
We have p o in te d  out elsew here th a t  th e  p u b lic  s e c to r  was 
to  undertalce about 60 p e r cen t o f th e  t o t a l  s iz e  of the  investm ent 
programme. As can be seen from Table 1 , p u b lic  s e c to r  investm ents Avere 
expected  to  reach  33 .7  b i l l i o n  TL. over f iv e -y e a rs  as compared w ith  
p r iv a te  s e c to r 's  23.9 b i l l i o n  TL,
The reason  f o r  a s tro n g  government predominance in  the sphere 
of development can be exp la in ed  as fo llo w s: the  u rg en t need f o r  ensuring
s t r u c tu r a l  changes in  th e  economy, w ith re sp e c t to  GNP, la b o u r-fo rc e , 
fo re ig n  tra d e  and commodity to  be su p p lied  made i t  e s s e n t ia l  f o r  the govern­
ment to  become d i r e c t ly  in v o lv ed  in  the  economic development p rocess by 
p u tt in g  th e  economy la r g e ly  in  the  hands o f the  p u b lic  s e c to r .
The lo ng -term  goal in  Turkey l ik e  in  most developing  c o u n trie s
v/as, o f co u rse , a la rg e  share  f o r  the m anufacturing in d u s try  in  th e  Gross
N a tio n a l P roduct. A change in  the s t ru c tu re  of th e  economy could  be 
p o s s ib le  only by developing  th e  m anufacturing s e c to r .  The p re se n t 
economic s t ru c tu re  c h a ra c te r is e d  by a la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  of th e  t o t a l  
working fo rc e  in  p rim ary  p ro d u c tio n  i s  someviiat unbalanced and should 
be cured  by an a l l - o u t  d riv e  f o r  m anufacturing in d u s try . The government
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wanted to  in te n s i f y  i t s  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  la rg e - s c a le  in d u s tr ie s  by i t s  
S ta te  Economic E n te rp r ise s  (SEE). These in d u s tr ie s  in c lu d e  s te e l - i r o n ,  
m achinery and equipm ent, chem icals, paper and ru b b er.
Second, the expansion of a g r ic u l tu r a l  ou tpu t stopped  sh arp ly  
by th e  end of 1956 when the l im i t  o f c u lt iv a b le  la n d  was reached. 
A g ric u ltu re  which v/as o r ig in a l ly  dependent on ex ten s iv e  farm ing and 
w eather co n d itio n s  was s u f fe r in g  from a la rg e  su rp lu s  of la b o u r fo rce  
which esèirfced a se r io u s  p re ssu re  on peasan t a g r ic u l tu re .
TATLE 1 -  P lan  Investm ent P ro je c tio n s  fo r  P u b lic  
and P r iv a te  S ec to rs  -  1965-1967
PRIVA'TE PUBLIC TOTAL




B il l io n
TL. of GNP
B il l io n
TL. of GNP
1963 3 .8 6 .7 5 .8 10.3 9 .6 17.0
1964 4 .2 7 .0 6 ,6 . 10 .9 1 0 .8 17.9
1965 4 .7 7.3 7 .1 11.0 1 1 .8 18.3
1966 5 .3 7 .7 7 .8 11 .3 13 .1 19 .0
1967 5 .9 8 .0 8 .4 1 1 .4 14.3 1 9 .4
TOTAL 23.9 35.7 59.6
Average Annual 
In c rease 11 .0 10 .6 1 0 .7
As percen tage  o f 
t o t a l  Investm ents 40.0 60.0 100.0
Source: The F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  1965-67, p .108
I t  was due to  t h i s  background th a t  the government l a id
co n sid e rab le  emphasis on m anufacturing in d u s try , f o r  th e  l a t t e r  could  ■
o f f e r ,  in  th e  long  run , la r g e r  employment o p p o r tu n i tie s . In  f a c t ,
accord ing  to  p lan  p ro je c tio n  employment in  in d u s try  was to  grovr by 52 '
(2)p e r cen t as compared to  5 .6  p e r  cen t in  a g r ic u ltu re X
(1) At the beg inn ing  of the p lan  e ra , th e re  was over 1 m illio n  unemployed 
in  a g r ic u l tu r e .
(2) See F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  1963-67, SPO, Ankara, I 963 , p . 400.
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T hird , th e re  was a chron ic  s t r a in  developed on th e  balance  
of payments v ia  r e l a t i v e  s ta g n a tio n  o f th e  export demand f o r  prim ary 
p roducts  on which T urkey 's  fo re ig n  tra d e  p o s itio n ;d e p en d s . The 
government f e l t  th a t  im port s u b s t i tu t io n  in d u s tr ie s  v/hich-are by n a tu re  
c a p i ta l - in te n s iv e  b u t p re ssu re -red u c in g  on the b a lan ce  of payments in  
th e  lo n g -ru n  should  be i n i t i a t e d .  These in d u s t r ie s  were needed to  feed  
o th e r s e c to rs  of th e  economy and a lso  le s s e n  th e  dependence o f th e  coun try  
on the  im ported  c a p i ta l  goods.
F in a l ly ,  th e  government was eager to  improve te c h n ic a l  s k i l l  
and know-how which the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  v/as no t ab le to  in tro d u ce  because 
p ro p er loiowledge o f markets and technology i s  b o th  c o s t ly  and d i f f i c u l t  
to  o b ta in , and a la c k  o f loiowledge would h in d e r th e  e stab lish m en t of 
o therw ise  p r o f i ta b le  in d u s t r ie s .  The d iffe re n c e  betw een th e  p r iv a te  
en trep ren eu r and th e  p lan n ers  vbo a c t f o r  th e  government i s  one of 
tim e. This i s  th e  tim e between each of them becoming aware of new 
o p p o r tu n itie s .
In  conclusion  th e  government took th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f r a i s in g  
the  p ro d u c tiv e  c a p a c ity  o f the  economy as w ell as th e  s o c ia l  overhead 
c a p i ta l  investm ent re q u ire d  fo r  the form er.
As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3^ t o t a l  p u b lic  ex pend itu re  
(c u rre n t and c a p i ta l  ex pend itu re) during the p lan  p e rio d  amounted to
100.03 b i l l i o n  TL. C urren t expend itu re  and c a p i t a l  expend itu re  
budgets re ce iv ed  39*2 b i l l i o n  TL and 40 .7  b i l l i o n  TL, r e s p e c tiv e ly .
T o ta l p u b lic  expend itu re  in  th e  p la n  was p ro je c te d  to  r i s e  from 24,7 
p e r  cen t of GNP in  1962 to  27 ,4  p e r  cen t in  1967 ( a  10 p e r  c en t in c re a s e ) .
A ccordingly , p u b lic  c a p i ta l  expend itu re  c o n s t i tu te d  39 p e r  c en t 
o f the t o t a l  p u b lic  ex pend itu re  a t  the  beg inn ing  of th e  p lan  and 41 .4  
p e r  c en t a t  th e  end of th e  p la n  -  an in c re a se  of 6 .2  p e r  c en t over the  
p lan  p e rio d . P u b lic  c u rre n t ex p en d itu re ,o n  the  o th e r  hand, Avas p ro je c te d  
to  d e c lin e  from 6 l p e r  cen t to  58.6  p e r  cen t in  th e  same p e rio d .
I t  must be no ted  t h a t ,  though the  r i s e  in  c a p i t a l  expend itu re  
was encouraging , i t  was f a r  from be ing  s a t i s f a c to r y  f o r  ach iev in g  the  
p lan  o b jec tiv es*  I t  i s  ev id en t th a t  a 6 .0  p e r  cen t in c re a se  in  p u b lic  
c a p i ta l  expen d itu re  was v e ry  in s ig n i f ic a n t  and re c u r re n t  expend itu re  
( i . e .  defence and genera l a d m in is tra tio n ) cou ld  have been squeezed much 
f u r th e r  than i t  v/as a lre ad y  in  the F i r s t  P lan ,
TABLE 2 PUBLIC EXPEDmiTUPE TARGETS 1963-67 
B il l io n  TL ( 196I  p r ic e s )
Year
C urren t ( l )  Investm ent 
E xpenditure  E xpenditure
T o ta l p u b lic  
E xpenditure
1962 7.96 5.08 13.04
1963 9.07 5,80 14,67
1964 9 .55 6.60 15.95
1965 10.01 7.10 17,11
1966 11 .00 7.80 18.80
1967 11.90 8.40 20,30
T otal 59.29 40,78 100.03
Source: FEYP, 1963- 67 , p .112
TABLE 3 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AS PERCEIvTTAGE OF GNP
C urrent Investm ent T o ta l p u b lic
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
1962 15.10 9.64 24.74
1963 16,08 10.28 26.36
1964 15,50 10 .94 26.45
1965 15.52 11.01 26.53
1966 15 .94 11.30 27.25
1967 16,10 ■ 11.37 27.47
Source : PPYP, 1963- 67 , p .112
TABLE 4 CURRENT AND INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE AS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
1963-67
C urrent Investm ent
Year E xpenditure Expenditure T o ta l
1962 61.0 39.0 100
1963 60.9 39,1 100
1964 58.6 41,4 100
1965 58 ,5 41.5 IOC
1966 58 .5 41.5 IOC
1967 58 .6 41 .4 100
Source Î Computed from Table 52, PPYP, p .112
(1 ) C urrent expend itu re  in c lu d es  developm ent, dom estic debt repayment and 
in t e r e s t  (on in te r n a l  and e x te rn a l debts) and lo c a l  a d m in is tra tio n .
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The p lan  g iv es  a b road  in d ic a tio n  of what i s  expected  from the  
government investm en t. To quote from the  p lan ; " I f  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  
does no t in v e s t  in  a f i e l d  which i s  regarded  as n e ce ssa ry  in  the  p la n , 
and th i s  s i tu a t io n  c re a te s  s ig n if ic a n t  b o ttle n e c k s  in  th e  economy, the  
s ta t e  or p u b lic  e n te r p r is e s  w il l  r e a d ju s t  t h e i r  investm ent programmes 
to  a ssu re  the  r e a l i s a t i o n  of th e  n ecessa ry  investm ents"^^^
But a l l  t h i s  does n o t mean th a t  the p r iv a te  s e c to r  was to  
p la y  a l e s s  im portan t ro le ;  on the  c o n tra ry , p r iv a te  investm en ts were 
expected to  r i s e  from 6-7 p e r  cen t of GNP to  8 p e r  c en t o f the  GNP 
over th e  same p lan  p e r i o d . T h i s  in d ic a te s  a  n o ta b le  in c re a se  in  th e  
volume of p r iv a te  investm ents# In  ab so lu te  tearms, th e  p r iv a te  investm ents 
were p lanned to  r i s e  from 3 .8  b i l l i o n  TL. to  5 .9  b i l l i o n  TIj, in  th e  p lan  
p e rio d  (see  Table l ) . This i s  an u n d erestim atio n  as w i l l  be seen in  
S ec tion  ( e ) .  This p ro je c t io n  im p lie s  th a t  th e re  would be an in c re a se  
o f 55 p e r  cen t in  the t o t a l  p r iv a te  in v estm en ts . I t  can be concluded 
th a t  the p lan  in  f a c t  had expected  an equal perform ance from the p r iv a te  
s e c to r  d e sp ite  the  f a c t  th a t  the p lan  cannot be b in d in g  f o r  the p r iv a te  
s e c to r .
The d is t r ib u t io n  of investm ents by investm ent a c t i v i t i e s  in  pub lic  
and p r iv a te  s e c to rs  i s  no t given by th e  p lan  and the  only  a v a ila b le  ta b le  
was th e  one p rov ided  by th e  OECB in  the  "Turkish F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan ,
1963- 67, Report by an E xpert Group f o r  th e  OECD Consortium f o r  Turkey"  ^
Table 5 in d ic a te s  th a t  the l a r g e s t  p ro p o rtio n  of the  p u b lic  investm ent was 
devoted to  in d s try ( in c lu d in g  m anufacturing , raining and energy) w ith 29.6 
p e r  cen t fo llow ed  by a g r ic u ltu re  w ith  20,9 p e r cen t; by  t r a n s p o r t  and 
communications Avith 18 .2  p e r  c en t; and the rem aining 31*3 p e r  cen t was 
devoted to  ed u ca tio n , h e a lth  housing and o th e r se rv ices#
( 1 ) The F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , 1963-67, p . 55.
( 2) I b i d . ,  p p .109-110
( 3) According to  the  p lan  the government Avas to  take  c e r ta in  measures to  
encourage the  p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  i . e .  by e s ta b lis h in g  environm ental 
c o n d itio n s , p ro te c t io n  from fo re ig n  com p etitio n , encouraging investm ents 
by f in a n c ia l  and f i s c a l  p o l ic ie s .  The government was a lso  to  p rovide 
e q u a li ty  between p r iv a te  and p u b lic  se c to rs  in  re s p e c t of p r ic e  p o licy^  
fo re ig n  exchange and c a p i t a l .  See The F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , 1963-67 
SPO, Ankara, 1963 , pp . 56, 109. -
( 4) OECD, T urk ish  F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , 1963-67, Ju ly  1963, p . 6
44.
The p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  on the  o th e r hand, a l lo c a te d  alm ost h a lf  
of i t s  investm ent re so u rces  to  housing (4 4 .7  p e r  c e n t) ,  fo llow ed  by 
m anufacturing  (2 5 .7  p e r  cen t) and a g r ic u l tu re  (12 .9  p e r  c e n t) .  P r iv a te  
investm ents devoted  to  energy, t r a n s p o r t  and m ining are n o t v e ry  s u b s ta n t ia l  
as compared w ith  government investm en ts in  the same a c t i v i t i e s .
TABLE 5 D is tr ib u t io n  of P ro jec te d  Plan Investm ents by Type 
of A c t iv i t i e s ,  1963-67 B il l io n  TL ( 196I  p r ic e s )
P ub lic P r iv a te T o tal
Amount % Amount Amount
A g ric u ltu re 7 .5 20,9 3ol 1 2 .9 10,6
Mining and quarry ing 2.1 5 .9 1 ,1 4 .7 3 .2
M anufacturing 4 .0 11.1 6.1 25,7 10,1
Energy 4 .5 12 ,6 0 .6 2 .6 5 .1
T ranspo rt and Commun­
ic a t io n s 6 .5 18 .2 1 .7 6 .9 8 .2
Housing 1 .4 4.1 10 .7 44.7 12.1
S erv ices and Tourism
( i n c l ,  educa tion  and h e a lth )  9 .8 27.2 0,6 2 .5 1 0 .4
T o ta l 35 .8 100.0 23.9 100,0 59.7
Source: The T urk ish  F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , 1963-67. Report
by an E xpert Group f o r  the  OECD Consortium fo r  
Turkey, Ju ly  1963, p#6
Of cou rse , the  p r iv a te  investm ent d ec is io n s  cannot be f o r e c a s t  A\lth g re a t 
accuracy and th e re fo re  the  d is t r ib u t io n  of investm ents between p u b lic  and 
p r iv a te  s e c to rs  shown in  Table 5 , should  be t r e a te d  as a te n ta t iv e  in d ic a tio n  
o f magnitude and d ir e c t io n .
The SPO's investm ent c l a s s i f i c a t io n  does n o t show us the  tru e  
n a tu re  of the  development p la n  and the  investm ent s t r a te g y  endorsed by i t .  
T h ere fo re , i t  may be n ecessa ry  to  examine the p a t te rn  of a l lo c a t io n  on the 
b a s is  of d i f f e r e n t  b u t qui.te a c o e p te d -o la s s if ic a t io n  system s. This way, 
a c le a r e r  p ic tu re  can be o b ta ined .
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A. Under the f i r s t  c l a s s i f i c a t io n  system we t r e a t  investm ent 
under the headings o f p ro d u c tiv e  in v estm en ts , im pulse in v estm en ts , s o c ia l  
investm ents and h o u rsing  in v estm en ts . In Table 6, which I  have arranged 
from Table 5 , p ro d u c tiv e  investm en ts are  used to  inc lu d e  a g r ic u l tu re ,  
m ining and m anufacturing; im pulse investm ents as in c lu d in g  tra n s p o r t  
and communications and energy; s o c ia l  investm ents as in c lu d in g  ed u ca tio n , 
h e a lth ,  s e rv ic e s ,to u r is m ; Housing as opvering  government and p r iv a te  
dw ellin g s .
The sh a re  of p u b lic  s e c to r  in  what I  have term ed "productive 
in v estm en ts" , exceeds th e  share of the  p r iv a te  s e c to r . Such i s  a lso  
the  case w ith  o th e r types of investm en ts such as im pulse and s o c ia l  
inv estm en ts , excep t f o r  item  (d ) ,  in  Table 6, where the p r iv a te  sec to rb  
d o h tf ib u tio n  to  th e  development of the housing s e c to r  f a r  exceeds th a t  of 
p u b lic  s e c to r .
The main p o in ts  th a t  can be draivn from Table 6 and 7 a re :
1) Almost 40 p e r  cen t o f t o t a l  c a p i ta l  o u tla y  designed f o r  the  p lan  p e rio d , 
1965- 67, v/as a l lo c a te d  to  p ro d u c tiv e  investm ents# Impulse investm ents 
c o n s t i tu te d  on ly  22,2 p e r  cen t o f the t o t a l  investm ent amounting to  13.5 
b i l l i o n  TL-b. in  the  same p e rio d . Housing by i t s e l f  re c e iv e d  a s u b s ta n t ia l  
p ro p o rtio n  of t o t a l  investm ent re p re se n tin g  20.3 p e r  c en t of the t o t a l .
S o c ia l investm en ts ranlced a t  the  bottom  of the o v e ra ll  investm ent programme 
(o n ly  17o7 p e r  c e n t) .
2) The d is t r ib u t io n  o f investm ents between p u b lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to rs  under 
t h i s  type of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  a lso  in te r e s t in g  (see  Table 7 ) ,
Almost 57 p e r  cen t of th e  p ro d u c tiv e  in v estm en ts , 83 p e r cen t of 
impu3.se and 94 p e r  cen t of s o c ia l  investm ents were undertaken  by the  government 
o r i t s  A gencieso
P r iv a te  s e c to r ,  on th e  o th e r hand, was exceed ing ly  dominant in  
housing investm ents Avith 88 p e r  c e n t, w hile i t s  share  in  p ro d u c tiv e  and 
im pulse investm ents was 43 p e r cen t and 17 p e r  c en t r e s p e c tiv e ly . P r iv a te  
s e c to r  investm ents in  im pulse and s o c ia l  investm ents were le s s  s ig n i f ic a n t .
The amount o f c a p i t a l  devoted to  housing b o th  w ith in  th e  p r iv a te  
s e c to r  and as a p ercen tage  of t o t a l  investm ents deserves sp e c ia l  a tte n tio n *  
Almost a q u a r te r  o f t o t a l  investm ent and a lso  45 p e r  cen t of t o t a l  p r iv a te  
investm ents are in  housing  s e c to r  a lo n e . M anufacturing investm ent in  p r iv a te  
s e c to r  c o n s t i tu te d  on3.y 25#7 p e r cen t which s ig n i f ie s  th e  im portance of a
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TABLE 6 P lanned D is tr ib u t io n  o f Investm ent by Type of
In v e s to r  and A c tiv i ty ,  1963-67 B i l l io n  TL (196I  p r ic e s )
Source: I t  i s  re a rran g ed  accord ing  to  the  f ig u re s  given in
Table 5*
S ec to r
A c tiv i ty
Pub lic
S ec to r
P r iv a te
S ec to r T o ta l
As percen tag e  of 
the  t o t a l  %
a) P roductive
Investm ents 13 .6 10.3 23.9 40.0
b) Impulse Investm ents 11.0 2o3 13.3 22.2
c) S o c ia l Investm ents 9 .8 0.6 1 0 .4 17 .3
d) Housing Investm en ts 1 .4 10 .7 12 .1 20.3
T o ta l 35.8 23.9 59 .7 100,0
TABLE 7 D is tr ib u t io n  o f investm ents between P u b lic  and
P r iv a te  s e c to rs  -  1963-67, By percen tag es
S ec to r P ub lic
S ec to r
P r iv a te
S ec to r
T o ta l
a) P roductive  Investm ent 57 43 100
b) Im pulse Investm ents 83 17 100
c) S oc ia l Investm ents 94 6 100
d) Housing Investm en ts 12 88 100
Source: I t  i s  computed from Table 6.
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s h i f t  in  the a l lo c a t io n  of investm ents in  th is  s e c to r .
B earing th i s  in  mind the  F i r s t  P lan suggested  the  necessa ry  
measures ( f i s c a l  and monetary) in  o rd e r to  d i r e c t  p r iv a te  investm ents in to  
more p ro d u c tiv e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i . e .  m anufacturing or a g r ic u l tu r e .  In  the 
p lan  p ro je c t io n , p r iv a te  investm ents in  non-housing a c t i v i t i e s  were expected 
to  r i s e  hy 17 p e r cen t as compared to  7 pen cent in c re a se  in  housing 
i n v e s t m e n t s . T h i s ,  however, would seem, as im plem entation r e s u l t s  
in d ic a te d , to  he a r a th e r  o p tim is t ic  p ro je c tio n  where the p r iv a te  sector?, 
d e sp ite  a l l  the  measures talcen, in s i s t e d  on c o n c e n tra tin g  in  housing.
3) The co n sid e rab ly  h ig h e r percen tage  o f p u b lic  investm ents in  "p roductive
investm en ts" r e f le c te d  the re a d in ess  o f the government to  d i r e c t  p u b lic
(2)a c tio n  toward a c c e le ra te d  developm ent' , The h ig h e r p ro p o rtio n  here 
was duo to  the  f a c t  th a t  the  government was to  undertake heavy in d u s try  in  
which the p r iv a te  s e c to r  was no t in te re s te d #
Bo A b roader c l a s s i f i c a t io n  o f investm ent a l lo c a t io n  can a lso  shed 
some l ig h t  in to  the  investm ent s t r a te g y  of the  P lan . Here, I  s h a l l  look in to  
the  investm ent p a t te rn  from the angle o f s o c ia l  overhead c a p i ta l  v s . d i r e c t ly  
p roductive  a c t i v i t i e s .
In  the d i r e c t ly  p ro d u c tiv e  investm ent ca teg o ry  I  have inc luded  
a g r ic u ltu re  (exc lud ing  i r r i g a t i o n ) , mining and quarry ingpnantifac tun ing  and 
to u rism (^ ). This investm ent catego ry  amounted to  19o2 b i l l i o n  TL. du rin g
(1) F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  1963-67» Report by an Expert Group fo r  the OECD 
Consortium fo r  Turkey, Ju ly  1963» p .6
(2) The p u b lic  s e c to r  in te rv e n tio n  in  in d u s try  in  Turkey s ta r te d  as e a r ly  as 
'1934 w ith  the in c e p tio n  o f the  F i r s t  F iv e-y ear I n d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  Programme
( 1934- 38)0 Turkey d u ring  th a t  p e riod  aimed a t  e s ta b l is h in g  the b a s ic  and 
key in d u s tr ie s  in  o rd e r to  s tim u la te  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t io n .  The government, 
which was then  im p a tien t w ith  the  slow response from the p r iv a te  s e c to r  
to  undertake b a s ic  in d u s tr ie s  d e sp ite  the encouraging f i s c a l  and monetary 
measures p rov ided , f e l t  ob lig ed  to  s tep  in  and i n i t i a t e  key in d u s tr ie s  
such as s t e e l - i r o n ,  chem icals, cement, t e x t i l e s  end c lo th in g . These 
in d u s tr ie s  were ( s t i l l  a re  now) c a r r ie d  out by the  s t a t e  economic e n te r ­
p r is e s  (SEE)whidk were e s ta b lish e d  in  the  'same p e rio d . For more d e ta i l s  
see the  p re sen t a u th o r 's  II.A, th e s i s :  "A study o f the  T urkish  F i r s t  Five
Year P lan  1963-67 w ith  s p e c ia l re fe re n ce  to  Resource A llo ca tio n  and 
Investm ent D ecis io n s" , Durham U n iv e rs ity , England, May I 966 , C hapter 2#
( 3) I  have inc luded  tourism  in  the DPA category  because i t  has been and s t i l l  
i s  the f a s t e s t  growing s e c to r  in  th e  economy and because i t  i s  p ro v id in g  
the  g re a te s t  improvement in  the balance of paym ents. In  o th e r words 
r a te  o f r e tu rn  on c a p i ta l  in v es ted  in  tourism  p ro je c ts  ranks h ig h e r than 
o th e r a l t e r n a t iv e  u se s . In  I 967 tourism  revenue was 48 per cent h ig h e r 
than  1966 le v e l  and th e re  i s  good evidence now th a t  the  number of to u r i s t s  
v i s i t i n g  Turkey i s  in c re a s in g  by 20 per cent p e r annum. See I k f is a d i  Rapor 
1968. Turkiyo T ic a re t o d a la r i ,  Sanayi 'o d o la r i re  T ic a re t B o n sa la ri B i r l ig i ,  
p . 138
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the  p lan  period#
I  have taken  800 in  a  very broad sense to  in c lu d e  energy, 
t ra n s p o r t  and communications, i r r i g a t io n ,  education , h e a lth  and serv ices#
These taken  to g e th e r  amounted to  28#2 b i l l i o n  TL. in  the same p e rio d . I t
i ] )must be no ted  th a t  I  am fo llow ing  A.O.Hirschman* s ^ d e f i n i t i o n  of 800 
which can be d is tin g u ish e d  by the  fo llow ing  c o n d itio n s : ( l )  s e rv ic e s
which a re  in  some sense b a s ic  to  the c a rry in g  on of a g re a t v a r ie ty  of 
economic a c t i v i t i e s ;  (2) s e rv ic e s  which a re  provided in  alm ost a l l  c o u n trie s  
by p u b lic  agencies o r by p r iv a te  agencies su b jec t to  some p u b lic  co n to l;
(3) a c t i v i t i e s  which cannot be im ported; (4) those investm ents which 
re q u ire  high c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t i o s ,
800 investm ents o f the  F i r s t  P lan  had c o n s t i tu te d  47*3 p er cent 
o f t o t a l  investm ent as compared w ith  32*4 per cent in  d i r e c t ly  p roductive  
investm en ts . (See Table 8)# Housing, on the o th e r hand, c o n s ti tu te d  
20o3 p er cen t of t o t a l .
I t  fo llow s th a t  the F i r s t  P lan  gave o u ts tan d in g  p r io r i t y  to the 
estab lis lim en t o f b a s ic  s o c ia l  in f r a s t r u c tu r e  so as to  prov ide firm  ground 
fo r  fu r th e r  in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n #  I t  appears the SPO co n cen tra ted  on economic 
and s o c ia l  in f r a s t r u c tu r e  (energy supply , t ra n s p o r t ,  i r r i g a t io n  and a l l  o th e r 
s e rv ic e s )  d e l ib e ra te ly  f o r  they  considered  these  as p re -c o n d itio n s  fo r  
in d u s t r ia l  growth. But, need less  to  add, th i s  a l lo c a t io n  does no t support 
the  argument th a t  the  P lan i s  a d i r e c t ly  p roductive  p lan  as was advocated by 
the  SPO.
I t  i s  tru e  th a t  b asic  economic f a c i l i t i e s  o f th e  kind we have
mentioned above a re  re q u ire d  in  every type of p roduction  and th e i r  b e n e f its
(e x te rn a l)  to  o th e r s e c to rs  o f the economy can be immense. M arginal s o c ia l
b e n e f i ts  in  800 a re  so much in  excess o f m arginal n r iv a te  b e n e f i ts  th a t  the
(2)governm ent's investm ents in  th e se  f i e ld s  become in e v i ta b le # ' ^
But our o b je c tio n  here i s  not to  the i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f th ese  in v e s t­
ments but to  the s c a le  o f p r io r i t y  given to  800 in  the  o v e ra l l  investm ent
(1) See A.O.Hirschman, The S tra teg y  o f Economic Development, Yale U n iv e rs ity  
P ress , 1358, London, pp#63-84
(2) The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of a p ro je c t  to .a n  en trep ren eu r depends on h is  p r o f i t  
and the  tu rn o v e r to  c a p i ta l  in v es ted  while the government ev a lu a tes  
investm ent o p p o rtu n itie s  by the "value added" from a l l  f a c to r s  of 
p roduction  in c lu d in g  lab o u r. In  the former case wages a re  considered
as a co st to  be deducted from p r o f i t s  w h ils t to  the  l a t t e r  i t  c o n s t i tu te s  
"value added"#
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programme. Moreover, as s h a l l  be explained  f u l ly  in  subsequent s e c tio n s , 
s e c to ra l  a l lo c a t io n  to  s o c ia l  overhead a c t i v i t i e s  was based on inadequate  
s e c to r  a n a ly s is  in s te a d  o f an o v e ra ll  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  which could in d ic a te  
the  in te ra c t io n  between the two broad c a te g o r ie s . F u r th e r , i t  seems th a t  
th e re  i s  a c o n tra d ic t io n  in  the p lan  in  re sp e c t of i t s  major o b je c t iv e , 
th a t  i s  prom oting in d u s t r ia l  growth and thus p ro d u c tiv e  c ap ac ity  on the 
one hand, and the type o f a l lo c a t io n  which gave p r io r i t y  to  800 investm ents 
on the  o th e r hand# The p lan  appears to  have d iv e r te d  from i t s  b a sic  
o b je c tiv e  as can be read  in  the fo llo w in g  q u o ta tio n . The P lan  s t a t e s :
"In  o rd er to  make th e  b e s t use o f th e  c o u n try 's  economic re so u rces  c e r ta in  
p u b lic  s e rv ic e s  must be given g re a te r  emphasis than  in  the  p a s t .  These 
s e rv ic e s  which are the  foundation  of economic development inc lu d e  both the  
t r a d i t io n a l  p u b lic  s e rv ic e s , such as power supply, i r r i g a t io n  and hydro-dams 
which a re  the  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of the C en tra l A u th o rit ie s  even in  the most 
advanced c o u n tr ie s . These s e rv ic e s  a re  p re - r e q u is i te s  fo r  the  investm ents 
to  be made in  p ro d u c tiv e  f i e l d s . "
The above s ta tem en t in  the F i r s t  P lan  in d ic a te s  th a t  the p lan  
r e l ie d  co n sid e rab ly  on the p ro v is io n  o f SOC sin ce  the  SPO f e l t  tha.t th i s  would 
have a g re a te r  im pact on the  p rocess o f " c re a tin g  c ap a c ity  to  c re a t  w ea lth ."
But th i s  s ta tem en t i s  c o n tra ry  to  the  P lan o b je c tiv e  which was to  
ptomote in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  and a balanced growth o f a l l  s e c to rs  (as we s h a l l  see 
in  the im plem entation)#
TABLE 8 -  D ire c tly  P roductive v s . S oc ia l Overhead C ap ita l 
Investm ents (1963-67) ( I 96I p rices ')
S ec to rs M illio n  TL. Percentage of t o t a l
lo D ire c tly  p ro d u c tiv e  
Investm ents (DPI) 19, 264.3 32,4
2oSocial overhead 
c a p i ta l  (SOC) 28,266,3 47.5
3# Housing Investm ents 12,116*0 20.3
T otal 39,64608 100.0
Source: I t  i s  computed from Table 5 ,
(1 ) The F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan 1963- 67 , p . 33
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Co The investm ent s tra te g y  of the  F i r s t  P lan  w il l  be 
compared here  w ith  o th e r developing  c o u n trie s  ih  r e l a t i o n  to  the p u b lic  
investm ent s tr a te g y  as w e ll as o v e ra l l  investm ent s t r a te g y .
In Table 9, developing  c o u n trie s  a re  c la s s i f i e d  accord ing  to  
t h e i r  p u b lic  investm ent s tra te g y  Under t hree groups such as c o u n trie s  
which a re  p la c in g  emphasis on commodity p roduction  and b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s ;  
c o u n trie s  p la c in g  emphasis on commodity p roduction  and s e rv ic e s ;  and 
f i n a l ly  c o u n trie s  p la c in g  emphasis on b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  and serv ices#  This 
c la s s i f i c a t io n  method i s  Avhat i s  ap p lied  by the U.h. Economic Commission 
in  comparing v a rio u s  developing  coun tries#
I t  can be seen from Table 9» th a t  the p u b lic  development programme 
in  Turkey does no t f a l l  in to  groups (a ) or (c ) ;  but p robab ly  i t  i s  much 
n e a re r  to  group (b)# In  a c tu a l f a c t  the emphasis in  the  F i r s t  P lan  as 
f a r  as the p u b lic  investm ent prograimne i s  concerned i s  r a th e r  eq u a lly  
d is t r ib u te d  among commodity p ro d u c tio n , b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  and serv ices#
I t  i s  apparen t th a t  the  planned government investm ent was designed to  enable 
the country  to  advance sim u ltaneously  in  d i r e c t ly  p ro d u c tiv e  s e c to rs ,  b a s ic  
f a c i l i t i e s  as w ell as s o c ia l  s e rv ic e s .  This i s  tantam ount to  say ing  th a t  
the  government had aimed a t  a balanced p a tte rn  of growth w h ils t  g iv in g  more 
emphasis to  commodity production# As Table 9 in d ic a te s  p u b lic  investm ent 
ass igned  to  commodity p roduction  rep re se n te d  5T.9 per cen t o f the  t o t a l ,  
b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  be ing  30.8  per cen t and se rv ic e s  31.5  per c e n t.
But w hile c o u n trie s  l ik e  In d ia , P a k is ta n , and Ü.A.R. devoted alm ost 
h a l f  o f t h e i r  p u b lic  investm ent to  commodity p ro d u c tio n , Turkey in  the F i r s t  
P lan devoted only  I /3  o f i t s  t o t a l  p u b lic  investm ents# Thus the ro le  o f 
the  government in  d i r e c t ly  p roductive  s e c to rs  in  those  co u n trie s  appears 
to  be more s ig n i f ic a n t  than  i t  i s  in  Turkey.
So f a r  I  have considered  the p u b lic  investm ent and i t s  a l lo c a t io n .  
But, again  ta k in g  the investm ent c la s s i f i c a t io n  adopted by the  M , Economic 
Commission the  o v e ra ll  investm ent programme can be compared w ith o th e r le s s  
le s s  developed c o u n tr ie s .
A ccording to  t o t a l  investm ent programme in  the p lan , Turkey 
a llo c a te d  40 p e r cen t o f the  t o t a l  to  commodity p ro d u c tio n , 22*3 p e r cent 
in  b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  and 37*7 p er cent in  s e rv ic e s  ( in c lu d in g  housing)#
(See Table lO)#
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Table 9 Planned D is tr ib u tio n  of P ub lic  Investm ent -  percen tage
Country Commodity P roduction  
T o tal A gric . Min. Manuf#
Basic F a c i l i t i e s  . — .... ...— ... ... -Trans # &
T otal Power comm#
Serv ices
A. Group
U.A.R. 55 24 1 31 25 6 19 20
In d ia 48 21 - 27 42 17 25 10
P ak is tan 46 35 3 10 29 10 19 23
Ceylon 47 23 24 30 10 20 23
B. Group
Sudan 41 32 - 9 28 6 22 32
Jordan 45 45 - 26 26 28
(1 )Turkey 37. 9 20.9 5.9 11.1 30.8 12.6 18.2 31.3
C. Group
Ira n 37 19 2 17 37 11 26 26
M alaysia 30 25 1 39 19 20 31
Burma . 27 15 2 10 37 8 29 36
: N ig eria 27 14 — 13 44 19 26 29
Chile 15 6 " 8 43 17 26 42
Colombia 6 5 — 1 52 13 38 42
Source ; UN. World Economic Survey, New York , 1965, p . 37
Notes : AoGroup in d ic a te s  co u n trie s  p la c in g  emphasis on commodity p roduction
and b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s
Bo Group in d ic a te s  c o u n tr ie s  p la c in g  emphasis on commodity p roduction  
and s e rv ic e s .
C. Group in d ic a te s  co u n trie s  p la c in g  emphasis on b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  
and s e rv ic e s .
( l )  The f ig u re s  fo r  Turkey are p laced  in  the Table so as to  provide 
com parison, For Turkey, commodity p ro d u c tio n  in c lu d es  a g r ic u ltu re  
and i r r i g a t io n ,  m ining and m anufacturing# B asic f a c i l i t i e s  inc lude  
Power and T ransport and Communications, S erv ices  inc lu d e  Housing, 
E ducation , H ealth , Tourism and o th e r se rv ices#
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In  view o f th i s  c l a s s i f i c a t io n ,  Turkey f a l l s  in to  group G. 
where the  emphasis i s  both  on b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  and se rv ice s#  I t  fo llow s 
th a t  60 per cen t o f th e  t o t a l  investm ent i s  assigned  to  s o c ia l  and economic 
overhead in v estm en ts . This f in d in g  supports  the second c la s s i f i c a t io n  
model we have ap p lied  e a r l i e r .
C oun tries l ik e  In d ia , P a k is ta n , B o liv ia  and U .A .R ., in  c o n tra s t ,  
have devoted la rg e r  p ro p o rtio n  o f t h e i r  investm ent re so u rce s  to  commodity 
p ro d uction  (ran g in g  from 53 por cen t to  6l  p e r cen t)#  For in s ta n c e , i f  
we : tplce in d u s try  as com prising m anufacturing  and m ining, we n o tic e  th a t  
c o u n tr ie s  l ik e  B o liv ia , P a k is ta n , In d ia  and U.A.R., ou t o f th e i r  t o t a l  
re so u rce s  devoted 44 c en t, 26 p er c en t, 3I  por cen t and 29 p e r cent 
r e s p e c tiv e ly  to  in d u stry #  Turkey, in  c o n tra s t  to  the  above c o u n tr ie s , 
a ss igned  only  22«3 por cent o f i t s  t o t a l  investm ent to  industry^^^#
I t  can th e re fo re  be p o in ted  out th a t  the T urk ish  Five-Y ear p lan  
does no t seem to  j u s t i f y  the p la n n e rs ' a s s e r t io n  th a t  th e  p lan  i s  an 
in d u s t r i a l  development p la n . I t  must, however, be no ted  What makes 
the  p lan  le s s  an in d u s t r i a l i s a t io n  programme is  the g re a te r  w eight given to  
a g r ic u l tu r a l  in f r a s t r u c tu r e  ( i . e .  i r r i g a t io n  works) in  commodity p roduction  
and the  ex cessiv e  a l lo c a t io n  p e r s is ta n t  in  the housing  s e c to r  which i s  
in c luded  in  th e  "S erv ices"  category# Thus, investm ents in  bo th  s e c to rs  
can be considered  to  be the main determ inan ts of the  Investm ent s tra te g y  
o f the F i r s t  P lan .
To sum up the  conclusions which a re  derived  from th is  sec tio n s
1 ) The s ig n i f ic a n t  ro le  o f the  p u b lic  investm ent programme in  the 
a l lo c a t io n  o f t o t a l  investm ent i s  q u ite  apparent# The P lan  expected a 
n o tab le  perform ance from the  p u b lic  s e c to r  in  the  p ro v is io n  o f p h y s ica l and 
s o c ia l  in f r a s t r u c tu r e  and in  expanding the  b a s is  fo r  f u r th e r  in d u s t r ia l  growth, 
by p la c in g  g re a t emphasis on heavy industry#
2 ) But, co n tra ry  to  the p lan  o b je c tiv e s  Turkey d id  no t a ss ig n  
i t s  to t a l  investm ent re so u rces  to  d i r e c t ly  p roductive  s e c to r s ,  but in s te a d  
fo r  the expansion o f b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  and s e rv ic e s .  Also as compared to  
o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  Turkey, w ith  the p lan  a l lo c a t io n  o f in v estm en ts , f a l l s  in to  
the catego ry  o f c o u n tr ie s  where the  emphasis i s  on the b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  and 
s e rv ic e s .
C ontrary  to  the planners* concept o f in d u s try , I  have excluded power from 
in d u s try  and inc luded  i t  in  b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  ca teg o ry  so as to  make i t  
correspond to  the UN. c la s s i f ic a t io n #
TABLE 10
93,
-  planned D is tr ib u tio n  of T o tal Investm ent 
(percen tage)
(a)
Commodity .Production B asic Faci l i t i e s
Country T o ta l A gric . Min. Manuf. T o tal power T ransp . 
& Com.
Perv ices
(1) B o liv ia 61 14 32 12 17 6 11 23
P ak is tan 54 27 4 22 24 7 18
15(c)
22
U.A.R. 54 25^^^ “ 29 28 12 18
In d ia 53 22 « 31 29 11 18 18
(2 ) Morocco 60 31 6 23 10 1 8 30
T u n isia 55 39 4 11 10 4 7 35
T rin idad 52 5 30 13 16 5 11 33
( 3) B thopia 49 23 5 20 24 4 20 28
Ghana 48 20 5 24 20 16 32
Jodan 48 52 2 14 16 2 14 36
Sudan 43 25 1 16 23 3 2q(^) 34
Venezuela 43 10 11 19 16 5 11 42
Turkey * 40.0 17,7 5*4 16.9 22.3 8 .6 13.7 37.7
C hile 38 10 7 21 31 12(8 ) 19 31
Columbia 36 13 7 16 28 6 23 36
Iran 36 15 1 19 26 10 15 38
—  ... Ï
Source: UN. World Economic Survey, I 964, p . 39
(a) For B o liv ia , Ghana, T u n isia , d a ta  a re  fo r  n e t investm ent
(b) in c lu d in g  High Dam; (c) in c lu d in g  Suez Canal; (d) T e r tia ry  
p ro d u c tio n ; power, t ra n s p o r t  and communications and housing;
(e) V olta  R iver P ro je c t only; ( f )  in c lu d in g  d is t r ib u t io n ;
(g) E le c t r ic ,  petroleum  and c o a l.
Notes (1 ) C ountries in d ic a t in g  emphasis on commodity p roduction  and 
b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s
(2) C ountries in d ic a tin g  emphasis on commodity p roduction  and se rv ice s ,
( 3) C ountries in d ic a t in g  emphasis on b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  and s e rv ic e s .
^ Turkey i s  p laced  in  the ta b le  accord ing  to  i t s  investm ent 
s t r a te g y .
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3) As can be n o tic e d  the  investm ent s t r a te g y  o f the  p lan  
changes accord ing  to  the  type o f investm ent c l a s s i f i c a t io n  one a p p lie s .  
P la n n e rs ' c l a s s i f i c a t io n  maiœs the p lan  an in d u s t r ia l  one s in ce  energy is  
inc luded  in  in d u s t r ia l  s e c to r .  But energy i s  o fte n  pu t under the heading 
of b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  o r SOC. On the  b a s is  of H irschm an's and the  UN d e f in ­
i t i o n ,  the  p lan  becomes s o c ia l  overhead b ia se d .
True, th e re  i s  no uniform  c la s s i f i c a t io n  system fo r  o v e ra ll  
investm ent s t r a te g y , bu t the  UN c la s s i f i c a t io n  w ith  some re s e rv a tio n s  can 
be c o n s id e re d 'a s  a u se fu l one.
A c lo se ly  r e la te d  q u estio n  to  the above conclusion  w il l  be: 
i s  the  "S O C -first"  th e s i s  an accep tab le  one?
Exponents o f "heavy investm ent in  b a s ic  economic f a c i l i t i e s  (SOC)" 
m ain ta in  th a t  in  the i n i t i a l  s ta g e s , i f  a  developing  economy devotes i t s  
re so u rce s  p r im a ri ly  to  the b u ild in g  up of an " in f r a s t ru c tu re "  o f ro ad s , 
r a i l r o a d s ,  power e t c . ,  the  e x te rn a l economies c re a te d  by th ese  w il l  b r in g  
about an a c c e le ra t io n  in  i t s  r a te  o f developm ent. But i t  i s  q u estio n ab le  
w hether e i th e r  p ra c t ic e  o r experience  i s  such as to  g ive the  argument the 
s tre n g th  of wide a p p l ic a b i l i ty , .
I n d ia 's  F i r s t  and Second Five-Y ear P lans can be quoted h e re ,
I n d ia 's  overinvestm ent and o v e rcap ac ity  in  many " in f r a s t ru c tu re "  s e c to rs  
had co n sid e rab ly  slowed down the  c o u n try 's  r a te  o f economic growth* In  1^60 
the  use o f w ater from m ajor i r r i g a t io n  p ro je c ts  was only a t  65 per cen t 
o f capacity#  Energy and power s e c to rs  had a lso  a co n sid e rab le  degree o f 
o v e r - c a p a c i t y ^ # Consequently, in  the F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  an in c re a se  
o f /3  b i l l io n s  in  g ross investm ent y ie ld ed  an annual in c re a se  o f / l , 5  
b i l l i o n s  in  g ross output#  Again ^ b i l l i o n  o f investm ent y ie ld e d  an annual 
in c re a se  o f over / l  b i l l i o n  in  the f i r s t  tv/o y ears  o f th e  Second Five-Y ear 
P lan
Obviously the  p rev ious funds were spent in  p ro je c ts  which do 
l i t t l e  to  in c re a se  the  stream  of o u tp u t. Less o u tpu t w i l l  imply fewer 
re so u rces  to  fin an ce  a su s ta in e d  investm ent e f f o r t  and the  economy becomes 
s ta g n a n t,
(1 ) See B.Ro Shenoy, The R ight Road to  Ind ian  P ro g re ss , F ortune, A p ril I 960 , 
p#246
(2) I b i d . , p#246.The F i r s t  p lan  re p re se n ts  a c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t io  of 2:&; 
and the Second P lan  a r a t i o  o f 5 :1 .
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S im ila r ly  in  Turkey, p r io r  to  the F i r s t  P lan , and during  the
perio d  1950«60, th e re  was a co n sid erab le  id le  c ap a c ity  in  b a s ic  s o c ia l
overhead c a p i ta l  sec to rs*  For in s ta n ce  the u t i l i z e d  c ap ac ity  in  highways
( l )and ra ilw ays was 63 per cen t and 20 p er cen t re sp e c tiv e ly ^   ^, There was, 
in  a d d itio n , an exceed ing ly  high  id le  c ap ac ity  in  Energy and power in  some 
reg io n s  w hile o th e r  a reas  had su ffe re d  from the absence o f power f a c i l i t i e s #  
Here again  heavy investm ents in  in f r a s t r u c tu r e  s e c to r  supported  by d e f i c i t  
f in a n c in g  had r e s u l te d  in  a very low r a te  o f growth (3*3 por oen t)^^ / 
which was an in d ic a t io n  o f the common f a i lu r e  o f the S O C -first argument 
adopted by the government#
Moreover, " so c ia l  overhead c a p i ta l"  f i r s t  argument depends mainly 
on the  assum ption th a t  en te rp ren eu rs  w il l  be eager to  come forward once such 
b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  are  e s ta b lis h e d . Sut the v a l id i ty  o f th i s  assum ption 
i s  r a th e r  dubious s in ce  en trep ren eu rs  a re  extrem ely r e lu c ta n t  in  le s s  
developed c o u n tr ie s , to  respond to  such SOC f a c i l i t i e s #  This i s  so because 
p r iv a te  en trep ren eu rs  lack  exp erien ce , la rg e  sums o f c a p i ta l  (no w e ll-o rg an ised  
c a p i ta l  m arket), and most o f a l l  they  a re  a f t e r  quick re tu rn s  on the c a p i ta l  
invested#  Thus, to  base the economic growth o f a coun try  on the response 
o f the p r iv a te  en trep ren eu rs  to  such b a s ic  f a c i l i t i e s  i s  no t a p la u s ib le  
su g g estio n .
I t  i s  th e re fo re  argued th a t  a  d i r e c t  government a tta c k  on 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t io n  becomes in e v i ta b le .  This b rin g s  us to  the exponents of
the  "heavy in d u s try  f i r s t "  argument which i s  a  p a t te rn  of investm ent a l lo c a t ­
ion  th a t  i s  u s u a lly  follow ed in  E ast European Communist co u n tries#  The 
p o lic y  th e re  has been, in  g e n e ra l, to  n e g lec t d e l ib e ra te ly  a l l  s e c to rs  
o th e r  than  heavy in d u stry #  The share  o f heavy in d u s try  and c o n s tru c tio n  
v a rie d  from 38 per cen t in  the  S ov ie t Union to  49 p e r cen t in  Roumania fo r  
the  p e riod  1950-58* On the o th e r  hand, investm ent in  l ig h t  in d u s try  v a ried
from 5 p er cen t in  Hun.ga.ry to  9 per cent in  E ast Germany and th a t  o f
a g r ic u l tu re  from 10 p er cent in  East Germany to  21 pe^ cen t in  B ulgaria# 
A llo ca tio n  to  t r a n s p o r t  and communications reached I 5 p e r cen t in  R ussia and
( 1 ) See the F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , I 963- 67 , p#126
(2 ) Average annual r a t e  of growth fo r  period  1954-58 was 3*7 per cen t;
fo r  pe rio d  1959-63 was 3*3 p er c en t. These a re  c a lc u la te d  from the
f ig u re s  given in  the F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , pp#14 and 108#
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in  most oases were n o t over 10 p er cen t The c h a r a c te r i s t i c  p a t te rn
here  i s  the  h igh  p ro p o rtio n  o f investm en ts in  Heavy in d u s try  and C on stru c tio n
and the low p ro p o rtio n  devoted to  l ig h t  in d u s try . This p a t te rn  o f a l lo c a t io n
was based on the  r e l a t i v e  im portance o f in d u s tr ie s  f o r  ach iev in g  a h igh  r a te
o f economic growth# I t  was fo r  th i s  reason  th a t  low est p r io r i ty  follow ed
in  ascending  o rd e r by a g r ic u l tu re ,  consumer-goods in d u s t r ie s  and the  s e c to rs
( 2 )producing c a p i ta l  goods ^
I f  t h e i r  c a p i ta l-o u tp u t  r a t io s  seem to  be low er than  in  non­
communist c o u n tr ie s  the  main reaso n  should l i e  e n t i r e ly  w ith  the  d is t r ib u t io n  
o f investm ent resou rces#  I t  can be observed th a t  the  low share o f non­
p ro d u c tiv e  investm ent was a f a c to r  reducing  the  o v e ra l l  IGORo Also an o th er 
f a c to r  was the  low share  of consumer s e c to r  in  t o t a l  investm ents#
The above mentioned two opposing arguments on investm ent s tra te g y  have 
th e i r  own drawbacks and weaknesses s in ce  they  re p re se n t extreme th e s i s .  I t  
i s  a w ell Icnown f a c t  th a t  ex cessiv e  investm ents in  s o c ia l  overhead f a c i l i t i e s  
may lead  to  a slow er r a te  o f growth and a lso  to  in f l a t io n a r y  p re s su re s , the 
c o n tro l o f which might be q u ite  d i f f i c u l t#  On the o th e r  hand overinvestm ents 
in  "heavy in d u s tr ie s "  alone might no t so lve the  economic problems of a country  
and might cause im balances o f s e c to rs  tro u b led  w ith  extrem e id le  capacity#
Thus, in  my th in k in g  a balanced growth between p h y s ica l i n f r a ­
s t ru c tu re  and d i r e c t ly  p ro d u c tiv e  a c t i v i t i e s  appears to  be a s a t i s f a c to r y  
s o lu t io n . An a c c u ra te  assessm ent o f the  growth in  bo th  s e c to rs  and tim ely  
ad justm ents in  the  p lann ing  and im plem entation o f the  in d iv id u a l p ro je c ts  
concerned should be the  r u le .  I t  must be noted  th a t  a p ro je c tio n  o f the  
fu tu re  demand fo r  t r a n s p o r t ,  power and o th e r b a s ic  economic f a c i l i t i e s  
should f i r s t  be made on the p ro je c te d  or planned growth o f the  d i r e c t ly  
p ro d u c tiv e  a c t i v i t i e s #  Of cou rse , th i s  in  tu rn  w il l  c a l l  fo r  a f u l l y  fledged  
in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  which could m ain ta in  in te rn a l  co n sis ten cy  o f the  p lan  and 
thus avoid  b o ttle n e c k s  among v a rio u s  sec to rs#  That, as s h a l l  be exp lained  
below, was what the  F i r s t  p lan  had n o t done#
However, a l l  th is  does n o t mean th a t  th e re  should no t be g re a t
emphasis on heavy in d u s try  which may be e s s e n t ia l  to  change the  s tru c tu re
%T) See IM, World Economic Survey, 1959» pp#119“20; and a lso  Holzman, F.D#,
The S ov ie t Kuznets Combine: a study of Investm ent C r i te r ia  and Indus­
t r i a l i s a t i o n  p o l ic ie s ,  QJE, August, 1957#
(2) UN World Economic Survey, 1959» p .H 9
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of the economy# I t  can he argued th a t  i f  the main is su e  i s  the  r a p id i ty  
in  the  fu tu re  r a te  of growth o f output, ' heavy in d u s try  i s  the r ig h t  
answer to  economic development# A d e s ire  fo r  ra p id  growth of the edonomy 
in  the lo n g -run  re q u ire s  a heavy emphasis on the cap a c ity  c re a t in g  investm ent 
in  the  p re se n t p e rio d . I f  the emphasis in  the p re sen t p e rio d  i s  on the 
consumer-goods in d u s t r ie s  no doubt i t  may in c re a se  c u rre n t ou tpu t fo r  
consumption, bu t i t  w i l l  d e f in i te ly  slow down the  r a p id i ty  of the fu tu re  
r a t e  o f growth o f p ro d u c tio n  by way o f in s u f f ic ie n t ly  in c re a s in g  the fu tu re  
p ro d u c tiv e  c ap ac ity  of the  economy. Thus th e re  i s  a  very  fundam ental choice 
to  be made a t  t h i s  stage#
The c la s s ic a l  method o f "go-slow" developm ent, th a t  i s  f i r s t  to  develop 
the  consumer goods in d u s tr ie s  and then  to  develop the cap ita l-g o o d s  in d u s tr ie s  
inv o lv es  a  very  long  p e rio d  to  develop the economy# The economic development 
o f G reat B r i ta in  i s  a c la s s ic a l  example. Such a s lu g g ish  p rocess  o f 
development can be "reversed" by p lan  development o f heavy in d u s tr ie s  in  the 
p re sen t p e rio d  a long  w ith  some development o f consumer goods in d u s t r ie s .  By 
th is  p rocess the h is to ry  o f a hundred y e a r s ' economic development can be 
compressed in to  a few decades o f planned development# This i s  what most 
developing  c o u n trie s  need today; the e f f ic ie n c y  o f p lan n in g  in  these  c o u n trie s  
l i e s  in  d isco v e rin g  a smooth method of such .compressed developm ent.
The choice o f developing  heavy in d u s tr ie s  has a lso  to  be faced  
from an o th er an g le . I f  the underdeveloped c o u n trie s  do not produce th e i r  
own machine to o ls  and equipment they  have to  im port them from developed 
c o u n tr ie s . T urkey 's  F i r s t  P lan  in d ic a te d  th a t  44 pon cen t o f im port con ten t 
was in  c a p i ta l  goods# This i s  a h igh  r a t io  and the  more the dom estic develop­
ment ex pend itu re  in c re a se s  the  g re a te r  w il l  be the im port requ irem en t. In  
the  f in a l  a n a ly s is ,  th i s  in c re a s in g  demand fo r  im ported c a p i ta l  goods 
has to  be met by dom estic e x p o rts . Aid, loans and g ra n ts  might m itig a te  the  
sh o r t- ru n  p re ssu re  on the balance of - payments, bu t the  lo ng -run  payment 
l i a b i l i t y  has to  be p r a c t ic a l ly  faced# The qu estio n  here  i s  to  what e x ten t 
can the  expo rts  be in c reased ?  .For most developing  c o u n tr ie s , in c lu d in g  
Turkey, the  p ro sp ec ts  o f export expansion are  very l im ite d  as t h e i r  exports  
a re  in c re a s in g  r e l a t iv e ly  slow ly . Turkey too i s  no t an excep tion  to  th is  
phenomenon. Thus, the only  se n s ib le  way out fo r  Turkey i s  to  p lan  fo r  
im port s u b s t i tu t io n ,  e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  c a p i ta l  goods ( in  f i e ld s  where i t  has 
favou rab le  f a c to r  endowments)
See nex t page fo r  fo o tn o te
58 .
Thus, th e  emphasis l a i d  on heavy in d u s try  in  th e  F i r s t  Plan 
was a prom ising s tep  f o r  a s t r u c tu r a l  change in  Turkey. As was no ted  
elsew here 50 p e r  cen t of the  m anufacturing  va lue  added was planned to  
derive  from th e  heavy in d u s t r ie s  ( a  r i s e  from 38 p e r cen t to  50 p e r  cen t)#  
A ccordingly  81 p e r  c en t of t o t a l  m anufacturing investm ents was devoted to  
c a p i ta l  goods in d u s t r ie s .
The p ro je c t io n  o f heavy in d u s try  was a s tep  fo rw ard , h u t the  
im plem entation r e s u l t s  of the  F i r s t  P lan have been q u ite  d isap p o in tin g .
These in d u s t r ie s  were m ainly undertaken by the  s ta te  economic e n te rp r is e s  
(SEE)whileiho p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  d e sp ite  a l l  n ece ssa ry  m easures p rov ided , 
d id  no t p a r t i c ip a te  ws was expected . The l a t t e r  s e c to r  p laced  th e  usual 
emphasis on housing investm en ts which c o n s t i tu te d  43 p e r  cen t of th e  p r iv a te  
investm ents#
T h ere fo re , u n le ss  the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  does come forw ard and s h i f t
t h e i r  reso u rces  from housing to  heavy in d u s try , a s t r u c tu r a l  change in
the economy may no t take  p lace  f o r  a long  tim e. T h is, of co u rse , c a l l s
f o r  more r a d ic a l  and e f fe c t iv e  measures on the  p a r t  of the  government.
The problem as i t  rem ains, i s  to  channel p r iv a te  re so u rces  from excessive
emphasis on th e  p ro f i ta b le  investm en ts w ith  quick re tu rn s  such as r e a l
e s ta te ,  im port and o th e r sp ec u la tiv e  a c t i v i t i e s  to  more p ro d u c tiv e  f i e ld s
which could  supply  th e  economy w ith  b a s ic  in p u t requ irem ents such as
( l )m e ta ls , m achinery, tra n s p o r t  equipm ent, pap er, f e r t i l i s e r s ,  e tc .
Footnote ( l )  from p rev ious page
The heavy in d u s try  s t r a te g y  a t  the  beg inn ing  would r a is e  the c a p i t a l -  
ou tput r a t i o  and be more im p o r t- in te n s iv e , b u t in  the long  run th e se  
would low er c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t i o  as w ell as reduce dependence on 
im p o rts . L ig h t- in dust r y  approach w il l  perhaps in c re a se  r a p id ly
th e  savings/incom e r a t i o  because income a t f i r s t  under th i s  s t r a te g y  
w ill  be h ig h e r, b u t in  th e  long  run th i s  s t r a te g y  has to  be m odified  
in  th e  d ire c t io n  of h ig h e r c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t i o  or e ls e  im port dependence 
would be a s tro n g e r  c o n s tr a in t  on fu tu re  grovrth.
See th e  F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan , 1963-67, p .41
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(d) On the  P lann ing  Methodology and S e c to ra l A llo ca tio n
The T urk ish  F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  w ill  be analysed  here w ith 
re sp e c t to  th e  p lan n in g  methodology th a t  was adopted in  the  fo rm u la tio n  
of the  P lan , This in c lu d es  the  macro-model, s e c to ra l  programming; an 
a p p ra isa l  of investm ent p ro je c ts  and t h e i r  s e le c t io n .  The l a t t e r  
problem w il l  be th e  su b jec t-raa tce r of P a r t  I I I ,  which v d l l  inc lu d e  
exam ination of two se p a ra te  p u b lic  investm ent p r o je c ts .  Because the  
f i n a l  stage  of p la n n in g , th a t  i s  th e  economic e v a lu a tio n  of p r o je c ts ,  
w il l  to  a  g re a t e x ten t depend upon th e  p lann ing  procedure adopted,
I  f e e l  i t  i s  u se fu l to  shed some l i g h t  on the is su e s  invo lved  in  th e  
p lan n in g  technique#
There i s  some evidence to  show th a t  the  SPO has pursued  the
"method o f su ccessiv e  approxim ation" o r , in  o th e r words, "planning in
( l )s tag e s"  # Such a p lann ing  method in c lu d es  the fo llo w in g  th re e  
s ta g e s : a) macro-economic s ta g e , b) s e c to ra l  s ta g e , and o) p ro je c t
a p p ra isa l s ta g e .
In  the  m acro -stage , magnitudes such as aggregate  income, 
consumption, sav in g s , in v estm en t, expo rts  and im ports and th e  i n t e r ­
r e la t io n  among them were studied# For th is  purpose the  p lann ing  
p rocess s ta r t e d  w ith the  c o l le c t io n  of a number of f ig u re s  f o r  the 
p e rio d  1950-62* The aim here  was to  draw up a growth model and the 
v a rio u s  development p o l ic ie s  th a t  are  ap p ro p ria te  f o r  such a model.
The macro-growth model was form ed, on the  b a s is  of s e v e ra l te c h n ic a l 
s tu d ie s  conducted on th e  above magnitudes# At th i s  s tag e  th e  SPO, 
o f co u rse , fa c ed  a tremendous la c k  o f s t a t i s t i c a l  d a ta  which made 
drawing up a p lan  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t .  Consequently, th i s  le d  to  over­
s im p lif ic a t io n  in  th e  p ro cess  o f p lan n in g .
( l )  The "method of su ccessiv e  approxim ation" can be exp la in ed  as fo llo w s:
In  th e  f i r s t  s ta g e , a macro-economic study  of th e  o v e ra ll  economy 
in  term s of the  g en era l p ro cess  of p ro d u c tio n  and investm ent w ill  be 
made* The aim of th i s  s tag e  i s  to  determ ine in  a p ro v is io n a l way the  ra te  
of savings and th e  g en era l index of p ro d u c tio n . The second stage  in c lu d es  
the  ta sk  of sp ec ify in g  p ro d u c tio n  ta rg e ts  f o r  a number of s e c to rs  over a 
r e l a t i v e ly  long  p e rio d . The t h i r d stage  may go deeper and give more 
d e ta i ls  f o r  a s h o r te r  p e rio d  p ro v id in g  f ig u re s  f o r  a l a r g e r  number of 
sm alle r sec to rs#  The f ourth  stage  c o n s is ts  o f f i l l i n g  out the  p lan  
vrith in d iv id u a l p ro je c ts#  In  o th e r words, th i s  s tag e  c a l l s  fo r  the 
a p p ra isa l of investm ent p ro je c ts  and t h e i r  in c lu s io n  in to  the  p la n  
according to  a s e t  o f investm ent c r i te r ia #  In  the course of fo llo w in g  
th i s  p rocedure i t  v d ll  be n ecessa ry  from tim e to  tim e to  re v is e  the  
e a r l i e r  s ta g e s . The f ig u re s  de riv ed  from th e  second stage  may be used 
by th e  p la n n e rs  to  re v is e  some of the  c o - e f f ic ie n ts  used in  the f i r s t  
stage  and to  re c o n s tru c t accordingly# ' With a f ix e d  in te r n a l  of tim e ,
(n o te  con tinued  on page 60
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Key f ig u re s  fo r  the  n a tio n a l income, in v e s tm e n t,. consum ption, 
b a lance  p f  payments fo r  the p lan  p e rio d  1963^67 were chosen. This ch o ice , 
however, c a l le d  fo r  an e s tim atio n  of c a p ita l- 'o u tp u t r a t i o  which was found 
to  be 2*6 f o r  th e  p e r io d  s in ce  1950. Given a very  high  p o p u la tio n  growth
o f 3 p e r  cen t and government d e s ire  to  achieve a h ig h e r p e r  c a p ita  income
in  o rd er to  "ca tch  up" w ith  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s ,  a  r a te  of growth of 7 p e r  cen t 
was chosen to  be th e  f i r s t  t a r g e t .  By sim ple Harrod-Bomar model, t h i s  
meant an investm ent volume of 18 p e r cen t of n a tio n a l income was n ece ssa ry . 
Foreign a id  o b ta in a b le  b e in g  o f n a tio n a l income th i s  meant th a t  dom estic 
sav ings should  be in c re a se d  to  14 p e r  cen t from 12 p e r  cen t in  the  p re -p la n  
p e rio d .
The growth model a p p lie d  in  the  f i r s t  p lan  was a  s in g le - s o c to r  
model# This was because, th e  problems con fron ted  when the  p lan  v/as designed  
d id  no t req_uire a  more d e ta i le d  fo rm u la tio n . C onsequently , the  f i r s t  p lan  
Was drawn up acco rd ing  to  th e  model taken  from a UN handbook on programming 
t e c h n i q u e , T h e  model which was used can be exp ressed  in  the fo llo w in g  
form ula:
G- = ks ( l  -  td )  H* ks ( t  + td ) + kb
where the f i r s t ,  second and th i r d  terras on the  r ig h t  hand s id e  of the
equation  re p re se n t th e  share  of p r iv a te  sav in g s , p u b lic  sav ings and
(2)fo re ig n  sav ings in  the  r a t e  of grovrfch re s p e c tiv e ly ,^  ' This shows th a t
(c o n tin u a tio n  of fo o tn o te  from p . 59):
new d a ta  w ill  be a v a ila b le  and t h i s  may le a d  to  a f u r th e r  re v is io n . This
demands a system of continuous e v a lu a tio n  of p r o je c ts ,  the  fu n c tio n a l do-
e f f ic ie n t s  and the  im p lic a tio n  o f accep ted  p o l ic ie s  and o th e r  s e ts  of d a ta .
F or more d e t a i l s ,  see J .T in b e rg en , Mathematical- models of Economic Growth, p .9
(1) Programming tech n iq u es  f o r  economic developm ent,wàth sp e c ia l re fe re n c e
to  A sia and the  F ar E a s t, UN Economic Commission f o r  A sia  and the  F a r
E a s t, Bangkok, I 96O,
( 2) The v a r ia b le s  and equations on which th e  m acro-growth model was based  
a re :
D e f in i t io n a l  equ atio n s:
Y’ = Cg H- Cp + Ip  + Ig  + E -  M
Y» = Y + Ti 
Y = Yp + Eg + Td
Yg » Sg + Cg
Yg = Ti + Td + Rg ];I = l'î/yYp = Cp + Sp I  = I g /  (Cg + Ig )B = 1f'l "" E (Yg-Cg)/ Yg
Sp = Sg + B = Ig  + Ip I  = Ip  ( t l Ig  ( t )
-Behavioural equations; k = Y(t-J-I) - Y (t)
td. = T%/Y
Ti = T V y 
rg  = Eg/y
(Footnote  ( 2) con tinued  on page 6I )
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The key c o - e f f ic ie n ts  a re  k and s which are  d i f f i c u l t  to  c o n tro l by 
th e  p la n n e rs .
The second s tag e  c o n s is te d  of sp ec ify in g  p ro d u c tio n  ta rg e ts  
f o r  a number o f s e c to rs  over a f iv e -y e a r  p e rio d  1963-67, The stag e  
was p a r t ly  based  upon an in p u t-o u tp u t model and p a r t ly  on p a r t i a l  s e c to r  
a n a ly s is . To be more a c c u ra te , th re e  sep a ra te  s tu d ie s  were c a r r ie d  out 
by th e  SPO a t th e  s e c to r a l  s tag e ; (a) th e  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  fo r  1959?
(b) p a r t i a l  s e c to ra l  a n a ly s is ;  (c) th e  study of ad hoc committees*
D uring th e  in te r im  p e r io d  le a d in g  to  th e  f i r s t  p la n , the  problem 
was b a s ic a l ly  to  s e t  up balanced  s e c to ra l  programmes so as to  avoid se r io u s  
b o ttle n e c k s  and o v er-p ro d u c tio n  in  c e r ta in  s e c to r s .  P r io r  to  the  fo rm u la tio n  
of the p la n  th e  most se r io u s  b o ttle n e c k s  occurred in  s e c to rs  such as cement, 
i r o n - s te e l  and machine to o ls ,  and overproduction  in  t e x t i l e s  and t r a n s p o r t ,
T h ere fo re , the main ta s k  of the s ta te  p lann ing  o rg a n isa tio n  (SPO) 
was to  p repare  an in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  by adopting th e  L e o n tie f  model which, 
a t  p re s e n t, has a wide a p p lic a tio n  in  many c o u n tr ie s . The in p u t-o u tp u t 
analy ses were c a r r ie d  out accord ing  to  a 15 by 15 in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  where 
th e  d a ta  of 1952 were used and l a t e r  ev a lu a ted  accord ing  to  1959 b u y e rs '
( 2)p r ic e s .  The in p u t-o u tp u t model was worked out under the  su p e rv is io n  of
P ro fe sso r  J , T inbergen v/ho was then  appoin ted  as the c h ie f  a d v ise r  to  th e  
s ta t e  p lann ing  o rg a n is a tio n . Follow ing h is  advice some of th e  columns and 
rows were l e f t  empty t i l l  the  end of the work. The economy was o r ig in a l ly
(Footnote  (2) co n tin u ed  from p ,6 o ):
See Y, Kiiouk, The Manro-Model of the P lan , in  "P lanning in  Turkey" 
M iddle-E astern  T eoM ical U n iv e rs ity , P u b lic a tio n  No.9 , Ankara, 1967, 
pp. 84-85,
(1 ) See Y, Kucufc, S e c to ra l Prograranxing in  the Plan in  "Planning in  Turkey", 
op. c i t . ,  p ,98
The in p u t-o u tp u t model th a t  was p repared  fo r  th e  F i r s t  P lan  took 
1959 as th e  base y e a r  because 1958 was an abnormal y e a r  to  take as 
a base s in ce  a severe  in f l a t io n  developed and reached i t s  peak 
th a t  y e a r . The in f l a t io n  which developed r e s u l te d  in  a 65 p e r  cen t 
d ev a lu a tio n . S im ila r ly  I 96O was not a s u i ta b le  y e a r  because of an 
e x tra o rd in a ry  p o l i t i c a l  ev en t, a m il i ta r y  ta lce-over. Thus, p lan n ers  
decided  to  talce 1959 as the  base y e a r as i t  was a r e l a t i v e ly  more 
s ta b le  y ea r.
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d iv id ed  in to  tv/enty s e c to rs  and was l a t e r  reduced to  f i f t e e n  s e c to r s .
The choice o f s e c to rs  was p a r t l y  based  on t h e i r  p a s t and p re s e n t ,  and 
p a r t ly  on t h e i r  fu tu re  im portance f o r  the  Turkish economy, The 
in te r - in d u s t r y  flows were gross o f competing im ports and n e t of complementary 
im ports. The flow s were a lso  ev a lu a ted  on b u y e rs ' p r ic e s  in  1959 from the  
p o in t of view of tra d e  m argins and on the  b a s is  of s e l l e r s '  p r ic e s  from th e  
p o in t of view  of t r a n s p o r ta t io n  m argins.
The p ro d u c tio n  p ro je c tio n s  were made accord ing  to  th e  in c re a se
in  f i n a l  demand which would stem from a 7 p e r  cen t r a te  of growth in  the
n a tio n a l income. The f i n a l  demand wus d iv ided  in to  7 groups which were
competing im p o rts , e x p o rts , p r iv a te  consum ption, p u b lic  consumption,
( 2 )p r iv a te  investm en t, p u b lic  investm ent and changes in  s to c k s , '  ^ The 
in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  v/as then  f i l l e d  according  to  T in b erg en 's  su g gestions 
by d ec id in g  a p r io r i  which c e l l s  v/ere to  be f i l l e d  aj.id which v/ere to  be 
l e f t  empty. The f i r s t  th in g  to  decide was what the in p u ts  of a s p e c if ic  
s e c to r  could  be and then  vaJ-ues ivere given acco rd in g ly . In  f a c t  in  some 
s e c to rs  the  d a ta  were about th e  a l lo c a t io n  of th e  p ro d u c t w hile in  o th e r 
s e c to rs  i t  concerned the  s t ru c tu re  of in p u ts . T h is, o f co u rse , has made 
th e  ta s k  of ba lan c in g  more d i f f i c u l t  than  expected . A lso , most of the 
d a ta  a v a ila b le  vrere given in  q u a n tity  term s w ithout any m onetary values 
a tta ch e d  to  them. This im p lied  th a t  th e se  q u a n ti t ie s  had to  be expressed  
in  money v a lu es  based  on th e  r e t a i l  p r ic e s  p re v a il in g  in  a o p e c if ia  c ity ,^ ^ ^
There a re , however, many shortcom ings in  th e  in te r - in d u s t r y  ta b le  
p rep ared  by th e  SPO,
( i )  The main s im p lif ic a t io n  v/as the assum ption of a  c o n sid e rab le  number 
of zero c o - e f f ic ie n t s .  In  f a c t ,  the  flow s o f goods were assumed to  c o n s is t  
o f the  main su p p lie s  to  each in d u s try  only; "co n s tru c tio n "  having i t s  
in p u ts , b u ild in g  m a te r ia ls  only; " te x t i l e s "  t h e i r  raw m a te r ia ls  -  c o tto n  
o r wool only; "food" in d u s t r ie s ,  in p u ts  from a g r ic u l tu re  on ly , A 11 th ese
(1) See J .  T inbergen, M ethodological Background of the P lan , in  "Planning in  
Turkey", Middl.e E ast T echnical U n iv e rs ity , ed, by S . I lk in  and E ,In an e , 
F a c u lty  o f A d m in is tra tiv e  S c ien ces , P u b lic a tio n  No.9 , Ankara, 1967, p p .71-2
( 2) The d a ta  f o r  th e se  aggregates were ob ta ined  by the  SPO and p a r t i c u la r ly  
through ad hoc committees c re a te d  fo r  th a t  purpose ,
(3 ) This was th e  reason  f o r  th e  a s s e r t io n  th a t  th e  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  v/as 
based  on b u y e rs ' p r ic e s .
6 3 .
im ply th a t  e n t r ie s  in to  th e  ta b le  were based  on th e  main su p p lie s  while 
th e  in c lu s io n  of a l l  o th e r in p u ts  was igno red . The f ig u re s  f o r  in p u ts , 
th e re fo re  cannot be s a id  to  re p re se n t accu ra te  flow s of goods among v a rio u s  
s e c to rs ,
( i i )  One of th e  assum ptions used in  design ing  th e  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le
was th a t  "a s e c to r  perforais by i t s e l f  th e  commercial and t r a n s p o r ta t io n
s e rv ic e s  f o r  the  goods i t  produces" Yet i f  one looks a t th e  15th  rov/
of the t a b le ,  which i s  the tra n s p o r ta t io n  s e c to r ,  we n o tic e  th a t  i t  i s  one
of the most crowded rows. This means th a t  the  assum ption was l a t e r
abandoned and su bsequen tly  tra n s p o r ta t io n  was d is t r ib u te d  among s e c to rs
w ithout making th e  n ecessa ry  i n i t i a l  adjustm ent in  the  d a ta  co llec ted *
C onsequently, th e  a c t i v i t i e s  of some s e c to rs  such as energy , t r a n s p o r ta t io n
and tra d e  which supply  t h e i r  p ro d u c ts  to  alm ost a l l  s e c to rs  were sim ply
( 2 }assumed to  develop in  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  t o t a l  n a tio n a l  income^ . This 
i s  a lo g ic a l  assum ption, b u t i t  appears to  n e g le c t the o th e r  determ inants 
of th e se  in te rm e d ia te  a c t i v i t i e s  which supply in p u ts  to  o th e r  s e c to rs  
( i . e .  th ese  a c t i v i t i e s  would a lso  be a fu n c tio n  of demand and techno logy ),
( i i i )  There was a s u b s ta n t ia l  la c k  of consumption d a ta  which has rendered  
a more s c e p t ic a l  v a lu e  to  th e  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le .  In  the  f i n a l  demand 
an a ly s is  th e  f i l l i n g  of th e  columns was n o t ve ry  d i f f i c u l t  except fo r  th e  
p r iv a te  consum ption. Due to  the shortage  of d a ta  p r iv a te  consumption ta b le  
was l e f t  to  the  l a s t  and c a lc u la te d  as a re s id u a l , There were no fam ily  
budget surveys a v a ila b le  and even tim e s e r ie s  d a ta  on consumption lack ed  
p re c is io n  and accuracy . F in a l ly ,  p r iv a te  consumption was e stim ated  on the  
b a s is  of th e  income e l a s t i c i t y  of consumer demand in  th e  l a s t  10 y e a rs .
The income e l a s t i c i t y  o f demand v/as a lso  compared to  income e l a s t i c i t i e s  
o f o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  w ith a s im ila r’ p e r  c a p ita  income.
But th e  time s e r ie s  d a ta  c o lle c te d  were, so sca rce  as fam ily  budget
d a ta  and th e  ones a p p lie d  in  e l a s t i c i t y  e s tim a tid n  were no t f u l l y  r e l i a b le
{ T y  Colloquium on the  T echnical A spect of T urkey 's Long Term
P lan , SPO, (mhneD), Ankara, 1963, (see  Y. Küctüc's s e c to ra l  program, p .99)
( 2) See J ,  T inbergen , M ethodological Background of th e  P lan  in  "Planning 
in  Turkey", op, c i t . ,  p ,73
( 3) P ub lic  Consumption, however, was taken  as th e  demand on s e c to rs  
a r is in g  from g en era l and annexed budget e x p en d itu re s .
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M oreover, borrow ing income e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  p r iv a te  consumption from 
o th e r  developing  c o u n tr ie s  cou ld  be very  m islead in g  i f  a t te n t io n  i s  not 
given to  d i s t r ib u t io n  of income in  bo th  c o u n tr ie s . This p o in t b rin g s
in  th e  co n tro v e rsy  about borrow ing such c o e f f ic ie n ts  during  th e  p lann ing  
p ro c e ss ,
( iv ) The in p u t-o u tp u t model ap p lied  in  the  F i r s t  P lan  took various 
shapes b e fo re  i t  was concluded. For in s ta n ce  the Table was reduced in  
s iz e  and im portan t s e c to rs  l ik e  ownership of d w e llin g s , h o te ls ,  r e s ta u ra n ts ;  
p la ce s  of re c re a t io n ;  commercial, p ro fe s s io n a l and o th e r se rv ic e s  were 
l e f t  out However, p u b lic  s e rv ic e s  and im p o rts , which were excluded
i n i t i a l l y  from th e  i n t e r - i n dust r y  a n a ly s is ,  were l a t e r  in c lu d ed  in  the  
calcu].a,tion of th e  f in a l  demand. T h is, su re ly , seems to  be incom patib le  
w ith  the  in p u t-o u tp u t model which i s  supposed to  be tm overadd eq u ilib riu m  
model.
As cl r e s u l t  of th ese  above-m entioned shortcom ings, the  in p u t-o u tp u t 
ta b le  as i t  was f in a l iz e d  d id  no t even s a t i s f y  the p lan n er#  and ex p e rts  who 
p a r t ic ip a te d  in  i t .
In  the second study  ( P a r t i a l  S ec to r i-m alysis) s e c to ra l  p lan n ers  
have t r i e d  to  make demand p ro je c t io n s ,  f o r  th e  p la n  p e rio d  1963-67 and 
f o r  the  y e a r 1975 e s tim a tin g  f i r s t ,  th e  e x is t in g  c a p a c ity  and l a t e r  the 
a d d itio n a l c a p a c ity  to  be c re a te d  to  meet the  p ro sp e c tiv e  demand in  the  
s o e c if ic  s e c to r .
F or the demand fo re c a s ts  t re n d  equations were w idely used and
i t  was f e l t  th a t  the  concept of e l a s t i c i t y  was the  most s u ita b le  teclm ique to
apply  in  demand p ro je c t io n . In  the  estim atio n  of e l a s t i c i t i e s  e i th e r
per, c a p ita  income o r &NP was taken  as the  independent v a r ia b le  according
(2)
to  th e  n a tu re  of th e  dependent v a r ia b le  , In  de term in ing  p ro d u c tio n  
ta r g e ts  of th e  s e c to r s ,  fin& l^,. in te r - in d u s t r y  and fo re ig n  demand were tak en  
in to  account, S im ila r ly , re g io n a l demand was taken  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  
e s p e c ia l ly  in  s e c to rs  l ik e  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  power, and tra n s p o r t  and communications^
(1) For d e ta i l s  on th i s  p o in t ,  see Y, Kucuk, S e c to ra l Programming in  th e  P lan , 
in  "Planning in  Turkey", op_, c i t , , p .100
( 2) See Y, Kucuk, S e c to ra l Programming in  the  P lan , in  "Planning in  Turkey", 
op. c i t . ,  ppelOO-101,
( 3) When th e  F i r s t  P lan  was p rep ared  th e  id e a  o f d is t in g u is h in g  domestic 
from in te r n a t io n a l  in d u s tr ie s  had no t y e t come up and most P lan  f ig u re s  
were based  cn demand es tim a te s  f o r  home sa le s  and f o r  e x p o rts . But 
f o r  some s e c to r s ,  p roduction  c a p a c ity  was taken  as th e  b a s is  f o r  fu tu re  
a c t i v i t y ,  i . e .  a g r ic u l tu r e .
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S e c to r a n a ly s is  was q u ite  a u se fu l study  in  showing the  e x is t in g  
cap a c ity  of th e  s e c to r  and the r a te  o f u t i l i s e d  c ap a c ity ; the  main causes 
of u n d e ru t i l i s a t io n  of c a p a c ity  in  each s e c to r ;  b e n e f i ts  stemming from the  
s e c to r  programmes in  terras o f value added, fo re ig n  exchange earn ings (o r  
savings) and employment e f f e c t s .  The a d d itio n a l c a p a c ity  to  be genera ted  
was c a lc u la te d  in  o rd e r to  meet th e  fu tu re  demand which th e  p re se n t c a p a c ity  
was n o t ab le  to  m eet. The optimum c a p a c ity  of p ro d u c tio n  reached in  th i s  
way v/as broken down by p lan  y ea rs  to  meet the  demand of each y e a r and to  
achieve co n s is te n cy  between demand and p ro d u c tio n .
B esides th e  two s tu d ie s  above-m entioned th e  SPO had e s ta b lis h e d  
"ad-hoc com m ittees" to  s tu d y  v a rio u s  s e c to rs  of the  economy. These committees 
were of th e  k in d  seen in  Ind ia^^^and  t h e i r  ta sk  was to  e s tim a te  and a sse ss  
the e x is t in g  c o n d itio n s  in  each s e c to r  and c l a r i f y  th e  a d d itio n a l b e n e f i ts  
th a t  may d e riv e  from a f u l l - ih . t r a -  and in te r - s e c t  o ra l co o rd in a tio n .
In  the f i n a l  a n a ly s is ,  the problems of de term in ing  th e  p roduction  
ta r g e ts  of s e c to rs  f o r  the  1963-67 Plan p e rio d  appears to  be so lved  on the  
b a s is  o f th o se  th re e  sep a ra te  s tu d ie s  we have m entioned above. There i s ,  
hov/ever, some evidence which suggests  th a t  th e  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  of 1959 
was no t f u l l y  a p p lie d  in  determ in ing  p roduction  t a r g e t s ,  d e sp ite  the f a c t  
th a t  i t  was the most im portan t study  undertalien by th e  SPO, The a c tu a l 
procedure fo llow ed  by th e  SPO can be exp lained  as fo llo w s . For th e  in p u t-  
ou tpu t model, f in a l  demand needed e s tim a tio n  and th e re fo re  i t  was d iv ided  
in to  7 agg reg ate  s e c to rs  as m entioned e a r l i e r .  The most d i f f i c u l t  p a r t  
was th e  d e te rm in a tio n  of p r iv a te  consumption and changes in  in v e n to r ie s .
But f o r  the  f o m e r ,  income e l a s t i c i t i e s  were used t o i  c a lc u la te  p r iv a te  
consumption which were based  on time s e r ie s  d a ta  ( e l e c t r i c i t y
e s tim a tio n  was based  on the  r e la t io n s h ip  between p e r  c a p i ta  consumption and 
p e r  c a p ita  d isp o sab le  incom e)• The second d i f f i c u l t y  faced  in  th e  in p u t-  
ou tpu t ta b le  was the changes in  s to ck s . T h is, to o , was overcome sim ply 
by assuming th a t  th e re  would be no changes in  in v e n to r ie s  during  th e  P lan 
p e rio d  ( S ta t ic  Inpu t-O u tpu t T ab le ),
The problem then  v/as the  de term ina tion  of p ro d u c tio n  going in to  
in te r - in d u s t r y  t r a n s a c t io n s .  H ere, th e  p lan n ers  had no a l te r n a t iv e  bu t 
to  use th e  p ro p o rtio n s  ( te c h n ic a l c o e f f ic ie n ts )  e n te red  in  the  1959 In p u t-  
Output ta b le  o r borrow th ese  c o e f f ic ie n ts  from developing  c o u n tr ie s  wi.th 
s im ila r  economic s t r u c tu r e .  Of co u rse , i n t e r - i n dust r y  flow s were a lso
( l )  T urkish  p lan n e rs  were sen t to  In d ia  to  s tudy  th e  work of v a rio u s  
ad hoc com m ittees. The id e a  of form ing such committees was used 
in  Turkey l a t e r  on.
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based  on th e  e s tim ated  grov/th of each s e c to r  in  o rd er to  avo id  b o ttle n e ck s  
o f b a s ic  goods during  th e  P lan p e rio d .
The p ro d u c tio n  ta r g e ts  f o r  v a rio u s  s e c to rs  were determ ined as 
p re sen te d  in  Table 11, As can be seen from th e  T able , th e  r a te s  of 
growbh of s e c to rs  were determ ined s e p a ra te ly  by th e  in p u t-o u tp u t model and 
th e  re le v a n t s e c to ra l  an a ly se s . The s e c to ra l  growth r a te s  appear to  
d i f f e r  co n s id e rab ly  accord ing  to  the type of a n a ly s is  chosen. As the  
Table in d ic a te s ,  th e  bases  f o r  the  p lanned grov/th r a te s  were the  " p a r t ia l  
s e c to r  a n a ly s is " .  D esp ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  Plan claim s to  have used
TABLE 11 Growth Rates by S ec to rs  in  the  P lan  P erio d  1965-67
S ecto r
A g ric u ltu re




C o n struction
T ran sp o rta tio n
Average
Growth Rate by Type of A nalysis
Inpu t-O utpu t
Model
5 .8
8 .5  
11*1
8.5
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4 .7  
11 o 4
8 .7  





Source: Notes on the Colloquium on the  Technical A spects of
T urkey 's  Long-Term P lan  1962 (m ine#), Ankara 1962, p p .30-45; 
a lso  Y.Kuc^ulc, op, c i t . , p j.03 , 104.
^ l)  Grov/th r a te s  in  the P lan  are added to  th e  Table to  
p rov ide  com parison,
in p u t-o u tp u t a n a ly s is  f o r  th e  p lan  ta r g e t s ;  many p lan n e rs  a re  of the  
opposite  op in ion  and th ey  g e n e ra lly  suggest th a t  th e  in te r - in d u s t r y  ta b le  
has n o t had any p r a c t i c a l  va lue  ,
B e s id e s ,th e  de te rm in a tio n s  of s e c to ra l  growth r a te s ,  investm ents 
to o , are determ ined h e re . A fte r  determ ining  s e c to ra l  p ro d uction  ta r g e ts  and 
c ap a c ity  req u irem en ts, th e  nex t problem was to  work out s e c to ra l  d is t r ib u t io n
( l )  Dr. Y, Kuo tile, form er head of Long-Term P lanning  Department s tro n g ly  ho lds 
th is  type of op in inn . See h is  a r t i c l e  m entioned e a r l i e r .
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of in v estm en ts . In  th e  p lan n in g  th eo ry , s e c to ra l  c a p i ta l-o u tp u t  r a t io  
(a d ju s te d  accord ing  to  la g s  and id le  c ap a c ity  in  the  s p e c if ic  sec to r)  has 
become the  y a rd s t ic k  f o r  th e  form u].ation of investm ent programmes. But, 
w ith  Turkish  p lan n in g  ex p erien ce , d e term ina tion  of investm ent a l lo c a tio n  was 
done in  a v e ry  cu rio u s  way as can be read  in  th e  fo llo w in g  q u o ta tio n :
"The c a p i ta l - o u tp u t  r a t io  has been used in  bo th  an a c tiv e  and 
a p ass iv e  fo ra  in  th e  P lan , To determ ine the  F ive-Y ear investm ent re q u ire ­
m ents, the  c a p ita l" o u tp u t  r a t i o  of the  l a s t  lO y ears  was ap p lied  to  the 
in c rease  in  th e  Gross N a tio n a l P roduct, The s e c to ra l  d is t r ib u t io n  of 
investm ents was made on the b a s is  of P ro je c ts  and Programs and s e c to r  
re p o r ts ;  the. c a p i ta l- o u tp u t  r a t i o  in  th i s  case i s  the  r e s u l t  of weighing 
investm ents a g a in s t th e  expected in c re a se  in  outpu t in  the  v a rio u s  sec to rs"^^^
I t  fo llov/s t h a t ,  in s te a d  of determ ining s e c to ra l  investm ents through 
s e c to ra l  c a p i ta l- o u tp u t  r a t i o s ,  the  p lan n ers  had d.one the  opposite ' by d e te r ­
m ining c a p i ta l- o u tp u t  r a t i o  a f t e r  s e c to ra l  investm ents and in c re a se  in  output 
wane worked o u t. In  o th e r  words, the  c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t i o  concept used in
(2^th e  P lan  was r a th e r  a p a ss iv e  one, which r e a l ly  does n o t b e a r  much im portance ' '
However, th e re  i s  more evidence to  suggest th a t ,  b e s id e s  c a p ita l-o u tp u t
r a t i o ,  the  fo llo w in g  f a c to r s  were a lso  taken in to  account in  the s e c to ra l
(%)
d is t r ib u t io n  o f investm ents
(a) p re se n t id l e  c a p a c ity  in  th e  s e c to r ;
(b) l i f e  of investm ent p ro je c ts ;
(c) th e  requ irem ents of o p e ra tio n a l c a p i ta l ;
(d) th e  requ irem ents of non-p roductive  c a p i t a l ;
(e) p re -d e te rm in ed  r a te  of growth f o r  each s e c to r .
D esp ite  th e  a s s e r t io n  of the SPO, th a t  th e  above-m entioned f a c to r s
were taken  in to  account, Turkey in  f a c t  has fo llow ed  "departm ental approach"
in  i t s  p lann ing  design  and. investm ent a l lo c a t io n .  I t  appears th i s  i s  th e
u su a l tre n d  in  many of th e  le s s  developed c o u n tr ie s  undertak in g  development
( a )
p lan s  as M.D.Dosser has shown in  h is  a r t i c l e ' " ' .  He has p o in ted  out th a t  
in  a g re a t number of l e s s  developed c o u n trie s  most of the d ec is io n s  on
(1) See th e  F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan  1963-67, SPO, Ankara, I 963 , p .126
( 2) Increm ental c a p i ta l-o u tp u t  r a t io s  of the  m ajor s e c to rs  are p re sen te d  
in  the  Appendix to  th i s  c h ap te r .
( 3) A s p e c ia l  typed  document ob tained  from the  Department of Economic 
P lann ing  of the  SPO, Ankara, I 968,
( 4) D osser, D.M,, The Form ulation of Development P lans in  th e  B r i t i s h  
C olonies, Economic Jo u rn a l, 1959? June, r,260
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development p lan s  in  g en era l and on th e  question  o f investm ent a l lo c a t io n  
a re  in flu en c ed  by th e  b a rg a in in g  s tre n g th s  of p re-conoeived  id e a l  and 
p re ssu re  groups. To quote:
"A th i r d  f a c to r  mentioned e a r l i e r  which in f lu e n c e s  th e  a l lo c a tio n  
between d i f f e r e n t  investm ent p r o je c ts ,  whether " so c ia l"  or "p ro d u c tiv e" , 
i s  the  b a rg a in in g  s tre n g th  of e x is t in g  in t e r e s t s ,  u s u a lly  in  the shape 
o f departm ents of governments o r sein i-pub lic  c o rp o ra tio n . Thus i f  an 
a g r ic u l tu r a l  departm ent i s  a lre ad y  s tro n g , a g re a te r  p ro p o r tio n  than o th e r­
w ise i s  l i k e l y  to  be devoted to  a g r ic u ltu re  whether o r n o t th a t  s e c to r  
i s  r e l a t i v e ly  under- o r over-developed".
S im ila r ly , in  Turkey, as a r e s u l t  o f p a r t i a l  s e c to r  a n a ly s is , 
s e c to ra l  investm ent programmes were, in  th e  f i n a l  a n a ly s is ,  l e s s  determ ined 
accord ing  to  an economic dev ice , b u t more accord ing  to  th e  s tre n g th  o f 
b a rg a in in g  power between the  SPO and th e  re le v a n t government departm ents.
In  a c tu a l f a c t ,  p r io r  to  th e  fo rm u la tio n  of th e  p la n , investm ent agencies 
were asked to  p rep a re  and submit investm ent programmes f o r  the P lan p e rio d  
1963- 67, Not s u rp r is in g ly ,  th e re  was a c la sh  of op in ions between p la n n e rs , 
and the  o f f i c i a l s  of the  re le v a n t government departm ents in  re sp e c t to  the  
s iz e  and com position of the  Investm ent Programmes, This meant th a t  th e  
government o f f i c i a l s  t r i e d  to  o b ta in  as la rg e  investm ent funds q.s p o s s ib le  w ith­
out g iv in g  due a t te n t io n  to  th e  in te r - r e la t io n ,  .and c o n sis te n cy  in  v a rio u s  
s e c to r s .  While th e  p lan n e rs  have aimed a t  ch an n e llin g  investm ents in to  
p ro d u c tiv e  f i e l d s ,  th e  government agencies seemed v e ry  eager to  in v e s t  in  
t h e i r  own f i e ld s  i r r e s p e c t iv e  of t h e i r  co n sis ten cy . N eedless to  say 
th e  departm ental approach when ap p lied  d id  no t secu re  the  b e s t  a l lo c a tio n  
o f investm ent re so u rces  and, in  the  end, th e  a b i l i t y  to  secure  p o l i t i c a l  
support appeared to  be more im portan t than the  economic arguments th a t  
were p u t forw ard  by th e  p la n n e rs .
Concluding Remarks
I t  i s  v e ry  encouraging to  see th a t  the T urk ish  p lan n ers  have 
re s o r te d  to  an in p u t-o u tp u t model in  t h e i r  programming techn ique  in  the 
F i r s t  P lan , D esp ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  i t  has n o t been f u l l y  a p p lie d , i t  has 
been a u se fu l s tep  in  th e  r ig h t  d ire c t io n .
In p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  i s  a way of a rran g in g  th e  n a tio n a l accounts 
which fo cuses a t te n t io n  on p ro d u c tiv e  r e la t io n s .  The d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu re s
( 1 ) I b i d ,  p . 260
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o f th is  model a re ;  f i r s t ,  i t  d ea ls  e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith  p ro d u c tio n  and the 
problem i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  te c h n o lo g ic a l, second i s  i t s  dev o tio n  to  em p irica l 
in v e s t ig a t io n  and th i r d ,  i s  i t s  emphasis on g en era l e q u ilib riu m  phenomena,.
Most im p o rtan t, an in p u t-o u tp u t model seeks to  take account o f the  i n t e r ­
dependence o f p ro d u c tio n  p lans and a c t i v i t i e s  of many in d u s t r ie s  which 
c o n s t i tu te  the  o v e ra l l  economy, ' The in terdependence r e s u l t s  from the  fa c t  
th a t  each in d u s try  uses as i t s  raw m a te r ia ls  th e  p roducts  o f o th e r in d u s tr ie s#  
The b a s ic  problem then  i s  to  see what i s  l e f t  fo r  f in a l  demand(cohsumption, 
investm en t, ex p o rts  e t c . )  and how much o f each ou tpu t w i l l  be used up in  the 
course o f p ro d u c tiv e  a c t i v i t i e s  to  o b ta in  n e t o u tp u t.
The in p u t-o u tp u t model has the  fo llow ing  advantages over o th e r
methods :
( i )  The c a lc u la t io n  o f the p roduction  ta rg e ts  f o r  the  v a rio u s  p ro d u c tiv e  
s e c to rs  i s  th e  most s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  u t i l i s a t i o n  o f the  in te r - in d u s t r y  model* 
Having p ro je c te d  the f i n a l  demand on any s p e c if ic  p a r t  o f i t ,  i t  can be easy 
to  c a lc u la te  p ro d u c tio n  ta rg e ts  re q u ire d  to  f u l f i l  the  demand* By th i s  
method one i s  a lso  ab le  to  c a lc u la te  the d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  requirem ents 
from a l l  the  s e c to rs  a t  the  same time to  s a t i s f y  the  f i n a l  demand p ro je c te d . 
This means th a t  i f  we break  down the  f in a l  demand in to  i t s  v a rio u s  components, 
i . e .  ex p o rts , consum ption, investm ent (leave  clianges in  s tocks a s id e ) ,  v/e
can a r r iv e  a t  tfie p roduction  requ irem ents fo r  each by u s in g  the  in v e rse  of 
the  m atrix .
( i i )  Thus, by en ab lin g  us to  c a lc u la te  d i r e c t  and in d ir e c t  requirem ents 
to  meet a f i n a l  b i l l  o f goods we a re  ab le  to  d isco v e r b o ttle n e c k s  and excess 
c a p a c i t ie s .  This avoids waste o f re so u rc e s ,
( i i i )  In terdependence becomes more c lb a r  and the  e x te n t o f dependence 
of the economy on a c e r ta in  in d u s try  as w ell as the  dependence o f th a t  
in d u s try  on the  p ro sp e c ts  of o th e rs  can be seen . The in te r - in d u s t r y  r e la t io n s  
make i t  p o ss ib le  to  d isco v e r the  key le ad in g  s e c to rs  o f the  economy and th e  
w eight they  have on the  growth of the  economy, N eedless to  add th a t  i n t e r ­
in d u s try  an a ly ses  a re  the  b e s t  s e c to ra l  model th a t  can be used when c o n s is ­
tency  s tu d ie s  a re  p rep a red ,
( iv )  An in p u t-o u tp u t model can be used u s e fu lly  in  p re d ic t in g  fu tu re  
p roduction  i f  u sab le  demand e s tim a te s  are o b ta in ed . A lso, more m odestly , i t
(1) Inverse  o f the  m a trix  fo r  investm en t, consumption and exports  would be 
as fo llo w s;
» (1 -a ) " HI 
Xq = (1 -a )"  YC 
Xg = (1 -a ) "  YE
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can provide a d e ta i le d  s t ru c tu re  of n a t io n a l income a c c o u n tin g ,.
No doubt the  1959 in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  ap p lied  in  the Turkish 
Five-Y ear P lan r e f l e c t s  s t r u c tu r a l  in terdependence among s e c to r s ,  bu t th is  
was probably  incom plete because of lack  o f d a ta . As we mentioned elsew here 
the  1959 in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  was based on f ig u re s  compiled in  a very sh o rt 
pe rio d  and in  some cases in p u t-d o è f f ic ie n ts  were borrowed from o th e r developing  
cou n tries*  Moreover, the  s e le c t io n  of s e c to rs  fo r  the ta b le  was determ ined 
accord ing  to  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f d a ta  r a th e r  than upon th e  im portance o f th ese  
s e c to rs  in  the edonomy. F u r th e r , th e re  were a la rg e  number o f s im p lif ie d  
assum ptions involved  in  the  in te r - in d u s t r y  model* Some of th e se  assum ptions 
a re  im p lic i t  in  such a model and some were ap p lied  in  the 1959 ta b le .  There­
fo re , those two s e ts  o f assum ptions which a re  not r e a l i s t i c  give r i s e  to  
c e r ta in  doubts about the a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o f an in p u t-o u tp u t model. F i r s t  
assum ption im p lic i t  in  the  model i s  th a t  in  any p ro d u c tiv e  p rocess in p u ts  a re  
employed in  r ig i d ly  f ix e d  p ro p o rtio n s  and th a t  in p u ts  expand in  p ro p o rtio n  
to  the  le v e l o f  output* An in p u t-o u tp u t model a lso  assumes th a t  each
ou tpu t i s  produced by only one tech n iq u e . T h ird , such a ta b le  assumes the
Cl')
s t a b i l i t y  o f the  te ch n o lo g ica l c o e f f ic ie n ts * ' '
Probably  the most im portan t charge a g a in s t an Input-O utput ta b le  i s  
the  f a c t  th a t  te ch n o lo g ica l c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  no t s ta b le  and th e re  a re  th re e  
main fa c to rs  th a t  a f f e c t  th i s  c o e f f ic ie n t*  These a re :  (a) te ch n o lo g ica l 
change, (b) change in  r e la t iv e  p r ic e s  and (c) in  p ro d u c tio n  of scale*  A ll 
th ese  f a c to r s  would be f e l t  when a  country  i s  ex p erien c in g  s. ra p id  economic 
transfo rm ation*
(1) The L eo n tie f p roduction  fu n c tio n  i s  as fo llo w s:
Xj “ f j J Xgj) Xhj , Mj, Vj)
and the u su a l way o f c a lc u la t in g  the te ch n o lo g ica l c 'o e ff ic ie n ts  from 
an in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  i s :
B a s ic a lly , in p u t-o u tp u t a n a ly s is  i s  a  s e t  o f sim ultaneous l in e a r  
equations in  which the  unknowns a re  the le v e l  o f  ou tpu t o f vario u s  
branches o f in d u s try , and in  which the  param eters a re  to  be estim ated  
from the  in fo rm atio n  con tained  in  the in p u t-o u tp u t tab le*
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T herefore  when in te r - in d u s tr y  analyses a re  s tu d ie d , the b a sic  
assum ptions must be kep t in  mind and re v ised  accord ing  to the a v a i l a b i l i ty  o f 
d a ta . These assum ptions must no t be overlooked s in ce  they  may give r i s e  to  
m islead ing  p ro je c tio n s  o f p roductive  t a r g e t s .
In  the  F i r s t  P lan , p lanners  faced w ith u n re lia b le  d a ta  and in ­
a p p ro p ria te  methods o f a n a ly s is , have tended -to  choose b a s ic a l ly  " p a r t ia l  
s e c to r  a n a ly s is "  because the Input-O utput ta b le  was u n s a t i s f a c to r y , Thus, 
the  p lan  fo rm u la tio n  was based la rg e ly  on tren d  equations o r some re g re ss io n  
analyses w ith  one or two explanatory'- v a r ia b le s  o f which the  le v e ls  o f 
s ig n if ic a n c e  were n o t te s te d  adeq u a te ly . D espite  the  f a c t  th a t  " reg re ss io n  
c o e f f ic ie n ts "  were improved by the  suggestions of some e x p e r ts , they would 
tend  to  be le s s  u se fu l i f  th e re  were to  be a change in  the  com position of 
produot-m ix.
By u s in g  " p a r t i a l  s e c to r  a n a ly s is "  a g r ic u l tu re  was given a 6 .8  
p e r cen t r a te  o f growth and in d u s try  10,5 per cen t fo r  the  p lan  p e rio d . L a te r
th e se  ta r g e ts  were re v ise d  w;hen i t  was re a l is e d  th a t  a g r ic u l tu re  could no t 
p o ss ib ly  a t t a i n  th i s  r a te  o f grow th. Thus i t s  r a te  v/as reduced to  4*7 pen 
cen t and in d u s try  in c reased  to  11.4 p e r cent* I f  the  in p u t-o u tp u t model 
had been used fo r  the d e te rm in a tio n  o f p roduction  ta r g e t s ,  such an im p lic a tin g  
e r r o r  could have been avoided^
The comparison between the  s e c to ra l  ta rg e ts  based on an in p u t-o u tp u t 
ta b le  and the  a c tu a l r e a l is e d  ta rg e ts  du ring  the p lan  perio d  would seem to 
j u s t i f y  the s u p e r io r i ty  o f the  in p u t-o u tp u t method* As Table 12 in d ic a te s ,  
A g ric u ltu re , on the  b a s is  o f the  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  o f 1959 was to  have a 5*8 
p e r cent r a te  o f grov/th w hile in d u s try  and t ra n s p o r t  8 .5  p e r  cen t and 7<>7 per 
cen t re sp ec tiv e ly *  These f ig u re s  seem to be very  n ea r to  the  re a l iz e d  r a te s  
o f growth o f th e se  s e c to r s .  Thus p ro je c tio n s  based on an in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  
appeared to  be more r e a l i s t i c  and a t ta in a b le  than  the ones based on " se c to r  
a n a ly s is " .
Table 12 -  F o recasted , planned and r e a l iz e d  grov/th ra te s ( l9 6 2 -6 7 )
S ecto r In p u t-o u t put P lan R ealized
A g ricu ltu re 5 .8 4 .7 3.0
In d u s try 8 ,5 11*4 8.8
C onstruction 10,3 10*5 8 .0
T ran sp o rta tio n 7.7 9.6 7 .5
Source: From Table 11* The th i r d  column from th e  SPO income study group.
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I t  i s  tru e  th a t  th e re  a re  se r io u s  charges a g a in s t  an in p u t-o u tp u t 
model; hut a l l  th e se  shortcom ings do not reduce th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  and the  
use of the in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  in  the s e c to ra l  programming* The u se fu ln ess  
o f c o n s tru c tin g  an in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  fo r  a developed economy has more o r 
le s s  ceased to  be a p o in t o f argument* But th e  p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of con­
s t r u c t in g  such a ta b le  fo r  an underdeveloped country  i s  s t i l l  a h ig h ly  
deb atab le  su b je c t In  my th in k in g , however, th e se  d e fe c ts  are  b a s ic a l ly
o f s t a t i s t i c a l  and a d m in is tra tiv e  n a tu re  and do n o t cause an unsurm ountable 
problem fo r  th e  fu tu re  use o f an in te r - in d u s t r y  model. For in s ta n c e , Turkey, 
w ith  more d a ta  and in fo rm atio n  coming in , co n stru c ted  an o th er in p u t-o u tp u t 
ta b le  ( 1963) fo r  th e  programming o f the  Second Five-Y ear Plan ( I 968- I 972) .
The p re p a ra tio n  of the  I 963 in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  was much e a s ie r  due to  more 
incoming d a ta  and th e  l ig h t  o f p a s t experien ce .
One can conclude th a t ,  as P ro fe sso r J ,  T inbergen po in ted  out (2 ) ,
the  in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  o f 1959 was a t  le a s t  very  s ig n i f ic a n t  in  p o in tin g  out
the  in te r - in d u s t r y  r e la t io n s  and em phasising the s t r a t e g i c  in d u s tr ie s*  A fte r
a l l  i t  i s  no t the number o f the  e n tr ie s  which are  im p o rtan t, but the s ig n ify  
icanoe o f the  e n tr ie s  them selves* Furtherm ore, c o n s tru c tio n  o f such a 
Table in  Turkey helped the  SPO to  d isco v e r the  gaps and in c o n s is te n c ie s  in  
the a v a ila b le  data*
(1 ) The major o b je c tio n s  to  th is  method in  developing  co u n trie s  a re :  ( i )  high 
o p p o rtu n ity  c o s t o f c o l le c t in g  and p ro cess in g  th e  necessa ry  d a ta ; ( i i )  
the complete la ck  o f s t a t i s t i c s  of any k ind ; ( i i i )  lack  of personnel 
capable o f c o n s tru c tin g  such a ta b le ;  iv  the  use of the ta b le  i s  lim ite d  
because o f la ck  of in terdependence between s e c t o r s ; ■ (v) the assum ption 
o f th e  r i g i d i ty  o f te ch n o lo g ica l c o e f f ic ie n ts*
( 2 ) "In th i s  way, a lthough  a much sim pler system of equations i s  ob tained  
than  f o r  the  more complete in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le s ,  i t  rem ains p o ss ib le  
to  keep tra c k  o f the  more im portan t i n t e r - r e l a t io n s  between s e c to r s ."
See J. Tinbergen, M ethodological Background o f the P lan , op. c i t . ,  p*73
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APPENDIX I
Table 1 p ass iv e  Increm ental C ap ita l-O u tpu t R atios in  
Various S e c to rs , 1965-67
P roduction
ta r g e ts
Gross
Investm ent
Increm ental c a p i ta l  
ou tpu t r a t io
1963 '  1967 (1965- 67) (ICOR)
A g ric u ltu re 36 , 470*0 43 , 560.0 10 , 548*4 1*48
M ining & quarry in g 2 ,583 ,9 3 , 577.4 3 , 233.0 3.25
Manuf ac tu n in g 20 , 867.1 31 , 462*1 10,089*2 0.95
Energy 729.1 1,187*7 5 , 134.0 11.19
T ran sp o rta tio n  
and communications 3 , 744.9 5 , 340*2 8 , 159.4 5*11
Average (ICOR) 4.39
N otes; 1) Increm ental c a p ita l-o u tp u t  r a t i o  or m arginal c a p i ta l-o u tp u t  
r a t i o  i s  computed by d iv id in g  the a d d itio n  to  the  c a p i ta l  
s to ck  by the in c re a se  in  the ou tpu t in  th a t  s e c to r .
2 ) The (IGOR) computed i s  in  terms o f g ross va lues s in ce  in v e s t­
ment and p ro d u c tio n  o f the va rio u s  s e c to rs  a re  g iven in  
g ross  te rm s. For the  com putation o f n e t (ICOR), d e p re c ia tio n  
must be deducted from the  gross investm ent in  each s e c to r .
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(;erj)') Im plem entation R esu lts  o f the F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P lan
In  th i s  s e c tio n , 1 s h a l l  he d ea lin g  w ith  the  im plem entation 
r e s u l t s  o f the  F i r s t  P lan , p a r t i c u la r ly  in  r e la t io n  to  the  o v e ra ll  r a te  
of growth, dom estic savings and to t a l  investm ent* Since the a c tu a l r e s u l t s  
a re  a v a ila b le  only fo r  the  f i r s t  fo u r years  of th e  p lan  im plem entation, 
the  a n a ly s is  below w il l  be confined only to  th is  period*
Rate o f Growth During 1962^66 p e rio d , the a c tu a l in c re a se  in  the  GiTP was, 
on average, 6*5 p e r cen t per annum as compared to  the p lan  t a r g e t o f  7 
p e r  c e n t. This sim ple average r a te  i s  the a r ith m e tic  average o f the  f i r s t  
4 years  (See Table 15 ). But fo r  a more accu ra te  r a t e ,  the compound r a te  of 
growth form ula should be a p p lie d . Since the a c tu a l r e a l i s e d  f ig u re s  fo r  GNP 
in  1962 and I 966 were 61*8 b i l l i o n  TL and 79*5 b i l l i o n  TD. re s p e c tiv e ly , the 
compound r a te  of growth fo r  th i s  p e rio d  w il l  be :
Ph = Po (1 + r ) ^
lo g  Po = lo g  618
-  1*7910
lo g  Ph := lo g  79 o 5
= 1.9004
then  :
lo g  = log  Po + n . log  (1 -H r )
log  (1 + r )  = m s
lo g  (1 + r )  = 2 | l î S l  „ «02755
1 H- r  = 1*064 
r  = 1,064  -  1 
r  = *064
r  = 6*4 p er cen t
In  o th e r  words, the GNP ro se  by 17.7 b i l l i o n  TL. over the f i r s t
4 years  o f the  p lan  period* As compered to  the  p lan  ta r g e t  o f 40 p e r cen t
in c re a se , the  in c re a se  in  GNP (from 61*9 b i l l io n  TL. to  79*5 b i l l i o n  TL.) 
re p re se n ts  a r a te  o f in c re a se  of 28.5 per cent ; w ith  I 967 r e s u l t  y e t to  come, 
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  t e l l  i f  th i s  r a te  can be achieved*
The a c tu a l  annual ra te  o f growth over th i s  p e rio d  v a ried  between
4*0 per cen t and 8*8 per cent* In I 965 the a c tu a l r a te  of growth in  GNP
exceeded the ta r g e t  which was fo reseen  in . th e  plan* The 7°7 per cen t r a te
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of growth in  t h i s  y e a r  was due to  the  extremely s u b s ta n t i a l  growth in  a g r i c ­
u l tu r e  which a t t a in e d  a  7 .6  pe r cen t growth r a t e  (as compared to  4 .2  per cent 
p lan  t a r g e t ) .  The s u b s ta n t i a l  in c re a se  in  a g r ic u l tu re  was n o t ,  however, due 
to  in te n s iv e  farm ing p r a c t i c e s ,  but to a n ,e x c e l le n t  h a rv e s t  and weather 
co n d i t io n s .
Table 13 « Plan and Actual Gross N ational Product, 1962-66
















R e a l is a t io n
Ratio Index( 1962=100:
1962 62,497 100 61,882 99 100
1965 66,871 1 oO 106,9 66,648 7,7 99 107.7
1964 71,553 7 .0 114,4 69,910 4 ,9 97 113,0
1965 76,562 7oO 122,5 73,127 4 ,6 95 118.2
1966 81,921 7,0 131,0 79,536 8*8 97 126.5
Average in c rease 7.0 6.5 . 97
Source; I t  i s  based on the f ig u re s  given in  Table 1, in
"Kalkinma plantL, .2,c i  Bes YilJ 1968- 72 , Anliara, I 967 , p . 2
While a g r ic u l tu r e  achieved an ex cep t io n a l ly  h igh  r a t e  o f  growth in  
the  F i r s t  Year, the  o th e r  s e c t o r s ,p a r t i c u l a r l y  in d u s t ry ,  lagged behind the 
p lan  t a r g e t .  I t  was fo reseen  in  the  p lan  th a t  the  n o n - a g r ic u l tu ra l  output 
would r i s e  annually  by 9 pen cent w ith  m anufacturing and energy growing 
by 13 p e r  cent* But the implementation r e s u l t  in  I 963 showed th a t  only 
7*5 per cent was achieved which was much below the p lan  ta rg e t*
In d u s try  by i t s e l f  (com prising a lso  mining and p u b lic  u t i l i t i e s )  
achieved an 8 per cent r a t e  of growth in  1963. I t  i s  s a id  in  the Second 
Five-Year p lan  t h a t  the slowdown which occurred in  in d u s t ry  was the r e s u l t  of 
the  d e f la t io n a ry  measures taken to prevent i n f l a t i o n  wnich re s u l te d  in  a 
considerab le  f a l l  in  the genera l  le v e l  of demand* This, in  tu rn ,  caused a
( 2 )lower u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  c ap ac ity  and a considerab le  drop in  i n d u s t r i a l  output*^ '
(1) See OECD, Turkey, I 966 , P a r i s ,  Feb. I 966, p . 27
( 2 ) See Kalkinma p la n i ,  2c i Beg 71^1968-1972, SPO, Ankara, I 967 , p*4
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The o th e r  reason , as we s h a l l  see l a t e r ,  was the r e t a r d a t io n  
which occurred in  the execu tion  of p u b lic  investm ents , p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  those 
p ro je c ts  which a re  undertaken by the  SES. In  f a c t ,  p u b l ic  investment in  I 963 
reached the le v e l  of 5*5 b i l l i o n  TL. as compared to rhe p lan  t a r g e t  of 6.6 b i l l i o n  
TL. IThereas p r iv a te  investm ents - in  the sajne year exceeded the plan t a r g e t  by 
ach iev ing  5,5. b i l l i o n  TL. a g a in s t  i t s  plan  t a r g e t  of 4*3 b i l l i o n  TL.^^^
The r a t e  o f  growth in  I 964 and I 965 was conside rab ly  below the 
p lan  t a r g e t  of 7 pe r c en t ,  be ing  4-9 pe r cent and 4 ,6  pe r  cent re sp ec tiv e ly *
This extremely sharp drop in  the  o v e ra l l  r a t e  of growth was due to the  f a c t  
th a t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  ou tpu t in  I 964 dropped to i t s  I 963 l e v e l ;  and l a t e r  
in  1965 in d ic a te d  a n ega tive  r a t e  of growth of -3 ,3  per c en t .  Moreover, 
th e re  was a n o ta b le  slow down in  p r iv a te  business  and investm ents (due to  
the Cyprus problem) which can be considered  to  have played some p a r t  in  
t h i s  performance.
As Table 13 in d ic a te s  I 966 was the  most su c c e ss fu l  y e a r  o f  the 
p lan  p er iod , r e a l i s i n g  a r a t e  o f  growth of 8 .8  per c en t .  Again, here the 
o v e ra l l  economic growth was h eav i ly  dependent on the  a g r i c u l tu r a l  s e c to r ,  
where the  l a t t e r  m aintained an 8*6 per cent r a t e  of growth.
A ctual Domestic Savings
Looking a t  the  r e a l i s e d  f ig u re s  fo r  GNP and domestic savings, 
one can r e a d i ly  c a lc u la te  the average and marginal r a t e  o f  domestic sav ings .
As can be seen from Table I 4 , average domestic savings inc reased  from 9*5 
per cent to  16*1 per cen t of GNP during  the period  I 962- 66 . This r e p re se n ts ,  
on average, I 3.4  pe r  cent o f  GNP* From the same f ig u re s  again , marginal r a t e  
of domestic savings can be computed* Average marginal r a t e  of domestic 
savings can be found to  be 41.3  per cent ( fo r  the 5 y e a r  period) as compared
f 1 'w ith  the 26*5 per cent of marginal p ropens ity  to save based on p lan  p ro je c t io n s .  ' 
The i n t e r e s t i n g  conclusion  th a t  can be in f e r r e d  from t h i s ,  i s  th a t  the  
Development Plan had been financed  mainly by domestic sav in g s .  This appears 
to be in  l in e  w ith  the  F i r s t  P lan o b je c t iv e s .
Total domestic savings t h a t  were r e a l i s e d  over the  f iv e -y e a r  period  
(1962- 66) accorded a r i s e  of 117 per cent amounting to 47*8 b i l l i o n  TL. 
a g a in s t  a g a in s t  the  49*9 b i l l i o n  TL. p ro jec ted  in  the P lan , This re p re se n ts
(1) I b i d . ,  p . 3
( 2 ) This r a t e  o f  marginal sav ing  i s  fo r  the  o v e ra l l  economy in c lu d in g  both 
pub lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to r s .
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a ' r a t e  o f  im plem entation of 95 cen t which might he considered  an 
extreme accomplishment.
Table I 4 -  Actual Average and Marginal Domestic
Savings (1962-66) B i l l io n  TL. (1965 p r ic e s )
Years GNP
Total













1962 61 , 882,8 8 , 157.6 - 2 , 178.0 5 , 979,6 9.5
1963 6 6 ,648.8 10,637.7 2 , 709.0 8 , 129.7 12.1 45*0
1964 69 , 910.3 10,828.1 0 , 954.0 9,874,1 14,0 51.5
1965 73 , 127,1 11,950.3 0 , 695.0 11 , 257,3 15,3 43,7
1966 79 , 536.7 14 , 313,3 1 ,476 .0 12,837,3 16,1 25.0
Average Domestic Savings 13.4 41,3
Source: I t  i s  compiled from the  f ig u re s  given in  Table 7, in  the
Second Five-Year Plan 1966-72, SPO, Ankara, 1967, p.4* 
Average and m arginal r a t e  o f  sav ing  f ig u r e s  a re  mine.
The r e a l i s e d  and planned t o t a l  investm ent and domestic savings are  
p resen ted  in  Table 15* The h igh  r a t e  of implementation in  domestic savings 
means t h a t ,  domestic savings were augmented by a d d i t io n a l  tax es  ( d i r e c t  
and i n d i r e c t ) ,  p u b l ic  revenue from the  S ta te  Economic E n te rp r is e s  (SEE) and 
p a r t l y  by d e f i c i t  f i n a n c i n g * I n  f a c t  t o t a l  government revenue inc reased  
from 11.1 b i l l i o n  TL to  19*4 b i l l i o n  TL. during the  pe rio d  I 962- 66 , r e p re se n t in g  
a 75 pGh cent inc rease*  The h ig h e s t  in c rease  in  the government revenue 
occurred- in  the  funds from the SEE and in  the  t o t a l  ta x  revenue. For in s ta n c e ,-  
the SEE revenue ro se  almost 4 times i t s  I 962 l e v e l ,  and ta x  revenue inc reased  
by 74 P®r cent over the  p lan  p e r io d .  The share o f  the  l a t t e r  in  the t o t a l  
revenue had a lso  shown a conside rab le  in c r e a s e , r i s i n g  from 58 per cent in  I 965 
to  64 per cent in  1966*^^3 This was a no tab le  in c re a se ,  d e sp i te  the f a c t  th a t
the  Plan t a r g e t  was no t a t t a in e d .
( 1 ) The a d d i t io n a l  in c re a se  in  the tax  revenue was due mainly to  newly 
in troduced  in d i r e c t  ta x es ,  i . e .  t r a v e l l i n g  tax ,  import stamp duty . 
Previous tax  r a t e s  were a lso  in c reased . In the case of D irec t  ta x e s ,  
too , new taxes  v/ere in troduced , i . e .  a g r i c u l tu r a l  income ta x  and
motor c a r  ta x .  For the above f ig u re s  see , SPO, Kalkinma P la n i ,  2 c i  Bes 
Y il 1968- 1972, Ankara, Ju ly  I 967 , p p .5-6
( 2) I b id ,  p . 5, Table -  8
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Table 15 -  R ea lised  T o ta l  Investment and Domestic Savings
B i l l io n  TL. (1965 p r ic e s )
1 T otal Investment Domestic Savings
Years
Plan (a) Actual
R e a l is a t io n
Ratio Plan (a) Actual
R e a l is a t io n
Ratio
1962 10*1 8 .1 80 7.6 5*9 7 7 . 6
1965 11,5 10,8 95 8.5 8 .1 95,2
1964 12.7 10.8 85 9o7 9.8 101
1965 15,9 11,9 85 11,5 11,2 99
1966 15,4 14.5 92 1 2 . 8 12,8 100
T ota l 65.4 55.9 88 49,9 47,8 9 5 , 7
Note : I t  i s  a rranged from the f ig u r e s  given in  Tahle 7, in  the Second 
Five-Year Plan 1968-72; and the f ig u re s  given in  the F i r s t  Five-Year 
P lan . (a) P lan  t a r g e t s  f o r  t o t a l  investment and domestic savings are  
o r ig i n a l ly  based on I 96I  p r i c e s .  Therefore , these  f ig u re s  have to  be 
converted in to  I 965 p r ic e s  in  o rder to compare them w ith  the r e a l iz e d  
f ig u re s  which are  based on I 965 p r i c e s .  For t h i s  purpose, the p r ic e  
in c re a se  over I 96I -65 period  i s  worked out to  be I 9 pe r  c en t .  I  have 
accord ing ly  c a lc u la te d  the planned investment and domestic sav ings .
R ealised  Total Inves tm en ts t
T otal investm ent a l lo c a te d  to  economic development in  the period  
1965-66 d id no t reach  the corresponding p lan  ta rg e ts*  As compared to the 
P lan ta r g e t  of 52.1 b i l l i o n  TL. t o t a l  investment which was undertaken during  
the same period  stood a t  47*9 b i l l i o n  TL. (See Table 16)* This in d ic a te s  
an implementation r a t i o  of 9I  P®r c e n t ^ ^ \  In  o th e r  words, t o t a l  investment 
rose  from 10.8 b i l l i o n  TL to 14.5 b i l l i o n  TL. over the 4 y e a r  p e riod .
As corresponding to the low r a te s  of growth in  I 964 and I 965, the 
r a t e s  of implementation o f  t o t a l  investm ents in  both y ears  were r e l a t i v e l y  low 
(87 per cent)* This may exp la in  the c lose  r e l a t io n s h ip  between the  r a t e  of
growth in  the  economy and t o t a l  c a p i t a l  ou tlay  undertaken in  the  same p e r io d .
During the F i r s t  f iv e -y e a r s  (1962- 66) of p lan  implementation, 
t o t a l  investm ent as a percentage of GNP had f lu c tu a te d  between I 5 per cent 
and 18 per c e n t .  Taking the whole p e riod , i t  can be observed th a t ,  on
average, I 5.8  pe r  cent of GNP was a l lo c a te d  to c a p i t a l  form ation wnich was
considerab ly  below the average expected in  the Five-Year P ro je c t io n  (18 per
(1 ) Tailing I 962 as a  base y ea r ,  t o t a l  investment rose  by 75 pe r cen t,  in c re a s ­
ing  from 8oî  ^ b i l l i o n  TL in  I 962 to  14.5 b i l l i o n  TL. in  I 966 (See Table15).
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cen t of
Table 16 « T o ta l  Investment « Plan Targets and Actual
R e a l i s a t io n ,  I 965-66 B i l l io n  TL. ( I 965 p r ic e s )
Years
Plan Tar­
g e ts Actual




1965 10*9 10*8 99ol 151*7
1964 12,4 IO08 87.1 131*7
1965 15.8 12.0 87.0 146,5
1966 (temp ) 15.0 14,5 95.5 174*4
T otal 52*1 47*9 91,9
Source: Kalimna p la n i . Zoi Bes Y il 1968^72, SPO, Anliara, 1967, p . ;
A b r i e f  summary of the  performaiice of p ub lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to rs  
might be u s e f u l .  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t o t a l  investm ents during  I 965-66 p e r iod , 
between p u b lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to rs  are  p resen ted  i n  Table 17*
As can be seen from the  Table, while p r iv a te  investment exceeded the 
p lan  t a r g e t s  throughout the p e r io d ,  pu b lic  investm ent lagged considerab ly  
behind the p lan  t a r g e t s .  The implementation r a t i o  in  the  former v/as over 
100 p e r  cent and in  the  l a t t e r  81 pe r cen t .
As a r e s u l t ,  the share  of p r iv a te  investm ents in  the t o t a l  investment 
ou tran  co ns iderab ly  the  p lan  p ro je c t io n  where i t  was to remain around 40 
pe r  cento But a c tu a l  implementation r e s u l t s  shov/n in  Table I7 , in d ic a te s  
th a t  p r iv a te  investm ents  c o n s t i tu te d  49 per cent of the t o t a l  investment 
o u t la y  in  I 965 , though t h i s  dropped l a t e r  to  42.9  pe r  cen t in  I 9660
I t  fo llow s th a t ,  co n tra ry  to the Plan p ro je c t io n  the p r iv a te  
s e c to r  had played a g re a te r  ro le  than was expected . In  a c tu a l  f a c t  in  the  
F i r s t  Plan i t  was planned th a t  tiie p r iv a te  investm ents would r i s e  by 11 
pe r  cent pe r  annum c o n s t i tu t in g  8 per cent of GNP a t  the  end of the  Plan
TABLE 17 (see  over)
( 1 ) Total investm ent as percentage of GNP was 15.2 pe r cent in  I 962; 
16*5 per cent in  1965; 15*5 pe r  cent in  I 964; 16*5 per cent in
1965 and 18*0 per cent in  1966*
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Table 17 D is t r ib u t io n  o f  Investments between p u b lic  and p r iv a te  
s e c to r s ,  1965^66 B i l l io n  TL* (1965 p r ic e s )
!
' p r iv a te  Sec to r pub lic S ec to r Share of P r iv a te  Investment
Plan R e a l is a t io n Plan R e a l i s a t io n Plan Actual
t a r g e t Actual r a t i o  (1 ) t a r g e t Actual r a t i o  ( 1 )
1963 4o5 5*5 123 6.6 5.5 *83 59*4 49*1
1964 4 .9 5oO 104 7*6 5*8 .76 58.7 46*3
1965 5*4 5*5 102 8*4 6*5 *77 59*1 45*8
1966
( tem p .) 60O 6*4 106 8.9 7*9 .88 40*0 42*9
Source: Kalkinma P lan , 2 c i  Bes ^ i l  1968^72 , SPO, Ankara, I 967 , p . 5
( 1 ) R e a l i s a t io n  r a t e s  are added to  the Table by me
period* ( 1)
sense e s tim ate
F i r s t ,  though the p ro je c t io n  of p r iv a te  investm ent was a common
~ T 2 ) i t  tu rned  out to  be a r e a l i s t i c  and an a t ta in a b le  one.
I f  one excludes 1964» the  annual r a t e  of growth of p r iv a te  investm ent reached 
10 per cent in  I 965 and I 6 per  cen t in  1966^^^, The r a t h e r  h igh r a t e  of 
implementation in  the p r iv a te  investment po in ts  to the  f a c t  th a t  the p lanners  
had underestim ated  the  p o t e n t i a l  which e x is ted  in  the p r iv a te  s e c to r .  This, 
as o f ten  argued, was because the  p lanners  based t h e i r  e s t im a te s  of p r iv a te  
investment on the pe r io d  1960“62 which were years  of re c e s s io n  in  the p r iv a te  
s e c to r .
Second, though the a tta inm en t of the planned p r iv a te  investments 
was q u i te  d e s i r a b le ,  t h i s  does not mean much u n less  i t  i s  in  conformity with 
the p a t te r n  o f  a l lo c a t io n  envisaged in  the  p lan . U nfo rtuna te ly , t h i s  i s  
what the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  had no t accomplished, d e sp i te  many f i s c a l  and 
monetary measures. For in s ta n c e ,  the  share o f  housing investm ents  in  the 
t o t a l  p r iv a te  investm ent was 45*2 per cent in  I 965 and i t  ro se  to  46.0  pe r  
cent in  I 965, while the  share  o f  manufaotaring investm ents  in  t o t a l  dropped
Tïy 
( 2 )
See F i r s t  Five-Year P lan , 1965^67 SPO, Ankara, p . 108
An es tim ate  was made to f ind  the volume of p r iv a te  investm ent in  the  
plan* This W'as based on p a s t  data* But t h i s  was d i f f i c u l t  s ince  
p a s t  investm ent s e r i e s  d id  not rev e a l  a  s p e c i f i c  t r e n d .  In  o th e r  
words, the  volume and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p r iv a te  investm ent in  p a s t  years  
was l a rg e ly  in f luenced  by i n f l a t i o n ,  foreign, t ra d e  r e s t r i c t i o n  end the 
p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n .  The f i n a l  e stim ate  was based on I 96O-62 p e r io d .  
See FFYP 1965-67, p . 109
( 5) They a re  c a lc u la te d  from Table 17*
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from 56*4 per oent to 25*9 cen t over the  same period, (1)
The breakdown of p r iv a te  investment by s e c to rs  i s  no t a v a i la b le  
f o r  the  whole p e r io d , bu t the  implementation r e s u l t s  given in  I 966 annual 
programme can be u s e fu l  in  showing the p r iv a te  s e c to r  performance in  
dw ellings and m anufacturing*
Table 18 - Investments in  Dwellings ( I 965 and I 964)
In m il l io n  TL ( I 96I p r ic e s )
1963 1964
Plan Plan
Target Actual Target Actual
P ub lic 545.8 274,8 222*2 185.6
P r iv a te 1756*9 2024*4 1915,7 1896«9
T ota l 2100*7 2299,2 2157.9 2080.5
Source: I 966 Annual programme, SPO, Ankara, I 965 , p . 552
I t  can be seen th a t  p r iv a te  investment in  housing in  I 965 exceeded 
i t s  p lan  t a r g e t  by 15 p e r  c en t ,  while investment in  I 964 was q u i te  c lo se  to
(2 )the p lan  ta rg e t*  But the  b u i ld in g  perm its  is su ed  in  I 965 , in d ic a ted
th a t  c o n s tru c t io n  a c t i v i t y  was gx'owing f a s t e r  than the  plan had envisaged*
D espite  the f a c t  t h a t  r a t e s  fo r  b u i ld in g  ta x  were rev ised  and 
b u i ld in g  ta x  exemptions were p a r t l y  abo lished  and loans from the Beal E s ta te  
and C red it Bank were l im i te d  to  the  co n s tru c t io n  o f  u t i l i t y  houses, the expected 
change in  the composition o f  p r iv a te  investment d id  not take p lace  accord ing  to 
the  Plan P ro je c t io n s .  '




See SPO, Kalkinma P la n i ,  Zoi Bes Y il 1968-72, Ankara,, I 967 , p p .5=4. The 
r a th e r  h igh share  of m anufacturing investment in  the  t o t a l  p r iv a te  in v e s t ­
ment was due to  the investm ent a l lo c a te d  to the  E re g l i  I ro n -S te e l  P lan t  
which i s  h a lf -u n d e r tak en  by the p r iv a te  s e c to r .
Ongiit, I* , The P r iv a te  Sector in  the Five-Year P lan , in  "Planning in  
Turkey" kliddle E astern  Technical U n iv e rs i ty ,  op. c i t . ,  p p * l6 o - l6 l
The red u c t io n  in  r e s i d e n t i a l  investment was to be achieved by measures 
such a s :  a) e l im in a t in g  ta x  exemptions, b) imposing h igher b u i ld in g
ta x es ,  0 ) l im i t in g  c r e d i t s  to u t i l i t y  housing. The p re sen t  lO-year 
ta x  ho lid ay  f o r  new b u i ld in g s  which makes investm ent in  t h i s  f i e l d  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t t r a c t i v e  was reduced in  I 964 and was maintained only 
fo r  new h o te ls  and cheap dwellings* Also the s p e c ia l i s e d  Mortgage 
Bank, Emlak, ve Kredi Bankasi, in  I 966 provided loans fo r  non-luxury 
apartments up to  40,000 TL which ca rry  a 2 -year grace p e r io d , a 20 year  
am o rt iz a t io n  and a 6*5 P®r cent i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  exceedingly  low by Turkey 's  
s tan d a rd s .  See OECD, Turkey, I 966 , P a r is ,  p*4Q4d> OECD, Turkey, I 965 , 
P a r i s ,  p*40o
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than  h o u se -b u i ld in g 5 in c lu d in g  measures such as; more favourab le  c r e d i t  
f a c i l i t i e s  and ta x  re d u c tio n s  to  the  entrepreneurs who in v e s t  in  the  re q u ire d  
f i e l d s .  Both a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n  allowances and a scheme to exempt 
c e r t a in  p ro p o r t io n s  o f r e in v e s te d  funds from income and co rp o ra t io n  taxes  were 
approved under the  I 965 Income Tax b i l l
The p e r s i s te n c e  of the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  in  housing a c t i v i t i e s  can 
be connected to the  fo llow /ng  rea so n s :
a) p roductive  investm ent r e q u i re s  en trep ren eu rsh ip  but b u i ld in g  a house 
does no t;  b) the  amount of c a p i t a l  a v a i la b le  fo r  b u i ld in g  a house or 
apartment i s  g e n e ra l ly  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  undertake a l a r g e - s c a le  i n d u s t r i a l  
p ro je c t ;  c) r e s i d e n t i a l  investm ent provides quick and h igh  r e tu r n s ,  while 
i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c t s  re q u ire  longer g e s ta t io n  periods  and longer p ay -o ff  p e r io d s ;  
d) i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s  depend h eav i ly  on imported cap i ta l-g o o d s  and raw m a te r ia l s ;  
bu t housing investm ent can e a s i ly  be c a r r ie d  out s in ce  the  domestic market 
p rovides  a l l  necessa ry  in g re d ie n t s ,  i . e .  s t e e l ,  i ro n ,  cement, etc*
The composition of p r iv a te  investm ent in  m anufacturing in d u s t ry  can
provide  a  b e t t e r  p ic tu re  on the d i r e c t io n  o f  p r iv a te  investment* But the
s t a t i s t i c a l  d a ta  here  a re  a v a i la b le  only f o r  years  19&5 and 1964*
Table I 9 -  P r iv a te  Investment in  the  Manufacturing
In d u s try  (I’o t a l  f o r  I 963 and I 964) M il l io n  TL.





R e a l i s a t io n  
Ratio  fo
lo Consumption Goods 292*2 650*8 217
2o In te rm ediary  Goods . I 93O08 1989,4 105
5o Investment Goods 551,0 502*4 57
Total 2761*0 2942*6 107
Source: I 966 Annual ^Prograimiie, SPO, Ankara, I 965» pp*174~d77;
a lso  I* üngu t, op. c i t . ,  p*l60
F i r s t ,  i t  can be seen th a t  the r e a l i s e d  p r iv a te  investm ent in  
Manufacturing in d u s t ry  exceeded the programmed t a r g e t s  by 7 pe r  cent in  the 
f i r s t  two years  o f  the  Plan period*
Second, the  above achievement becomes le s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  i f  we look 
a t  the  composition of a c tu a l  investm ents in  M anufacturing, P r iv a te  in v e s t ­
ment in  consumer goods in d u s t r i e s  ( i .e *  t e x t i l e ,  c lo th in g ,  food process ing)
(1) OECD, Turkey, P a r i s ,  I 965 , p*40<
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by f a r  exceeded the  programmed t a r g e t ,  while these  investm ents  in  c a p i t a l -  
goods (machinery and equipment, chemicals) f e l l  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  below the 
planned t a r g e t  (57 per cen t r a t e  o f  implementation)* I t s  investm ent a l l o c ­
a t io n  to  in te rm ed ia ry  goods in d u s try ,  however, was more o r  l e s s  in  l in e  with 
the  plan p ro je c t io n .
T h ird , i t  can be concluded t h a t ,  too la rg e  a p ro p o r t io n  of non- 
r e s i d e n t i a l  f ix ed  p r iv a te  investm ent was concen tra ted  in  t r a d i t i o n a l  f i e l d s  
where p r o f i t s  were s u b s t a n t i a l  but where a t  p re sen t  excess ive  capac ity  e x i s t s ,  
i . e .  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t e x t i l e s  and c lo th in g .  The p r i o r i t i e s  s p e c i f ie d  in  the  
f i r s t  p lan , however, included pe tro -ch em ica ls ,  rubber , b a s ic  m eta ls ,  machinery 
and t r a n s p o r t  equipment and wood p roduc ts .  But, as can be seen, new ven tu res  
of t h i s  kind did no t a t t r a c t  the  p r iv a te  s e c to r .
Four th , i t  can be deduced from above, t h a t  th e  p o licy  measures 
which were put in to  e f f e c t  during  the plan implementation were not s u f f i c i e n t  
or e f f e c t iv e  f o r  such a tran s fo rm a tio n  of re so u rce s  from unpi-oductive to 
p roductive  f i e l d s  in  the  long run . Consequently, th e re  were se r io u s  arguments 
on the  unfavourable  performance of the p r iv a te  s e c to r  f o r  not conforming to 
plan o b je c t iv e s .  I t  was s t ro n g ly  argued th a t  the  i n d i r e c t  co n tro ls  were not 
s u f f i c i e n t  to  speed up such a s h i f t  in  p r iv a te  re so u rce s ,  and thus  a system of 
investment l i c e n s in g  should be in troduced  to  b r in g  the  p r iv a te  investm ents 
toward p lan  o b je c t iv e s .
On the  o th e r  hand, pub lic  investm ents did not accord a s u b s ta n t i a l  
achievement; i t s  r a t e  of implementation f e l l  below the  plan t a r g e t  co n s id e rab ly .  
Average implementation r a t e  f o r  the fo u r -y e a r  pe riod  ( 1963- 66) was 81 per c en t .
In  o th e r  words, t o t a l  p u b lic  investm ent reached the  l e v e l  of 25.7 b i l l i o n  TL, as 
compared to  the  plan t a r g e t  of 31.5 b i l l i o n  TL. over the  same p eriod .
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of pub lic  investm ents by government agencies a re
( 2)not given in  the second p lan , and th e re fo re  the t a b le  p resen ted  by Ho. Clcen, 
i s  the  only one a v a i l a b le .
( iy i^easu x es  to  encourage p r iv a te  investment to  heavy i n d u s t r i e s ,  included: 
a c c e le ra te d  d e p re c ia t io n  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  investm ent allowances 
f o r  s e le c ted  f i e l d s .  A system of ta x  in c en t iv e s  was adopted in  Turkey by 
which in v e s to rs  in  s e le c te d  f i e l d s  which took advantage of p r e f e r e n t i a l  r a t e s  
of terms o f payment f o r  import taxes  on investm ent goods as well as of tax  
r e l i e f  fo r  p r o f i t s  to  be derived  from such s p e c i f ie d  investments*
( 2) N , . Olcen, A Follow-up Study; the  Implementation of the  Investments fo reseen  
in  the  f i r s t  F ive-Year P lan , in  "Planning in. Turkey", Middle E as te rn  Tech­
n ic a l  U n iv e rs i ty ,  ed. by S. I l k i n .  P u b l ic a t io n  No.9, June 1967, p . 282,
Table 2.
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The percen tage  of p ub lic  investm ents  undertaken  by the 
General Budget dropped from 32.2  p e r  cent in  19^3 to  23*3 p e r  cen t in  
1963; whereas the  percen tage  share  by the SEE in  t o t a l ,  ro se  from, 
over the  same p e r io d ,  37.1 p e r  c en t  to  4-2,3 p e r  cento The h ig h es t  
share of the SEE in  t o t a l  p u b l ic  investm ent, occurred  i n  19^4 (46*3 
p e r  cen t of the  t o t a l ) .  The subsequent drop in  the  percen tage  share 
of the  SEE was due to  the  in c re a se d  investm ents  in  Annexed Budgets and 
Revolving Funds, (see  Table 20 ) ,
Table 20 Public  Investm ents by Type of Budgets -  percen tage
1904 I9ê5"
Percen tage  R ealis- 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  a t io n  
of I n v e s t -  Ratio
Percentage R e a l is -  Percentage R e a l is -  
d i s t r i b u t -  a t io n  d i s t r i b u t -  a t io n  
ion  of in -  r a t i o  ion  of i n -  r a t i o
ments vestment vestment
General Budget 32.1 0 .87 26.6 0.84 23o3 0.82
Annexed Budget 23.6 1.02 23.0 0.86 30.5 0.79
Revolving Fund 3.1 0.91 3.9 0,86 3 .8 0.83
SEE 37,1 0.87 46.3 0.67 42.3 0.73
T o ta l  Investm ent 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average R e a l is ­
a t io n  r a t i o 0.91 0.78 0.77
Sourcej N. &Lceu, a Follow-up Study; th e  Implementation of the Investm ents
fo re seen  i n ' t h e  FFYDP in  "Planning in  Turkey" op, c i t . ,  p . 282 -
As a whole, the  share of i n d u s t r i a l  investm ents  by the SEE had 
in c reased  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  between 19&3 and 19^5. But s in ce  i n d u s t r i a l  
p ro je c t s  have l a r g e r  g e s ta t io n  p e r io d s  and are more dependent on fo re ig n  
c r e d i t s ,  the  investm ent r e a l i s a t i o n  r a t i o  f o r  the SEE was much lower than  
o thers  (v a ry in g  between 87 p e r  cen t and 67 pe r  c e n t ) .  Other reasons 
f o r  t h i s  w i l l  be exp la ined  f u l l y  in  the  subsequent s e c t io n s .
However, the  implementation r a t e s  in  General Budget and 
Revolving Fund had been q u ite  co n s id e rab le .
S e c to ra l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of pub lic  investm ents  and t h e i r  r e a l i s ­
a t io n  r a t i o s  a re  a lso  i n t e r e s t i n g  in  show?Jig t h a t  the  pu b lic  investm ents 
in  p roduc tive  se c to rs  ( i . e . ,  m anufacturing and energy) were no t up to  
the p lan  fo r e c a s t  and they  d id  not m ain ta in  a high r a t e  of implementation.
The fo llow ing  conclusion  can be drawn from th e  s e c to r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of pub lic  investm ents ; i )  italcing the  f i r s t  th re e  y ears  of the  Plan
(1) In  view of the  Table p re sen ted  by N. Oloeh, op. c i t . ,  p . 283
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( 1963- 63) ;  I'Fe n o tic e  t h a t  p u b lic  investm ents devoted to  primary s e c to r s  rose  
from 16 per cen t to  21 p e r  cen t ( i . e .  a g r i c u l tu r e ) ;  and secondary s e c to r  ro se
( 1 )from 28.7 per cen t to  37*3 per c e n t .  Public  investm ent on t e r t i a r y  s e c to r ,  
on the  o th e r  hand, dropped from 35*3 per cen t to  41*5 per cen t over the  same 
p e r io d .  But, th e  re so u rce s  re le a se d  from the  t e r t i a r y  s e c to r  were absorbed 
by the in c re a se s  in  the  c u rre n t  expenditu re  of the  government due to  c o l l e c t iv e  
b a rg a in in g  ex pend itu re , c o n s t ru c t io n  of la rg e  and lu x u rio u s  genera l  d i r e c to r a t e -  
o f f ic e  b u i ld in g  e tc .^ ^ ^
i i )  The low est r a t e  of im plem entation, occurred in  m anufac tu ring , energy and 
t r a n s p o r t  s e c to r s ,  where th e  implementation r a t e  on I 963 was 55 pe r cen t ,  76 
pe r  cent and 78 per cen t r e s p e c t iv e ly .  The i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t ' s  implementation 
r a t e  had lagged behind the  average r a t e ,  due to  many com plicated f a c to r s ;  among 
those th e  most im portan t reasons  were the  co n s id e rab le  d e lay  in  p ro je c t  p re ­
p a ra t io n  and delays in o b ta in in g  th e  necessary  fo re ig n  re s o u rc e s .  I t  would be 
safe  to  argue t l ia t  the  bad performance of the p u b l ic  s e c to r ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  
the  m anufacturing s e c to r  could be c i te d  as one of the  major reasons why the 
o v e ra l l  r a t e  o f  growth in  I 964 and 1965 did no t a t t a i n  i t s  planned t a r g e t .
i i i )  In  the  sphere o f  p u b lic  s e c to r ,  the  h ig h e s t  r e l i s a t i o n  r a t i o  was a t ta in e d  
by a g r i c u l tu r e  and mining (85 p^r cen t and 94 cen t r e s p e c t iv e ly ) .  This 
performance in  the  above f i e l d s  can be a sc r ib e d  to  the f i n a n c i a l  resou rces  which 
were b a s i c a l l y  provided d o m est ica l ly .  Also, p ro je c t s  in  th e se  f i e l d s  were 
a lre ad y  prepared and reqdy f o r  im plem entation.
The p r in c ip a l  reasons f o r  the  r e t a r d a t io n  in  th e  p u b l ic  i n d u s t r i a l  
p ro je c t s  a re  o f  a f i n a n c i a l ,  a d m in is t ra t iv e  and le g a l  n a tu re .  The most 
im portant ones however, can be l i s t e d  as fo llow s:
a) There was a conside rab le  h e s i t a t i o n  in  ta k in g  d e c is io n s  by the  
government agenc ies ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by the  SEE’. The Law h o ,440
( 1 ) T e r t i a r y  s e c to r  inc ludes  t r a n s p o r t ,  tourism , housing, educa tion , h e a l th  
and o th e r  s e r v ic e s .  For th ese  f ig u r e s  see Ib id ,  Table 3» p . 283.
( 2) See N. Olcen, Ib id ,  p . 283
( 3) In  1964 , the  implementation r a t e s  in  m anufacturing and energy were 60 per 
cen t and 76 p e r  cent r e s p e c t iv e ly .  Ib id ,  Table 3> p . 283.
(4 ) On t h i s  p o in t see h . .O lc e n ,  o p ,c i t . ,  p p .287-289; a lso  see SPG, Kalkinraa 
p la n i ,  2c i  Ees Y il  1968-72, J u ly  I 967 , p p .4 -3 .
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was enac ted  in  o rder  to  give a d m in is tra to rs  of the  SEE power to  take 
d ec is io n s  on t h e i r  ovm in  r e l a t i o n  to  p r ic e  r e g u la t io n ,  p re p a ra t io n  of 
p r o je c t s ,  investm ent p roposa ls  and choice of f i rm s;  thus d ispensing  
with the  approval of the  concerned M in is te r s ,  But, u n fo r tu n a te ly  the  
SEE a d m in is t ra to rs  r e f r a in e d  from a c t in g  on t h e i r  own i n i t i a t i v e  and 
p re fe r r e d  to  o b ta in  w r i t te n  approval from the r e l a t e d  M in is try ,  even 
in  m a tte rs  of minor im portance. The f e a r  of tak in g  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  
of course , l e d  to  g re a t  lo s s  of time in  d e c is io n - ta k in g  and implementat­
ion  of investm ent p r o j e c t s ,
b) I t  must a lso  be n o ted  th a t  a t  the  beg inn ing  of the  p lan  
p e r io d , th e re  was not a s u f f i c i e n t  number of P ro je c ts  to  co n s id e r  and 
undertake . For in s ta n ce  in  I 962 and I 963 , i t  was s a id  t h a t  most
( 1 )o f  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s  d id  not even e x i s t  in  id e a  form.^ Nor was 
th e re  any p ro p o sa l  f o r  c o n s t i t u t i n g  a r e a l i s t i c  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  those 
proposed. Thus, to  c a r ry  out P ro je c t  re s e a rc h  and im plem entation 
s im ultaneously  had proved to  be im p ra c t ic a l  and d i f f i c u l t ;  t h i s  consequent­
l y  l e d  to  s e r io u s  b o t t le n e c k s ,
c) A good number of government agencies  p r i o r  to  the  F i r s t  P lan  
was invo lved  only in  p roduc tion  and m anagerial a c t i v i t i e s  and did not 
have the experience  to  undertaîce la rg e  p r o j e c t s .  But th e se  agencies 
were fo rce d  to  become investm ent agencies a t  sh o r t  n o t ic e  w ithout giving 
any c o n s id e ra t io n  to  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  in  terras of te c h n ic a l  and economic 
ex p e r ts .  (F or in s ta n c e ,  SENA, The General D ir e c to ra te  of C ellu lo se  and 
Paper F a c to r ie s ,  the  PFT are  cases in  q u e s t io n ) .  At shorb n o t ic e ,  these  
agencies were handed th e  t a s k  of p rep a r in g  and execu ting  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s  
each probably  to  the  value of 300 m il l io n  TL, To s e t  up the  necessa ry  
o rg a n is a t io n ,  of course , took some time which caused d e lay  in  the execu t­
ion  of p r o j e c t s .
d) More im p o rtan tly ,  th e re  was a co n s id e rab le  d e lay  in  e x te rn a l  
fmnance as w ell as domestic c r e d i t s ,  over the  p lan  p e r io d .  The fo re ig n  
c r e d i t s  promised by the Consortium (OECD) d id  n o t  a r r iv e  in  due time; 
and th e re  was confusion on the p a r t  of goverranent agenc ies  on questions  
such as where, and how to  apply f o r  both  e x te rn a l  and i n t e r n a l  c r e d i t s .
B esides, fo re ig n  c r e d i t  o rg a n isa t io n s  d id  n o t sp ec ify  how.
( 1) A p r iv a te  in te rv ie w  with Cerail C inar, o. p lan n er  a t  the  SPO, /nikara. 
February 1969; a lso  an in te rv ie w  with B, Bender L iop lu , a p lanner  
on paper in d u s t ry ,  a t  the SPO, February 1969> Ankax-a,
( 2) N. Olcea, op. c i t . ,  p . 288
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with what documenta and under what cond itions  such a p p l ic a t io n s  should 
be made. T his , of course , caused f u r t h e r  de lays  in  the  implementation of 
p r o je c t s ,
Again, as N. 01@eQ had shovn us in  h i s  s tudy , the  fo re ig n -
exchange requirem ents of i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s  were s t ro n g ly  c o r r e la te d  with
( 2)the  s iz e  of the  p r o je c t s  . .For in s ta n ce ,  h i s  f in d in g s  showed th a t  
in  1963 , fo re ig n  exchange requirem ents of investment p r o je c t s  co s t in g  
between 13 -  30 m i l l io n  TL., were, on the  average, 13 p e r  cen t of the  
c o s t ;  while f o r  p ro je c t s  c o s t in g  between 30 -  100 m il l io n  TL,, t h i s
( s')r a t i o  rose  t o  50 p e r  cen t .
The above f ig u re s  may in d ic a te  t h a t  b ig  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s
depended h e a v i ly  on foreign-exchange sources which d id  n o t  come a t  the  
r i g h t  tim e,
e) There was no t (and s t i l l  so) a s u f f i c i e n t  number of organised
firm s in  the  c o n s tru c t io n  s e c to r  t h a t  could undertalce the  execu tion  of
l a r g e - s c a le  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s .  The c o n s tru c t io n  s e c to r  i s  no t well 
developed and has d i f f i c u l t y  in  o b ta in ing  the  machinery and equipment
i t  r e q u i re s .  According to  Law No, 2490, "The S ta te  i s  ob liged  to  
award the  c o n s tru c t io n  to  the  low est b id d e r" .  But, in  p r a c t i c e ,  i t  i s  
always p o s s ib le  f o r  a  second b id d e r  to  undertake the  c o n s tru c t io n  by 
proposing a 13 p e r  cen t red u c t io n  in  the  p r ic e  o f fe re d  by the  low est b id d e r .  
T his, of course , c r e a te s  l e g a l  c o n f l i c t s  and compensation to  th e  f i r s t  
b id d e r ,  e v e n tu a l ly  le a d  to  co nside rab le  lo s s  of time,
f)  Another f a c to r ,  though l e s s  important, w%s the  3 month la g  
betvieen the  f i s c a l  y e a r  and the programme y ea r .  Annual programmes
in  Turkey become e f f e c t iv e  in  January , while the  a d m in is t ra to rs  of the  
General Bedget and Annexed Budgets were fo rce d  to  wait t i l l  the  p a r l i a ­
mentary approval in  March b e fo re  they  could make the  necessa ry  expenditure  
d isbursem ents f o r  new p r o j e c t s .  This shortcoming i s  s t i l l  apparen t.
(1) In  1963 , f o r  in s ta n c e ,  12 la rg e  sca le  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s  req u ired  
almost 1169 m i l l io n  TL. worth of e x te rn a l  funds which rep re sen ted  
53 p e r  cen t of t h e i r  t o t a l  c o s t .  But the  amount of fo re ig n  
exchange th a t  could be obta ined  f o r  these  p r o je c t s  during  years  
1964 and 1963. programmes was only 236 m il l io n  TL, This, of course , 
rep re sen ted  a 20 p e r  cen t r a t e  of r e a l i z a t i o n .  This supports  the 
f a c t  t h a t  shortage  of fo re ig n  c r e d i t s  was one of the  im portan t f a c to r s  
in  r e ta r d in g  the  implementation of p u b lic  p r o j e c t s .  See N. Olcew,
op. c i t . ,  p . 292
( 2) N. 01ceu, p . 282
( 3) N, Olceu, op, c i t . ,  p . 283
( 4) The Lav; No,2490 was supposed to  be amended so as to  avoid these  
problems, b u t th e re  i s  no in d ic a t io n  of t h i s  be ing  done.
F in a l ly ,  th e re  are reasons to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  investm ent 
programmes a re  n o t  p repared  r e a l i s t i c a l l y .  The genera l assumption 
f o r  the  completion o f  such p ro je c t s  i s  3 y ea rs ;  t h i s  may seem q u ite  
an o p t im is t ic  timespan f o r  a g e s ta t io n  p e r io d .  Four or f iv e  years  
would be a b e t t e r  assumption to  talce. In  s h o r t ,  th e re  i s  a tendency 
in  Turkey to  underestim ate  the  d u ra t io n  of programmes.
I t  can a lso  be added th e re  was not an e f f e c t iv e  system of 
implementation of investm ent programmes during  the  F i r s t  Plan p e r io d .
Conclusion
1 . D esp ite  the  remarkably h igh r a t e  of growth in  I 963 and 
1966 , the  o v e ra l l  r a t e  of growth s e t  out in  the  F i r s t  Plan vms not 
achieved in  the  f i r s t  fo u r  years  of the  p lan  im plem entation,
2, I t  must be no ted  t h a t  the  y e a r ly  f l u c tu a t io n  which 
occurred in  a g r i c u l tu r a l  output has been one of the  major f a c to r s  in  
causing  th e  unsteady growth in  the  economy* The economic growth, as 
i t  was in  the  p a s t ,  has been m ainly  determined by the  performance
of a g r i c u l tu r e  and the l a t t e r ,  in  tu rn ,  by weather c o n d i t io n s .
T h is ,  in  o th e r  words, shows th a t  investm ent a l lo c a t io n  to  
i r r i g a t i o n  and f e r t i l i z e r s  did no t o f f s e t  the  dependence of a g r ic u l tu r e  
on c l im a tic  c o n d i t io n s .  With the  i r r i g a t i o n  scheme re q u i r in g  a long 
g e s ta t io n  p e r io d ,  perhaps i t  v;as no t p o s s ib le  to  see the  e f f e c t  of 
i r r i g a t i o n  w orks.w ith in  the  f i r s t  4 years  of the  p la n  implementation,
3 . The o v e ra l l  r a t e  of growth i s  a lso  c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  the  
growth r a t e  in  in d u s t ry .  But, in d u s t ry  as a whole, as was mentioned 
e a r l i e r ,  d id  no t  re c o rd  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  growth to  a t t a i n  i t s  planned 
output t a r g e t .  This was m ostly  due to  delays in  th e  p ro v is io n  of ex­
t e r n a l  f in an ce  and to  the  la c k  of f u l l y  p repared  p ub lic  investm ent pro­
j e c t s ,  In  a d d i t io n  to  th e se ,  the  government investm ent agencies d id  
n o t  have the  n e cessa ry  experience f o r  undertaAcing such l a r g e - s c a le  
p r o je c t s .
P ro je c ts  p re p a ra t io n  in  the  public  s e c to r  has been one of the  
main f a c to r s  ho ld ing  back the  p rog ress  of investm ent. Therefore , a 
co n s id e rab le  e f f o r t  i s  needed to  a c c e le ra te  the  p re p a ra t io n  of sound and 
f e a s ib l e  investm ent p r o je c t s .  A lso, a id -g iv in g  c o u n tr ie s  should, f o r  
t h e i r  p a r t ,  be asked to  provide  t h e i r  e x te rn a l  c r e d i t s  promptly without 
causing  n o tab le  de lays in  p r o je c t  f in a n c in g ,
4, From the  implementation r e s u l t s ,  i t  fo llow s  th a t  the  p r iv a te  
s e c to r ,  though i t  exceeded i t s  planned t a r g e t ,  d id  n o t conform to  the p lan
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o b je c t iv e s  l a i d  down. P r iv a te  s e c to r ,  c o n tra ry  to  the  p la n n e rs '  f o r e ­
c a s t ,  had confined  almost h a l f  of i t s  resources  to  t r a d i t i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
i . e .  lu xu rious  housing, , I t s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the  m anufacturing in d u s t ry  
was a lso  in  the  wrong d i r e c t io n  where most of i t s  non-housing investment 
was devoted to  t r a d i t i o n a l  consumer-goods in d u s t r i e s  in s te a d  of heavy 
i n d u s t r i e s ,  ( i . e .  t e x t i l e  and c lo th in g ,  food) .
The problem of p r iv a te  p roduc tive  investm ent remains one of 
c a p i t a l  and en trep re n eu rs .  D ire c t in g  savings towards p roduc tive  
investment remains d i f f i c u l t  and f in d in g  w i l l in g  in v e s to r s  capable of 
managing new in d u s t r i e s  even h a rd e r .
This may im p lica te  two a l t e r n a t iv e s :  a) e i t h e r  th e  p o l ic y
measures adopted during  the p lan  d id  not p la y  an e f f e c t iv e  ro le  to  
make the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  d i r e c t  i t s  resources  to  p roduc tive  f i e l d s ;  
thus more e f f e c t iv e  and c o n s t ru c t iv e  measures of a f i s c a l  and monetary 
k ind  would be needed to  achieve the  d e s ired  p a t te rn ^ ^ ^ ;  o r  b) more 
government p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the f i e l d  of heavy in d u s t ry  should be 
decided upon; with a r e lu c t a n t  p r iv a te  s e c to r  in  the  sphere of c a p i t a l -  
goods i n d u s t r i e s ,  i t  i s  lo g i c a l  to  argue th a t  a predominant ro le  should 
be given to  the  S ta te  Economic E n te rp r ise s  (SEE) in  t h i s  f i e l d ,
5) Domestic savings in  the' same p e r io d  showed a h ig h e r  r e a l i s ­
a t io n  r a t i o  than  t o t a l  investm en ts .  Accordingly, marginal r a t e  of saving 
seconded a much more remarkable r i s e  than was expected  in  the p la n .  Thus, 
one of the major o b je c t iv e s  of the F i r s t  F ive-Year P lan , which was to  drav/ 
most of the  f in a n c e  from domestic sav ings , was th e re fo re  accomplished. 
Perhaps the most im portan t aspec t of the development in  the  
f i r s t  4- years  of the  p lan  p e r io d  was the  r a p id ly  r i s i n g  p ro p o r t io n  of 
pu b lic  investm ent f inanced  out of domestic sources (from 32 p e r  cent 
of the t o t a l  in  I 962 to  36 p e r  cen t in  1963, 73 p e r  cen t in  1964- and 
74 p e r  cen t in  1963)^^^ .
I r r e s p e c t i v e  of d ive rgenc ie s  with the p lan  f ig u r e s  t h i s  t re n d  
i s  of the  utmost s ig n if ic a n c e  f o r  the f u tu r e .
( 1 ) I f  i n d i r e c t  measures do n o t b r in g  a d e s i r a b le  s o lu t io n  to  the  
problem, a system of investm ent l ic e n c in g  can be in troduced  to  
b r in g  the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  in to  conform ity with the  p lan  o b je c t iv e s  
or a more genera l suggestion  would be to  p rovide  a b roader c a p i t a l  
market. But, the c r e a t io n  of a c a p i t a l  market i s  a long-term  
p rocess  and may re q u ire  the  form ation of l a rg e  jo in t - s to c k  cor­
p o ra t io n s  as an e f f e c t iv e  mechanism fo r  a t t r a c t i n g  small money holdings, 
I t  may be argued, s tk n u la t io n  of a cap i ta l-m ark e t  may be more u sefu l
in  the  long-r im  than the sh o r t- te rm  tax  in c e n t iv e s ,
( 2) See OECD, Turkey. P a r i s ,  1966 , pp„33-33
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6) The p a t t e r n  of investm ent a l lo c a t io n  among v a r io u s  
s e c to rs  might be one of the  reasons why the  t a r g e t  r a t e  of 
growth v;as n o t achieved . The composition of investm ent as p ro je c te d  
in  the  F i r s t  Plan was d i r e c te d  toward s o c ia l  overhead c a p i t a l  (SCC) 
investm ents  r a th e r  than  d i r e c t l y  p roductive  investm en ts .
From the  p lan  im plem entation, we n o t ic e  th a t  a l lo c a t io n
to  SOC s e c to r s  was more than the  planned t a r g e t .  For in s ta n c e ,
investment in  SOC se c to rs  re p re sen ted  6O.6  p e r  cen t of the  t o t a l  
investment o u t la y  as compared m t h  i t s  planned t a r g e t  of 38 p e r  cen t.  
D i r e c t ly  p roduc tive  investm en ts , on th e  o the r  hand f e l l  below the pro­
je c te d  t a r g e t ,  c o n s t i t u t i n g  39 p e r  cent of the t o t a l  investm ent, as 
compared with the  p lan  p ro je c t io n  of 41.7 pe r cent,^^^
This may p a r t l y  exp la in  why the  over add r a t e  of growth has
n o t  been m ain ta ined .
However, th e  divergence of investment a l lo c a t io n  to  SOC vs. 
DPI from the p lan  p r o je c t io n ,  does not seem to  be s u b s ta n t i a l ;  thus 
the  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  of 2 .6 :1  t h a t  was p ro je c te d  by the  SPO appears 
to  be a t t a in e d ,  (See Table 21). Increm ental c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  
t h a t  i s  r e a l i s e d  during  the  f i r s t  fo u r  years  of the  p lan  implementation 
was 2 .3 :1  (see  Table 21),
Table 21 -  R ea lised  Increm ental C ap ita l-O utpu t Ratio
f o r  the  p e r io d  I 963- 66. B i l l io n  TL ( I 963 p r ic e s )
Years Y r Ù>1 ^ (ICOR)
1963 66.6 7*7 10.8
1964 69.9 4*9 10.8
1965 73.1 4.6 12,0 16.3  p e r  cen t 2.3
1966 79.3 8 .8 14.3
Total = 289.1 ^  26.0 = 6 .5  = 47,9
Note 1 ) The f ig u r e s  f o r  GNP and investment are  taken from Table 1,
SPO "Nalkinma P lan iy  Zdi Bes Y il ,  1968-72, Ankara, Ju ly  1967,
p .2
2) Increm ental c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  i s  sim ply c a lc u la te d  from the 
Harrod-Domar growth f ormida: 
s
8 =




( f o r  fo o tn o te  1 see next page
91 -  paragrapn i  ixxxae 4 / ,  hü^uj-u.
. . .  The maintenance of a considerably low capital-output 
ra t io  can be a ttr ib u ted ,  mainly to the existence of 
unu tilised  capacity in the SOC investments in the pre-plan 
period. Otherwise, the concentration of investment ^
SOC sectors might have caused a considerably higher capi a 
output r a t io .
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As compared with the Plan’ s capital-output ra t io  of 2.6:1, 
th is  seems to be a reasonable accomplishment. But with 1967 figure 
yet to come, th is  ra t io  may be expected to exceed the orig inal projection 
in the plan. The maintenance of a considerably low capital-output ra tio  
can be a ttr ib u ted , mainly, to the existence of unu tilised  capacity in '  h 
the SOC investments both in the' past and present, Otherwi.se, the 
concentration of investment on SOC sectors might have caused a considerably 
higher capita l-output ra t io ,
7) The ra te  of growih of National Income in any economy depends 
f i r s t  on the size of to ta l  investment; second, on the composition of 
an investment programme.
The size and composition of a programme are in te rre la ted ,  
not only d irec t ly ,  in tha t the to ta l  programme obviously consists of 
the sum of individual p ro jec ts ,  but also in d irec t ly  in tha t the size 
vdll dej^end on the composition through the effect of the composition 
on growth, on taxable capacity, on export earnings and on incentives 
in the private  s e c t o r ^ . . This puts the burden of programming upon 
the analysis of individual p ro jec ts ,
Given the to ta l  investment and sectoral a llocation , the 
problem becomes selecting  the best a lte rnative  in a particu].ar sector.
Thus, we enter in to  the problem of selecting investment projects by 
applying theore tica l  investment c r i t e r i a .  This problem will be dealt 
with in part I I I ,  where I  shall  make two case s tudies.
(Footnote ( l)  from page 90)
SOC Investment includes energy, transport, housing, education, 
health , tourism and services. Directly  productive sectors 
include agricu lture , mining and manufacturing. The above 
figures are calculated from table 6, in the "Kalkinma Plani",
Zci Bes Yil, SPO, Ankara, July 1967, p .4
(1) Y/,Fo Stolper, Investment C ri te r ia  from a Planning Standpoint, in
"Planning without Pacts", p .144. I t  can be said tha t the size of 
a programme is  a function not only of foreign and domestic savings 
but of i t s  ov.n composition.
PART I I
A CRITICAL SURVEY OP GENERAL INVESTl'M'TT CRITERIA
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CHAPTER 5
PRICE MECHANISM AND THE CRITERION 
OP COMMERCIAL PROFITABILITY
1-  In tr o d u ctio n : In recen t years most o f  tiie  d evelop ing  co u n tr ies
have s e t  up development programmes w ith the B e l ie f  th a t the government in  
the process o f resource a llo c a t io n  can speed up the ra te  o f  economic 
growth* This c o n v ic tio n  i s  Based upon the f a c t  th a t investm ent d e c is io n s  
determined m erely By the free-m arket fo r c e s  are in s u f f ic ie n t  to  provide an 
optimum a llo c a t io n  o f  resou rces fo r  rapid economic growth. I t  i s  w id ely  
recognized  now th a t the market m echanism ,for reasons we s h a l l  exp la in  below, 
i s  not o p era tin g  properly; or as i s  o ften  argued, even i f  i t  i s ,  a p e r fe c t  
com p etitive  market i t  would s t i l l  not produce the B est r e s u lt s  fo r  economic 
developm ent.
In the fo llo w in g  s e c t io n s  i t  i s  my in te n t io n  to  shed some l ig h t  
on the major d e fe c ts  o f  market mechanism as an appropriate instrum ent fo r  
resource a l lo c a t io n .  I t  i s  not my purpose in  th is  chapter to  examine every  
asp ect o f  market mechanism or e n ter  the heated d isc u ss io n  o f market medianism  
v s .  cen tra l p lanning d o c tr in e s . In stead , I  am here m erely concerned w ith  
the inadequacy o f  p r ice  mechanism in  mixed economies as fa r  as investm ent 
d e c is io n s  are concerned.
B efore I take up th is  p o in t i t  may Be u s e fu l to see the B asic  
assum ptions on which the free-m arket mechanism depends and which can make 
a ctu a l c o s t s  measure s o c ia l  c o s t  and a c tu a l r e c e ip ts  measure s o c ia l  B e n e f its .
F i r s t ,  p r ice  mechanism operates under the assumption o f  f u l l  
employment o f resou rces and p e r fe c t  com petition  in  a l l  product and fa c to r
( 2 )m arkets. At f u l l  employment co n d itio n  and in  a p e r fe c t  com p etitive  s t a t e ,
marginal product o f labour would Be equal to the wages paid; m arginal
( 3)p ro d u ctiv ity  o f  c a p ita l  w i l l  Be equal to  i t s  opportunity  c o s t .  Under
s t a t i c  p e r fe c t  com petition  market p r ic e s  o f  fa c to r s  and commodities can Be
( T )
 ^ /The ir r it in g s  on t h is  is s u e  are q u ite  e x ten s iv e  and i t  might requ ire a la r g er  
space than I in tend  to  devote to  i t  h ere ,
( 2 )' /Ro monopoly p o s it io n  to  in flu en ce  .p r ic e s .
( 3) ^ /'Under f u l l  employment and p e r fe c t  com petition  the opportunity  c o st  o f  a 
commodity, which i s  the value o f the fa c to r s  used to  produce i t  in  th e ir  
B est a lte r n a t iv e  p a ttern , i s  equal to i t s  market v a lu e .
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used to  r e p re se n t  the  i n t r i n s i c  va lues  of th ese  f a c t o r s .  But p e r f e c t  
com petitive  c o n d it io n s  a re  not f u l f i l l e d  in  r e a l  l i f e  due to dynamic changes.
Second, p e r f e c t  com petition  re q u ire s  a la rg e  number o f  f irm s to 
be producing each commodity so th a t  each i s  too sm all to a f f e c t  i t s  price*
In o th e r  words the  aim o f t h i s  la rg e  number of firm s i s  to  maximize p r o f i t s  
w ithout having any in f lu en ce  on p r ic e s  and wages.
P e r f e c t  com petition model assumes away m onopo lis tic  and o l ig o p o l­
i s t i c  tendencies  which can in f lu en ce  p r ic e s  and ou tpu ts  in  such a way as  to  
cause d iv e rg en c ie s  between s o c ia l  and p r iv a te  p ro d u c t iv i ty .  The commercial 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  can serve  the  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  so long as  p e r f e c t  com petition 
i s  not v io la te d  by such tendencies*
T hird , i t  i s  the  assumption of the  p e r f e c t  com petition th a t
changes in  p roduction  o r demand to  be m arginal. In o th e r  words, p e r fe c t
com petition  works p e r f e c t ly  under the  cond ition  o f  small chants es and
p e r fe c t  d i v i s i b i l i t y *  As w i l l  be d iscussed  l a t e r ,  i n d i v i s i b i l i t i e s  should
not e x i s t  in  p roduction , demand o r  supply of c a p i t a l  f o r  a p e r f e c t ly  fu n c t io n ­
a l)
in g  market economy*'
I f  th e re  were p e r f e c t  d i v i s i b i l i t y  o f  a l l  f a c to r s  th e re  would be 
many more firm s and sm alle r  f i rm s ,  bu t each would be producing in  the  
optimum manner the f a c to r s  i t  employs being combined in  the optimum proportions, 
There would then be co n s tan t r e tu r n s  to  sca le  and p e r f e c t  com petition .
But so long as th ese  i n d i v i s i b i l i t i e s  e x i s t  i t  becomes im possible  fo r  the  
same f a c to r s  to  be combined in  the same p a t te rn  to  make the  same product on 
any sca le  t h a t  might be chosen*
F ourth , in  the  p e r f e c t ly  com petitive model (when f u l l  employment 
e x i s t s )  e x te r n a l  economies or diseconomies are assumed away. According 
to  t h i s  model, each in d iv id u a l  re c e iv e s  the  f u l l  value of h is  c o n tr ib u t io n  ,
to  production and each pays the  f u l l  c o s t  of the  commodities he consumes. 
Likewise f o r  f i rm s .  But, i t  w i l l  be shown below t h a t ,  as d i s t i n c t  from 
the p e r f e c t  model e x te rn a l  economies and diseconomies are  always p re se n t .
^ I n d i v i s i b i l i t y  in  genera l  may be found in  the f a c to r  in p u t ,  in  the  product 
or in  the  method of p roduction . For an e x c e l le n t  account of in d iv i s ib ­
i l i t i e s  see Lerner, Abba p. , The Economics of C ontro l, P r in c ip le s  of 
Welfare Economics. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1946, p .174 (esp . 
Chapters 15 and 16)
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F i f t h ,  ano ther assumption embodied in  the  market com petitive  
model i s  the  consumer so vere ign ty  by which i t  i s  im plied th a t  consumption 
i s  the end of an economic a c t i v i t y  and thus ev ery th ing  can be valued in  terras 
of an immediate or u l t im a te  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  t h i s  end. But t h i s  i s  no t 
always t ru e  *
F in a l ly ,  f o r  a perfecb  com petition  to  p r e v a i l  th e re  must be 
a d issem ina tion  of knowledge about the  techniques of p roduction  and a lso  a 
quick response to  changes in  knowledge. In o th e r  words, businessmen must not 
be slow to  respond to  tech n o lo g ica l  change or o p p o r tu n i t ie s .
But i t  w i l l  be shown l a t e r  th a t  the  lack  o f  spread of knowledge 
of new techniques  may c re a te  tendenc ies  to monopoly or o l ig o p o ly .
The q ues tions  which may a r i s e  here are  two. F i r s t ,  n a t io n a l  
income may be maximized by the  working of the mechanism o f supply and demand 
under the co n d it io n s  of a p e r f e c t  com petitive  model. I t  can be argued then 
t h a t ,  i f  the  co n d itio n s  of a p e r f e c t  competition model a re  s a t i s f i e d ,  the 
commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  would be an ap p ro p r ia te  guide in  a l l  economic 
decision-m aking, p u b lic  o r  p r iv a te .  Here, expend itu res  w i l l  c lo se ly  measure 
s o c ia l  c o s ts  and r e c e ip t s  c lo se ly  measure s o c ia l  b en e f i ts*
But the  cond itions  of p e r f e c t  com petition  do not p re v a i l  in  the  
r e a l  world and th e re fo re ,  market p r ic e s  are  n o t com petit ive  to  r e f l e c t  s o c ia l  
c o s t  and b e n e f i ts*
The second problem i s  t h a t  market im perfec tions  p re v a i l  ever^uhere 
in  developed and le s s  developed economies; but the  markets of the l a t t e r  
co u n tr ie s  a re  more im perfec t than those of developed c o u n tr ie s .  For one 
th in g  in  developing c o u n tr ie s  th e re  i s  a l a r g e r  d ivergence of s o c ia l  from 
p r iv a te  m arginal product than in  advanced coun tries*
Before ex p la in in g  the main reasons why s o c ia l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  
i s  more d e s i r a b le  in developing economies and why the  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
c r i t e r i o n  i s  not a s a t i s f a c to r y  device f o r  investm ent d e c is io n s ,  i t  seems 
ap p ro p r ia te  to  see various  forms of commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n .
( ^^ I f  "dynamic changes" can be foreknown f o r  a s u f f i c i e n t  time before they 
take p lace  or they take p lace according to  a lav; g e n e ra l ly  known so t h a t  
t h e i r  course can be p re d ic ted  as f a r  in to  the fu tu r e ,  then the p e r fe c t  
com petition  may be su s ta in e d .  In o th e r  words i f  ev ery th ing  moved in a 
uniform way, the  fu tu r e  would be completely known in  the p re sen t  and 
com petition  would c e r t a in l y  a d ju s t  th ings  to  the  id e a l  s t a t e  where a l l  
p r ic e s  would equal c o s t s .  See Knight, Frank, H . , R isk, U n certa in ty  and 
P r o f i t ,  H oughton .M ifflin  Comp*, New York, 1921, ppô34"57»
95'
I I  - FORMS OF COMMERCIAL PROFITABILITY CRITERION
In p ra c t ic e  the  commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ru le  i s  o f ten  app lied
in  various  forms. Most of the  p r iv a te  e n te r p r i s e s  opera te  on a r a t e  of
r e tu rn  ( i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n ,  annual accounting  r a t e  of r e tu rn )  on pay­
back (recoupment period) period  p r in c ip le .  B e t te r  and more e f f i c i e n t  ones,
however, opera te  on the  b a s is  of the  p re sen t  va lue  method (sometimes named 
as d iscounted  cash f lo w ) .
a) One measure of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  the  in t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  
t h a t  i s  the  "y ie ld "  of the  p r o je c t .  By d e f in i t i o n  t h i s  i s  the  r a t e  of
d iscoun t which makes the  p re sen t  value pv of the  p r o je c t  zero*
I n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  r u le  can be expressed  as fo llow s:
pv (o ) = - I  + S  ----- — -  Bt = 0
t  = o ( l+ r )^
where I  i s  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  c o s t ,  B^ i s  n e t  b e n e f i t s ,  r  r a t e  of 
d iscount which makes the pv of the  p ro je c t  equal zero , and t  i s  the  l i f e s p a n  
of the  p r o je c t .
I n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  here i s  defined as r  which s a t i s f i e s  
the  above e q u a tio n .  I t  must be noted th a t  B-t i s  merely the  d if fe ren c e  
between incomes derived from the p ro je c t  and o p e ra t in g  costs  fo r  the  
p ro je c t  (Rp -  Bp).
This c r i t e r i o n  t e l l s  us to  rank p ro je c ts  accord ing  to  the  h ig h es t  
r  o r ,  a f t e r  s e t t i n g  the  minimum value f o r  r  ( c u t - o f f  r a t e ) ,  a p r iv a te  
in v e s to r  would undertake a l l  p ro je c ts  f o r  which r j ^  r
b) The o th e r  c r i t e r i o n  which i s  often  used by the firm s i s  the  
p ay -o ff  period method. This i s  defined as th e  number of y ea rs  T t h a t  i t  
takes  f o r  a stream  of ne t  b e n e f i t s ^  B^ to  make up fo r  the  i n i t i a l
t=o
(1) For t h i s  fo rm ula , see A* K. Sen and S. A, Rlarglin, Lectures on Socia l 
C ost-B enefit  A nalysis  f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  Formulation and E va lua tion . 
United Nations I n d u s t r i a l  Development O rgan iza tion , United N ations. June 
1967, Chapter IV, p . 62
( 2)' ‘/The advantages and d isadvantages of t h i s  ru le  w i l l  be d iscussed  in  
Chapter Ü.
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c a p i ta l~ o u t la y  of a p r o j e c t . I f  i t  i s  used the in v e s to r  would rank 
p ro je c t s  accord ing  to  q u ick es t  pay -o ff  or undertake p ro je c t s  which do not 
exceed maximum recoupment pe riod  T. So firms w i l l  undertake  p ro je c ts  fo r  
T < T .
c) R e la t iv e ly  good f irm s use the p resen t va lue  (o r  discounted 
cash flow) method. As f a r  as  p ro je c t  ev a lua tion  i s  concerned, f o r  every 
y e a r  a l l  expected expenditu res  on goods and s e rv ic e s  f o r  the  p ro je c t  ( in c lu d in g  
c a p i t a l  expend itu res )  and a l l  expected r e c e ip t s  from th e  p ro je c t  ard recorded . 
For each y e a r ,  the  su b tra c t io n  o f  the  former from th e  l a t t e r  shows how much 
cash the firm  ga ins  o r  lo ses  as a r e s u l t  of th e  p r o je c t  ( i n t e r e s t  and dividend 
payments a re  normally excluded from the  concept of cash f lo w ).  Also from 
the  f i r m 's  p o in t  of view, d i r e c t  taxes  should he su b tra c te d  to  a r r iv e  a t  
'hash flow",^^^
The next s te p  i s  to  d iscoun t fu tu re  cash flows back to  the p re se n t .  
For t h i s  purpose a r a t e  of d iscoun t i s  s e le c te d .  This r a t e  i s  u s u a l ly  market 
r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  o r  some average form of i t*  In g e n e ra l ,  any fu tu re  r e c e ip t  
o r  expenditure  i s  m u lt ip l ied  by the  p re sen t  worth f a c to r  "pwf", which stems
from the  formula of  Rt , where i  i s  percentage r a t e  o f  d iscoun t and t  i s
( l + i ) t
number of years*
F in a l ly ,  by process o f d isco u n t in g ,ex p en d itu re s  and r e c e ip t s  which 
uccur a t  d i f f e r e n t  times a re  reva lued  to  make them comparable to p resen t  
ex p en d itu res .  Investment p ro je c ts  here  w i l l  be ranked accord ing  to the 
b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o s  o r  d iscounted ne t ben ef i ts*
 ^ ^This measure of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  easy to apply and easy  to  unders tand , but 
i t  has many d isadvan tages . For example, n e t  b e n e f i t s  a f t e r  p ay -o ff  period 
are  no t  taken in to  account; choice of unique T i s  not ap n ro p r ia te  when 
p ro je c ts  compared have d i f f e r e n t  l i f e  t im es, and d i f f e r e n t  time p a t te rn s  of 
in p u ts  and o u tp u ts .
Though in  p r in c ip le  i t  i s  ve iy  i n f e r i o r ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  widely used by 
f i rm s .  For more d e t a i l s ,  see A. K, Sen and Stephen A. M srglin , Lectures 
on Soc ia l  C ost-B enefit  Analysis  fo r  I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  Formulation and 
E va lu a tio n .  U.N. I n d u s t r i a l  Development O rg an isa tion , June I 967. p p .61-62,
( 2 )'  /Rut, as w i l l  be in d ic a ted  l a t e r ,  from the  s o c ia l  p o in t  of view t h i s  i s  not 
so. Cash flow fo r  the  s o c ie ty  w i l l  be "pre ta x  cash f lo w " .
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The formula f o r  the  p re sen t  discounted r e tu rn  i s  o f ten  w r i t te n  
. ( 1 )as follows:
B p=n Rn__r Bp
f  ' ( B I T p
p=o
where the  symbol in d ic a t in g  a l l  terms of the form Bp
( l+ i ) Pp=o
a re  being  added fo r  a l l  va lues of p from o to  n, l i f e  of the  p ro je c t ;  Dp 
i s  o p e ra t in g  c o s t  and I  i s  the i n i t i a l  investment made in  y e a r  0 .
I t  should be noted t h a t  in a l l  these  above mentioned p r iv a te  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  forms market p r ic e s  a re  o ften  used w ithou t in tro d u c in g  any 
c o r re c t io n  f o r  the  market p r ic e  of outputs  and in p u ts  invo lved . The d iscount 
r a t e  which i s  app lied  i s  the  market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  which does not convey 
any re levance  to  the  i n t r i n s i c  value of c a p i t a l  c o s t .  F in a l ly ,  none of these  
ru le s  a ttem pts  to  take in to  account the e x te rn a l  or i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  stemming 
from in d iv id u a l  p ro jec ts#
This may b r in g  us back to  the reasons why the commercial p r o f i t ­
a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  i s  no t a convenient device to  a l l o c a t e  investm ent re so u rce s .  
B a s ic a l ly ,  the argument a g a in s t  p r iv a te  investment r u le s  i s  due to  many 
im perfec tions  which e x i s t  in  the  economy of an underdeveloped country . I t  
should be remembered however, th a t  some of these  im perfec tions  a re  a lso  v a l id  
f o r  developed economies, though to  a l e s s e r  e x te n t .
I l l  -  BEVEDOPING COUNTRIES AND DEPARTURE FROM 
COMMERCIAL PROFITABILITY
I ,  I t  can be r e a d i ly  exphasized th a t  a c tu a l  p r ic e s  in markets of
developing co u n tr ie s  a re  very  much worse r e f l e c t o r s  of s o c ia l  c o s t  and 
b e n e f i t s  than in  the case of developed coun tries*  The main reasons f o r  such 
a s trong  divergence of s o c ia l  from p r iv a te  b e n e f i t s  and co s ts  inc lude  in 
g enera l  w age-rate  o v e rva lua tion  d e sp ite  a la rge  pocket o f  unemployment, very 
im perfec t c a p i t a l  m arkets, m onopolis tic  ten d en c ie s ,  e x te rn a l  e f f e c t s  v/hich
(■ 3 )
 ^ ‘/For the  d e r iv a t io n  of the formula see , L i t t l e ,  I.M.B. and H i r r le e s ,  J . A. ,  
S o c ia l  C ost-B enefit  A nalysis ,  Manual of I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  Analysis in  
Developing C ountries , V o l . I .  Methodology and Case S tu d ies ,  OECD, Development 
Centre S tu d ies ,  P a r i s ,  I 968 , p . 116.
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a re  not r e f l e c t e d  in  the  p r ic e  o f  ou tpu ts  sold and inpu ts  purchased by en 
in d u s t ry ,  domestic currency overv a lu a t io n ,  p ro te c t io n  provided to  the domestic 
in d u s try  in  the  form of import quotas and t a r i f f s ,  i n f l a t i o n a r y  cond itions  
p re v a i l in g  in  th ese  c o u n t r ie s ,  e t c ,
1) The p r ic e  mechanism ( theo ry  of com petition) re q u ire s  th a t  the 
marginal product of l a b o u r ^ b e  equal to  the wage r a t e  paid* But as i s  
w ell observed in  many developing co u n tr ie s  peasant a g r i c u l tu r e  predominates 
with a la rg e  pocket o f  unemployment or underemployment. I t  i s  a common 
phenomenon in  peqsant a g r ic u l tu r e  f o r  a worker to  consume more than h is  
m arginal p roduct.  This im plies  th a t  even w ithout new investment t o t a l  
output would r i s e  i f  men were s h i f te d  from peasan t ag ricu ltu r-e  to i n d u s t r i a l  
employment.
The unemployment (o r  underemployment) in  r u r a l  a reas  as w ell as 
urban a reas  may cause a c tu a l  money wage c o s ts  to  exceed considerab ly  the  t ru e
( 2 )s o c ia l  value of lab o u r ,   ^ I f  unemployaient b e n e f i t s  a re  provided people 
would be openly o r  wholly unemployed which i s  a g a in s t  cond itions  requ ired
( 3)to  make wages r e f l e c t  the  r e a l  s o c ia l  c o s t  of employing a worker*
In  so f a r  as the  market wage r a te  does no t r e f l e c t  i t s  t ru e  s o c ia l  
co s t  (marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  of labour)  the labour c o s t  needs to  be ad justed  
downward to  o b ta in  the  o p portun ity  cos t  of employing one e x tra  labourer*
2 ) C ap i ta l  markets in  underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s  a re  n o t w ell 
organised and th e re  i s  a la rg e  d iscrepancy  between the c a p i t a l  cos t  in  
organised and d iso rgan ised  c a p i t a l  m arkets . In o th e r  words c a p i t a l  co s t  
does not r e p r e s e n t  an eq u il ib r iu m  r a te  of i n t e r e s t  which would be p re v a i l in g
( 4 )under a f r e e  and com petitive  c a p i t a l  m arket. The degree of v a r i a t io n  in
(^^The e x tra  output which r e s u l t s  from the employment of an e x t ra  lab o u re r .
( 2)Because of immobile labour th e re  w i l l  be i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  in  the r e tu rn s  to  
labour in d i f f e r e n t  u se s .  Then market wage r a t e  may not re p re se n t  the 
o p portun ity  co s t  of lab o u r ,
( 3 )'^ ^ In  a d d i t io n  to t h i s  minimum wage, l e g i s l a t i o n  may a lso  r e s u l t  in a 
divergence between a c tu a l  and s o c ia l  wage r a t e s ,
^ ^ \ h i s  i s  due to  lack  of access to  c a p i t a l  markets as  w e ll  as to  immobility 
of c a p i t a l  w ith  a consequent r e s u l t  of irregu lax ib ies  in  the  r e tu rn s  to  
c a p i t a l  in  a l t e r n a t iv e  uses*
99.
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  not s o le ly  the measure of d i f f e r e n t i a l  r isk s*  Other
f a c to r s  such as government in te rv e n t io n ,  ignorance and monopoly elements
may opera te  in  the  supply of c a p i t a l  which widen the  range of r a t e s  from
( 1 )low to  extrem ely h igh  beyond what i s  r a t i o n a l .
Moreover, in c re a s in g  r e tu r n s  to sca le  in  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s
iaupear to  be one reason  f o r  la ck  o f  com petition , im perfec tion  in  the
( 2 )’d issem ina tion  of knowledge a n o th e r .  /Undertakings which re q u ire  la rg e  c a p i t a l  
funds a re  in  r e a l i t y  open only to  a handful of p o t e n t i a l  e n tre p re n eu rs ,  a 
cond ition  which i s  qu ite  c o n tra ry  to  a com petitive  model. The p r iv a te  
a l t e r n a t iv e s  become monopoly or o ligopo ly  with the r e s u l t i n g  divergence 
between commercial p r o f i t s  and s o c ia l  gains*
Because c a p i t a l  may be more va luab le  to  th e  country  than the 
o f f i c i a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  would suggest i t  i s  necessa ry  in  p ro je c t  ev a lua tion  
to  in troduce  an upward c o r re c t io n  f o r  i n t e r e s t  r a te s*
5) P e r f e c t  com petition  re q u ire s  a la rg e  number of f irm s to  be 
producing each commodity so t h a t  each i s  too sm all to  a f f e c t  i t s  p r ic e .
But many in d u s t r i e s  are  c h a ra c te r is e d  by " in c re a s in g  r e tu r n s " ,  th a t  i s  by a 
technology which perm its  the  co s t  per' u n i t  o f  ou tpu t to  f a l l  markedly with 
the  sca le  of ou tp u t .  E l e c t r i c  energy, s t e e l  i n d u s t r i e s  and t r a n s p o r t  are  
cases in  q u e s t io n .  The e x is ten ce  of in c re a s in g  re tu rn s  favours  la rg e  s c a le  
e n te r p r i s e s  both from the s o c ia l  and the  p r iv a te  p o in t  of view. There can 
be so few firm s th a t  each can have an in f lu en ce  on the p r ic e  a t  which i t
can s e l l  i t s  ou tp u t.  This i s ,  of course, co n tra ry  to  the  cond itions  of
p e r fe c t  competition*
Consequently the assumption of la rg e  numbers of f irm s tends to  be
v io la te d  and th e  tendency i s  s tro n g e r  in  developing  c o u n tr ie s  because of the
r e l a t i v e l y  small s iz e  o f  m arkets. The tendency to  monopoly or o ligopo ly  
can in f lu en ce  p r ic e s  in  such a way as to cause la rg e  d ive rgenc ies  between 
s o c ia l  and p r iv a te  p ro d u c t iv i ty .
 ^ ^See L i t t l e ,  I.M .D., S o c ia l  B enefit-C ost A na lysis .  OECD Manual of
I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  A nalysis  in  Developing C oun tries ,  V o l . I I .  P a r is  1969, 
p . 54; e lso  see Rosenstein-Rodan, P.IH , Programming in  Theory and in  
I t a l i a n  P r a c t ic e  in  "Investment C r i t e r i a  and economic Growth", I 964 , 
p p .19-20, He s t a t e s :  "Here again the f r e e  working o f the p r ic e  system 
in c rease s  the  degree of monopoly and the c a p i t a l  market a r r e a r s  to be 
governed by i n s t i t u t i o n a l  or t r a d i t i o n a l  r a t io n in g  quo tas" , p . 19.
( 2 )Bee Sen, A . I . ,  H arg lin , S.A. ,  Lectures on S oc ia l  Cost B en e f i t  A na lysis .  
For I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  Formulation and E v a lu a tio n .  Ü.N* I n d u s t r i a l  
Development O rg an isa t io n ,  June 196?, 'p .8 .
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Under m onopolis tic  o r  o l ig o p o l i s t i c  c o n d i t io n s ,  the  d ec is io n  of 
an in d iv id u a l  f irm  a f f e c t s  the  economic w ellbe ing  of agen ts  o th e r  than the  
firm  i t s e l f  and the b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  remain o u ts id e  the  scope of the  
commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r u l e .
4 ) An im portan t way in  which technology reduces the  e f f ic a c y  of 
p e r f e c t  com petition  i s  in  the  ex is ten ce  of e x te rn a l  economies or diseconomies.
In  the  p e r f e c t ly  com petitive  model (w ith  f u l l  employment) e x te rn a l  economies 
a re  assumed away* But in  r e a l i t y  e x te rn a l  economies or diseconomies p resen t 
themselves in  v a rio u s  forms, i . e .  smoke nuisance . For in s ta n c e ,  discom fort 
caused to  the  popula tion  does not e n te r  in to  the c a lcu lu s  of commercial 
p r o f i t s  because the  in d iv id u a l  f irm  i s  not in  genera l obliged to  compensate 
f o r  the  damage. But th ese  d i s - b e n e f i t s  ought to  be taken  in to  account in  
the  c a lc u la t io n  of s o c ia l  b e n e f i t s .
I t  i s  a lso  very  common to  have " la rge  p r o je c t s "  i . e .  a Hydro dam - 
which can have s i g n i f i c a n t  rep e rcu ss io n s  on p r o f i t s  elsewhere in  the  economy.
For in s ta n c e ,  investm ent in  one s ec to r  may have a considerab le  e f f e c t  upon 
the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  investm ent in  an o th er  s e c to r  v ia  inc reased  demand or
( 2)reduced c o s t s .
By d e f in i t i o n  e x te rn a l  economies are b e n e f i t s  which accrue to the 
whole community or to  some members of i t  in a way t h a t  does not b r in g  a d i r e c t
( 3)r e tu rn  to  the in v e s to r  who undertakes  the  i n i t i a l  investm ent. P r iv a te
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ru le  does n o t take in to  account the ne t b e n e f i t s  a r i s in g  from 
e x te rn a l  economies and economic in te rd ep en d en c ies .  Since these  b e n e f i t s  
(o r  d i s b e n e f i t s )  are  not o r  cannot be r e f le c te d  in  the  p r ic e  ob ta inab le  f o r  
the  output of the  in d u s try  or in  the  p r ic e  i t  pays fo r  i t s  in p u ts ,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
measure should take in to  account the r e s u l t i n g  in c rease  in  the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
in  o th e r  s e c t o r s . O t h e r w i s e ,  commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the p ro je c t
^^^They are  sometimes i n d i r e c t l y  r e f l e c te d  in  the  Zoning Law re g u la t in g  
i n d u s t r i a l  loca tion*
( 2)' 'T h is  has been c a l le d  by Bcitovsky a "dynamic e x te rn a l"  economy. See, 
Sc ltovsky, T .,  Two Concepts of E x te rn a l rnonomies. JPE, August 1954» 
Vol.LXII, p* 14-3-51: and Fleming, M., E x te rn a l  Economies and the Doctrine
of Balanced Growth. E . J . ,  1955, Fol*IKV, pp. 24I - 256 .
( 3)'  /This i s  due to i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework which does not permit him to  charge 
a p r ic e  fo r  the by-product b e n e f i t s  the investm ent made by him b r in g s .
See Fleming, H. ib id .  \ T- Sfttovslcvj. X bfd  » pjo. ,
(^^In p ra c t ic e  th e re  i s  a small p o s s i b i l i t y  of e s t im a t in g  a l l  kinds of 
e x te rn a l  b e n e f i t s ,  bu t a r a t io n a l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  should a ttem pt 
to  e s t im a te  a t  l e a s t  the measurable e f f e c t s .
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i t s e l f  cannot be regsrded  as a good measure of ne t s o c ia l  benef it*
I t  should a lso  be noted th a t  e x te r n a l  economies or diseconomies 
a re  c lo se ly  bound up w ith the  in c re a s in g  re tu rn s  and p u b lic  goods. I t  can 
be said  in g en e ra l  th a t  most pub lic  goods and in c re a s in g  re tu rn s  cond itions  
lead to  some kind o f e x te rn a l  economies.
5) Public-goods may be ano ther  problem of why p e r f e c t  com petition 
cond itions  a re  no t s u s ta in e d .  In  economists ' term s, "public-goods" are  
goods th a t  have the  p roperty  th a t  they a re  consumed j o i n t l y  by everybody 
w ithout the consumption o f one person in t e r f e r i n g  w ith the consumption by 
ano ther ( i . e .  t r a n s p o r t ,  h e a l th ,  educa tion , de fence ) .
By d e f in i t i o n  "public-goods" a re  pu re ly  te c h n ic a l  and i t  does not 
always imply t h a t  they  should be in  the  pub lic  s e c to r .  But i t  i s  c le a r  
th a t  public-goods cannot be produced under the co n d it io n s  of p e r fe c t  
com petition . I t  may fo llow  then th a t  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  does not r e f l e c t  
the  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .
For example, the  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a b ridge  should be valued no t on 
the  b a s is  of a c tu a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  but on the  b a s is  o f  what i t s  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
would be in  the  h y p o th e t ic a l  case which a lso  ih c lu d es  the "consumer's su rp lus", 
th a t  would accrue to the  u se rs  of pub lic  u t i l i t y .  In  o ther.w ords , as 
Scitovsky has poin ted  out the  t e s t  of s o c ia l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  i s  whether the
( 2)sum of p r o f i t  and consumers' su rp lu s  i s  p o s i t iv e*  Thus the  l a t t e r  mipht
be g r e a te r  than  the c o s t  and consequently  a case can be made f o r  c o n s t ru c t in g  
a bridge  d e sp i te  the  commercial lo s s e s .  Such an un d e rtak in g  would be re je c te d  
on the  b a s is  of p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  which may be c o n tra ry  to  
the  i n t e r e s t  o f  society*
The genera l  advantages (e x te rn a l  b e n e f i t s )  which may derive  
from such pu b lic  u t i l i t i e s  should be talm in to  account f o r  a proper a s s e s s ­
ment of t h e i r  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  I f  t o l l  i s  charged f o r  c ro ss in g  the  bridge 
th e re  may be some p r o f i t ,  but the  important f a c to r  in  p ub lic  u t i l i t i e s  i s  
no t what the  p r iv a te  p r o f i t  w i l l  be, bu t what the  o v e r - a l l  b e n e f i t s  a re .
 ^ ^ I t  must however be noted th a t  t h i s  c h a ra c te r  of public-goods may have some 
ex cep tio n s .  For in s ta n c e ,  a b r idge , u n t i l  i t  has been crowded i s  a puolic- 
good; then i t  becomes private-good  s ince  one man's c ro ss in g  delays the  
c ro ss in g  o f ano ther  man.
{21^ See, Sc itovsky , T. Two Concepts of E x terna l Economies (R eprin t)  in  
"Readings in  Welfare Economics", p . 247- I t  does no t m a tte r  whether 
consumers' su rp lu s  accrues to  persons or re p re se n t  e x te rn a l  economies to 
f irm s; see a lso  Lerner, Abba, 1-, The Economics o f  C ontro l, The Macmillen 
Corap, New York, 194c> Chapter 10.
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6) G enera lly  speaking the  foreign-exchange in  le s s  developed 
c o u n tr ie s  i s  managed by tlie government in  such a way t h a t  i t  does no t re p re se n t  
i t s  e q u il ib r iu m  ra te^^^  In  o th e r  words, a t  o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e s  the  
demand f o r  fo re ig n  exchange exceeds the  supply of fo re ign  exchange.
I f  the  exchange r a t e  ’i s  unchanged d e sp i te  i n f l a t i o n ,  domestic 
p r ic e s  g e t  out of l i n e  w ith  world p r i c e s .  Consequently lira p r ice  o f  an 
import i s  l e s s  than the  r e a l  cost  to  th e  economy* S im ila r ly ,  the  l i r a  
p r ic e  of an export  i s  l e s s  than the  b e n e f i t s  to  the economy. In  so f a r  as 
currency i s  no t devalued in o rder to  remedy the p o s i t io n  the  demand f o r  
foreign-exchange f o r  imports w i l l  outrun the  supply and the  government becomes 
forced to  r e s t r i c t  imnorts fu r th e r*  Surely , t h i s  causes  f u r th e r  gaps
( 2 )between the market p r ic e s  of goods and the r e a l  c o s t  of producing them.
Therefore , foreign-exchange r a t e  re q u ire s  an upward c o rre c t io n  
w h ils t  a s s e s s in g  the  economic value of an investm ent p r o je c t .
Many developing c o u n tr ie s  fo llow  a p ro te c t io n  p o l ic y  over t h e i r  
domestic in d u s t ry .  This may be a d e l ib e ra te  in f lu en ce  on the  p r ice  
mechanism to  make i t  opera te  in  a manner more donducive to  s o c i e ty 's  b e n e f i t  
than would be a l a i s s e r - f a i r e  commercial p o l ic y .
The domestic in d u s t ry  i s  u s u a l ly  encouraged and p ro tec ted  by
t a r i f f s  and import quo tas .  bonsequently the domestic p r ic e  of the output
i s  kept above the  import p r i c e .  when an in d u s try  exports  i t  f in d s  t h a t  the
very  system which p ro te c ts  i t  in  i t s  domestic m arke t-p lace  pu ts  i t  a t  a
disadvantage in  export m arke ts . P ro te c t io n ,  l ik e  currency  o v e rv a lu a tio n ,
im plies  t h a t  th e  l i r a  p r i ce ob ta in ab le  f o r  an expo rt  underestim ates  the
(3)s o c ia l  va lue  o f  t h a t  ex p o rt .
 ^ ^Some economists may argue th a t  in t h i s  case r.n underdeveloped country 
should change the  exchange r a t e  accord ing ly . But such a p o l ic y  cannot 
be e a s i ly  followed s ince  i t s  consequences a re  q u i te  harmful to fo re ign  
trade* To put the foreign-exchange r a te  a t  eq u il ib r iu m  r a te  im plies  
i n d i r e c t l y  a devalu '-tion with a l l  i t s  d e fe c ts .  This kind of p o licy  may 
c re a te  a very  u n s tab le  balance of paynents r o s i t i o n .  This i s  p a r t l y  
why low ering fo re ig n  exchange becomes an in e v i ta b le  policy*
( 2) ^ / ? o r  t h i s  p o in t  see . L i t t l e ,  l.M.J). & M irr le e s ,  J . A. ,  S oc ia l  C o s t-b en e f i t  
A na lysis ,  CïïCl) Manual o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  A nalysis  in  Leveloning 
C ountries , Vol. I I ,  P a r is  15'69,P«32.
^^^Ibid, p*35
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Another reason  why the  r e l a t i v e  gap between domestic and worlc 
p r ic e s  i s  la rg e ly  d ive rgen t between in d u s t r ie s  i s  the ex tensive  use of irroort 
quo tas . A l e s s  developed economy runs in to  a balance of payments probl'm*
The d e f i c i t  i s  then brought under c o n tro l  by r e s t r i c t i n g  imports and the 
l e a s t  e s s e n t i a l  goods w i l l  be h eav ily  r e s t r i c t e d .  Consequently th e re  w i l l  
be a growth of domestic in d u s t ry  g re a t ly  supported by p ro te c t iv e  quotas which 
may bear l i t t l e  r e l a t i o n  to  the  long-term  comparative advantage of the  
co un try .
7 ) I t  can f u r t h e r  be argued th a t  underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s  are  more 
prone to  in f l a t io n a r y  cond itions  than  developed and t h i s  s i tu a t io n  may cause 
a divergence between p r iv a te  p r o f i t  and s o c ia l  p r o f i t .
An economic p o licy  of a  rap id  growth o ften  r e s u l t s  in  a constan t 
tendency f o r  demand to  exceed supply . This can be more apparent in  some 
s e c to rs  where th e re  i s  an i n e l a s t i c i t y  of supply ( i . e .  a g r i c u l tu r e )  which may 
cause s e c to r a l  n r ic e  r i s e s  which by t r a n s m i t t in g  themselves across  to o th e r  
s e c to rs  can fo rce  the  a u t h o r i t i e s  to in c rease  t o t a l  money demand i f  the 
recess io n  i s  to  be e l im in a te d . ^
I f  i n f l a t i o n  develops in  a uniform way so th a t  r e l a t i v e  p r ic e s  
a re  not changed, i t  could then be maintained th a t  p r ic e s  cannot be a poor 
measure o f  r e a l  c o s ts  and b e n e f i t s .  But su re ly  t h i s  i s  not so . With 
i n f l a t i o n a r y  co n d itio n s  p re v a i l in g  the  governments a re  o f ten  led  to  adopt 
p r ic e  c o n tro ls  in some se le c te d  a reas  where they  can be opera ted . A r e s u l t  
o f such cond itions  would be t h a t  a c t i v i t y  in  the  s e le c te d  f i e l d s  w i l l  be 
r e l a t i v e l y  u n a t t r a c t iv e  and unprofitable without regard  to  the  b e n e f i t  of 
such a c t i v i t i e s *
So f a r  I  have concen tra ted  on the im perfec tions  of the  p r ice  
mechanism which stem from the depar tu re s  from market s t a t i c  assum ptions.
Many f a c to r s  we have mentioned e a r l i e r  may provide a r i g i d  market s t r u c tu r e ,  
monopoly p o s i t io n s ,  immobile labour and c a p i t a l  and consequently  la rg e
( 2 )i n e q u a l i t i e s  in  the r e tu rn s  to  lab o u r  and c a p i t a l  in  d i f f e r e n t  u ses .
( ^ ^ L i t t l e ,  I.M.D.,. ' M ir r le e s ,  J .A . ,  S oc ia l C o st-B en efi t  A na lysis ,  Manual of 
I n d u s t r i a l  P r o je c t  A nalysis  in  Developing C oun tries .  OECD Development 
Centre S tu d ies .  V o l . I I ,  P a r is  I I 69 , p p .32-33«
( 2)'  / Informat io n  in  developing co u n tr ie s  i s  l e s s  widely a v a i la b le  in  re sp e c t  to  
a l t e r n a t iv e  production techn iques , f a c to r  s u p p l ie s ,  consumer and producer 
demands. In ad d i t io n  th e re  i s  no f r e e  access  to  some kinds of occupations 
because /
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The case f o r  p r ic e  mechanism however becomes even le s s  convincing 
i f  i t  i s  taken in to  co n s id e ra t io n  th a t  the  p r ic e  th eo ry  i s  to  a la rg e  e x te n t  
s t a t i c  w hile  r e a l i t y  i s  dynamic. The dynamic f a c to r s  which a re  not fo re s e e ­
able  by the  p r ic e  system may be considered an im portan t reason fo r  the 
inadequacy of f r e e  market mechanism. The e f f e c t s  of change in  l e s s  
developed c o u n tr ie s  may cause more u n c e r ta in ty  than in  developed c o u n t r ie s .
For example, building; one or two p la n ts  may double p roduction  of a given 
commodity where they  could perhaps re p re sen t  a m arginal in c re ase  in  a more 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  coun try . The importance of these  e f f e c t s  in  investm ent 
d ec is io n s  i s  the  im perfec t f o r e c a s t  of fu tu re  demands and o f  commodity and 
f a c to r  c o s t s F a c t o r  co s ts  may change s u b s t a n t i a l l y  over time as a 
consequence of economic growth, Thus an advantage based on cheap labour 
may prove q u i te  l im ited  in  the f u tu r e .  Productive.ty  change in  f a c to r
in p u ts  i s  a lso  an im portan t f a c to r  and investm ent d e c is io n  should be taken
( 2 )w ith in  the p e rsp ec t iv e  o f  changes over tim e,  ^ üs i s  o f ten  argued, a 
p roductive  p rocess  i t s e l f  may have co nsiderab le  e f f e c t s  on the  experience and 
s k i l l  o f labour  and savings e f f e c t .  These are  a l l  i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  of 
expanding a c e r t a in  p roduction  l i n e .  But the f a c t  th a t  improvements in  f a c to r  
supply o r  r e in v e s t i b l e  su rp lus  are  not r e f l e c te d  in  the  market mechanism may 
in d ic a te  b ia s  a g a in s t  a given production  l in e  ( i . e .  m anufactu ring).
In a d d i t io n  the  e f f e c t  of one investment on the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of 
ano ther (by inc reased  demand or reduced costs)^^^  which i s  c a l le d  in  theo ry  
"dynamic e x te r n a l  economy" i s  no t taken in to  account by th e  market mechanism* 
Whereas im puta tion  of th ese  economies to  the o r ig i n a t in g  investm ent may
(c o n td .)  of s o c ia l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c to r s .  Ih rr ther , access to  f a c to r  
markets ( i . e .  c a p i t a l ,  labou r, n a tu ra l  re so u rces )  i s  o ften  unequal. Bee 
Chenery, H.B. Development P o l ic ie s  and Programs, D.li, B u l le t in  fo r  L a tin  
America, March 1958. p, 53*
^Chenery, H.B. Development P o l i c ie s  and Programmes. UN B u l le t in  fo r  
L a tin  America, March 1958, p . 53*
( 2 )
■ /Chenery, H.B. Comparative Advantage and Development P o licy  in  "Surveys of 
Economic Theory, Growth and Development", The Hoyal Economic S oc ie ty . A.E.AS. 
V o l . I I .  Macmillan, S t .  M a r t in 's  P re ss ,  Hew York I 965 . pp.l29-15C.
(^^Cost re d u c t io n s  may a r i s e  from economies of s c a le ,  p ro d u c t iv i ty  in c rease s  
or new technology. A red u c tio n  of cos t  in  a p roduction  l in e  se rv in g  
ano ther p roduction  l in e  w i l l  a l t e r  a lso  the o th e r  p roduction  l in e  and may 
in c re ase  demand f o r  the  products of the f i r s t  p roduction  l i n e .  In o th e r  
words, t h i s  i s  an i n t e r r e l a t i o n  between two d i f f e r e n t  demand fu n c tio n s  and 
between production  and demand fu n c t io n s .
See Dr, L« S i r e ,  Lecture Notes on " In te rn a t io n a l  Economics", Handout I I I ,
p .4 .
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s e r io u s ly  a l t e r  th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c a lc u la t io n s  of t h a t  investm ent. F in a l ly ,  
i t  can s a f e ly  be argued th a t  com plem entarities among s e c to r s  and p ro je c ts  
a re  not given due a t t e n t io n  in  the  a p p l ic a t io n  of market mechanism and i t s  
investm ent r u l e s .  For in s ta n ce ,  i t  may be the  case t h a t  a group of i n v e s t ­
ment p ro je c ts  w i l l  only be p r o f i t a b l e  when they a re  a l l  considered to g e th e r  
and then i t  may be f e a s ib le  to  c a r ry  out a l t e r n a t iv e  combinations of 
investm en ts .
For t h i s  reason  a case can be made fo r  an o v e ra l l  programming which 
can perm it sim ultaneous a p p ra is a l  of a group of investm ents  by fo llow ing  i t s  
own p la n n e rs '  s o c ia l  investment c r i t e r i a .  In  o th e r  words "uncoordinated 
investment p lans  a re  l i k e l y  to  be made a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o in ts  of time and the 
mere d i f f e re n c e  in  tim ing  causes them to  be based on le s s  in fo rm  t io n  than 
would be a v a i la b le  i f  the  same investment d ec is ions  were coord inated  and 
taken s im u ltan eo u s ly " . ^
I t  can be m aintained th a t  coordinated and sim ultaneous planning
( 2)gives r i s e  to  le s s  u n c e r ta in ty  than would market mechanism.  ^ O vera l l  
programming however, may provide b e t t e r  access to re q u ire d  inform ation
( 3)necessary  f o r  long-term  fo r e c a s t s  of output and demand.  ^ Besides complem­
e n t a r i t y  of demand w i l l  reduce the r i s k  of no t f in d in g  a market, i f  co o rd in a t­
ed inv es tm en t-d ec is io n  i s  implemented. Reducing such interdependence r i s k s  
may e v en tu a l ly  in c re a se  the in c en t iv e  to i n v e s t , O n  the o th e r  hand, 
the r e s u l t  o f  u n c e r ta in ty  i s  th a t  r i s k s  to  p r iv a te  in v e s to r s  in  some s e c to rs
^^^See Scitovsky, T. Two Concepts of E x terna l Economies: A Reply in
"Papers oh Welfare and Growth", George Allen & Unwin l t d . ,  London I 964 , 
p . 83 '
C 2)' / f t  i s  t r u e  in r e a l i t y  en trep reneu rs  and c e n t r a l  p lanners  a re  faced with the 
same u n c e r ta in ty ;  i t  i s  a lso  t ru e  th a t  under dynamic co n d itio n s  no th ing  
can be said  f o r  c e r t a in .  U ncerta in ty  can be in  re fe ren ce  to ( l )  how demand 
w i l l  develop, (2) what course technology w i l l  ta k e ,  and ( 3 ) what su p p lie s  
o f  f a c to r  in p u ts  w i l l  be forthcoming. As always argued fu tu re  develop­
ments can be p red ic ted  on the  b a s is  of p a s t  developments, but t h i s  i s  not 
enough since u n c e r ta in ty  i s  re fe r re d  to the  fu tu re  and not to  the p a s t .
See Ur. S i re ,  L . ,  Lecture Notes on " In te rn a t io n a l  Economics" Handout I I I ,  
p . l .
f 3) ~' /See Rosenstein-Rodan, P .N .,  Programming in  Theory and P r a c t ic e ,  in  
"Investm ent C r i t e r i a  and Growth"-, f i . I .T ,  (R eprin t)  in  M eie r 's  "Leading 
Is su e s  in  Development Economics". O.U.P, new f o r k  I 964 , p n .416-418; 
and Rosenstein-Rodan, P .P . ,  Problems of I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  of Eastern and 
South E as tern  Europe. E . J , ,  June-Sepr. 1943 (R eprin t)  in  "M eier 's  
Leading Issues  in  Development Economics", p p .434-435'
( 4) l b i d ,  p . 436.
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may be :• increased and investm ent resources  may be a l lo c a te d  to  l e s s  p roductive  
u ses .  F in a l ly ,  i t  can be sa id  th a t  the  case f o r  the  co o rd ina tion  of i r t e r -  
r e l a t e d  investm ent d ec is io n s  i s  more r e le v a n t  to  underdeveloped co u n tr ie s  
where u n c e r ta in ty  i s  more acute* I n t e r n a l i z a t i o n  of e x te rn a l  economies 
may r a i s e  the marginal e f f i c ie n c y  of c a p i t a l  and consequently  lead  to  i n v e s t ­
ment in  l a r g e r  p roductive  u n i t s  than would-be b u i l t  under p r ic e  mechanism.
From the  above c o n s id e ra t io n s  i t  fo llow s th a t  d i r e c t  in te rv e n t io n  
by the  government in  investment d ec is ions  becomes necessary  to promote 
investm ents in  new production  l in e s  where dynamic f a c to r s  a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
im portant and where the r i s k  to  p r iv a te  in v e s to rs  may be much l a r g e r  than 
w ith some form of government co o rd ina tion  of investm ent p lan s ,
So long as market im perfec tions  a re  p r e v a i l in g  in  an economy 
p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  should then be rep laced  by s o c ia l  investm ent c r i t e r i a  
which may a l lo c a te  resources  more a c c u ra te ly  and e f f i c i e n t l y .
■ A f i n a l  c o n s id e ra t io n  f o r  inadequacy of market mechanism i s  o f ten
re la t e d  to  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of w ealth  and d e f ic ien cy  of sav ings .
I t  i s  sometimes argued th a t  i t  i s  unreasonable  to  expect p r iv a te  
e n te r p r i s e  to  take  consumers' gain  in to  account, but a pu b lic  e n te r p r i s e  
ought t o .  Governments cannot be in d i f f e r e n t  to  who rece iv e s  the b e n e f i t s  
o f  pu b lic  economic a c t i v i t y .  The e s s e n t i a l  goal of economic n o l ic y  in 
most developing c o u n tr ie s  i s  the  e ra d ic a t io n  of extreme in e q u a l i t i e s  and 
i t  i s  th e re fo re  ap p ro p r ia te  t h a t  g re a te r  weight be a ttach ed  to  b e n e f i t s  
received  by the  poor r a th e r  than to  b e n e f i t s  rece ived  by the r i c h .
Commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  however inadequate  f o r  pub lic  i n v e s t ­
ment d e c is io n s  f o r  two b a s ic  reasons; f i r s t  commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  f a i l s  
to  take in to  account b e n e f i t s  and co s ts  to  economic agents  o th e r  than the
 ^ ^I am no t proposing here th a t  in  every f i e l d  of the  economy the government 
should s tep  in ;  there  a re  a number of p o l i c i e s  the  government can take 
to  o f f s e t  market d e fe c ts  w ithout r e s o r t in g  to  an o v e ra l l  economic 
programme, i . e .  c o n tro l  of monopoly, removal of o b s tac le s  to  e n try  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  measures e t c .  But government in te rv e n t io n  becomes necessary  
in  l a r g e - s c a le  undertak ings and s o c ia l  overhead f a c i l i t i e s ,  i . e .  e l e c t r i c  
power, t r a n s p o r t  e t c . , which depend la rg e ly  on an eva lu a tio n  of fu tu re  
production  p a t te rn s  and where economies of s c a le  a re  s ig n i f ic a n t*
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e n te r p r i s e  and second, the  d i s t r i b u t io n  of th ese  b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts .
But the  dilemma here i s  t h a t  in e q u a l i ty  in  the  d i s t r i b u t io n  of 
income- promotes savings and he lps  fu tu re  g e n e ra t io n s .  I t  i s  th e re fo re  
argûed th a t  market mechanism by c re a t in g  such i n e q u a l i t i e s  may c o n tr ib u te  
more to  economic development. . But the  government in  an underdeveloped 
country  can make the  c o n f l i c t  l e s s  acute  by in c re a s in g  p u b lic  savings via  
increased  ta x a t io n ,  tak in g  the form of savings of the  r i c h  -  but th e re  i s  a 
l im i t  to  t h i s  and the  dilemma remains.
In  the  p e r f e c t ly  com petitive  model the  most d e s i r a b le  d i s t r i b u t io n
of income i s  assumed to  be achieved by means of taxes  and su b s id ie s  th a t  do
( 2 )not d i s t o r t  d e c is io n s .  But no government has y e t  found a way to  levy
taxes  and give su b s id ie s  th a t  does not a f f e c t  econom ic-decision making*
Many governments seem to  be r e lu c ta n t  to  apply lump-sum t r a n s f e r s  even i f  
they  a re  f e a s ib l e  (because o f  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t io n ) .
N evertheless  w ithout the lump-sum t r a n s f e r s  commercial p r o f i t a b i l ­
i t y  i s  not a proper c r i t e r i o n  f o r  the s o c ia l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  pub lic  investment
(3)even in  an economic system th a t  i s  o therw ise p e r f e c t ly  com petitive .
There may be a case where " the  government may wish to s a c r i f i c e  the  s iz e  of 
the  economic p ie  to  achieve a b e t t e r  s l i c in g ;  and t h i s  would re q u ire  i t  
to depar t  from the c r i t e r i o n  of commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y "
In  f a c t  commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  an inadequate  ru le  fo r  the 
government not only because the  absence o f  lump-sum t r a n s f e r s  ob liges  the 
government to  fo llow  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  goals  through i t s  choice of investm ents .
 ^ ^As Chenery has pointed out market mechanism does no t provide in r e a l i t y  a 
favourab le  tendency to reduce in e q u a l i ty  in  income d i s t r i b u t i o n  among 
economic c la s se s  o r geographica l a re a s .  In s te ad  i t  i s  now widely accepted 
t h a t  i t  has tended to  opera te  in the opposite  d i r e c t io n  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  
l e s s  developed c o u n tr ie s .  See Chenery, E .B .,  Devdlopment P o l i c i e s  and 
Program s., o p .c i t . ,  p . 53
( 2 )'  /fhe  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  can be a good measure of n e t  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t  i f  
the  ta x  system and o th e r  measures can provide e q u a l i ty  to  the  ex ten t  th a t  
i s  s o c i a l l y  d e s i r a b le .
( 3)/See Sen, A.K,, M arplin , S.A., Lectures on S oc ia l  C ost-B enefit  Analysis 
For I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  Formulation and E v a lu a tio n ,  United Nations Indus­
t r i a l  Development O rgan ization . U.N, June 1967, p*3
( 4 ) lb id ,  p . 3.
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Commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  an in ap p ro p r ia te  device a l s o  because p e r f e c t  
com petition  i s  a mere descrip tion , of econom ists’ id e a l  model vbich i s  q u i te  
d i s t i n c t  from the  a c tu a l  co n d itio n s  in which investm ent d ec is io n s  a re  t a /e n ,  
e s p e c ia l ly  in  developing c o u n t r ie s .  Hence the income produced by an 
investm ent i s  no t n e c e s s a r i ly  maximized when p r iv a te  p r o f i t  i s  maximized.
D efic iency  of savings i s  a lso  argued to  be an o th e r  reason why the 
government should depar t  from the commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n .  I n v e s t ­
ment p ro je c ts  have d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t s  on consumption and sav ings , Per 
in s ta n c e ,  two p ro je c ts  may have the  same ne t p r o f i t ,  bu t a d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t  
on the  amount of e x t ra  consumption and savingso
I f  the  government in  developing c o u n tr ie s  f e e l s  more savings and 
le s s  consumption i s  in  the  i n t e r e s t  of the so c ie ty ,  th e re  may then be a 
c o n f l ic t*  As  we have noted e a r l i e r ,  a com petitive  model depends on consumers' 
sovereignty*
The p o in t  here i s  th a t  savings can be transform ed in to  investm ent 
and investm ent can provide e x t ra  consumption f o r  a s a c r i f i c e  of p re sen t  
consumption. The government may p lace r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h e r  va lue  on the 
consumption of people in  the d i s t a n t  fu tu re  than do p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls .
By and la rg e  t h i s  im plies  th a t  the  r a t e  a t  which the  s o c ie ty  ought to  d iscoun t 
the  fu tu re  may d i f f e r  from the r a t e  a t  which a p r iv a te  f irm  can borrow*
I f  the  d iscoun t r a t e  i s  taken lower than the  market r a t e ,  t h i s  means th a t  
fu tu re  consumption w i l l  be more va luab le  than i s  in d ic a ted  by aggregate  
choices of in d iv id u a ls .  I f  the  p u b lic  saved more, i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would be 
lower. In o th e r  words, the  government considers  p re sen t  savings to  be more 
va luab le  than p re sen t  consumption. There i s  then a c o n f l i c t ;  one between 
p resen t  consumption and in c re ase  in  savings (hence an in c rease  in  the  r a t e  
of n a t io n a l  income)*
The government has powers to  in c rease  savings by increased  ta x a t io n ,  
but the  government does not use i t  o r there  i s  no scope to  in c rease  i t  in  
economies which e x i s t  on su b s is ten ce  l e v e l .
I t  i s  th e re fo re  argued by some e c o n o m i s t s ^ t h a t  the  government 
in  developing c o u n tr ie s  should d ep ar t  from the u su a l  commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y
Galenson and H. L e ibens te in  suggest th a t  investm ent d ec is io n s  should be 
taken on the  b a s is  of p r o j e c t s '  r e in v e s t ib le  su rp lu s  or savings e f f e c t .
To t h i s  end they propose to  in v e s t  in  in d u s try  in  urban a reas  as a g a in s t  
investm ents in  r u r a l  a reas  w ith  l i t t l e  or no r e in v e s t i b l e  su rp lu s .  See 
Galenson, Vf, and L e ib en s te in ,  H ., Investment C r i t e r i a ,  P r o d u c t iv i ty  and 
Economic Development. QJE, August 1953» VoI*69 , i io . l ,  p n ,930-93$
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c r i t e r i o n  and give p re fe rence  to  p ro je c ts  with th e  g r e a te r  c o n tr ib u t io n  to 
r e in v e s t i b le  su rp lu s  (o r  sav in g s ) ,
IV. C onclusion
In the presence of p e r f e c t  com petition  commercial p r o f i t s  do 
r e f l e c t  a l l  the gains and lo s se s  produced by an e n te r p r i s e .  Eut a p e r fe c t  
com petitive  model does not e x i s t  as we have explained  e a r l i e r ; t h e r e  
a re  a t  l e a s t  th re e  s e t s  of assumptions which are no t ap p ro p r ia te  to  developing 
c o u n tr ie s .  These are  te ch n o lo g ica l  o b s tac le s  which a re  r e f le c te d  in  in c re a s ­
ing  r e tu rn s ,  pu b lic  goods and e x te rn a l  economies, im perfec tions  in  c a p i t a l  
markets and f i n a l l y  im perfec tions  in  the d issem ina tion  of knowledge and in  
response to  knowledge.
These and o the r  market d i s to r t io n s  we d iscussed  above may produce 
a s t ru c tu re  of p r ic e s  which does not ensure the  b e s t  a v a i la b le  guide to  
resource  a l lo c a t io n  in  a number of s e c to r s .  This i s  so because f a c to r s  of 
production a re  no t used in the  p ronortion  they a re  a v a i la b le :  labour i s  not
f u l l y  employed and n a tu ra l  re sou rces  tend to  be i n e f f i c i e n t l y  u t i l i z e d  due 
to  lack  of complementarity among d i f f e r e n t  in d u s t r i e s .  Consequently, p r iv a te  
p r o f i t s  aupear to  d i f f e r  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  from s o c ia l  b e n e f i t s .
As we mentioned above, p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  which i s  based on 
a c tu a l  market p r ic e s  ceases to  be a s a t i s f a c t o r y  device f o r  the a l lo c a t io n  of 
investment resou rces  and f o r  the assessment of s o c ia l  b e n e f i t s  and s o c ia l  
c o s ts  of investm ent p ro jec ts*
Can the commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  guide government in v e s t ­
ment d ec is io n s?  The answer i s  probably n o t .  The b a s ic  d if f e re n c e  i s  th a t  
the  b e n e f i t s  accrued to  o th e r  economic agents ( in d iv id u a ls  or f irm s) are  of
i n t e r e s t  to  the n r iv a te  firm  only as e means to  i t s  own n r o f i t s , the n rov is ion
( 2 )of b e n e f i t s  to  o th e rs  i s  im portant to  the government as an end in i t s e l f .  ■ '
As Tp Balogh has pointed out: "There i s  no in h e re n t  tendency in t h i s
system (market system) e i t h e r  to  e q u a l i s a t io n  of f a c to r  remuneration ( in c lu d ­
ing  i n t e r e s t )  or to  the  e l im in a tio n  of m o n o ro l is t ic  p r o f i t  margins. Nor 
a re  p roduction  and p r ic e s  s e n s i t i v e ly  ad justed  to s l i g h t  changes in  demand 
in a way c o n s is te n t  with th e  assumption of n e r f e c t  competition"., 8ee T« 
Balog'h, Economic P o licy  and the  P r ice  System, U.N. Economic B u l le t in  fo r  
L atin  America, Esrch IS o l .  Vol.VI, N o .l ,  p . 3$.
( 2) ^ I t  i s  sometimes argued th a t  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  may e x i s t  as much fo r  p r iv a te  as 
f o r  p ub lic  investm ents . But as a p r in c iu le  these  e f f e c t s  are  not taken 
in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  in  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  nor a re  they crrnpatible 
with maximizing p r iv a te  p ro f i ts*
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Moreover, the  government cannot be i n d i f f e r é n t  to i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  and co s ts
nor can remain in d i f f e r e n t  to  who rece iv e s  the  b e n e f i t s  of nub lic  economic
( 1 )a c t i v i t y .
Thus i t  becomes necessa ry  f o r  the  government to  depart from the
commercial n r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  in  a u n ra is in g  i t s  ovrn n ro je c t s  and r e s o r t
( 2 )to  some o th e r  s e t  of c r i t e r i a  which can s a t i s f y  a l l  th e se  requ irem en ts .  '
S oc ia l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  (o r  s o c ia l  p re sen t  va lue) can be 
considered to  be the b e s t  s u b s t i t u t e  to  commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  in  both 
economies (developed and underdeveloped), bu t probably  s t i l l  more in developing 
c o u n t r ie s .  The reason f o r  t h a t  i s  the f a c t  th a t  developing co u n tr ie s  a re  
f a r t h e r  removed from the  com petitive  assumptions than a re  most advanced 
c o u n tr ie s .
I t  must be noted t i a t  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c r i te r io n ,  may take 
ex ac t ly  the  same form as p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a ly s is .  In f a c t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
a n a ly s is  by en trep reneu rs  i s  a p r iv a te  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s i s .  But one can 
c i t e  the  fo llow ing  d i f f e re n c e s  between the two types of a n a ly s i s ,
( i )  For a f irm  re c e ip t s  a re  i d e n t i c a l  to  b e n e f i t s  and expenditures  
a re  id e n t i c a l  to  c o s ts .  But expenditiires and r e c e ip t s  to  the f irm  may d i f f e r  
from co s t  and b e n e f i t s  to  s o c ie ty .  T herefore , i t  becomes necessary  to  value 
inpu ts  and ou tpu ts  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p r ic e s  from those a c tu a l ly  paid by or received  
by the  f irm . In o th e r  words i t  w i l l  be necessary  to  app ly  "shadow" or 
"accounting" p r i c e s .  Accounting p r ic e s  w i l l  be u s u a l ly  requ ired  fo r  wage 
r a t e s ,  foreign-exchange r a t e s  and c a p i t a l  costs  ( i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ) .
( i i )  Second, there  may be some b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  r e s u l t i n g  from 
the p ro je c t  which do no t appear as inpu ts  o r  ou tpu ts  of the  f irm , and do not
 ^ ^In o th e r  words commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  may choose those in v e s t ­
ment p ro je c t s  which, though p r o f i t a b l e  from the p r iv a te  f i r m 's  p o in t of view, 
may not be accep tab le  from the  n a t io n a l  economy's p o in t  of view, A p r iv a te  
f irm  can and the  government cannot ignore the  e f f e c t  of a p ro je c t  on n a t io n a l  
income, balance of payments, employment and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of income,
( 2 ) ^ '^Public investm ent c r i t e r i a  inc lude  those such as c a n i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o ,  
capital-em ploym ent r a t i o ,  balance of payments e f f e c t  and s o c ia l  marginal 
p ro d u c t iv i ty  l u l e s .  More broadly  i t  inc ludes  s o c ia l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  
to o .  These w i l l  be d e a l t  w ith in Chapters 4 and 5»
(9)Shadow p r ic e s  should be chosen so as to  r e f l e c t  b e t t e r  the  r e a l  c o s ts  of
in p u ts  to  so c ie ty  and the r e a l  b e n e f i ts  of the  o u tp u ts  than do a c tu a l  p r ic e s .
I l l ,
vary  w ith  these  in p u ts  o r  o u tp u ts .  Such costs  o r  b e n e f i t s  have to  be sep a ra te ly  
added or su b trac ted  f o r  every y ear  of o p e ra t io n .
( i i i )  The r a t e  a t  which b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  need to  be discounted 
may be d i f f e r e n t  in s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is .  I t  may a lso  be necessary  
to  sep a ra te  c e r ta in  kinds of b e n e f i t s  and co s ts  because i t  seems d e s i r a b le  
to  d iscoun t them a t  d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s .
( iv )  Mien p r iv a te  d ec is io n s  a re  guided by commercial p r o f i t s ,  
p r o f i t s  a re  defined as the  d i f f e r e n c e  between revenues (b e n e f i t s  to  the  e n te r ­
p r i s e )  and c o s t s .  But d i r e c t  taxes  have to  be deducted from the f ig u r e  f o r  
expend itu res  l e s s  r e c e ip t s  o f  th e  f irm  to  f ind  th e  f i n a l  b e n e f i t  derived*
But t h i s  i s  no t a co s t  to  so c ie ty  and must be added b-ck to  o b ta in  s o c ia l  
b e n e f i t .
I t  can be seen th a t  once such adjustm ents  a re  made to the  b e n e f i t s  
and co s ts  which accrue in  the p r o j e c t ’s l i f e  and to  the  r a t e  a t  which they are  
d iscoun ted , the  procedures followed are  then the  same. Thus the  p re sen t  
va lue  (pv) of the p ro je c t  becomes i t s  p resen t s o c ia l  value and th e  in te r n a l  
r a t e  of r e tu r n  becomes the  s o c ia l  y ie ld .
To summarise, the  fo llow ing  conclusions can be drawn:
1, The p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r io n  as i t  s tands  i s  widely 
challenged as an a l lo c a t io n a l  device and i f  i t  i s  to be used i t  must be 
co rrec ted  by adopting  shadow or accounting  p r ic e s ,
2. Or f o r  p ub lic  investm ent dec is ions  i t  needs to  be rep laced
by some o th e r  s e t  o f  c r i t e r i a ,  i . e .  probably by s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  
ru le  or s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c r i t e r i o n .
5 . In o rd e r  to  ob ta in  the equ ilib r ium  p r ic e  c a p i t a l  and fo re ig n -  
exchange r a t é  need an upward c o r re c t io n  while labour c o s t  needs a downward 
c o r re c t io n .  Shadow p r ic e s  should th e re fo re  correspond more c lo se ly  to  the 
r e a l i t i e s  of economic s c a r c i ty  and the s tre n g th  of economic needs tlian to
( 2)guesses as to  what fu tu re  p r ic e s  would be. ^
^^^See L i t t l e ,  I.M.ID. & M ir r le e s ,  J .A . ,  S oc ia l  C o st-B enefit  A nalysis , lianual 
o f I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  A nalysis  in  Developing C oun tr ies ,  V o l . I I ,  P a r is  I 969,
pp.ld-2C
 ^ ^ l o t  a l l  d i s to r t i o n s  in p r ic e  mechanism can be adequa te ly  d e a l t  w ith  by 
u s in g  accounting  p r ic e s  in  p ro je c t  a p p r a i s a l .  Some d i s to r t i o n s  can be 
remedied by p o l ic ie s  which lead to  proper correspondence of p r ic e s  and 
c o s ts  and b e n e f i t s .
1 1 2 .
4* I t  i s  now widely accepted by many economists th a t  the  fu tu re  
needs o f  s o c ie ty  tend to  be provided inadequa te ly  by f r e e  market o p e ra t io n .
This has th e re fo re ,  led many le s s  developed countriws to  p repare  development 
p lans and programmes in  o rder to  apply t h e i r  s o c ia l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  
to  investm ent p ro je c t s  and a l s o ’ to modify consumers' power over the p a t te rn  
of production so as to  pursue an optimum path  o f  growth. In o th e r  words 
a p lanning  agency 's  w elfa re  fu n c tio n  may be assumed to  be a s o c i a l l y  d e s i r a b le  
s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h a t  of consumers' sovereignty* Of cou rse , i t  should be 
noted th a t  the  p lann ing  agency 's  w elfare  fu n c tio n  does not always correspond 
to  a s o c i a l l y  accep tab le  w elfa re  function* I t  can even be argued th a t  a 
"bad" p lan  may not r e f l e c t  s o c i e t y ' s  w elfare  fu n c tio n  more than the  f r e e  market 
mechanism would do. But, on the  o th e r  hand, i t  can be maintained th a t  a 
"good" plan which i s  based on coordinated  investm ent d ec is io n s  and undertaken 
s im ultaneously  may provide a b e t t e r  chance f o r  su s ta in ed  economic growth as 
w ell as  more d e s i r a b le  s o c ia l  w e lfa re .
Besides the  p r iv a te  in v e s to r s '  f o r e s ig h t  and a n t i c ip a t io n  of the
fu tu re  i s  very  im perfec t  ( e s p e c ia l ly  in developing c o u n tr ie s )  so t h a t  the
in d iv id u a l  in v e s to r s  r i s k  may be h ia h e r  than  th a t  c o n fro n tin g  on o v e r - a l l
( 2 )investment programme. A f a i l u r e  in fo r e c a s t in g  fu tu re  demands and f a c to r  
c o s ts  of commodities i s  l i k e l y  to  r e s u l t  in a waste o f  c a p i t a l  not j u s t  to  
the  in v e s to r  but a ls o  the  n a t io n a l  economy^^^hiereas p e r f e c t  fo re c a s t in g  of 
the  above f a c to r s  may be q u i te  im portant in  the  p roduction  of commodities f o r  
use by o th e r  s e c to r s  and f o r  investm ent which invo lves  a long: p lann ing  and 
c o n s tru c t io n  p e r io d . '
 ^ ^Though not a l l  th e se  development p lans have always been su cc e ss fu l  in
p r a c t ic e ,  i t  can be argued th a t  government in te r v e n t io n  in  the  form o f com­
prehensive p lann ing  can be e s s e n t i a l  to  speed up economic growth by a l l o c a t ­
in g  investm ent re sou rces  by s o c ia l  investm ent c r i t e r i a  r a th e r  than p r iv a te  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  B esides, the  requirem ents of the fu tu re  have to  be looked 
a t  not from the in d iv id u a l ' s  p o in t of view, but from the  p o in t  of vi^w of 
s o c ie ty .
I t  should be added however, th a t  co ncep tua lly  w elfare  func tion  i s  no t 
easy to  de fine  and any d e f in i t i o n  of i t  i s  l i a b l e  to  s u b je c t iv e  value judge­
ments, I  am w ell aware of the long con troversy  on t h i s  p o in t  and I  do not 
in tend to  go in to  the  d e t a i l s  of such an u n s e t t le d  problem.
( 2)“'^Because of lack  o f in fo rm ation  and e x p e r t is e  the p r iv a te  s e c to r  of the econ­
omy f in d s  i t  r a t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  to fo re c a s t  a c c u ra te ly  the  fu tu r e  r a t e s  of 
r e t u r n .
( 4)'^See Rosenstein-Rocdn, I .N . ,  Programming in  Theory and in I t a l i a n  P r a c t ic e ,
o p .c i t . ,  r.,417»
See Chenery, E ' . j  
La t  :l n A me r  i  c a , Ma rch  1938, p . 5 $
(â) b '.E,, Bevelonment P o l i c ie s  and Programmes. II.N, B u l le t in  fo r
11$.
CHAPTER 4
A CRITICAL SURVEY OP PR8LIG lUYPSTfPRTT CRITERIA:
C A p j ^ / L ^ TPUT ItATIcT......................
In tro d u c t io n :  - s^ wo discussed in fh e  nrevious chan ter  under
im perfec tions  which e x i s t  in the  market, y r ic e s  cease to  he a s a t i s f a c to r y  
device fo r  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of investm ent funds and f o r  the  assessment of 
s o c ia l  c o s ts  and b e n e f i t s  of investment p r o je c t s .  I t  was a lso  in d ica ted  
th a t  the  d i s p e r s a l  of s in g le  investm ent dec is io n s  based on maximization of 
commercial p r o f i t s  as the only c r i t e r i o n  may lead to  a non-optimum investment 
com bination,
Mien investm ent p ro je c ts  are  evaluated  from the  so c ie ty  o r genera l 
economy p o in t  of view, investm ent c r i t e r i a  take d i f f e r e n t  forms than the 
p r iv a te  c r i t e r i a  d iscussed  e a r l i e r ,  A government in  developing co u n tr ie s  
ought to  value investm ents in terms of t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on n a t io n a l  income, 
employment, balance of payments and d i s t r i b u t io n  of income. I t  becomes 
e s s e n t i a l  to  ap p ra ise  p ro je c ts  on th e  b a s is  of t h e i r  c o n tr ib u t io n  to  these  
major economic o b je c t iv e s .  So pub lic  investment d ec is io n s  should be based 
on s o c ia l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  as was d iscussed e a r l i e r ,  and not on 
commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a .
A wide range of investment c r i t e r i a  have been developed from the
( 1 )
genera l  economy p o in t of view. In the e a r l i e r  s tu d ie s  of investment
c r i t e r i a  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  was s u b s t i tu te d  by p a r t i a l  p ro je c t  ev a lua tion  
measures such as c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o s ,  c a p i ta l - la b o u r  r a t i o s  and balance of 
payments e f f e c t  c r i t e r i o n .
This chap te r  w i l l  th e re fo re  be confined to the d iscuss ion  of 
c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  o r  c a p i t a l  tu rnover  r a te  c r i t e r i o n .  Employment e f f e c t  
and balance o f  payments e f f e c t  c r i t e r i a  however, w i l l  be very  b r i e f l y  d e a l t  
w ith in  an appendix a t  the  end o f t h i s  ch ap te r .  S oc ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  
(smp) and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c r i t e r i o n  w i l l  be d iscussed  in Chapter 5*
For a good summary of Public  Investment Choice C r i t e r i a ,  see UN - Choice and 
Phasing’ of P ub lic  Rector P r o je c t s ,  in UN Economic B u l le t in  fo r  Asia and the 
Far E as t ,  Vol.XVII, No.2, Sept. 1966, p p .16-29, Ficro-ec^nomic c r i t e r i a  
include the f a c to r - in te n s ^ ty  c r i t d r i o n ,  th-  ^ s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  
c r i t e r i o n ,  the  m arginal per c ap i ta  re investm ent c r i t e r i o n  and the m arginal 
growth c o n tr ib u t io n  c r i t e r i o n .
114.
CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO; (o r  C a p i ta l  Turnover Raté)
This concept i s  used in the  theory  of g r o w t h ^ a s  a to o l  to  
determine the t o t a l  c a p i t a l  requirem ents  to achieve a c e r ta in  ro te  of growth 
of income. The c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  in the  e a r ly  v/riting's of investm ent 
c r i t e r i a  was a lso  used to  a l e s s e r  ex ten t  as a device to ass ign  p r i o r i t i e s  to  
various  investm ent p r o j e c t s .  I t s  former use i s  now broad ly  accepted but 
i t s  l a t t e r  use as an a l l o c a t io n a l  device has been challenged e x ten s iv e ly .
The c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  i s  defined as the q u a n t i ty  of c a p i t a l
( 2)requ ired  to  ‘produce one u n i t  of ou tp u t.  I t  i s  a c o e f f i c i e n t  which
re p re se n ts  the  re c ip ro c a l  value of c a p i t a l  p ro d u c t iv i ty  c o e f f i c i e n t .  Accord­
ing  to  t h i s  kind o f  measurement, c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  (o r  c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i t y )  
w i l l  be th e  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  requ ired  by the  p r o je c t  per u n i t  of value added or 
g ross annual value rroduced . The r a t i o  of t o t a l  c a p i t a l  and gross annual 
•production value i s  the  r e c ip ro c a l  value from which the c a p i t a l  tux'nover r a t e  
i s  measured: and the  r a t i o  of t o t a l  c a p i t a l  to  annual value added i s  th e
re c ip ro c a l  value of the p ro d u c t -c a p i ta l  r a t i o  and i s  known as the  " c a p i ta l  
c o e f f i c i e n t " *
C a p i ta l -o u tp u t  r a t i o  can simply be shown as:
K 
0
and 0 i s  g ross o r  n e t  annual va lue  produced.
— where K i s  c a p i t a l  investm ent
According to  t h i s  r u l e ,  developing c o u n tr ie s  should choose p ro je c ts
($'! ■with the low est c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o .  This im plies  t h a t  c a p i t a l  which i s
(^^The Harrod-Uomar theory  of growth r e l a t e s  a c o u n try 's  r a t e  o f  growth of 
income to  i t s  savings-income r a t i o  and marginal c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o ,
( 2 )
g = where g  s tands  f o r  growth of income, s f o r  savings-income r a t i o  and 
c fo r  th e  marginal c a p i ta l - o u tp u t  r a t i o .  See AER, March 1947, Po54*
Of course, c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  can be used f o r  the o v e ra l l  economy, fo r  a 
s e c to r  o r  fo r  an in d iv id u a l  p r o je c t .  The p r in c ip le  of c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  
however, remains the same*
Increm ental c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  (IGOR.) f o r  the  whole economy ir- the  
value of the a d d i t io n  to  c a p i t a l  (ne t investm ent) d ivided by the a d d it io n  
to  income (n e t  n a t io n a l  income),
(^^The r a t e  of c a p i t a l  tu rn o v er  (which i s  r e c ip ro c a l  of c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o )  
i s  the  r a t i o  between the e n t e r p r i s e ' s  gross annual production  value and 
c a p i t a l  and i s  an a ttem pt to  measure c a p i t a l  p ro d u c t iv i ty ,  not in terms of 
p r o f i t s  but in  gross p roduction  v a lu e .
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a scarce  f a c to r  in  such economies should provide maximum a d d i t io n  to  
income•
I I I .  DEFINITION OF OUTPUT AM) CAPITAL
Because numerator and denominator o f  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  may he 
defined  in  v a rio u s  ways the im p lic a t io n s  o f  r e s o r t i n g  to  one o r ano ther  
concept need to  he borne in  mind.
Let us take f i r s t ,  ou tp u t.  Output, which i s  taken  here to  mean 
value gdded (VA) can be c a lc u la te d  in  two d i f f e r e n t  ways. I t  can be taken 
in  terms of g ross  or n e t ;  and i t  may be defined in  terms of value or p h y s ica l  
q u a n t i ty .
Value added (VA) can be f i r s t  found by ta k in g  the  d if fe ren c e  
between the s a le s  value of outpu t (goods or s e rv ic e s )  c rea ted  by the in v e s t ­
ment and th e  expenditu re  on purchases of raw m a te r ia ls  from t h i r d  p a r t ie s*
Or secondly , i t  can be taken  as the  sum of f a c to r  incomes such as  s a l a r i e s ,  
wages, r e n t s ,  i n t e r e s t s  and p r o f i t s .
Value added r e s u l t i n g  from an investm ent can be taken  as ne t or 
g ro s s .  For gross value added to  the  above sum i n d i r e c t  tax es  and d e p re c ia t io n  
need to  be added. Whereas f o r  n e t  value added (NVA) the  l a s t  two items ought
( 2 )to  be excluded from the above sum*^
T ota l  investm ent, on the  o th e r  hand, inc ludes  imported machinery 
(exc lud ing  customs d u t i e s ) ,  wages paid to s k i l l e d  and u n s k i l le d  labour, pay­
ments to  v a rio u s  n a t io n a l  m a te r ia ls  and equipment, customs d u t ie s ,  i n d i r e c t
(-5 )
taxes  on raw m a te r ia l s ,  land e t c .  ' This i s  investm ent from p r iv a te  f i r m 's  
p o in t  of view. But in  s o c ia l  v a lu a t io n  of investment customs d u t ie s  and 
in d i r e c t  tazces on raw m a te r ia ls  a re  excluded and do n o te n te r  the concept of 
s o c ia l  investm ent. The only d if fe ren c e  between p r ic in g  a t  market va lu es  and
^^^See UN - Manual on Economic Development P r o je c t s .  United N ations, New York, 
1938, p . 222. P r o f i t s  a re  taken here  to  mean "p re - tax "  p r o f i t s ,
( 2 ') ^ 'N et value added can simply be shown as in the  fo llo w in g  equation :
NVA = Ct + P r - (Xp 4- Dp -f i t )  where
Ct denotes t o t a l  c o s t ,  I r  p r o f i t s ,  Xp inpu t purchased from th i r d  p a r t i e s ,
Dp d e p re c ia t io n  and i t  i n d i r e c t  ta x e s .
( 3)^^/Put c a p i t a l  l i k e  in  value added needs to  be valued on the b a s is  of s o c ia l  
p r ic e s  r a th e r  than market p r i c e s ,  ‘ See UN -  Manual on Economic Development 
P r o je c t s ,  o p .c i t . ,  p . 222,
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a t  s o c ia l  c o s t  w i l l  derive  from in d i r e c t  tax es  paid on "purchases from the 
t h i r d  p a r t i e s " ,  as these  tax es  a re  omitted from the  s o c ia l  c o s t  e s t im a te s .
Because the  n e t - investm ent i s  derived from gross invetment minus 
d e p re c ia t io n ,  which i s  based on accounting concept, i t  may be d o u b tfu l i f  t h i s  
f ig u re  can give the  t ru e  value of the  increments to  the  s tock  of productive 
c a p i t a l .  The doubt here  stems from the f a c t  th a t  d e p re c ia t io n  i s  c a lc u la ted  
on the b a s is  of an accounting  concept r a th e r  than a c tu a l  dep le t io n  of the  
s tock  of c a p i t a l .
The question  which may a r i s e  i s  whether to  take  IGOR gross o r  ne t 
o f  d e p re c ia t io n .  No doubt the  s e le c t io n  of e i t h e r  w i l l  produce d i f f e r e n t  
r e s u l t s  and ch o ices .  This might be i l l u s t r a t e d  c l e a r ly  i f  we take the  
fo llow ing  example.
Let us take  two p ro je c t s  A and B each c o s t in g  ^100, but A w ith  a 
l i f e  of 20 years  and B with 4 y e a r s .  Also suppose th a t  s t r a i g h t - l i n e  cost 
i s  the  agreed d ep re c ia t io n  charge on both of them.
P ro je c t  A P ro je c t  B
C ap i ta l  Cost
w 160 100
Gross y ie ld
(X) 40 55
Annual Deprec­
i a t i o n  (jiO 5 25
Net y ie ld  (^) 55 50
L ife  of p ro je c ts 20 4
Gross IGOR 2.5 1.81
Net IGOR 2.85 5.55
I t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  the g ross increm ental c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  favours 
p ro je c t  B, while n e t  increm ental c a p i ta l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  favours  p ro je c t  A*
Now one may ask which concept of output one ought to  take in to  
account when computing the  c o e f f i c i e n t .  This depends on whether the  s t ru c tu j  
of c a p i t a l  i s  to  remain s ta b le  or whether changes in  the economy are to  occur,
( l ) ^ ' I b i d ,  p . 22$. l i i r th e r ,  u n s k i l le d  laboiu? needs to  be valued on s o c ia l  p r ic e s .  
J .  Tinbergen de f in e s  c a p i t a l  as  "the sum t o t a l  of market va lue  of the equip­
ment and machinery and s tocks and the d ep re c ia t io n  funds accumulated". See 
Tinbergen, J . ,  The Design of Development. B altim ore, 1966. p . 70
( 2 ) ^ 'See C. Kindle b e rg e r .  Economic Development. McGraw-Hill Book Comp. London, 
New York, 1963 . p . 88
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Net output w i l l  be the choice i f  th e re  i s  s t a b i l i t y  in  the  economy. This 
i s  because in  t h i s  case d ep re c ia t io n  i s  not needed to  s h i f t  c a p i t a l  to  o t . is r  
s e c to r s .  I f  c a p i t a l  i s  to  be s h i f te d  to o th e r  s e c to r s  -  in  the  course of 
change -  i t  may be d e s i r a b le  to  deal with the  g ross concept o f  p roduction .
There i s  a lso  a la g  problem co n fron ting  the  c a lc u la t io n  of IGOR, 
since  t h i s  y e a r ' s  investm ent doe;: not co incide  w ith  t h i s  y e a r 's  output*
This of cour.‘se ,  makes the comparison between inpu t and outpu t very  d i f f i c u l t .
For in s ta n ce ,  in p u ts  in  period t  may lead to  ou tpu t in  period t-f l, and again 
investm ent in  period  t+1 b rin g s  output in  period t+2 and so on ( i . e .  some 
investm ents need many years  to  y ie ld  t h e i r  product -  Hydro Dam, i r r ig a t io n ) *
The r e l a t i o n  between in p u ts  and ou tputs  in  r e a l i t y  may show an even 
la r g e r  v a r i e ty  of lag s  than i t  i s  expected to  do. The r a t e  of ou tpu t may be 
constan t or may vary ; i t  may begin immediately or s t a r t  a f t e r  a la g .  Then
the  im puta tion  of a given output to a given inpu t becomes n ecessa ry . In such
a case, i t  i s  common p ra c t ic e  to  apply p resen t value formula f o r  the  measure­
ment of income streams in the  fu tu re  and compare i t  w ith  the  c a p i t a l  co s t  of 
a given investm ent p r o je c t .
I . Can c a p i ta  I - output  Ratio  be u sed as a Device  to  Ass ig n  Investmen t  Pr i o r i t ies? '
C a p i ta l-o u tp u t  r a t i o  was f i r s t  suggested as an investm ent c r i t e r io n
(?) ( 5)by Polak and Buchanan. J .  J .  Polak was the  f i r s t  to  conside r the  balance
of payments problems a r i s in g  from la rg e - s c a le  post-w ar re c o n s t ru c t io n  programmes 
and t h e i r  im p lic a t io n s  fo r  the  composition of the investm ent programme. Polak
^^^'If th e re  i s  a  la g  and v a r i a b i l i t y  in  ou tputs  the  PV formula becomes:
PV = Vi + V2 4- . . . . .  + "7-11
(iH-r) (l't-r)2 (l-i-r)H
The PV o f the  n e a re r  ou tpu ts  i s  h igher than th a t  of those  ou tpu ts  o ccu rr ing  
in  d i s t a n t  f u tu r e  because they are  h eav ily  d iscoun ted .
( 2 ) ^ /po lak , J . J . ,  Balance of Payments Problems of Gountries R e-co n s tru c tin g  w ith
the Aid of Foreign Loan, QJE, Feb. 1943> p p .208-240. 
'Buchai
1955.
(  x )
\ ' nan, N .S ., I n te r n a t io n a l  Investment and Domestic W elfare. New York.
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has s ta te d  th a t  "given the magnitude of capiJal investm ent . . . .  i t  i s  d e s i ra b le  
from the  p o in t of view of foreign-exchange to  maximize output and thus the  
r a t e  of tu rnover ,  and a lso  to minimize the  c a p i t a l  req u ire d  in  o rd e r  to keep 
the se rv ice  of the  fo re ig n  debt down".^^^
Miat i s  suggested here  i s  t h a t  the  c r i t e r i o n  of e f f i c i e n c y  w i l l  
be "maximization of ou tpu t per u n i t  of invéstm ent" . The recommended type of
investm ent p ro je c t s  would then inc lude  those r e q u i r in g  the l e a s t  amount of 
c a p i t a l .  Since he i s  mainly concerned about the  balance o f  payments e f f e c t s  ,■ 
o f  in v e s tm e n t 'p ro je c ts  he has a lso  proposed th a t  investm ent p ro je c ts  which f a l l  
w ith in  producing commodities f o r  exports  should rece iv e  h ig h e r  p r i o r i t y .  All 
p ro je c ts  a re  c l a s s i f i e d  on the  b a s is  of t h e i r  f i n a l  product; then the  u l t im a te  
choice depends upon the c o n tr ib u t io n  of each p ro je c t  to  th e  balance of payments 
compared to  i t s  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l ,
N, S. Buchanan w^ as a lso  in  agreement w ith  Polak when he s t a t e s  t h a t :
" I f  investm ent funds a re  l im i te d ,  the wise p o l ic y  in  th e  absence of s p e c ia l
c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  would be to  undertake f i r s t  those investm ents  having a h igh
value o f  annual product r e l a t i v e  to  the  investment necessa ry  to  b r in g  them
( 2 )in to  e x is te n c e " .
I f  we fo llow  the c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  as an a l l o c a t io n a l  device , 
p ro je c ts  a re  to  be ranked accord ing  to minimum requirem ent of c a p i t a l  per u n i t
( 3 )o f discounted n e t  ou tp u t.  This, in o th e r  words, means t h a t  p ro je c ts  with
the  h ig h e s t  c a p i t a l - tu rn o v e r  r a t e  w i l l  q u a l i fy  f o r  s e l e c t io n .  As can e a s i l y  
be in fe r re d  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  and c a p i t a l  tu rnover r a t e  a re  r e c ip ro c a l  values 
o f  each o t h e r . T h e r e f o r e ,  maximizing the l a t t e r  i s  tantamount to  minimizing 
the value of the  form er. I t  fo llow s th a t  those p ro je c t s  w ith  the lowest cost 
of c a p i t a l  per u n i t  of discounted n e t  ou tput (value added) are  to be se le c te d  
u n t i l  the  c a p i t a l  a v a i la b le  has been exhausted.
P o la k ,  J . J . ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p . 2 1 8 -2 1 9
( 2) ^ ^Buchanan, M.S., I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n v e s tm e n t  and D o m e s t ic  W e l fa r e .  New York.
1 9 5 5 .  p . 2 4
( 3 )^'^ See  D o s s e r ,  D.M., G en era l  In v e s tm e n t  C r i t e r i a  f o r  L e s s -D e v e lo p e d  C o u n tr ie s :
A P ost-M ortem , S c o t t i s h  J o u r n a l  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, June 1962 . p . 8?
^^^To a v o id  c o n f u s i o n  i t  sh o u ld  be m entioned  th a t  c a p i t a l - o u t p u t  r a t i o  i s  th e  
r a t i o  b e tw een  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  and g r o s s  an nu a l p r o d u c t io n  v a lu e  w hich  l o g i c a l l y  
t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  v a lu e  o f  c a n i t a l  tu r n o v e r  r a t e .  G ross annual p r o d u c t io n  
h e r e  i m p l i e s  g r o s s  v a lu e  added whicii co m p r ise s  m arket v a lu e  0 1  p r o d u c t io n  
p lu s  p r o f i t  so  th e  num erator in  th e  r a t i o  i s  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  from an nu a l  
p r o f i t  c o n c e p t .  Gross an nual p r o d u c t io n  can be shown as;
GAP = t o t a l  c o s t  -h p r o f i t s .
119.
iV. A ppra isa l  of Cgpital-Out-put Ratio
There i s  no s trong  t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  
r a t i o  being used as an ins trum ent to  determine p r i o r i t i e s  among investment 
p ro jec ts*
( i )  F i r s t  o f a l l ,  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  (o r  c a p i t a l - tu rn o v e r  r a t e )  cannot 
be considered as a ru le  f o r  maximizing f u tu r e o u tpu t.  The main goal in  
Development p o l ic y  i s  not maximizing output a t  a p o in t  of tim e, but r a th e r  a 
maximum r a t e  of growth over t i me. Even i f  we assume th a t  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  
would maximize the p resen t value o f  output t h i s  does no t mean t h a t  the  ru le  i s  
c o r re c t  f o r  a t t a i n i n g  t h i s  maximum over tim e . Let us take an example to  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t .
Suppose th a t  th e re  a re  two p ro je c t s ,  A and B each c o s t in g  ^100, 
and A w ith an investm ent l i f e  of 4 years  and B 20 y e a r s .
P r o je c t  A P r o je c t  B
^  ^
I n i t i a l  Investment 100 100
Annual Output 40 20
L ife  4 20
Annual s t r a i g h t - l i n e
D eprec ia tion  25 5
T o ta l output over
Investment L ife  l60 400
C ap i ta l-o u tp u t  R atio  2 .5  5.0
As can be seen from the Table above, the  t o t a l  ou tpu t f o r  p ro je c t  A 
i s  ^160 and f o r  B ^400. On the  o ther hand, the  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o s  are  
2.5 and 5.0  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  Since annual output ne t  of d e p re c ia t io n  i s  ^15 in  
each p ro je c t  t h i s  may r a i s e  the  question  of which p r o je c t  i s  c o n tr ib u t in g  more 
to  the  n a t io n a l  o u tp u t .
In o rder  to  compare th ese  n ro je c ts  i t  i s  necessary  to  c a lc u la te  
the  PV of each p r o j e c t ' s  income streams through t h e i r  investment l i f e .  I f  the 
market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  i s  5 t e r  cent the PV of p ro je c t s  A and B w i l l  be ^142 
and ^249 r e s p e c t iv e ly / '
As was pointed out be fo re ,  the market r a te  of i n t e r e s t  i s  l i k e l y  to  under­
s t a t e  the s o c ia l  co s t  o f  delayed in c reases  in ou tp u t .  Hence i t  may be 
ap p ro p r ia te  to  apply imputed r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  in s te a d  of market r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t .
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Now, in  th e  l i g h t  of t h i s  r e s u l t  the  choice w i l l  n a tu r a l ly  he in 
favour of B r a t h e r  than A, even though the  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  in the  former 
i s  h ig h e r  than in  the  l a t t e r *  Therefore , one may conclude th a t  c a p i t a l -  
outpu t r a t i o ,  as  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the above example, cannot be an ap n ro p ria re  
guide f o r  a s s ig n in g  p r i o r i t i e s  to  investm ent p r o j e c t s .  C lea r ly ,  when c a n i t a l -  
output r a t i o  i s  used the c o n tr ib u t io n s  of p ro je c ts  to n a t io n a l  income over a 
ner_iod_ are  n e g lec te d .  '
( i i )  Another weakness o f  th i s  c r i t e r i o n  i s  th e  f a c t  th a t  t h i s  r<ule 
may not maximize the  va lue  of t o t a l  o u tnu t.  This i s  because maximizing the 
p ro d u c t iv i ty  of c a p i t a l  by i t s e l f  i s  no t a s u f f i c i e n t  requirem ent fo r  maximum 
t o t a l  o u tp u t .  I f  the economic p o l ic y  o b jec t iv e  i s  maximizing t o t a l  output 
not only the p ro d u c t iv i ty  of s c a rc e s t  f a c to r  ( c a n i t a l )  but the  p ro d u c t iv i ty  of 
abundant f a c to r s  as w ell must be maximized. To see t h i s  p o in t  l e t  us consider 
an example:
Divide t o t a l  ou tpu t in to  two p a r ts  and l e t  the  f i r s t  p a r t  be Op, 
assuming t h i s  p a r t  of 0 i s  to  be produced by workers L ( in  optim al combination 
of c a p i t a l ) .  The o th e r  p a r t  of ou tp u t,  say Op and t h i s  i s  to be produced by 
the r e s t  of the  labour fo rc e ,  Lp, w ith  l i t t l e  or no c a p i t a l .
I t  i s  q u i te  obvious t h a t  0]_ Og w i l l  always exceed 0%, as long
Li •Lp Li
( 2 )as c a p i t a l  assumed to  be a sca rce  f a c to r  r e l a t i v e  to labour,^  T o ta l  output 
means output of any f a c to r  m u lt ip l ie d  by the number of u n i t s  of t h a t  f a c to r ,  
but t h i s  does no t n e c e s s a r i ly  mean th a t  maximizing the  p ro d u c t iv i ty  of th a t  
f a c to r  alone would lead to  maximum t o t a l  ou tpu t,
( i i i )  This c r i t e r i o n  assumes th a t  c a p i t a l  i s  th e  only scarce  f a c to r  
in the  economy and o th e r  f a c to r s  l ik e  labour and n a tu ra l  re so u rce s  have no 
oppo rtu n i ty  c o s t s .  In. o th e r  words c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  i s  v a l id  i f  c a p i t a l  
i s  the  only scarce  f a c to r  in the system or o th e r  in p u ts  a re  so p l e n t i f u l
^C ap ita l-o u tp u t r a t i o  does not take in to  account the  l i f e s p a n  of p ro je c t s ,  
whereas lo n v - I i f e  p ro je c ts  can be more advantageous. For in s ta n c e ,  in long­
l i f e  p ro je c t s  d e p r :o ra t io n /g ro s s  c a p i t a l  r a t i o  i s  co ns ide rab ly  low which 
means th a t  the  p ro je c t  w i l l  continue to  c re a te  outpu t fo r  a long period 
w ithout r e o u i r in g  la rg e  rep lacem ents .
( 2 ) ."Bee B. H iggins, Economic Development; Problems, P r in c ip le s  and P o l i c i e s .
New York 1959* p . 634*
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r e l a t i v e  to  c a p i t a l  t h a t  the l a t t e r  i s  the  dominant element in  determ ining 
(1^
c o s t  d i f f e r e n c e s .  ''
However, t h i s  system would not c h a r a c te r i s e  a l l  l e s s  developed
c o u n tr ie s  because c a p i t a l  th e re  i s  not always the s c a rc e s t  f a c t o r .  In f a c t
c a p i t a l  in some developing co u n tr ie s  may be le s s  of a b o t t le n e ck  than u n sk i l le d
( 2 )labour, immobile labour or s o c ia l  b a r r i e r s .  In such cases , c a p i ta I -o u tp u t
r a t i o  would no t inc lude a l l  underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s  bu t excludes those where 
c a p i t a l  i s  not the  s c a rc e s t  fa c to r*
Even i f  t h i s  i s  a m a tte r  of s c a r c i ty  of one f a c to r  and abundance of 
ano ther why no t inc lude  developed co u n tr ie s  which experience  la rg e  pools of 
unemployed labour in  se r io u s  depress ion  p e r i o d s . B e s i d e s  i f  labour and 
n a tu ra l  re sou rces  may have a s ig n i f i c a n t  opportun ity  c o s t ,  as being above zero , 
c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  ceases to  be a meaningful dev ice . I t  may be argued th a t  
abundant f a c to r s  cannot be t r e a te d  as f r e e  goods having zero p r i c e s .
( iv )  C ap i ta l-o u tp u t  r a t i o  does not take  in to  account the  in d i r e c t  
b e n e f i t s  an investment p ro je c t  might give r i s e  t o .  Yet some la rg e  p ro je c ts  
which re q u ire  a la rg e  c a p i t a l - o u t l a y  may r e s u l t  in  a considerab le  degree of 
e x te rn a l  economies. For in s ta n c e ,  p ro je c ts  such as  t r a n s p o r t  or hydro-dams 
may be r e je c te d  on the  b a s is  of t h e i r  high c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o s ,  whereas these  
same p r o je c t s '  i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  provided to  o th e r  s e c to r s  o r  p ro je c ts  can be 
extremely h igh . Then s e le c t io n  of investm ents on the  b a s is  of c a p i ta l -o u tp u t  
r a t i o s  w i l l  be a g a in s t  s o c ia l  overhead p r o je c t s .  T herefo re , i t  w i l l  be necessary  
to  take in to  account the  concomitant expansion in  o th e r  s e c to r s  and include
them in  the  denominator of the  c o e f f i c i e n t  so as to  compare with the value of 
c a p i t a l  in v e s te d .
(v) C ap i ta I -o u tp u t  r a t i o  (o r c a p i t a l  tu rn o v e r  r a t e )  i s  based on the 
e x p l i c i t  assumption th a t  market p r ic e s  o f  goods and s e rv ice s  w i l l  r e f l e c t  the
^^^See Ohenerj'’, H .B., Comparative Advantage and Development P o licy ,  AER 5 l / f 9 6 l ,  
V o l .31 , N o .l ,  p . 27
' ‘“^See D. H. Dosser, General Investment C r i t e r i a  For Less-Developed Countries:
A Post-Mortem, S c o t t ish  Jo u rn a l of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, June I 962 , p . 87
Dosser,  D.M., Ib id ,  p . 88,
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s o c ia l  c o s t  of these  goods. But, a s  I  have argued in  Chapter 5, market 
p r ic e s  of in p u ts  and ou tpu ts  may not co incide  w ith  s o c ia l  p rices*
Vt CONCLUDING REMARKS
In aggregate  term s, c a p i ta l -o u tp u t  r a t i o  i s  w idely accepted as a 
u s e fu l  to o l  to  determine t o t a l  c a p i t a l  requirem ents  needed to ach ieve  a c e r ta in  
r a te  of growth. In  many development p lan s ,  i t  i s  a lso  p a r t l y  app lied  a t  
s e c to ra l  l^ v e l  to  a l lo c a te  investm ent resou rces  to  va rious  s e c to r s .  But i t  can 
he a m is lead ing  device to  s e le c t  investment p ro je c ts  as i t  i s  the s im plest',  
approach developed f o r  t h i s  pu rpose . Main p o in ts  can he summed up as fo llow s:
1. The c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  i s  v a lid  i f  c a p i t a l  i s  the  only scarce 
f a c to r  in  the  system and o th e r  in p u ts  are  abundant r e l a t i v e  to  c a p i t a l .
2, I t  i s  an u n s a t i s f a c to r y  device to  maximize the  va lue  o f  fu tu re  
ou tpu t and to  a t t a i n  t h i s  maximum over tim e.
5o I t  i s  a m is lead ing  device to ass ign  p r i o r i t i e s  fo r  investment 
p r o j e c t s .  I t  i s  a r u le  which w i l l  always d isc r im in a te  a g a in s t  s o c ia l  overhead 
c a p i t a l  p r o j e c t s ,
4. Some d isadvan tages  of t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  can be co rrec ted  by tak in g  
value added on n e t  b a s i s ,  by in c lu d in g  in d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  r e s u l t i n g  from the 
investment (backward and forward e f f e c t s ) ,  and by app ly ing  shadow p r ic e s  
ins tead  of market p r i c e s .
5* But s t i l l  i f  the  l i f e s p a n  of p ro je c t s  a re  d i f f e r e n t  and i f  value 
added i s  not co n s tan t throughout i t s  l i f e  period , i t  must then be rep laced  by 
a su p e r io r  investm ent c r i t e r i o n ,  i . e .  s o c ia l  m arginal p ro d u c t iv i ty .
 ^ ^ I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason  th a t  A. E. Kahn and H. B. Chenery have argued th a t  the 
s o c ia l  d i f f e r s  from the  p r iv a te  p o in t of view and t h a t  p r i o r i t i e s  should be 
assigned on the  b a s is  of s o c ia l  p ro d u c t iv i ty  o f  c a p i t a l  - co n tr ib u t io n s  to 
the n a t io n a l  income. See A, S. Kahn, Investment C r i t e r i a  in Bevelonment 
Programmes, QJE, 1931, po59»f Chenery, H .B., The A pp lica t ion  of Investment 
C r i t e r i a ,  QJE 1935, v o l . 67, pp. 80-82
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Appendix A; Employment E f fe c t  C r i t e r io n  (Cap i t a l-Labou r  R a t io )
Another l a c t o r - s c a r c i t y  c r i t e r io n  suggested by the  economists in  
the post-w ar period i s  th e  c a p i t a l - l a b o u r  r a t i o .  This in d ic a te s  the r a t i o  
between c a p i t a l  in v es ted  and the number of workers employed by the  investm ent. 
Like in  the  f i r s t  r u l e ,  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  t e l l s  us how much c a p i t a l  we need to  
in v e s t  in  o rder  to employ one man. Maximizing employment of u n sk i l le d  
workers i s  the  main goal of t h i s  device*
I f  we c a l l  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  K, and number o f . workers employed E, 
employment- e f f e c t  c r i t e r i o n  becomes:
K
^ " Ë
Suppose c a p i t a l  investm ent i s  ^200.000 and the number of u n sk i l le d  
workers employed as a r e s u l t  o f  the  investment i s  200; then c a p i t a l -  
ernployment r a t i o  w i l l  be:
q = Asmooo . Xl.OOO
^200
This fugure simply im plies  th a t  we ought to  in v e s t  01.000 in  o rd e r
to  employ one man* As i s  the  case with the  c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o ,  according
to  t h i s  ru le  underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s  need s e le c t  those  p ro je c ts  w ith  the 
lowest capital-em ploym ent r a t i o .  P u t t in g  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  they w i l l  s e l e c t  
p ro je c ts  which c re a te  the  h ig h e s t  employment per u n i t  of c a p i t a l .
This may be re le v a n t  to  developing c o u n tr ie s  w ith a h igh le v e l  of
unemployment and where the  s in g le  o b jec t ive  fu n c tio n  i s  to  promote employment*
In the  a p p l ic a t io n  of t h i s  c r i t e r i o n ,  c a p i t a l  needs to be valued 
a t  s o c ia l  p r ic e s  in s te ad  of market p r ic e s .  T here fo re , as was mentioned
f 1) ^ - I^n o th e r  words t h i s  f a c t o r - i n t e n s i t y  th e s i s  a s s e r t s  t h a t  c a p i t a l - l a b o u r  
r a t i o  i s  the  r i g h t  c r i t e r i o n ,  i f  n a t io n a l  income in  the  cu r re n t  time ueriod 
i s  to  be maximized. Acceptance of th i s  lo g ic  lead s  to  the  a r n l i c a t io n  of 
minimum c a p i t a l - l a b o u r  r a t i o s  in p ub lic  s e c to rs  and p ro je c t  s e le c t io n .
This c r i t e r i o n  i s  sometimes c a l le d  " fa c to r  p ro p o r t io n s  th e s i s " ,  see Choice 
and Phasing of Pub lic  S ec to r  P r o je c t s ,  LH, .conomic B u l le t in  f o r  Asia and 
the Far E a s t ,  vol.XVII, No,2, Sept. 1966, p . 16
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e a r l ie r ,  customs d u tie s  and a l l  o th er in d ir e c t  ta x es  should not en ter  as c o s ts  
in  s o c ia l  v a lu a tio n  o f investm en t. These item s do not c o n s t itu te  c o st  fr^m 
s o c ie t y ' s  p o in t o f v iew . A lso wages paid during th e con stru ctio n  o f the  
investm ent p r o je c t should be valued on s o c ia l  p r ic e s .  When th ese  co rrec tio n s  
are  carr ied  ou t, the numerator o f the r a t io  w i l l  be reduced con sid erab ly  and 
t h i s ,  o f cou rse , w i l l  in crea se  "employment c o e f f ic ie n t"  o f  the p r o je c t .
Second, i t  i s  a lso  a common p r a c tic e  in d evelop ing  co u n tr ies  to  in clu d e on ly  
u n b ille d  workers in  the denominator o f the c o e f f i c ie n t  (e ) .  This i s  not a l l .  
An. investm ent p ro jec t may crea te  In d irec t employment in  o ther se c to r s  or 
f ie ld s *  Thus, " m u ltip lier  e f fe c t"  ca.n be q u ite  im portant and th is  ought to  
be estim ated  by u s in g  in p u t-ou tp u t ta b le s .  O therw ise, the n ea rest "forward 
and backward" emplo;yment e f f e c t s  may be roughly estim ated . The p r in c ip le  
here i s  th a t: i f  an investm ent p ro jec t provides a d o it io n a l employment in
other f i e l d s  due to  the e x is te n c e  o f u n u tiliz e d  ca p a c ity  the emrloyment in  the  
l a t t e r  ouaht to  be a ttr ib u te d  to  the o r ig in a l p r o je c t .
To sum up:
a) where there i s  a se r io u s  problem of unem ploym ent,projects v/ith 
the h ig h e s t  "employment c o e f f ic ie n t"  (or  with the low est k/L )  w i l l  be s e le c te d  
as fa r  as t h is  o b je c t iv e  i s  s o c ia l ly  d e s ir a b le . This ru le  accord in g ly  w i l l  
lead to  maximum employment by u s in g  the given amount o f c a p ita l*
But i t  can be argued th a t m axim ization o f employment does not r e a l ly  
mean th a t output w i l l  a ls o  be maximized. As jhiTpnscm and Lei bens t e i n have 
shown, la b o u r -in te n s iv e  technique does not o ften  r e s u lt  in  maximum n a tio n a l 
output because p ro d u c tiv ity  per worker i s  vei^r low which in  turn le a v e s  only
( 2 )a sm all r e in v e s t ib le  surp lu s to  be d irec ted  to  c a p ita l  form ation .
b) By i t s  nature t h is  c r ite r io n  w i l l  favour investm ents which l^sd  
to  la b o u r -in te n s iv e  in d u s tr ie s .  But some in d u s tr ie s  by t h e ir  nature requ ire
(^^In th a t case  k/L  r a t io  w illb e  sm aller which in  turn im p lies  an in crease  in  
employment per u n it  o f c a p ita l ,
( 2 )^See V/.G alenson  & L e i b e n s t e i n ,  H ., I n v e 'h:ment C r i t e r i a ,  k r o d u c t i v i t y  and 
Economic D eve lopm en t,  QJE, August 1953» Vol.LX IX , p .  3 5 l" 3 * '-h e ir  l i n e  o f  
argument i s  entirely opposite to the employment absorotirn c r i t - r i o n .
They have argued that over a longer ueriod the c p u ita l- in te n s iv e  method, 
through i t s  favourable e f f e c t s  on sav in gs and c o r i t a l  accum ulation, may 
b rin g  about a g rea te r  expansion  in ov’tu u t and emrloyment than w'uld be 
p o ss ib le  under la b o u r -in te n s iv e  techn ique, although i n i t i a l l y  the la t t e r  
cre a te s  g rea ter  employment and p o ss ib le  a lso  a. la r g er  t o t a l  output*
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advanced tech n ology  w ith  extrem ely h i Mi c a p ita l- in te n s ity *  Then the employ­
ment c o e f f i c ie n t  may not he v a lid  fo r  th is  category o f  p r o je c ts .  S ince  
labour and c a p ita l  are not good s u b s t itu te s  fo r  each  o th er the technology  
needs to  be imported from abroad. So long as underdeveloped co u n tr ies  cannot 
provide t h e ir  own technology the a r p l i c a b i l i t y  o f t h i s  c r ite r io n  becomes very  
l im ite d .
I t  can be concluded th a t th is  f a c to r - in te n s ity  c r ite r io n  i s  the 
most co n serva tive  c r ite r io n  to  adopt sin ce i t  su g g ests  that the le ss-d ev e lo p ed  
the cou n try  the lower should be i t s  c a p ita l- la b o u r  r a t io  ( k/ l ) which in  turn 
im p lies  the l e s s  so p h is t ic a te d  should be i t s  in d u s tr ia l  s tr u c tu r e .
11 - MM NOE OF PAYWTS EFFECT CRITERION
This c r i t e r io n  s ta r t s  from the b a sic  assumption th a t what l im it s  
investm ent l e v e l  i s  the s c a r c ity  o f foreign -exch an ge . T herefore, those  
p ro jec ts  which have the h ig h e s t  net n o s it iv e  e f f e c t  on the balance o f  payments 
should r e c e iv e  p r io r ity  in  resource a l lo c a t io n .
The balance o f  payments e f f e c t  c r ite r io n  can be sim ply expressed
( 2 )as " foreign-exchange product -  to  input r a t io " .
n, ___ ______
/È = i = l ( l y r ) t __________
A  —
i= l  (l4-r)^
where F denotes p o s it iv e  con tr ib u tion  o f the p ro jec t  due to  fo r e ig n -  
exchange earn ings (or  s a v in g s ) , f  denotes n ega tive  co n tr ib u tio n  due to  fo re ig n  
exchsnge exp en d itu re, I f  fo re ig n  exchange component o f c a p ita l  investm ent, n 
l i f e  span o f the p ro jec t and r  d iscount r a te .
As can be seen t h is  i s  a r a t io  between pv o f p o s it iv e  fo re ig n  
exchange e f f e c t  and pv o f  n ega tive  fo re ig n  exchange e f f e c t s  plus the fo r e ig n -  
exchange component o f  c a p it a l .  According to  t h is  r u le ,  investm ent p ro jec ts  
are ranked and se le c te d  by the fo re ig n  exchange product-input ratio where the
^^^See, Choice and Phasing o f P u b lic  S ector P r o je c ts , UN -  Economic B u lle t in  
fo r  A sia and the Ear E a st, v o l.X V ll, N o.2, S ep t. 1966, p .18
( 2. )  - ^ -^ UN Manual on Economic Development P r o je c ts . New ïo rk , 1958, p p .230-251.
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pre fe rence  w i l l  be given to  p ro je c ts  w 'tb  the  h ig h e s t  ra t io *
I t  should be noted th a t  most investm ent p r o je c t s  w i l l  have 
p o s i t iv e  and negative  e f f e c t s  on the  balance of payments. P o s i t iv e  e f f e c t s  
a re  defined as those foreign-exchange earn ings due to  in c re a s in g  exports  
or to  import s u b s t i t u t io n  c rea ted  by the p ro je c t .  Negative e f f e c t s  comprise 
foreign-exchange spending during  the  co n s tru c tio n  and op e ra t io n  of the  
p r o je c t ,  Net e f f e c t  i s  then  the  d i f fe ie n c e  between the  p o s i t iv e  and negative  
foreign-exchange e f f e c t s .
But investm ent p ro je c t s  may often  have some i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  on the  
balance of payments which can be in  various  forms. These e f f e c t s  which a re  
c i te d  below should be brought in to  a n a ly s is .
a) I t  may sometimes happen th a t  the e s tab lish m en t of an in d u s try  
(o r  i t s  expansion) may induce in c re a s in g  output in  o th e rs  and the  l a t t e r  
in d u s t r ie s  may be forced  in  tu rn  to  in c rease  t h e i r  a d d i t io n a l  spending on 
foreign-exchange as a r e s u l t  of the r i s e  in t h e i r  o u tp u t .  For in s ta n c e ,
a s t e e l  and iron  p ro je c t  may lead to  an in c rease  in  demand f o r  coal as raw 
m a te r ia l  and the  corresponding r i s e  in the output of th e  coal in d u s try  may 
involve a d d i t io n a l  foreign-exchange spending,
b) An import s u b s t i t u t io n  in d u s try  may p o ss ib le  induce an expansion 
in  t r a n s p o r t  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  s e r v ic e s .  The expansion in  the l a t t e r  s ec to rs  
to  meet the  reauireraents  may in  tu rn  involve ex tra  fo re ig n -cu rren c y  or 
investm ent in  a p a r t i c u l a r  in d u s t iy  may have negative  e f f e c t s  on ex p o r ts .
For in s ta n c e ,  investm ent in  a t e x t i l e  and c lo th in g  p r o je c t  can reduce fo re ig n -  
exchange earn ings  through exports  by u s ing  the  p rev io u s ly  exported raw 
m a te r ia ls  as t h e i r  in p u ts .
c) An investm ent in  a p a r t i c u l a r  in d u s try  may give r i s e  to  i n d i r e c t  
foreign-exchange e a rn in g s .  For example mine ores  ( i . e .  chrome or copper) 
may b e n e f i t  from in c re a s in g  exports  s t im ula ted  by the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of energy 
or t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s .  P ro v is ion  of energy supply may induce an expansion 
in  the  outpu t of the  mining in d u s try  whose products  can be u l t im a te ly  
ex p o rted ,
I t  fo llow s th a t  a more complicated v e rs io n  of t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  should 
take in to  account both d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  on the  balance of paymentèw
f l ) ^ '^For a more complex v e rs io n  of t h i s  c r i t e r i o n ,  see Chenery, H*B,, 
The A p p lica t io n  of Investment C r i t e r i a ,  QUE, 1935, V o l .6 l ,p p .87-91
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Both of these  c r i t e r i a  mentioned above a re  p a r t i a l  e v a lu a tio n  
methods t h a t  a ttem pt to  achieve a s in g le  r a th e r  than m u lt ip le  ob jec t ives*
Each c r i t e r i o n  by i t s e l f  can lead  to  m isa llocation . of investment resou rces  
and may no t a t t a i n  the  maximum c o n tr ib u t io n  to n a t io n a l  income. Both are 
simple and have a l im ited  degree of a p p l i c a b i l i t y  in  investm ent p lanning .
They can be q u i te  m is lead ing  by themselves and should be rep laced  by a b e t t e r  
c r i t e r i a  which can take in to  account t o t a l  e f f e c t s  o f  a p ro je c t  on the o v e ra l l  
economy* The SI'IP c r i t e r i o n  th e re fo re  has been in troduced  so as to  in co rpo ra te  
a l l  th e se  e f f e c t s  in  one model and t h i s  w i l l  be the  s u b je c t -m a t te r  of the  
next ch ap te r .
In  o rder to  a v e r t  confusion, i t  should be n o te d . th a t  none of th e se  
c r i t e r i a  a re  of d i r e c t  concern to  p r iv a te  en trep ren eu rs  who have funds to 
in v e s t  in  the i n d u s t r i a l  f i e l d s .  For them the  c r i t e r i o n  of choice f o r  
production  methods i s  norm ally  the  maximum p r o f i t  r a t e  on the  c a p i t a l  to  be 
in v e s ted .  Under t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  the  choice w i l l  be determined by the  
r e l a t i v e  te c h n ic a l  e f f ic ie n c y  of the a l t e r n a t iv e  methods and the r e l a t i v e  
p r ic e s  o f  th e  f a c to r s  of production to be used.
(^^Balance of payments c r i t e r i o n  can be u s e fu l  in  checking and determ ining 
the  s iz e  o f t o t a l  investm ent. See Chenery, H .B., Ib id ,  p . 88.
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GRAFTER 5 
SOCIAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY (Srff)
I .  In tro d u c tions  The c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  r a t i o  as i t  was d iscussed e a r l i e r  
has no t stood up fo r  long as  an investm ent c r i t e r i o n .  I t s  v a l i d i t y  has 
been challenged because i t  i s  based on the assumption th a t  in p u ts  o th e r  than 
c a p i t a l  have no op p o rtu n i ty  cos t  and a lso  because i t  may f a i l  to  maximize 
output overtim e. Consequently c a p i t a l - o u tp u t  (o r  c a p i t a l  tu rn o v er  ru le )  
has been shown to  be a m is lead ing  c r i t e r i o n  fo r  a s s ig n in g  p r i o r i t i e s  to 
investment p r o j e c t s .
The p o in t t h a t  s o c ia l  and market va lues  do no t au to m a tica l ly  nor 
always co incide  under f r e e  workings of the market system has led to  i t s  r e -  
e v a lu a tio n  by w elfare  t h e o r i s t s  and f i n a l l y  to  the  form ulation  of an a l t e r ­
n a t iv e  t h e s i s ,  SAjP,
This chap ter  w i l l  be d iv ided  in to  two p a r t s ;  ■ the f i r s t  p a r t  be ing  
devoted to  the  p re s e n ta t io h  and c r i t i c a l  assessment o f  the s o c ia l  m arginal 
p ro d u c t iv i ty  and the  second p a r t  to  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c r i t e r i o n  which is  
more comprehensive and widely used in the  investm ent a l lo c a t io n  techn iaue .
The r e l a t i o n s h ip  between these  two c r i t e r i a  w i l l  a lso  be exp la ined . I t  
w i l l  be the main purpose of t h i s  chap te r  to  demonstrate the  f a c t  th a t  the  
SMP and s o c ia l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  c r i t e r i a  are  the  most a p p ro p r ia te  m l e s  f o r  
resource  a l lo c a t io n  in  developing c o u n tr ie s .
This c r i t e r i o n  takes  i t  o r ig in  from the t r a d i t i o n a l  economic 
a n a ly s is  which advocates the  adoption of the "marginal" p r in c ip le  in 
a l l o c a t in g  investm ent re so u rce s .  The ru le  i s  th a t  an e f f i c i e n t  a l lo c a t io n  
can be achieved by equating  the  m arginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  of any re so u rce ,  
inc lu d in g  c a p i t a l  in  i t s  v a r io u s  uses.^^^
This c r i t e r i o n  considers  c a p i t a l  ( in c lu d in g  fo re ign  exchange) as 
one of the  main o b s tac le s  to  rap id  economic growth, in  underdeveloped coun tries ,
' The n e o -c la s o ic a l  ru le  endorses the view t h a t  c a p i t a l  l ik e  a l l  o th e r
resou rces  should be a l lo c a te d  between and w ith in  d i f f e r e n t  s e c to rs  of the 
economy, t h a t  r e tu rn s  from or ne t p ro d u c t iv i ty  o f ,  the  l a s t  o r  marginal 
u n i t  employed in each o f the d i f f e r e n t  uses s h a l l  be as n ea r ly  as p o ss ib le  
equal. See A. p,  Lerner, On the  Marginal Product of C ap ita l  and the 
Marginal E f f ic ie n c y  of Investment, J ,P ,E . ,  February 1955, p . 1
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I t  a ttem pts  to  solve the problem of huw these  c o u n tr ie s  can make th e  b e s t  
use of the  c a p i t a l  a v a i la b le  to  them. The question  i s :  what type of i n v e s t ­
ment p ro je c ts  should be s e le c te d ,  la rg e  sca le  o r  sm all sca le  p r o je c t s ,  r u r a l  
or urban p r o j e c t s ,  p ro je c ts  in  a g r ic u l tu re  or in d u s t ry ,  e t c .
F i r s t  l e t  us take p r iv a te  marginal productivit;^'' (PMP). I f  we 
d iscoun t the  stream  of fu tu re  b e n e f i t s  Rp and the  stream  of fu+ure c o s ts  of
the  f a c to r s  C-q then i t  may be w r i t te n :
pjvjp _
K
where K i s  the c a n i t a l  s tock . The p r iv a te  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  
of c a p i t a l  ^Î4P) is  the  r a t e  of re tu rn  on the l a s t  u n i t  (say  the l a s t  £100)
of c a p i t a l  inv es ted  to  the en trep ren eu r  who makes the investment*
According to  the p r iv a te  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  ru le^ investment 




But i t  must be noted th a t  th i s  c r i t e r i o n  r e s t s  upon the assumntion 
th a t  th e re  i s  p e r fe c t  com petition in  output and f a c to r  markets and th a t  th e re
( 2)are  no e x te r n a l  economies o r  diseconomies* Yet as 1 have explained e l s e ­
where th e re  a re  numerous d i s t o r t i n g  fa c to r s  in  the  market and allowance 
should be made f o r  such im perfec tions , i . e .  ta x e s ,  s u b s id ie s ,  t a r i f f s  and 
e x te rn a l  economies. I f  th e re  i s  a divergence between market n r ic e s  and 
s o c ia l  p r ic e s ,  i t  becomes necessary  to  switch to  the  s o c ia l  marginal
C 5)p ro d u c t iv i ty  c r i t e r i o n  which takes  in to  account a l l  th e se  f a c to r s .
^^^In Investm ent C r iter ia  l i t e r a tu r e  th is  i s  sometimes c a lle d  the " ca p ita l 
turnover rate" which i s  mentioned in  Chapter 4*
( 2) -"^ For the im p erfection s o f the market system , see Chapter 3*
( 3) ^ "^ It should be noted th a t such s o c ia l  evaliation  o f investm ents i s  norm ally  
r e lev a n t to p u b lic  in vestm en ts. This kind o f e x e r c is e ,  o f cou rse, r e -u ir e s  
a planning agency which conducts s o c ia l  ev a lu a tio n  o f  p ro jec ts  as refl^'Ct/ing 
s o c ia l  b '^nefits and c o s t s .  P rivate n r o je c ts , on the o th er hand, can be 
brought in to  s o c ia l  eva lu a tion  in d ir e c t ly  by m anipulating p r ic e s  in  fa c to r  
m arkets,
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I I .  EXPOSITION OF SOCIAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY
The use of s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  has been oroposed by 
A. E. Kahn,^^^ H. B. Chenery^^^ J .  T i n b e r g e n R .  Nurkse^"^^ and o th e rs .
A. E, Èahn has been the f i r s t  to  o b jec t  to  the  ru le  of c a p i t a l  tu rn o v e r  and 
has s ta te d  th a t :  " the c o r r e c t . c r i t e r i o n  fo r  o b ta in in g  the  maximum re tu rn
from l im ited  re sou rces  i s  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  or from the  po in t of view 
o f s o c ie ty  as a whole, s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  (BMP), ta k in g  in to  account 
the t o t a l  ne t  c o n tr ib u t io n  of the  marginal u n i t  to  n a t io n a l  product, and not 
merely t h a t  p o r t io n  of the  c o n tr ib u t io n  (o r  of i t s  c o s ts )  which may accrue 
to  the  p r iv a te  in v e s to r" .
Because the  p ro d u c t iv i ty  c r i t e r i a  a re  u s u a l ly  applied  to investment 
p ro je c ts  r a th e r  than to s in g le  u n i t s  of c a p i t a l  they are  "marginal" in the  
sense t h a t  a p r o je c t  normally c o n s t i tu te s  a small f r a c t io n  of the t o t a l  
c a p i t a l  inv es ted  in  a given y e a r .  Therefore the  marginal concept ought to  
be considered in  t h i s  sense .
The b e s t  p re s e n ta t io n  of the  SMP c r i t e r i o n  has been made by P ro fesso r
H. B. C h e n e r y ^ w h o  provides us with a formula in  which he allows f o r  
a r t i f i c i a l  elements in the p r ic e  system ( i . e .  t a r i f f s ,  su b s id ie s  e t c . )  and 
provides an ev a lu a tio n  of labour and foreign-exchange a t  opportun ity  cos t
^^^Kahn, A .E ., Investm ent C r i t e r i a  in  Development Programmes, QJE, 1951»P--3T-61
( ?)^"/Chenery, H .B., The A pp lica t ion  of Investment C r i t e r i a ,  QJE, Volume LXll, 
pp.79-'85.
( 3 ) ^ 'T inbergen , J . ,  The Relevance of T h eo re tica l  C r i t e r i a  in the  S e lec t io n  of
' Investm ent P lans in  "Investment C r i t e r i a  and Economic Growth", C . I .S . ,
M .l.T , 1964 . p . 3 . Tinbergen has s ta te d  th a t  "The p r i o r i t y  f ig u re s  
g e n e ra l ly  w i l l  have to  be the  r a t i o  of ne t r e s u l t s  to  t o t a l  c o s ts ,  a l l  
taken a t  accounting  p r i c e s " .  His c r i t e r i o n  d i f f e r s  in the  fo llow ing  r e s ­
p ec ts  from the a l t e r n a t iv e  used by the p r iv a te  in v e s to r :  a) by the a p p l i ­
ca t io n  of accounting p r ic e s ,  b) by the  co n s id e ra t io n  of in d i r e c t  and sec­
ondary c o s ts  and r e tu rn s ,  c) by r e l a t i n g  r e s u l t s  to t o t a l  co s ts  and not
only to  the  co s ts  of c a p i t a l  in ves ted . But where c a p i t a l  i s  the  only 
scarce  f a c to r  the  p r i o r i t y  f ig u re  w i l l  have to  be the r a t i o  of ne t r e s u l t s  
defined as the  d i f fe re n c e  between t o t a l  r e tu rn s  and t o t a l  c o s t - to  the 
c o s t  of c a p i t a l  in v e s te d .
(^^Nurkse, R . , Problems of C ap ita l  Formation in  Underdeveloped C oun tries ,
6 th  im pression , Oxford, B, Blackwell, I 962 , 0 . 136- 7 .
Kolzman, P .p . ,  The Sovie t U ral-huznetsk  Combine; A 
C r i t e r i a  and I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  P o l i c ie s ,  QJE, V o l .71, 1957 » p p .368- 405 .
5ee Chenery, H.!
-953, p n .76- 96 .
f s)^'UiOlz , b ra l-h Study in Investment 
G
(^^Se .B., The A pplication  of Investment C r i t e r i a ,  QJE, V o l.67,
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r a th e r  than a t  market p r i c e s .  He has a lso  taken in to  account the  b e n e f i t s  
provided to  o th e r  s e c to r s  in  the form of e x te rn a l  economies*^
Chenery has developed a measure o f  s o c ia l  p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  terms
( 2)of a s o c ia l  w elfa re  fu n c t io n  which would take  in to  account sev e ra l  
a sp ec ts  o r  dimensions of the e f f e c t  of an investm ent on a c o u n try 's  economy. 
For in s ta n c e ,  an investment p ro je c t  w i l l  a f f e c t  the  n a t io n a l  income, the 
balance of payments, employment and the d i s t r i b u t io n  of income. For 
p r a c t i c a l  use i t  i s  necessary  to  reduce a l l  th e se  e f f e c t s  to  a common
measure. I f  the  s o c ia l  w elfa re  fu n c tio n  i s  denoted as U and the  correspond-
( 3)ing  v a r ia b le s  as Y, B, D . . .  then we can w rite :
Ü = U (Y, B, D.. ) ( 1)
where
U = index o f s o c ia l  w elfare ,
Y = e f f e c t  on n a t io n a l  income,
B = t o t a l  n e t  e f f e c t  on the balance of payments,
D -  e f f e c t  on d i s t r i b u t io n  of income.
The increment in  U corresponding to  a given increment in  c a p i t a l  
can be iv r i t ten  as:
 ^ The d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in  the s t a t i s t i c a l  computation of "wrelfare" 
c o n tr ib u t io n s  of a p a r t i c u l a r  p ro je c t  w i l l  be ra i s e d  in the  sec t io n  r e la te d  
to the t h e o r e t i c a l  a p p ra is a l  of the  SNIP,
( 2 )'As I  have po in ted  out in the  preceding c h ap te rs ,  s o c ia l  w elfa re  func tion  
i s  n o t  an easy concept to  define  in  general terras nor i s  i t  t ru e  t h a t  
p lanners  can always r e f l e c t  the  tru e  s o c ia l  w e lfa re  func tion  of a s o c ie ty .  
Though t h i s  i s  s t i l l  a debated p o in t ,  one can s a fe ly  argue th a t  a p r o j e c t ’s 
c o n tr ib u t io n  to  the major o b je c t iv e s  of an economic plan may c o n s t i tu te  
a rough approximation to  a d e s i r a b le  p a t te rn  of s o c ia l  w e lfa re .
( 3)'The employment e f f e c t  of an investment p ro je c t  can a lso  be included in  
the  w elfa re  func tion : U = U (Y, B, D, W.. ) .  Here employment inc ludes
the manpower used in  the  opera tion  of a c e r ta in  p ro je c t  and i s  rep resen ted  
by the annual wage flow, W. py  then becomes the marginal r a t e  of s u b s t i t u t -
d Wion between income and wages,' In o ther  words, the  r a t i o  in d ic a te s  the 
number of u n i t s  of output which the  p lanner i s  w i l l in g  to  s a c r i f i c e  in 
o rder to  ob ta in  a u n i t  in c rease  in wages (employment).
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ZvÜ = A Y 4-  /A B 4' AD ^ . . . .  ( 2 )
ï.f Ü i s  measured in n a t io n a l  income u n i t s  and divided by y— = 1 .>ay
we ob ta in ;
AU =AY + 1 1  A b + I I  + . . . .  ( 3 )
( 1)
In  case we ignore D and c a l l  Du the s o c ia l  marginal p ’-’o d u c t iv i ty  
and r  the  marginal r a t e  of s u b s t i t u t io n  between Y and B then
equation  (3) becomes;
SMP = AU -  AY + r .  AB (4)
The s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  formula th a t  i s  ad justed  to
allow  fo r  the  d i s to r t i o n s  in the market economy can be w r i t t e n  as fo llow s:




(^^SMP A_±..Aji.Æ „ ^ |  (aBq + Bg) (6)
V— = value added d om estica lly  p e r  u n i t  of investm ent





the  t o t a l  o p e ra t in g  cost per u n i t  of investm ent excluding  
imported m a te r ia ls
balapce of payments premium per u n i t  o f  investment
( l )  dY ■^' 'S ince  —  would re p re se n t  a s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  v a lu e ,  judgem ent.is  assumed
away from the for-mula*
(?)“' r  in d ic a te s  the  amount o f  in c re a se  in n a t io n a l  income which would be é c r iv ­
a ie n t  to  an improvement of one u n i t  in the  balance of payments.
( 3)■^’^ ' i f  v/e want to  sep a ra te  d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  the  SlYP can a lso  be
presented  as; ^ _ 2 L -rJ l iL ± . .A ± J l l .± J i} .  , I  ,
" ' ■" K K K
(4)nii, •h is  d e f in i t i o n  does not however, coincide e x a c t ly  with whet has been termed 
the " c a p i t a l  tu rnover r a t e " .  V re p re se n ts  the  p ro je c ts  t o t ”l  production 
va lue , s o c i a l l y  p^'iced and in c lud ing  e x te rn a l  econorai<^s bur excluding 
imported m a te r ia l s .  I t  should be taken as the jlojkal_dop^pMic _}f\lue added 
in  the  p r o je c t  p lus the  t o t a l  backward and domestic va lues  added.
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For a c le a r  understanding’ i t  may be n ecessary  to  y iv e  the 
d e t a i l s  o f  the above form ula.
I . Soci a l  Value Added; V = X + E -  Mi
where
X = i s  in creased  market value o f  output ( ta x e s ,  s u b s id ie s ,  
t a r i f f s  are e lim in ated )
E = i s  the va lue added to  production due to  e x te r n a l economies 
Mi -  i s  th e  c o s t  o f  imported m a ter ia ls
I I . The Valu e  of  Total  Operatina: Co st;  C = L + Md 0
where
L = i s  labour c o s t
Md -  i s  the c o s t  o f  dom estic m a ter ia ls  
0 = i s  the overhead c o s t  ( a l l  o th er  c o s ts  in c lu d in g  
replacem ent o f c a p ita l)
I I I .  Ba la n ce o f  Payment s  E ffe c t  uer  U nit of  Investm ent :
Br = r  (a  Bp + B2 )
where
r  = measures the average overva lu ation  of the n a tio n a l 
currency a t the e x is t in g  r a te  o f  exchange 
a = the c o s t  o f  combined am ortization  and in t e r e s t  ra te  
o f current borrowing 
Bp = the e f f e c t  o f in s t a l la t io n  o f investm ent on the 
balance o f payments 
B2 = the e f f e c t  o f operation  o f investm ent on the balance  
o f  payments 
B = t o t a l  balance o f payment e f f e c t .
IV. In i t i a l  Inv estment  K; i s  increment o f c a p ita l  which in c lu d es  dom estic  
and foreign -exch an ge components. I t  i s  b a s ic a l ly  f ix e d  c o u ita l c o s t .
'^ A rith m etica lly  r  i s  obtained by su b tra c tin g  the o f f i c i a l  from the r e a l rare  
o f  exchange and d iv id in g  the d iffe r e n c e  by the o f f i c i a l  r a te .  Hence whon 
there i s  eq u ilib riu m  in the balance o f payments (r  = l )  the r e a l ra te  o f  
exchange becomes double th a t o f the o f f i c i a l .  For more d e t a i l s  on th is  
p o in t , see UN -  Manual on Economic Develooment P r o je c ts . N. York, 1958.
pp . 227
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Equation ( 5) may a ls o  be w r itten  by combining the terms (a ) an3 (b ):
“=m(¥)-F " I
a b c
The s o c ia l  m arginal p ro d u c tiv ity , as can be seen  from equation (? )
becomes equal to  the ra te  o f turnover m u ltip lied  by the r a t io  o f p r o f i t s
to  value added in  production plus the balance o f payments premium. This
equation  dem onstrates th a t low c a p ita l  p r o d u ctiv ity  (™) in  a given p ro jec t
V -  Ccan be o f f s e t  by a h igh value —ÿ —  i f  the e f f e c t  on the balance o f  
payments remains co n sta n t.
A ccording to  th is  ru le  investm ent p r o je c ts  are to  be ranked and
s e le c te d  by th e ir  SMP and go down the l i s t  u n t i l  the funds a v a ila b le  are
exhausted . Then any p ro jec t having a SMP above a given le v e l  w i l l  q u a lify
fo r  s e l e c t i o n , O n e  must however note th a t the SMP i s  defined  as the
"net co n tr ib u tio n  o f a m arginal u n it  (p r o je c t)  to  the n a tio n a l product where
( 2 )fo r  more accuracy c o st  and output should be d iscounted  to  the p resen t" .'
I I I .  OH THE CORRECTION OP MARKET PRICES AND COSTS
As I have pointed  out in  Chapter 3; i t  would be n ecessary  to  a ttach  
a hhadow" or "accounting price"^&^ the product in  order to  fin d  i t s  s o c ia l  
value when ever s o c ia l  p r o f it  d i f f e r s  from p r iv a te  p r o f i t .
The co rr ec tio n s  o f market p r ic e s  and c o s ts  w i l l  be n ecessary  fo r  the  
fo llo w in g  fa c to r s ;
F ir s t ,  fo r  s o c ia l  p r ic in g  i t  i s  n ecessary  to  e lim in a te  the e f f e c t s  
o f t a r i f f s ,  taxes and su b s id ie s  on the market p r ic e s  and c o s t s .
Second, as was mentioned in  Chapter $, a cou n try 's  dom estic currency  
i s  o ften  overvalued . For in stan ce , foreign-exchange may be ration ed  and
( x)
'For ranking i t  i s  f i r s t  n ecessary  to  determ ine the m arginal p ro jec t from 
the t o t a l  funds a v a ila b leo
( 2 ')See Kahn, A .E ., Investm ent C r iter ia  in  Development Programmes, QJE, Feb,
( 3),
( i . e .  c a p ita l ,  foreift'n-exchange, labour) o ften  d iverge from th e  in t r in s ic
value th a t would p r e v a il i f  equ ilibrium  e x is te d  on the markets ju s t  mention­
ed , For the reasons why s o c ia l  p r ices  d iverge from market p r ic e s , see  
Chapter 5*
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so ld  a t p p r ic e  which does not r e f l e c t  i t s  s o c ia l  v a lu e . Consequently, 
an overvalued exchange ra te  may underestim ate the c o s t  o f imported machinery 
and equipment. In such cases i t  would he appronriate to  add som ething to  the 
p riv a te  c o s t  o f  r r o je c ts  th at use foreign-exchange^^ or to  deduct something 
from the p r iv a te  c o s t  o f  a l l  p r o je c ts  th at save fo re ign -exch an ge .
Third, co rrectio n  w i l l  a lso  he needed in  regard to  unused or 
unemployed re so u r c e s . For in sta n ce , i f  investm ent w i l l  make p o s s ib le  the  
u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  resou rces which would not o therw ise be used only the s o c ia l  co st  
o f u t i l i z i n g  th ese  resou rces should be charged ra th er than the t o t a l  ren t  
or wages which a producer may pay. The s o c ia l  c o s t  o f employing one more 
worker in  any undertaking i s  th'’^ va lue o f  v/hat he would have produced in  other  
use o f  h is  labour. T herefore, the s o c ia l  c o st  w i l l  be n i l  i f  the worker i s  
w holly unemployed and very low i f  he i s  g r e a tly  underemployed.
Fourth, i f  an investm ent p ro ject purchases some o f i t s  requirem ents 
from productive u n its  th a t are producing under co n d itio n s  o f  d ecreasin g  c o s t s ,  
a shadow p r ice  r e f le c t in g  on ly  the marginal c o st  o f producing th ese  requirem ents
( 2 )may provide a b e t te r  measure o f  t h e ir  c o st  to s o c ie ty  than a market p r ic e .
F in a lly ,  i t  must be noted th a t the p r io r ity  and s e le c t io n  o f p ro jec ts  
w i l l  la r g e ly  depend on the in te r e s t  ra te  app lied  in  d isco u n tin g  the value of 
fu ture goods and s e r v ic e s .  Because o f  short-term  f lu c tu a t io n s  in the 
country’s balance o f  payments and im p erfection s in the cap ita l-m arket the  
market ra te  o f in t e r e s t  might not r e f l e c t  s o c ie t y ’s ra te  o f time p referen ces;  
thus i t  becomes n ecessary  to  compute "shadow" ra te  o f in t e r e s t  in the FF 
c a lc u la t io n s .
( 1 ) ^ ^In oth er words an a d d itio n a l fore ign  exchange p en a lty  which corresnonds to  
the d if fe r e n c e  between the s o c ia l  o r ice  o f foreign -exch ange and the o f f i c i a l  
exchange ra te  should be added to  the fo re ig n  exchange component o f c a p ita l  
investm ent.
I t  should be s tr e s se d  th a t th is  kind of co rrectio n  i s  o f  course v a lid  
esr^eorally fo r  p u b lic  n ro jec ts  and t h is  h^s been q u ite  q common p ra c tic e  in  
p ro ject eva lu a tion  in  many develop ing c o u n tr ie s , In d ia , Ceylon, T urkey.. .  
For* T n d n a n  O e c é  Rt n id iA R .  Re A A. K.  Sen» An Economic Evaluation, of the Bunga-
But fo r  so c ia l ev a lu a tio n  o f o u b lie  o r o je c ts  market p r ic e s  need to  be a d ju st­
ed so as to  r e f l e c t  the marginal co st o f prod u ction , This uo in t i s  more 
r e lev a n t to  cases where in d u s tr ia l  o r o je c ts  are in q u estio n . On t h is  po in t  
se e , In te r n a tio n a l Labour kevie w, Some A spects o f Investm ent P o lic y  in  
Underdeveloped C ountries, 1 , 1 .0 . ,  Ceneva, Jan .-Ju n e, 1958, p. 598
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I t  m a y  be concluded th a t i t  would be th ese  shadow p r ic e s  and c o s ts  
and not the a c tu a l market p r ic e s  and c o s ts  th a t must be taken in to  account 
in  app ly ing the SRE formula and hence s e le c t in g  investm ent p rojectso
IV. THEORETiaAL APPRAISAL AND APPLICATION OP ’THE SNIP.
a) As has been mentioned e a r l ie r ,  the SMP c r it e r io n  takes in to  |
account "the t o t a l  n et co n tr ib u tio n  o f the marginal u n it  (p r o je c t)  to n a tio n a l j
product, and not m erely th a t p ortion  o f the co n tr ib u tio n  which may accrue to  I
the p r iv a te  in v e s to r " . In t h i s  r e sp e c t , i t  d i f f e r s  from th e p r iv a te  p r o f i t -  j
a b i l i t y  c r ite r io n  in  which the p o lic y  o b j e c t iv e ' i s  m erely to  maximize p r iv a te  |
p r o f i t s .  However, what i s  im portant in  p ro jec t ev a lu a tio n  as taken from the |
p o in t o f  view  o f  s o c ie ty  i s  not commercial p r o f it s  but the value added created  |
by th a t in vestm en t. Value added i s  taken here to  in c lu d e  the sum of fa c to r  |
incomes such as s a la r ie s ,  wages, r e n ts , in t e r e s t ,  d ep rec ia tio n  and p r o f i t s . j
b) Another c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  th is  c r ite r io n  i s  th a t i t  aims a t  ^
maximizing the p resen t value o f r e a l n a tio n a l income. But i t  i s  argued by *
( ? )some econom ists ■ th a t maxim izing n a tio n a l product a t present may not be 
the same as m axim izing the fu tu re ra te  o f growth o f per ca p ita  income. In 
other" words i f  the economic goa l i s  maximizing the fu ture ra te  o f growth, the 
SMP ceases to  be an adequate c r i t e r io n ,  '
( 5 ) !Galenson and L eib en stein  have argued th a t i t  i s  the fu ture |
investm ent stream and not the current investm ent th at i s  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  [_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _         I
(^^This corresponds to  gross value added; but fo r  net va lu e added to be j
ca lc u la te d  d ep rec ia tio n  and in d ir e c t  taxes  need to  be excluded .
(  2 )  ISee  G a len so n ,  W, and L e i b e n s t e i n ,  H ,, I n v e s tm e n t  C r i t e r i a ,  P r o d u c t i v i t y  and |
Economic D ev e lo p m en t,  QJE., Augu.st 1955» V o l . L X I X ,h o . l ,  p p . 549"350* t
( 5) \ ^ 'Galenson and L eib en ste in  have proposed a reinvestm ent c r ite r io n  to  rep la ce  ,
the SMP. They argue that rep ercu ssiv e  e f f e c t s  o f  the p r o jec ts  which a re  not . 
considered  in  the e a r l ie r  form al a n a ly s is ,  should be taken in to  account in  
d ecisb n -m od els. In the c r ite r io n  tliey have proposed they attem pt to  include  
two main e f f e c t s  o f a p r o je c t . F ir s t ,  i f  per cap ita  growth o f income i s  the 
o b je c t iv e  fu n c tio n , d i f f e r e n t ia l  e f f e c t s  o f p r o je c ts  on population  growth 
should be included  in  the c r i t e r ia .  Second, i f  a government f in d s  i t  im poss­
ib le  to  ach ieve an optim al le v e l  o f investm ent, the c a p a b ility  o f p ro jec ts  
to  generate fu rth er  c a p ita l  out o f  b e n e f it s  should be con sid ered , Conseouen- 
t l y  a marginal reinvestm ent c o e f f ic ie n t  i s  introduced  as a measure. They 
have a ls o  concluded th a t th ese  repercussion  e f f e c t s  would favour in d u s tr ia l  
p ro jec ts  in urban areas as opposed to  agricu lt\u ?a l investm ents in ru ra l areas., 
ButG-L do not prouose a formal c r i t e r io n , they m erely make th e ir  p o in ts  
by tak in g  i l lu s t r a t iv e  exam ples. See, I b id . ,  puo 543“ 545
137.
long-run developm ent. The SMP does not take in to  account what happens to the 
f in a l  product during any p eriod , but in  fa c t  what happens to  the f in a l  product 
determ ines p a r tly  the investm ent ra te  in the fu tu r e .
In the l i s t  o f  c r i t ic is m  ra ised  a g a in st  the 8MP i t  i s  a lso  argued 
th a t th is  model i s  based upon s t a t i c  co n d ition s and i f  one moves away from 
tn ese  assum ptions i t s  v a l id i t y  d im in ishes con sid era b ly . This i s  because the  
SÏIP c r it e r io n  does not take in to  account the changes in  the nature and q u a lity  
o f  the fa c to r s  o f production th a t may p a r tly  be an in d ir e c t  consequence o f the  
current investm ent a l lo c a t io n .  By th is  i t  i s  meant th a t the SMP ign ores the 
in d ir e c t  e f f e c t  o f  investm ent on the expansion o f entrepreneursh ip , the 
q u a lity  o f labour: the future savings and thus fu tu re  ra te  o f  investm ent;
fu ture consumption p attern ; and f in a l l y  the ra te  o f population  growth which 
in  turn determ ines per cap ita  income.
P a r t ic u la r ly  c r i t i c s  argue th at the SMP th e s is  f a i l s  to  con sid er  
a h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t  temporal fa c to r  in  m erely d isco u n tin g  o p p o rtu n ities  c o s ts  
and r a te s  o f return to  a rr iv e  a t e stim a tes  o f p r o je c ts ' s o c ia l  p r o d u c t iv it ie s ,  
’//hat th is  ' SMP equation om its i s  a con sid era tion  o f fu tu re  u ses to  which returns  
to  p r o jec ts  w i l l  be put. Because returns from a p ro jec t  are d ivided  between 
p r o f it s  and wages, i t  then fo llo w s  th a t the magnitude o f the n a tio n a l product 
a t some fu tu re date w i l l  be determined by whether or not p r o je c ts  w ith r e la t iv -
( 2 )e ly  high r a te s  o f reinvestm ent have been con stru cted .
 ^ ^See H, L e i b e n s t e i n ,  Economic Backw ardness and Economic Grov/th, Hew York,  
1957» p p . 2 5 9 -6 0 ;  I t  i s  o f t e n  argued t h a t  m a x im iz a t io n  o f  th e  a g g r e g a te  
o u tp u t  i s  an in a d e q u a te  a c h ie v e m e n t  a s  i t  d o es  n o t  ta k e  i n t o  a cc o u n t  the  
i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n ' s  w e l f a r e  p o s i t i o n :  th a t  i s ,  i t  f a i l s  t o  e n t e r  th e
p o p u la t io n  f a c t o r  i n t o  th e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n .  P u t t i n g  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y  
th e  G-L t h e s i s  n o i n t s  to  th e  "income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  c o p u la t i o n " .  I f  c o p u l ­
a t i o n  r i s e s  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  an i n c r e a s e  in  a g g r e g a te  o u tp u t  a c c r u in g  t o  th e  
la b o u r  f o r c e ,  then  p er  c a p i t a  income may n o t  r i s e  by th e  same margin a s  d o es  
n a t i o n a l  in co m e.  Thus i t  i s  t h e i r  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  a d evelop m en t g o a l  should  
be v iew ed  in  p er  c a p i t a  te r m s .
( 2 )Though t h i s  i s  a v a l i d  p o i n t  a g a i n s t  th e  f o r m u la t io n  o f  th e  SHP, th e  
r e in v e s t m e n t  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  a p u b l i c  p r o j e c t  can be in c lu d e d  in  a r e f i n e d  
v e r s i o n  o f  th e  SMP o r  in  g e n e r a l  s o c i a l - b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a l y s i s .  For th e  
i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p o in t  s e e  A. K. b en .a n d  M. B , Chaudhary, Economic E v a l ­
u a t i o n  o f  Cement P r o d u c t io n  a t  P u tta la m  and o f  th e  P a ck in g  P la n t  h e a r  
Colombo: A Case S tu d y  o f  S o c i a l  B e n e f i t - C o s t  A n a l y s i s  from C ey lo n ,  UN
I n d u s t r i a l  Dev. O r g a n i s a t io n ,  June 1 9 6 7 , p p . l 2 - 2 1 o
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g) Other o b jec tio n s  to  the use o f  the s o c ia l  m arginal p ro d u ctiv ity  
are in r e la t io n  to  i t s  a p p l ic a b i l i t y  in  factual p r a c t ic e .  The q u estio n s which 
a r is e  here are: how to  c a lc u la te  Y, E, D . . .  e t c .?  bliat v a lu es  are to
be given . . . e t c .?  Whether the formula i s  to  be app lied  between se c to r s
or w ith in  each secto r?  And whether the StlP i s  to  be ap p lied  in  commodity 
or s e r v ic e s  sec to rs?
Chenery has exp lained  the method o f ca lcu latingyhY  and .&B. As I 
have mentioned e a r l ie r ,  the in crea se  in  n a tio n a l income w i l l  bp estim ated  by 
app lying  a s e t  o f  co rr ec tio n s  ( fo r  t a r i f f s ,  ta x e s , s u b s id ie s ,  unused resou rces  
and e x te r n a l econom ies) to  the businessm an's c a lc u la t io n s  of annual ra te  o f  
p r o f i t .
'There i s  o ften  no gen era l agreement on the is s u e  o f in trod u cin g  
such piecem eal co rr ec tio n s  or shadow p r ic e s  fo r  that m atter . Seme econ om ists' 
have argued th a t "oeductin- in d ir e c t  t^ ’^xes does not le a v e  the uroduct p r ic e  
a t  a le v e l  corresponding to  a non-tax s itu a t io n " . I t  i s  su sp ect whether th ese  
adjustm ents can g iv e  a p r ice  which i s  c lo se r  to  the one which would e x i s t  in  
the absence o f  ta x es  and su b sid ieso
E ou ally  some econom ists find  shadow p r ic e s  very  remote from
r e a l i t y  and th ere fo re  they d is tr u s t  them. Of cou rse , shadow p r ic e s  are
unreal in  th a t they  are not current p r ic e s  o f goods or fa c to r s  o f productiono
( %)
But as P ro fe sso r  i.M .D , L i t t l e  has emphasised in h is  recen t book;' one can eraue
(^^Chenery, H .B ., A p p lica tion  o f  Investm ent C r ite r ia , QU'E, Aufgist, 19t3» n .82  
( 2 )/fo o e e r , D .I l., General Investm ent C r iter ia  fo r  Less Deveiored Countries:
A Post-M ortent T co tttsh  Journal o f P o l i t i c a l  Economy, June 1962, p .08
L i t t l e ,  I.M .D. & K ir r le e s , J .A ., S o c ia l C ost-B en ^ fit A n a ly s is .
Manual o f  In d u s tr ia l P ro jec t A n a lysis  in D eveloping Countres, V o l .I I .
OECD, Development Centre S tu d ie s . P a r is , 1969, p . 37
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t h a t  no p r ic e  in  p ro je c t  a n a ly s is  can ever be an a c tu a l  p r ic e  f o r  every p r ic e  
assumed in  such an a n a ly s is  n e c e s s a r i ly  w i l l  l i e  in  the  f u tu r e .
The p o in t  h e re ,  in  my op in ion , i s  not th a t  the  shadow p r ic e s  are  
u n rea l  and should be r e j e c te d ,  but whether such shadow p r ic e s  can be computed 
so as to  correspond more c l o s e l y ' t o  the  r e a l i t i e s  of economic s c a r c i ty ,
I 'i i r th e r ,  i t  can be maintained th a t  the c o r re c t io n s  mentioned above 
might w ell hold t ru e  f o r  some developed c o u n tr ie s .  For s o c ia l  eva lu a tio n  of 
investment p ro je c t s  in  the l a t t e r  c o u n tr ie s  a l s o ,  i h d i r e c t  ta x es ,  e x te rn a l  
economies, fo re ig n  exchange and id le  (o r  u n d e ru t i l iz e d )  re so u rce s  may re q u ire  
s im ila r  ad justm en ts .  Hence, as D. Dossen^^^ has concluded, such adjustm ents 
a re  not designed e s p e c ia l l y  f o r  l e s s  developed economies but they  may in  some 
cases be e q u a lly  r e le v a n t  to  a developed country*
With regard  to  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  market ad justm ents  t h i s  is  
what Chenery has to  say: "The margin of e r r o r  involved in  c a lc u la t io n s  of t h i s
s o r t  in  underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s  may lead some read e rs  to  doubt the u se fu ln ess  
of the whole o p e ra t io n .  In my op in ion , however, the o b s tac le s  to the  ach ieve­
ment of d e s i r a b le  r e s u l t s  through free -m arke t fo rce s  are  so g re a t  t h a t  they  
g re a t ly  reduce th e  s o c ia l  value of investment u n le ss  an a ttem pt i s  made to  
o f f s e t  them. The method used here  i s  la rg e ly  an e f f o r t  to  make such c o rrec -
( 2)t io n s  f o r  the  d i f f e r e n c e  between p r iv a te  and s o c ia l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y " .
The balance of payments e f f e c t ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, inc ludes  both  
d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  investm ent e f f e c t s  ( i . e .  import o f  machinery fo r  the 
p ro je c t ,  and m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  of investment on income and im ports) ;  and 
a lso  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  on imports of o p e ra t in g  the p r o je c t .
The s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  ru le  I  have in troduced  has not 
considered the  e f f e c t  of an investment on the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of o u t r u t .  This
eCVparam eter was dropped from the formula because i t  i s  a m a tte r  of r o l i t i c a l
and s o c ia l  judgement. I t  i s  assumed th a t  f i s c a l  and monetary p o l ic ie s  in  th a t  
count]g;r can take care of t h i s  ob jec t ive*
(^ ^ lo s s e r ,  D.M., General Investment C r i t e r i a  f o r  Less-Developed C ountries:
Post-Mortem, S c o t t is h  J .P .E . ,  June 1962, p .89
(^^Chenery, H.B., The A up lica t ion  of Investment C r i t e r i a ,  QJE, August 1953' p .96 
and see Manual on Economie Development P r o je c t s ,  IJIJ, New York 1958, p . 229.
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(d<) In  regard  to  the  l a s t  ques tio n ,  the na tu re  o f  the  investment 
programme w i l l  have some e f f e c t  on the  a p p l ic a t io n  of the  ShïP c r i t e r i o n .
I t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  agreed th a t  la rg e  investment in s o c ia l  overheads during  the 
c o n s tru c t io n  period w i l l  tend to  enlarg;e the balance of payments d e f i c i t  
while investm ent in  the  "commodity" s e c to rs  w i l l  r e l a t i v e l y  reduce the  d e f i c i t .  
In the sh o r t - ru n  the  fo rm er 's  adverse e f f e c t  on the  balance of payments i s  
due to  i t s  h igh-im port con ten t and i t s  r a th e r  small a d d i t io n  to  d i r e c t  r e a l  
o u tp u t .  In  case the  SFff i s  used i t  may give p r i o r i t y  to "commodity" in v e s t ­
ment p ro je c t s  because these  w i l l  in c rease  the p ro te c t io n  r a t e  and a lso  the  
r e a l  ou tput of the  economy*
The SiMP may p resen t  some problems when we move away from commodity 
production ( i . e .  i n d u s t r i a l  and a g r i c u l tu r a l  p ro je c t s )  in to  producer s e r v ic e s .  
For in s ta n c e ,  i f  a p ro je c t  i s  concerned with the e s tab lishm en t of new roads 
i t s  c o n tr ib u t io n  to  the o v e ra l l  economy should inc lude  the increased  production 
and m arketing of the  a rea  which would be c rea ted  by th a t  very  p ro je c t .  The 
d i f f i c u l t y  here  i s  the  computations o f  " ex te rn a l  economies" which a p a r t i c u l a r  
p ro je c t  may give r i s e  to*
I t  i s  the  b a s ic  a s s e r t io n  of the theory  of w elfa re  economics th a t  
e x te rn a l  economies should be computed when an investm ent p ro je c t  i s  eva lua ted .
In o rder to  make s o c ia l  ev a lu a t io n  d i s t i n c t  from p r iv a te  ev a lu a t io n  i t  i s  
o ften  suggested by w elfare  economists th a t  " e x t e r n a l i t i e s "  should be computed 
80 as to  determine the "w elfare" c o n tr ib u t io n  of investment p r o je c t s .
But i t  must be added th a t  i t  i s  in the  realm  of " e x t e r n a l i t i e s "  
t h a t  enormous p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s e  when determ in ing  the s o c ia l  m arginal 
p ro d u c t iv i ty  (SM^) o r  8PV of a p a r t i c u l a r  p r o je c t .
(^ )p ro fe s so r  A. Hove in  h is  re c en t  a r t i c l e  p o in ts  to the  f a c t  th a t  i d e n t i f i c a t ­
ion and i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n  of e x t e r n a l i t i e s  should be examined w ith in  the  
con tex t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangem ents. He im plies  th a t  the type of ownership 
of p roductionor a c t i v i t y  w i l l  p lay  considerab le  in f lu en ce  on the investm ent 
d e c is io n .  He goes on to  say th a t  d i f f e r e n t  d e c is io n s  would bo reached i f  
two production  a c t i v i t i e s  (o r  s e rv ice s )  are owned by a s in g le  f irm  or j o i n t l y  
ov/ned or whether th e re  i s  c ro s s - s u b s id is a t io n  o r  whether ownership i s  h eav ily  
fragmented so as to  make m arketing of e x t e r n a l i t i e s  im p rac t ic ab le .
He a lso  draws our a t t e n t io n  to the  l im i t a t i o n s  involved in i n t e r n a l i s ­
a t io n  of e x t e r n a l i t i e s  where he m ain tains th a t  t o t a l  i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n  (even 
a t  c e n t r a l  p lanning  le v e l )  i s  im possib le . The c o s t  of i n t e r n a l i s i n g  may 
sometimes be l a rg e r  than not doing so.
For an e x c e l le n t  account of the problems o f i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n  of e x te r ­
n a l i t i e s  see A. Hove, I n te r n a l  Economies, E . J . ,  December I 969 , Vol.LXXIX, 
h o . 316, p r . 831-835"
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G enera lly  speaking w elfa re  t h e o r i s t s  have s te e re d  c l e a r  of t h i s  
o b s tac le  by c o n ce n tra t in g  on pure theory  e x c lu s iv e ly  and t h e i r  comments on 
a p p l ic a t io n  have dwelt p r im ar i ly  on opportun ity  c o s ts  encountered in a l l o c a t in g  
f a c to r s  away from t h e i r  o rd in a ry  market-determined fu n c t io n s  f o r  pub lic  
purposes. P ro fe sso r  H. B. Chenery^Als a rn l ie d  the  SM? c r i t e r i o n  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in  e v a lu a t in g  i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c t s  by only in tro d u c in g  " so c ia l"  o r  "accounting" 
p r ic e s  fo r  f a c to r  in p u ts .  His s tu d ie s  which a re  r e l a t e d  to  s p e c i f i c  indus­
t r i a l  p ro je c t s  in  Greece, I t a l y  and Turkey have no t inc luded  any measurement 
of e x te rn a l  b e n e f i t s .  This was probably due to  com putational d i f f i c u l t i e s  
faced in  e x te rn a l  economies.
An im portan t question  which a r i s e s  here i s  whether they  a re  l i k e l y  
to  be very  s i g n i f i c a n t  and whether i t  i s  sen s ib le  to  spend much time on 
e n q u ir ie s  and re s e a rc h  which would enable one to  make some s o r t  of rough 
com putation. In  case th e re  i s  a susp ic ion  t h a t  th e re  may be powerful e x te rn a l  
e f f e c t s  to  an in d iv id u a l  p r o je c t ,  then the  p ro je c t  e v a lu a to r  should a ttem pt 
to  q u a n t i fy  them however roughly . O therwise, as P ro fe ss o r  I.M.D. L i t t l e  
has s t r e s s e d  v e r y  r i g h t l y  " i t  may be f a r  more im portan t to  spend time
( 2 )improving the  o rd in a ry  e s t im a te s  of s a le s  and c o a ts " .
N ev er th e le ss ,  i f  w elfa re  economists take  the  p o s i t io n  of o m itt ing  
e n t i r e l y  the  question  of " e x t e r n a l i t i e s "  then the  SNIP th e s i s  may no t denart
( 3)f a r  from the p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  th e s i s  which i t  seeks to  d is p la c e .
I t  may be t ru e  th a t  in  comparing in d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  w ith each o th e r  the  
d i f f e re n c e s  in those  e x te rn a l  e f f e c t s  may not mak.e a s i g n i f i c a n t  d if fe re n c e :  
bu t the  same cannot be sa id  in  the  evalua tion  of s o c ia l  overhead p ro je c ts  
( i . e .  t r a n s c o r t  and e le c t r ic -p o w e r  p l a n t ) . These, d e sp ite  t h e i r  small d i r e c t  
b e n e f i t s  may be e s s e n t i a l  f o r  economic development in view of th e  e x te rn a l  
economies t h a t  fo llow  from them and consequently  t h e i r  e f f e c t  on o th e r  
i n d u s t r i e s .
The A pp lica t ion  of Investment C r i t e r i a ,  , August 1933, p p .64-85, "n: 
U.N. - Form ulating I n d u s t r i a l  Development Programs. ECAFE. rangkok I 96I .  
N o.2, TP.41-42 .
( 2 ) ^ '^Re a lso  goes on to  say t h a t  i f  th e re  are s tro n g  e x te rn a l  e f f e c t s  which n^ve: 
th e le s s  defy any p la u s ib le  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  the  only a l t e r n a t iv e  would be to 
mention such p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in  a q u a l i t a t i v e  manner. See L i t t l e ,  I.M.D. & 
M irr le e s ,  J .A . ,  S o c ia l  C ost-B enefit  A na lysis ,  Manual of I n d u s t r i a l  P ro jec r  
A nalysis ,  V o l . I I .  OECD. Development Centre S tu d ie s .  P a r i s ,  1969' p p .218-
219.
- Choice and Phasing of Ihiblic  Sector P r o je c t s .  UN - Economic B u l le t in  
f o r  Asia and the Far E a s t ,  Vol.XVII, Do.2. Sep t,  I 966 , p . 20
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The question  of " e x t e r n a l i t i e s "  i s  a v a l id  c r i t i c i s m  of the  SI4F 
approach in  case the  output stream of each in d u s try  i s  considered and valued 
in  i s o l a t i o n ,  w ithout regard  f o r  the  rep e rcu ss io n s  on the  s id es  both of (-smand 
and supply th a t  would be expected to  fo llow  from the simultaneous growth of 
o th e r  i n d u s t r i e s .  The recen t  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a l y s e s ^ h a v e  shown us 
th a t  most of the  e x te r n a l  or i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  can be approxim ately measured 
under some reasonab le  assum ptions. Therefore th e re  i s  no reason why the 
SNIP ru le  should no t b e n e f i t  from the  f in d in g s  of th e se  s tu d ie s .
In' regard  to  the genera l a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of the  SMP Chenery has con­
cluded th a t  t h i s  formula can be most su c c e ss fu l ly  ap p lied  to  "weigh p r i o r i t y  
of various  f i e l d s  based on the marginal p ro je c ts  in  each group f a l l i n g  with in
( 2)the  f i e l d " .  This im plies  th a t  very d e ta i le d  rank ing  of p ro je c ts  i s  not
necessary  and i t  may be s u f f i c i e n t  i f  the marginal p ro je c t s  of d i f f e r e n t
se c to rs  are  compared f o r  SMP.
V. Conclusion
As“i s  poin ted  out in  the  e a r l i e r  s e c t io n s ,  the SMP c r i t e r i o n  i s  
based upon the  measurement of c a p i t a l  p ro d u c t iv i ty  r a th e r  than of the  inpu t 
complex. Since c a p i t a l  i s  the  constra ined  f a c to r  the SMP ru le  a ttem pts  to 
maximize the  p re sen t  value (PV) of r e a l  na'bional income. I t  expresses the 
b e n e f i t s  of p ro je c t s  in. terms o f p r o f i t s  and t o t a l  e f f e c t s  s o c ia l ly  priced 
by means of in c lu s io n  of e x te rn a l  economies, the  omission of in d i r e c t  tax es ,  
su b s id ie s  and the  use of s o c ia l  exchange r a t e  and opportun ity  cost of lab o u r .  
Before app ly ing  the SMP i t  i s  necessary  to  a t t a c h  a shadow p r ice  and cos t  to
the product to  f in d  i t s  s o c ia l  value and c o s t .
I f  the  p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e  i s  to  maximize ou tpu t a t  p resen t the  SMP
becomes the  a p p ro p r ia te  c r i t e r i o n  to apply . But i f  th e  o b je c t iv e  fu n c tio n  i s
( 1 ')
 ^ /po r case s tu d ie s  in  which e x te rn a l  economies a re  considered see E ck s te in ,  0 . ,  
Water Resource Development. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. P res s ,  1958?
K r u t i l l a ,  J .U . ,  and E ck s te in ,  0 . ,  M ultip le  purpose R iver Development. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins P re s s ,  1958; F o s te r ,  C.D. and Beesley, M.E.,
E s tim ating  the  S o c ia l  B en e f i t  of C onstructing  an Underground Railway in 
London, Jo u rn a l  of the  Royal S t a t i s t i c a l  S oc ie ty , V o l .126, P a r t  I ,  I 963;
N, R. G illhespy , The Tay Road Bridge: A Case Study in  C ost-B enefit  Analysis
in  S c o t t is h  Jo u rn a l  of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, Vol.XV, June I 960 , No.2, p.l67*
( 2 ) ^ ^Ghenery, H.B., The A pp lica t ion  of Investment C r i t e r i a ,  QJE, August 1953,p . 95 
Chenery a lso  f e e l s  th a t  c a p i t a l  tu rnover c r i t e r i a  (as  r u le  of thumb) are 
l i k e ly  to  be more u se fu l  in  choosing among a l t e r n a t iv e s  w ith in  a civen 
s e c to r ,  i . e .  in  a g r ic u l tu re  a choice between read s ,  i r r i g a t i o n  scheme or 
flood p ro tec tio n *
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not the  p re sen t  hut the  f u tu r e  r a t e  o f  growth then the  SliP should be re t  laced
by e i t h e r  G a len so n -M b en s te in ' s re investm ent su rp lu s  c r i t e r i o n  or A, R. 5en 's
( l )t im e -s e r ie s  c r i t e r i o n .
I t  would be much b e t t e r  to  use t h i s  ru le  between s e c to r s  r a th e r
than between in d iv id u a l  p ro je c t s  in  a s s ig n in g  investm ent p r i o r i t i e s .  This
i s  because i t  i s  e a s i e r  to  compute the  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  of demand between
se c to rs  ( i . e .  food, c lo th in g ,  housing) than between d i f f e r e n t  p ro je c ts  w ith in
the same s e c to r .  The c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  of demand between d i f f e r e n t  goods
w ith in  a s e c to r  ( i . e .  food v a r i e t i e s )  are  very f l e x i b l e  and th e re fo re  the
( 2 )p ro je c t io n  of fu tu r e  demand w ith in  a given s e c to r  i s  ve ry  d i f f i c u l t .  I t  
must a lso  be added th a t  com plem entarities  between s e c to r s  can be more r e l i a b l y  
estim ated than between a l t e r n a t i v e  in d iv id u a l  p r o je c t s .
D espite  the  f a c t  t h a t  the 8MP i s  much c r i t i c i z e d  i t  has wide 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  as a c r i t e r i o n  of determ ining the  s ca le  of p r i o r i t i e s  and 
choosing a p p ro p r ia te  types of technology. then i t  i s  app lied  i t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  
recommended to  undertake  a l l  investm ent p ro je c ts  which y ie ld  a SMP g re a te r  
than the  8Î4P of the  m arginal p ro je c t  of the  c a p i t a l  budget. With a given 
budget and a s e r i e s  of p u b l ic  p ro je c ts  ordered in  terms of t h e i r  SMP's we 
merely choose those  a t  the  top  of the l i s t ,  moving toward the  p ro je c ts  with 
lower SMP's u n t i l  the  budget i s  exhausted*
V I . Soc i a l  Marginal P ro d u c tiv i t y  and S oc ia l  B enefit-C ost Analy s i s .
So f a r  I  havd concen tra ted  on the  s o c ia l  m arginal u ro d u c t iv i ty  
c r i t e r i o n  which i s  app lied  in the  p lanning of investm ent budgets. The 
question  one may r i g h t ly  ask: i s  whether the  SNEE^ and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t
c r i t e r i o n  a re  c lo se ly  re la te d ?
I t  must be noted t h a t  th e re  i s  not much d i f f e r e n c e  between the 
Ship proposed by Chenery and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s i s .  The s i m i l a r i t i e s  
between the  two c r i t e r i a  can be c i te d  as fo l lo w s ; -
W, Galenson & H. L e ib en s te in ,  Investment C r i t e r i a ,  P rc d u c t iv i ty  and 
Economic Development, GJE, Auvust 1933, vol.LRlX: and A. K„ ben, borne Dotes
on th'=' Choice of C a n i ta l - In te n s ’ ty  in Develoument P lanning. CJE, lo v ,  193 / ? 
v o l . 71, h o .4-, p. 368.
( 2 ) 8ee Rosenstein-Rodan, Programming in Theory and in I t a l i a n  P r a c t ic e .
M.I.T. in "Investment C r i t e r i a  and Economic Gro^/th", I 964 , p p .24-23.
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1, The o b je c t iv e  fu n c tio n  in SMP i s  to  maximize the p resen t value 
of b e n e f i t s  minus c o s ts ,  i . e .  to maximize the  p re sen t  value of r e a l  n a t io n a l  
income. The o b je c t iv e  of the  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c r i t e r i o n  i s  a lso  to  
maximize ne t p re sen t  value of b e n e f i t s  per d o l l a r  of the  constra ined  funds*
2. In both c r i t e r i a  the c r i t i c a l  m a tte r  i s  the  l im ited  kind of 
money which must be a l lo c a te d  op tim ally  and i t  i s  to t h i s  co ns tra ined  kind of 
funds th a t  the  two expenditu re  c r i t e r i a  address themselves*
The maximization in s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  ru le  i s  accomplished by 
computing the r a t i o s  of b e n e f i t s  to constra ined  funds f o r  each p ro je c t ,  
rank ing  p ro je c ts  by these  r a t i o s  and going down the l i s t  to  the p o in t  where 
the  scarce  funds a re  exhausted . Though rank ing  here  i s  by r a t i o s ,  i t  i s  not 
the  maximization of the r a t i o  which i s  the  o b je c t iv e  bu t r a th e r  the  t o t a l  ne t 
gains th a t  a re  p o s s ib le ,  given the  c o n s t r a in t .^
(^^The form ula f o r  th e  p r e s e n t  d isco u n ted  r e t u r n  i s  o f te n  w r i t t e n  as fo l lo w s ;
B = %  -  I
where th e  symbol t= p  i n d i c a t i n g  a l l  th e  terras o f  th e  form B t   a re
f S  . ( i + i ) t
b e in g  added f o r  a l l  v a lu e s  as  s t a r t i n g  from o to  w, l i f e  o f  th e  p r o j e c t .
B-fc i s  n o t  on ly  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t ,  bu t p r o f i t s  p lu s  a l l  o th e r  v a lu e  added item s 
we have mentioned e a r l i e r  in  th e  c h a p te r  ( d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  v a lu e  added 
r e s u l t i n g  from th e  p r o j e c t ) . I  i s  th e  i n i t i a l  in v e s tm en t made in  y e a r  o.
In  a more d e t a i l e d  form, annual c o s t  flow s Bo, B1...................Bn a re  reduced
to  a s in g le  f i g u r e .
B = Bq + — —  + ——2-----+ ........................+ — —
( l + i ) l  ( l+ i ) 2  ( lA i )h
and I  = I q i  —  + . . . . . . . . .  + — —
(1 + i)  (lH-i)2 ( l+ i)%
Then th e  p r e s e n t - d i s c o u n te d - v a lu e  o f  the  p r o j e c t  becomes;
B = - I  + — —  -h —  H- ................... 4- — ^—
(1 + i)  ( l + i ‘)2 (l+i)%
This method p ro v id e s  us wrath a t o o l  f o r  comparing d i f f e r e n t  in f lo w s  and 
ou tf low s by exp ress ing ' them, th rough the  known r a t e  of d i s c o u n t ,  in  terras 
o f  a s in g le  f ig u r e  which ta k e s  account of t o t a l  amounts o f  income and 
e x p e n d i tu re ,  the  p a t t e r n  in  which th ey  a re  spread  ou t over time and th e  
l i f e - s p a n  o f  th e  p r o j e c t .
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S im i l a r l y  the  SMP c r i t e r i o n  i s  a p p l ie d  to  c o n s t r a in e d  c a n i t a l  .funds 
as  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  in c re m e n ta l  r a t i o s  of p re s e n t  v a lu e s  o f  b e n e f i t s  minus 
o p e ra t in g  c o s t s  d iv id ed  by th e  r e q u i s i t e  inc rem en t o f  c a p i t a l .
Thus th e  te ch n iq u e  i s  s i m i l a r  to  th e  u se  o f  in c re m e n ta l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  
r a t i o s ,  ex ce p t  t h a t  th e  denom inator o f  th e  SNIP form ula  c o n ta in s  only c a p i t a l  
c o s t s .  The denom inator in  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t - c o s t s  in c lu d e s  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  c o s t  
p lu s  o p e r a t in g  and m aintenance c o s t s .  This  however, does no t a l t e r  th e  
r a n k in g  and s e l e c t i o n  o f  p r o j e c t s  so lo n g  as  th e  o b j e c t iv e  i s  n e t  p r e s e n t  va lue ,
L e t  us t a k e  an example. Suppose we have a p r o j e c t  w ith  an i n v e s t ­
ment o u t l a y  o f  ^100, b e n e f i t s  of ^150 and w ith  o p e r a t in g  c o s t s  o f  ^20. For 
s i m p l i c i t y  l e t  us ta k e  tt=o
a)  B e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  acc o rd in g  to  th e  SNIP r u l e  i s ;
B -  C 1 5 0 - 2 0  150 T ^
= = - t a o ô “  = ÎOÏÏ = ^-5
b) The b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  acc o rd in g  to  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r u l e :
„ ^ _ 1 5 Q ________ 150 2
“ K .f C 100 + 20 120
B ut,  as  we know, th e  r i g h t  c r i t e r i o n  i s  no t t o  ran k  p r o j e c t s  on 
th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  r a t i o s ,  bu t on th e  a c t u a l  n e t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  the  n a t io n a l  
income. The n e t  p re s e n t  v a lu e  (B -I)  in  both c r i t e r i a  i s  ^$0 and th e r e f o r e  
th ey  a re  bo th  i d e n t i c a l .
So long  as  the  o b je c t iv e  fu n c t io n  i s  th e  n e t  p r e s e n t  v a lu e  o f  
b e n e f i t s ,  b o th  c r i t e r i a  w i l l  lead  to  the  same s e l e c t i o n .
3, The SNIP c r i t e r i o n ,  a s  i t  i s  in  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s i s  
r e q u i r e s  an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  to  be s p e c i f i e d  f o r  th e  com putation  of th e  p r e s e n t
v a lu e  o f  n e t  b e n e f i t .  T h e re fo re ,  th e  SMP c r i t e r i o n  d i f f e r s  from th e  r a t e  
o f  r e tu r n  in  th e  c r u c i a l  r e s p e c t  t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  an i n t e r e s t  r a t e .^ ^ ^  The 
SNIP r u l e  may th en  be c o n s id e re d  as  one o f  th e  fa m ily  o f  p r e s e n t  v a lu e  c r i t e r i a .
' 'Chenery avo id s  t h i s  i s s u e  by c o n f in in g  h i s  c r i t e r i o n  to  p r o j e c t s  w i th in  the  
same f i e l d  and w ith  v e ry  s i m i l a r  c a o i t a l  i n t e n s i t i e s  so t h a t  th e  ra n k in g  
o f  p r o j e c t s  would be u n a f f e c t e d .  But th e re  i s  no reaso n  vhy the  SNIP should 
n o t  make use  o f  d is c o u n t  r a t e  in  comnutina’ p r e s e n t  v a lu e s  o f  r e t u r n s .  On 
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p o in t  see 0 .  E c k s te in ,  A Survey o f  th e  Theory o f  Pub.’ i c  
E x p e n d i tu re ,  in  Pub i c  F inances; Needs, S ources ,  U t i l i z a t i o n .  NBER,
New York; P r in c e to n  Univ. P re s s ,  P r in c e to n ,  I 96I ,  p . 489
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while the  r a t e  o f  r e tu rn  i s  n o t .
A, Both c r i t e r i a  attem pt to  inc lude d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  
( e x te rn a l  economies -  backward and forward e f f e c t s  as w e ll)  which may stem 
from undertaking- an investment p r o je c t .  The numerator in. both c r i t e r i a  does 
not d i f f e r  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  The SNIP and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c r i t e r i o n  take 
in to  account t o t a l  e f f e c t s  of the p ro je c t  on n a t io n a l  income, balance of 
payments, employment and a lso  b e n e f i t s  accru ing  to consumers.
5. The SMP and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  method make use of c o r re c t io n s  
o r adjustm ents needed on market p r ic e s  and costs  in  o rd e r  to  o b ta in  the  
i n t r i n s i c  va lues  o f  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s .  These c o r re c t io n s ,  as was s ta te d  
in  the  a fo re m e n tio n ed .se c t io n s , a re  in  re fe ren ce  to  ta x e s ,  su b s id ie s ,  t a r i f f s ,  
o ve rv a lu a tio n  of domestic currency, overva luation  of wages and underva lua tion  
of c a p i t a l  c o s t .
In o rd e r  to  r e f l e c t  s o c ia l  ev a lu a tio n  of p ro je c ts  both c r i t e r i a  
in troduce  shadow p r ic e s  and c o s ts  during the computations of stream of b e n e f i t s  
and c a p i t a l  exp en d itu re .
I t  can be concluded th a t  both the  SMP and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  
c r i t e r i o n  can be eq u a l ly  app lied  to  the  design o f p ro je c ts  and to  p ro je c t  
s e le c t io n  w ith  in d iv id u a l  p ro je c ts  t r e a te d  as increm ents in the de term ina tion  
of a programme. Since they  a re  bo th  id e n t i c a l  in  p r in c ip l e ,  in  concept and 
fo rm ula tion , e i t h e r  of them could lead  to  the most ap p ro p r ia te  s e le c t io n  of 
p ro je c ts  as f a r  as the  o b je c t iv e  i s  to  accomplish the maximization of the  
p re sen t  value of r e a l  n a t io n a l  income.
Before I  complete t h i s  c liapter i t  may seem a p p ro p r ia te  to  exp lain  
why I  s h a l l  adhere to  the  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c r i t e r i o n  (o r  SPY) throughout 
my study and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the case s tu d ie s  in  P a r t  I I I  of t h i s  t h e s i s .
There has been a s t ro n g  controversy  on the choice of p re sen t  value 
v s .  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n ^ r u l e  and t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  in  p r a c t i c e .
In  t h i s  s tudy  i t  i s  my in te n t io n  to  show th a t  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  
i s  the most a p p ro p r ia te  method fo r  investment a p p ra is a l  and s e le c t io n  in  
underdeveloped c o u n t r ie s .
F i r s t ,  p re sen t  value ru le  i s  a concept of d isco u n tin g  technique 
enab ling  income and expenditure  to  be compared over a long span of tim e.
(^^For in te r n a l  r a t e  of re tu rn  ru le  see Chapters 3 and 8,
147.
This c r i t e r i o n  reduces cash flows and expenditu res  a t  d i f f e r e n t  periods  of 
time to  the  p re sen t  v a lu e .  The PV approach can giveh, a c l e a r  exp ress ion  
of the  t o t a l  ne t  b e n e f i t s  expected from a p r o je c t  and does so in  a manner 
which invo lves  c o n s is te n t  time w eighting  fo r  a l l  p r o j e c t s .  V/heras in t e r n a l  
r a te  of r e tu rn  does not t e l l  us much about the p re sen t  value of cash flows 
nor the s c a le  of b e n e f i t s ,  the l a t t e r  method only t e l l s  us what i s  the  average 
r a t e  of r e tu rn  on the c a p i t a l  in v e s ted .
Second, the in t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  ru le  i s  meaningful only under 
the  system .of p e r f e c t  com petition  in which the c a p i t a l  market con ta in s  no 
r a t io n in g  and i s  equated by the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  s e rv in g  as the  p r ic e .  
H i r s c h le i f e r ,  who has f u l l y  examined the  i s su e ,  has r e c e n t ly  shown th a t  only 
in ex cep tiona l cases (o th e r  than  p e r f e c t ly  com petitive  c a p i t a l  m arkets) does 
the  use of the r a t e  of r e tu r n  c r i t e r i o n  r e s u l t  in  optim al r e s u l t s . B u t  
once th e  m arginal r e tu r n s  in s id e  the  budget be ing  planned d i f f e r  from re tu rn s  
elsewhere in the  economy and from th e  r a t e s  be ing  o ffe red  to s u p p l ie r s  of 
c a p i t a l ,  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  lo ses  any normative s ig n i f ic a n c e .  The 
su b je c t iv e  t im e-p re fe ren ce  r a t e  o f  the  p lanning  agency may not co incide  with 
the  market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  and thus the  r a t e  of r e tu rn  c r i t e r i o n  becomes 
misleading*
T hird , the  c r i t e r i o n  of in t e r n a l  r a t e  o f  r e tu r n  i s  enough i f  a 
p ro je c t  must be accepted or r e fu s e d , i f  i t s  r a t e  o f  average re tu rn  i s  h ig h e r  
than the  average r a t e  a t  which c a p i t a l  can be borrowed on the market to  
f inance  i t .  I f  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of re tu rn  is  lower than th e  r a t e  which has to 
be paid to  borrow c a p i t a l ,  the p r o je c t  ought not to  be c a r r ie d  ou t .
But when a choice has to  be made between a number of incom patib le 
p ro je c ts  (as  between more than one a l t e r n a t iv e  v e rs io n  of the same p ro je c t )  
the average re tu rn  c r i t e r i o n  i s  not adequate . For i t  w i l l  not be enough 
j u s t  to  see theit the d i f f e r e n t  p ro je c ts  would in  f a c t  be p ro f i t a b l e ;  th e re  
s t i l l  remains the need to  choose the  b e s t  one. A s e le c t io n  made on the 
b a s is  of the  average re tu rn  on investment w i l l  not be s a t i s f a c t o r y  because 
i t  w i l l  take no account of the  r e a l  co s t  of the c a p i t a l  invested*
Comparison between tvra p ro je c ts  can only be v a l id  i f  f in a n c ia l  
c ond itions  in  which c a p i t a l  can be borrowed and inv es ted  a re  i d e n t i c a l  in
^^'^See H i r s c h l e i f e r ,  On the Theory of Optimal Investment D ecision , 
JPE, August 1958 , p.529o
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both c a lc u la t io n s .  But t h i s  i s  no t the case when average re tu rn s  on in v e s t ­
ment are being compared. Consequently such a comparison cannot be meaning­
f u l .
F ourth , as f a r  as m utually  exclusive  r ro . je c ts  are  concerned the  
PV ru le  can lead us to the  r ig h t  s e le c t io n  by ta k in g  in to  account t h e i r  
abso lu te  b e n e f i t s ,  re g a rd le s s  of t h e i r  re sp e c t iv e  in t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn .
But when we have to  decide between two m utually  exc lus ive  a l t e r n a t iv e s  
in te r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  ru le  may choose the  small p ro je c t  w ith  a h i ^  r a te  
of r e tu rn  in  p re fe rence  to  a b ig  p ro je c t  w ith g r e a te r  abso lu te  b e n e f i t s .
Of course, the  l a t t e r  c r i t e r i o n  may lead to  wrong ch o ices .
F i f t h ,  r a t e  of r e tu rn  c r i t e r i o n  as compared to  the  PV ru le  i s  
very d i f f i c u l t  to compute and i t  r e q u ire s  a ted ious  t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r  procedure, 
Besides, i t  may sometimes have more than one s o lu t io n  and thus the choice can 
be d i f f i c u l t  to  make, i . e .  where time stream of ne t  b e n e f i t s  changes i t s  sign  
from n egative  to  p o s i t iv e  and negative  again . P resen t value r u l e ,  on the  
o th e r  hand, i s  f r e e  from such com plications and provides a simple and 
s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  answer*
F in a l ly ,  as I  have mentioned e lse w h e re ,ra te  of r e tu rn  ( i n t e r n a l  
r a t e  of r e tu r n )  i s  based on the  assumption th a t  market p r ic e s  and c o s ts  a re  
good r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  of s o c ia l  values* But i t  has been pointed out in  
Chapter 3 t h a t  th e re  a re  s e r io u s  d i s to r t i o n s  in  the  market and these  should 
be allowed f o r  in investm ent a p v r q i s a l . ^ A s  i t  s tands  the  r a t e  of re tu rn  
c r i t e r i o n  has a l im ited  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  in  the case of developing co u n tr ie s  
where what m atte rs  most i s  the t o t a l  e f f e c t s  ( s o c i a l l y  p r iced )  of the 
investm ent on the  o v e ra l l  o b je c t iv e s .  I t  can be concluded th a t  th e re  i s  
noth ing  which in te r n a l  r a te  of r e tu rn  does t h a t  cannot be done more e a s i ly  
and u s u a l ly  more a c c u ra te ly  by the ne t p resen t value (KPV) method.
 ^ ^This i s  d i s t i n c t  from the annual accounting  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t e  which i s  
merely the r a t i o  of u r o f i t  (g ross  or ne t)  over the  c a o i t a l  investm ent.
Even i f  s o c ia l  p r ic e s  and values are  used in the  computation of i n t e r n a l  
r a t e  o f  r e tu rn  s t i l l  i t  may not lead to the b es t  s e le c t io n  of p ro je c ts  or 
enable us to  compare m utually  exclusive  p r o je c t s .  I t  does not have the 
advantages of s o c ia l  p re sen t  value (SPV) r ' - l e .  For a comparison between 
p resen t  va lue  and in t e r n a l  r a t e - o f - r e tu r n  c r i t e r i o n ,  see Dry den, flyle s ?i, , 
C ap ita l  Budgeting: Treatment of U ncerta in ty  and Investm ent C r i t e r i a ,
S c o t t ish  Jo u rn a l  of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, V o l . I I ,  1964? p r . 235-243*
(' 2 )“'^For advantages and d isadvantages  of various  investm ent c r i t e r i a ,  read e rs  
are  r e f e r r e d  to  A. K, Sen. and Stephen A. M arg lin ’s a r t i c l e :  "Lectures on
S o c ia l /
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A ll th e se  p o in ts  do not however mean th a t  r a t e  of r e tu r n  as a 
ru le  should he pushed a s id e ;  on the  co n tra ry ,  the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of re tu rn  
of compatible p ro je c t s  should always be c a lc u la te d .  The in te r n a l  r a t e  of 
r e tu r n  i s  no th ing  but a p re c ise  d e f in i t io n  of "y ie ld "  and t h i s  can be u se fu l  
to  know beforehand both f o r  p u b l ic  and p r iv a te  e v a lu a t io n .  Moreover, PV 
computations depend on a proper choice of the r a t e  o f  d iscoun t and t h i s  could 
be determined in  the  l i g h t  of the  i n te r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  of th e  marginal 
p r o je c t .  I f  only  fo r  t h i s  reason the in te r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  should always 
be c a lc u la te d .
Both in  the  SNIP and s o c ia l  b e n e f i t  c o s t  a n a ly s is  the  fo llow ing  
g u id e l in e s  should be observed in  the a p p l ic a t io n  of p re sen t  value method:
a) The p re sen t  value PV of expected earn ings  and c a p i t a l  expen­
d i tu r e s  o f  a p ro je c t  r e q u ire s  a r a t e  o f  d iscoun t which i s  d i s t i n c t  from the 
market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t .  Perhaps i t  should r e f l e c t  th e  s o c ia l  opuortun ity  
c o s t  of c a p i t a l  as w ell as the  p lanning  agency’s time p re fe rence  ra te .^ ^ ^
b) One may have th e  problem th a t  the  number of p ro je c t s  w ith  a 
p o s i t iv e  PV ( a t  some chosen d iscoun t r a t e )  may exceed the  investm ent budget. 
There a re  two ways o f  l im i t in g  the number of p ro je c t s  in  th i s  case:
( i )  by r a i s i n g  the d iscoun t r a t e  - t h i s  w i l l  reduce the  number 
of p ro je c ts  w ith  a p o s i t iv e  p re sen t  va lue  and the  r a t e  
thus  can be ra is e d  t i l l  th e  number of such p ro je c ts  i s  
j u s t  enough to  exhaust the  budget;
( i i )  w ithout r a i s i n g  the  d iscount r a t e ,  s e l e c t  those  p ro je c ts
which have the  h ig h e s t  p resen t va lue  r e l a t i v e  to  the
Binvestm ent expenditu re  (the  h ig h e s t  j-) •
(co n td .)  S oc ia l  C ost-B enefit  A nalysis  f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  Formulation and 
E v a lu a t io n ," in UN - I n d u s t r i a l  Development O rgan iza tion , June I 967 , pp. 
60-72; a lso  see L i t t l e ,  I.M.D. and M irr le e s ,  J .A . ,  S o c ia l  C ost-B enefit  
A na lysis .  Manual of I n d u s t r i a l  P ro je c t  A na lysis .  Methodology and Case 
S tu d ie s ,  V o l . I ,  OECD. P a r i s ,  I960, Chapter IV, p p .109-142.
^^^In the  choice of d iscoun t r a t e  fo r  PV c a lc u la t io n s  the  fo llow ing  f a c to r s  
should bo taken in to  account: l )  the p r e v a i l in g  market r a t e s  which may
vary with the  borrowing or lend ing  terms (amount, d u ra t io n ,  e t c . ) ,
2) the  o p p o r tu n i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  in  the s e c to r  out of which the  resources  
are  drawn whether by ta x a t io n ,  borrowing or i n f l a t i o n ,  5) o v ^ r - a l l  i n v e s t ­
ment p lan , 4 ) the  r a te  o f  growth and the r a t e  o f  te c h n ic a l  progress  in  




c) For p r iv a te  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is ,  p r o f i t s  a re  defined as 
the  d i f fe re n c e  between revenues (b e n e f i t s  to  the  firm ) and c o s t s .  But 
d i r e c t  tax es  have to  be su b tra c te d  from the f ig u re  f o r  expend itu res  le s s  
r e c e ip t s  of the  f irm  to  find  the u l t im a te  b e n e f i t  d e r ived . But t h i s  i s  not 
the  cos t to  s o c ie ty  and i s  r a t h e r  a t r a n s f e r  b e n e f i t  to  the  government and 
thus must be added back to  o b ta in  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t .
d) F in a l ly ,  i f  two o r more p ro je c ts  a re  to  be compared, the 
period  covered by the c a lc u la t io n  must be the  same f o r  a l l .  Should any of 
them have a s h o r te r  l i f e  than the  o the rs  assumptions must be made as to  th e  
use to  which the c a p i t a l  a v a i la b le  a t  the  end o f the  s h o r t e s t  p ro je c t  w i l l  
be pu t.
I f  th e re  are  two p r o je c t s ,  one of which has a l i f e s p a n  of 5 years  
and the  o th e r  of 10 y e a r s ,  i t  may f o r  in s tan ce  be assumed th a t  the  f i r s t  
p ro je c t  w i l l  be renewed in  e x a c t ly  the same form a f t e r  5 y e a r s .  The choice 
can in such a case be made in  the  l i g h t  of e x p l i c i t  assumptions as to  t h i s  
f u r th e r  use of funds. Or a l t e r n a t i v e l y  they can be compared by assuming 
an i n f i n i t e  period  of renewal f o r  both p r o je c t s .
I t  should be s t r e s s e d  here th a t  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  background 
in troduced  in P a r t  I I  has not covered a l l  a sp ec ts  of s o c ia l  w elfare  economics. 
T h e o re t ic a l  d iscu ss io n s  r e la te d  to  the  choice of s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a te  (SDR), 
to  the  choice of the  b e s t  formal investment c r i t e r i a  and to the determ ination  
of "shadow p r ic e s"  of f a c to r  in p u ts  w i l l  be examined in  more d e t a i l  in  P a r t  
I I I  of t h i s  th e s i s  where case s tu d ie s  w i l l  be undertaken on pu b lic  p r o je c t s .
(c o n td .)  The th e o r e t i c a l  arguments on s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a t e  w i l l  be f u l l y  
examined in Chapter 8*





In tro d u c t io n
This p a r t  c o n s is t s  of two case s tu d ie s  in  which the  p r in c ip le s  
o f  economic e v a lu a t io n  of p u b l ic  investm ent p ro je c t s  as ap p lied  by the 
r e le v a n t  government Agency and S ta te  Planning O rgan isa tion  (SPO), w i l l  be 
emphasised* Before p roceeding  to  the  Case S tud ies  i t  should be s t r e s s e d  
th a t  s e v e ra l  p a r t s  of the  a n a ly s is  were not c a r r ie d  out in  d e t a i l ,  fo r  
va rious  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  f in d in g  the  r i g h t  inform ation*
These remarks apply  p a r t i c u l a r l y  to
a) the  f a c to r s  which lead  up to  a d ec is io n  as to  the  shadow wage 
r a t e  and shadow foreigta exchange r a t e ,
b) the  f a c to r s  which were paramount in  the choice o f  the  r a t e  of 
d iscoun t which the p lanners  had adopted*
The va lues  which I  have a p p lied  to  some of th e se  v a r ia b le s  a re  no t 
o f  course in tended  as recommendations. E sp e c ia l ly  in  Case Study 2, p a r t i c u l a r  
va lues  a re  given to  the  d iscoun t r a t e s  and fo re ig n  exchange r a t e  in  o rder to 
c a r ry  out s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s i s .  Some of the f ig u r e s  f o r  v a r ia b le s  had to 
be adopted in  o rd e r  to  ca rry  the  a n a ly s is  to  a p roper conclusion* However, 
i t  must be p o in ted  out t h a t  I  d id no t adopt merely a r b i t r a r y  v a lu es ,  bu t r a th e r  
those  which, w ith  my l im i te d  knowledge, seemed rea so n ab le .
In  Chapter 6, I  s h a l l  examine the economic e v a lu a t io n  of the 
Gaycuma paper p r o je c t  which i s  undertaken  by the  SEKA, a s t a t e  economic 
e n te rp r ise*  This p r o je c t  w i l l  be examined in  th re e  s te p s ;  f i r s t  the
layou t o f  the  o r ig in a l  p ro je c t  as p re sen ted  by the SEKA Report, and second,
the same p ro je c t  as  eva lua ted  by the  S ta te  Planning O rgan isa tion  (SPO)*
T hird ly , th e re  w i l l  be a c r i t i c a l  assessment of the  economic e v a lu a t io n  
system and the  investm ent c r i t e r i o n -  the SPO p lan n ers  have ap p lied  fo r  
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s .  The l a s t  two s tag es  w i l l  be exanD.ned in  Chapters 
7 and 8*
Chapter 9 i s  devoted to  ano ther Case Study where the IŒBAN 
HYDRO-ELECTRIC p ro je c t  i s  compared to  i t s  a l t e r n a t iv e  Thermal S ta t io n .
This p ro je c t  i s  p r im a r i ly  in v e s t ig a te d  by the  E . I .E . ,  which i s  the P lanning 
and Research Unit of the  M in is try  o f  N atural Resources and Energy, L a te r ,
I  have app ra ised  the  e v a lu a t io n  method and investm ent c r i t e r i a  of the E . I .E .  
by app ly ing  a su p e r io r  investm ent c r i t e r i o n ,  th a t  i s  s o c ia l  p re sen t  value 
r u le  (o r  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t ) ,  which I  have defended f o r  v a r ious  reasons in
P a r t  I I  o f  t h i s  th e s is*
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Thus, the analyses  of both p ro je c t s ,  w i l l  enable  us to  throw seme 
l i g h t  on the  shortcomings of the  p ro je c t  a r p r a i s a l  technique app lied  in  
Turkey by the SPO and o th e r  re sp o n s ib le  investm ent ag en c ie s .
F in a l ly ,  i t  i s  perhaps worth mentioning th a t  many pu b lic  i n v e s t ­
ment p ro je c t s  included in  the F i r s t  P la n 's  Investment Programme did not have 
reasonab le  a l t e r n a t i v e s  with which to  be compared. The Case Study I ,  
Gaycuma Paper and C e l lu lo se  p r o je c t ,  i s  no t an excep tion  to  t h i s  d e fe c t ,  
and has to  be app ra ised  in  i s o l a t i o n  from o th e r  probable a l t e r n a t i v e s .
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CHAPTER 6
No.1 CASE STUDY OP PAPER AND CELLULOSE PROJECT FOR TURKEY
I .  GAYGUM PAPER AND CELLULOSE PROJECT:
AS PRESENTED BY SEKA
In tro d u c t io n
"The Gaycuma K ra f t  Paper, K ra f t  C e llu lo se  and Semi-Chemical 
C ellu lose"  p r o je c t  i s  being b u i l t  in  Zcuguldak, North west of Black Sea*
The p ro je c t  i s  to  produce k r a f t  c e l lu lo s e  ( s u lp h i t e ) ,  semi-chemical c e l lu lo se  
and k r a f t  paper ( f o r  cement and f e r t i l i z e r  bags) by u s in g  wood pulp from 
p ine , beech and f i r  t r e e s  as i t s  raw m a te r ia l s .  The tim ber req u ired  by the 
p ro je c t  i s  to  be provided from Bolu and Kastomonu f o r e s t s  which a re  s i tu a te d  
nearby.
The p r o je c t  comprises th re e  s ep a ra te  p la n t s ,  each corresponding  
to  the  type of product to  be produced.
P la n t  I  -  K ra f t  C e llu lo se  P la n t ;  i t  i s  assi,cned to the production 
of unbleached s u lp h i te  pulp , i t s  cap ac ity  being estim ated  
as l8o tons per day*
P la n t  I I  -  Hemi-chemical C ellu lo se  P lan t:  i t  i s  to  produce un­
bleached semi-chemical pulps (by means of su lp h i te  or 
NSSC). I t s  production capac ity ;  04 tons per day in 
s u lp h i te  o r  NSSC semi-chemical pulps and 50 tons pe r 
day in s u lp h i te  pulps*
P la n t  I I I  -  i s  devoted to  th e  production of K ra f t  p a re r  and K ra f t
l in e n ,  the cap ac ity  being  estim ated  as l0O tons per day.
The p ro je c t  which c o n s is t s  of th ese  th re e  p la n t s ,  was expected to  
be completed by December lv69 and s t a r t  production from 1970 onwards*
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of annual cap ac ity  in  the  th ree  p la n ts  i s  
given as fo llow s:
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Table I . Annual Capacity  by Hlants
Tons
Years
I  -  K ra f t  Ce l lu lo s e  r i a n t  
(S u lp h ite  p u lp )
1970
25.000
I I  " Semi-Chemica 1 Ijlanjk
(sem i-chem ical c e l lu lo s e )  11.000
I I I  -  Paper  P la n t








60.000, ( 2 )
8o%].rce: Oaycuma, Kxaft S e llti lozu , K raft Kagidi Ve Yari-kd.inyevi (NSSC)
S e l lü lo z  T e s i s i  P r o je s i ,  SEKA, P a b r ik a la r i  Is le t rn e s i  Genel 
Müdürlügu, Ocak, I 967 , P .4-5
Note: ( 1) 1972 c ap ac ity ,  re p re se n ts  the f u l l  c ap ac ity  in the  th ree
p la n t s .
( 2 ) Out of 60.000 tons of capac ity  in  the Paper p la n t ,  K raf t  
ppiper c o n s t i tu t e s  42*400 tons and K ra ft  l i n e r  17.600 to n s .
( 5) Out o f  which, 18,000 tons of cap ac ity  i s  f o r  newsprint: and
10.000 tons of c ap ac ity  fo r  card-board . &ee Ib id ,  p . 12
( 4 ) The annual cap ac ity  of the p la n ts  i s  c a lc u la te d  on the  b a s is  
o f  353 working days per year .
(11) TOTAL IKVESTITCNT: In the SEKA Report, t o t a l  investm ent of the  Gaycuma
P ro je c t  was given as amounting to  387'^ m il l io n  T, L i ra s ,  out of which 
241,6 m il l io n  T, L iras  was in  domestic currency and 145*4 m il l io n  T, Lircïs 
was in  fo re ign  currency .
Domestic currency component of investment inc ludes  expenditure  
on the s i t e  and p rep a ra t io n  of the s i t e ,  w ater supuly, bu ild in g s  ( f a c to ry  
b u i ld in g s ,  o f f ic e  b u ild in g s  and housing scheme e tc^ ;  domestic machinery and 
equipment, t r a n s p o r t  and insurance  co s t  of imported machinery, domestic 
t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s ,  assembly c o s t ,  f u r n i tu r e ,  customs duty and o th e r  taxes  ra id
(1) Total investm ent of 387oO m il l io n  T, L i ra s ,  given in th e  SEKA Report was 
an e s tim ate  and t h i s  f i a u r e  was l a t e r  taken to be 385*2 m il l io n  T.L. in the 
SPO P ro je c t  A ppra isal Form*
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during  c o n s t ru c t io n ,  ■ore-operating c o s ts ,  unexpected c o s ts ,  i n t e r e s t  charges
( 1 )on inv es ted  c a p i ta l*
Foreign currency component of the t o t a l  investm ent, on the  o th e r  
hand, comprises the  (F .O .B .) value of the  imported machinery and equipment,
( 2 )payment to  the fo re ign  personnel fo r  assembly and o th e rs  * ^
The breakdown of t o t a l  investm ents num erica lly  i s  no t given in  
the  Report I  have had access to ; the only breakdown of investment i s  given 
f o r  the co n s tru c t io n  period (See Table 2 ), As can be seen from the t a b le ,  
investment du ring  co n s tru c tio n  inc ludes  items such as c o s t  of c o n s tru c t io n  
(purchase of s i t e  and ready b u ild in g s  excluded), machinery and equipment, and 
the co s t  o f  s i t e  o u tlay  and ready b u ild in g s  req u ired  by the p r o je c t .  A ll 
these  items, a re  given ih  terras of domestic and fo re ig n  currency* The grand 
t o t a l  fo r  c o n s tru c t io n  investm ent was 28.806 thousand T. b ird s  in  I 966, 76 . I 6O 
thousand T. l i r a s  in I 967 , 90.226 thousand T. L iras  in I 968, and I 4 . 9O8 thous­
and T. b ird s  in  I 969, and f i n a l l y  16.502 thousand T, b i rd s  in 1970.
Table 2. D is t r ib u t io n  o f  Investment During C onstruction ,
By Years.
Thousand T.L.
Years I 966 I 967 I 968 I 969 1970
I  -  C onstruction
(exc lud ing  s i t e  o u tlay  
and ready b u ild in g s )
a) Domestic Currency 2.000 20.850 24.512
b) Foreign Currency_________ - _______ -______  ~______ j-______
I I  - Machinery and Equip*
a) Domestic Currency - 37.200 9*200
 b) Fore ig n  Cau i t a l ______ 24 .881 18*160 56.514__ 14,.f08____I6^5p2_
I I I  -  T o ta l  Investm ent
( I  & I I )  é
a) Domestic Currency 2 .000 58.050 35.712
   b) Foreign Curren c y  24,891 I 8 . I 6O 5 6 . 514__2,4„*-908____16,?-5P.L
IV/
(^^A very  rec en t  document obtained from the  SPO - A p r iv a te  typed Report by 
B. Bendeflioglpï., p lanner a t  the  Paper In d u s try  Section  of the  SPO, Ankara, 
December I 969 , p . 2
(^^ Ib id ,  p . 2
( 3)^^/Though th e re  i s  no s p e c i f i c  inform ation given in th e  Report, th^se  in v e s t ­
ment f ig u re s  micht inc lude  the c o s t  of b u i ld in g  a p lan t  fo r  logging, a 
p la n t  f o r  paper pulp and pulp tow ers.
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Table 2 ( c o n td .)
Years
IV -  Cost of S i t e  and 
Ready B uild ings 
a) Domestic Currency
V -  T o ta l  P r o je c t  in v e s t ­
ment
( I I I  & IV)
a) Domestic Cujroency 




1967 1968 1969 1970
58.050
18.160
T ota l 28.808 76.160
33.712
90.226 14 . 908 16,502
Source: SEKA Report, o p .c i t . ,  p . 15
111" TOTAL BENEFITS OF THE PROJECT:
T o ta l  b e n e f i t s  of the  Gaycuma Paper P la n t  have been c l a s s i f i e d  
in  va rious  groups and these  b e n e f i t s  a re  being estim ated  in  o rder  to j u s t i f y  
i t s  s e l e c t io n .  These b e n e f i t s  a re  p a r t ly  economical, p a r t ly  s o c ia l  and
p a r t ly  a d m in is t ra t iv e  in c h a ra c te r  and they can be summarized as fo llow s: (1)
I ,  U t i l i s a t i o n  o f F o re s try  Products: I t  i s  s t ro n g ly  s t re sse d
in the  Seka Report th a t  t im ber production (p ine , beech, f i r  e t c . )  of the 
f o r e s t r y  in d u s t ry  w i l l  be expanded so as to  meet the  raw m a te r ia l  requirem ents 
of the  Gaycuma n r o je c t .  T h is , in tu rn ,  w i l l  he lp  s u b s t i t u t i n g  the i ro o r te d
(2 )k r a f t  paper and k r a f t  l i n e r  and thus the  saving of fo re ig n  exchange.
F u r th e r ,  the  e s tab lishm en t of the Gaycuma p ro je c t  w i l l  be an 
inducement to  c o n s tru c t iv e  and more e f f i c i e n t  f o r e s t r y  management and, 
to g e th e r  w ith  prevention  of f o r e s t r y  damage, t h i s  w i l l  c re a te  an a d d i t io n a l  
b e n e f i t  to the  economy.
I I .  Economic b e n e f i t s :  In the SEKA Report i t  i s  s ta te d  th a t  the
p ro je c t  w i l l  be b e n e f ic ia l  to  the  economy through i t s  c o n tr ib u t io n  to the  
economy in  terms of p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  foreign-exchange sav ings , value added to  
the  n a t io n a l  income, and employment e f f e c t  in  the  reg io n .
In a c tu a l  f a c t  the  choice of the  p ro je c t  was decided on the b a s is  
of commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  which i s  o ften  a rp l ie d  by p r iv a te  f i rm s .  
The e f f e c t s  of the  p ro je c t  on the  plan o b je c t iv e s ,  i . e .  value added, balance
(2)
SEKA, o n .c i t . ,  n.i
I b i d .  p . 8
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of payments, employment e t c ,  did  not p lay  a g re a t  p a r t ,  as we s h a l l  observe 
l a t e r ,
a) The commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  or more s p e c i f i c a l l y  the forms of 
"Accounting P r o f i t a b i l i t y "  which are  app lied  by the  SEKA O rgan isa tion  are  
p resen ted  below (Table 5)»




1 -  P r o f i t  before  ta x
Net S a les  R atio
2 -  P r o f i t  A f te r  Tax
Net Sales Ratio
5 -  P r o f i t  Before Tax









Source: SENA Report, Gaycuma K ra ft  s e l lü lo s u ,  K ra f t  Kagidi re  Yah
Kinyevi S e ll i i loz  T e s i s i  P r o je s i .  Ocak, 1967, p . 9
(^^The ta x ,  in  the  ta b le  re p re se n ts  the "co rpora te  tax" 
which i s  lev ied  on g ross p r o f i t s .  (35 pe r c e n t ) .
As can be seen, accounting  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the Gaycuma P ro je c t  
i s  worked out by c a lc u la t in g  d i f f e r e n t  v a r ia n t s  of the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n .  
These a re  g ross  p r o f i t / s a l e s  r a t i o ;  p r o f i t  a f t e r  t a x / s a l e s  r a t i o ;  and 
p r o f i t  before  tax / in v es tm en t r a t i o .
The Revenue account of the  P ro je c t  as estim ated  by SEKA is  
p resented  in  Table 4* Gross p r o f i t  i s  found by deducting  annual o p e ra t in g  
c o s t  from the  t o t a l  annual income in  each y e a r .  For n e t  p r o f i t  however, 
co rpo ra te  tax  i s  deducted from the  g ross p r o f i t  obtained each y e a r .  The 
v a r i a t io n s  in  the  annual income and annual o p e ra t in g  c o s t  i s  due to  under­
u t i l i s a t i o n  of th e  c ap a c i ty  in  the f i r s t  two years  of the  o p e ra t io n .  Prom 
1972 onwards, the  p la n t  op e ra tes  a t  f u l l  c a p a c i ty .
Table 4- Revenue Account of the Gaycuma P r o je c t
Thousand T. L iras
Years 1970 1971 1972 1975 1974
Annual Income 97.825 185.707 197.486 197.486 197.486
Annual O pera tim : Cost 98.086 159.591 165.860 164.762 163.586
Gross p r o f i t -  261 26.116 31.626 52.724 33.900
Corporation tax_ili.J.5)_„„ — . . . ..„il*G69 _________ ii_.^Al_ - _11.865
Net p r o f i t _______________ __ - 261 ___ 16_._9T5.__ 20,.%7____ 21._271__ _22 '0a5_
bource: SEKA Report, Gaycuma p ro je c t ,  or . . c i t . ,  u,23
158.
T o ta l  annual income d e r iv e s  only from domestic s a l e s .  The p ro je c t  
i s  not expected' to  export  i t s  products  s ince they  are  mainly f o r  domestic 
consumption. This i s  q u i te  n a tu ra l  fo r  an im n o r t - sU h s t i tu t in g  plant*
Annual o p e ra t in g  c o s t ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, inc ludes  expenditu re  on 
raw and a u x i l i a r y  m a te r ia l s ;  charges on fu e l  and e l e c t r i c i t y  (exc lud ing  tax  
on e l e c t r i c i t y ) ;  s e l l i n g  c o s ts ,  personnel c o s ts  (wages and s a l a r i e s ) ;  
replacem ent and maintenance and o th e r  o p e ra t in g  c o s ts  ( i . e .  w ater supply, 
t r a n s p o r t  e t c . ) .^ ^ ^
b) Foreign Exchange Saving of the P r o je c t ;
Since the  Gaycuma p a re r  and c e l lu lo se  p la n ts  c o n s t i tu t e  an import 
s u b s t i t u t i n g  in d u s t ry ,  g re a t  importance was a ttach ed  to the  fo re ig n  exchange 
savings t h a t  would der ive  from producing dom est ica l ly  the  paper and c e l lu lo se  
t h a t  were p rev io u s ly  imported.
I t  i s  s t r e s s e d  in the  o r ig in a l  p ro je c t  d r a f t  (SEIiA Report) th a t  th e re  
was a s teady  r i s e  in  the  import p r ic e s  of k r a f t  paper* For in s ta n ce ,  in  I 965 
the import p r ic e  of k r a f t  paper per ton was (F .O .B .) ^138.50 and ( C . I .F . )
^160 d o l l a r s .  In I 966 the  import p r ic e  of k r a f t  paper ro se  to  0Ï 6O FOB). ^
On the  assumption th a t  the Cement I n d u s t r y 's  import p r ic e  fo r  k r a f t  
paper was (F .O .B .) ^160 per ton the  foreign-exchange savings of the  p ro je c t  
was simnly c a lc u la te d .  The e s tim ate  here  was made by m u l t in ly in r  the  above 
(F .O .B .) im port p r ic e  w ith  the  expected domestic production of k r a f t  paper 
(see  Table 5) °
Table 5« Foreign Exchange Savings
Years K ra f t  paper production  ( ton )  US ^ T Lira^^^
1970 39.130 6 .260o800 56 . 848.064
1971 6 5 .2 1 7  1 0 .4 3 4 .7 2 0  9 4 .747 .257
1972 65.217 1 0 .434.720 94 .747.257
Source; SEKA Report, p p .9--10
( 1 ) The o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e  i s  1^ = 9.0 TL,
^ '^^SEKA Report, o p .c i t . ,  p . 11 
^^^SEKA Report, p . 9
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I t  i s  worth emphasizing th a t  the foreign-exchange savings c a lcu la ted  
in the  Table was confined only to  k r a f t  paper s u b s t i t u t i o n  by the p ro je c t .  
Foreign exchange savings t h a t  miaht a lso  stem from s u b s t i t u t io n  of semi­
chemical c e l lu lo s e  have n o t  been taken in to  account.
c) VALUE ADDED which would derive from the  execution  of the  p ro je c t  
was computed in a very  awkward way. The SEKA Report in d ic a te s  t h a t  "value 
added" i s  the  d i f f e re n c e  between th e  annual s a le s  value (a ) and the annual 
inpu t requirem ents  and a l l  kinds of op e ra t in g  expenses ( b ) ,  the  l a t t e r  being 
defined  to  inc lude  the  value o f  raw and a u x i l i a r y  m a te r ia l s ,  f u e l  and energy 
c o s ts  (exc lud ing  ta x  on e l e c t r i c i t y ) ,  s e l l i n g  co s t ;  r e p a i r  and maintenance, 
a d m in is t ra t iv e  and o th e r  o p e ra t in g  costso
Taking the  above d e f in i t io n  of value added, th e  bE?A Report has
( 2)given the  t o t a l  value added r e s u l t i n g  from the  p ro je c t  as fo llow s;
Year s  Value Added ( T .L ira )
1970 55.973.151
1 9 7 1  1 0 3 .7 0 0 .7 3 7
1972 1 0 8 ,265 .446
For year  1972, where the p la n t  would work a t  f u l l  capacity  the  
value added v/as estim ated  to  be;
A -  B = 197, 485.500 - 89 . 220,054 TU.
VA = 108 .265.446 TL.
The value added, c a lc u la te d  above in the  SEKA Report d i f f e r s  
from the u l t im a te  f ig u re  given in the SPO's A ppra isa l  Form. As we have 
pointed out e a r l i e r ,  our analyses  w i l l  be e s s e n t i a l l y  bnsed on the  f ig u re s  
given by the SPO and no t on the p re lim inary  f ig u re s  p resen ted  in the  SEM 
R eport ,
d) Employment E f fe c t ;
The manpowor recuirem ent of the  Gaycuma p ro je c t  was estim ated  to
be 755 people . This f ig u re  inc ludes  35 high rank a d m in is tra to rs  and personnel,
i t  i s  pointed out in  the  bEKA Renort th a t  semi-oh'^mical c e l lu lo s e  i s  ignored 
because i t  would re c u ire  fo re ig n  exchan"e spending in  the f i r s t  y e a r s .
The above fi.u_ires do no t corresuond to the l a t e r  f ig u re s  gho'en in  t h “ SPO 
A rp ra is a l  Form, which w i l l  be examined in Chanter 7,
SEKA Report, p .11
l 6 o .
21 te c h n ic ia n s ,  I 07 c i v i l  s e rv an ts ,  367 foremen end s k i l l e d  labour, and 
225 u n s k i l le d  labour (see Table 6 ) ,
In a very  crude way, the emrloyment e f f e c t  of the  Gaycuma p ro j e : t
was s p e c i f ie d ,  where i t  i s  suggested th a t  the emnloyment of 755 reon le  would
mean provi dinar b e t t e r  l i v in  ' co n d itio n s  fo r  a g r e a te r  number, say 3755; on
( ] )
the  assumption th a t  each fam ily  in  the  rea ion  c o n s is t s  of 5 members.
Table 6, Manpower Employed by the P ro je c t
Type of Labour Number
High le v e l  of A dm in is tra to rs  
and s p e c ia l is e d  personnel
Technicians
C iv i l  Servants
Foremen and s k i l l e d  labour
U nskilled  labour














9 . 735 .805
Source: SEKA Report, Gaycuma, k r a f t  se lK ilozu , K ra ft  Kanidi re
Yari Kimyev.i oe llU loz  T e s is i  p r o j e s i .  OCAK, I 967, p .20
IV- A CRITIQUE OF THE SEKA REPORT
The SEKA' s ev a lu a tio n  of the  Gaycuma p ro je c t  poses many se r io u s  
questions  which make the whole p racess  of ev a lu a t io n  a simple and dangerously 
m isleading  one. The shortcomings of t h e i r  ev a lu a tio n  method w i l l  be examined 
b r i e f l y  below and a c r i t iq u e  of the  investment c r i t e r i a  they have adopted 
w i l l  a lso  be made. Since most of the f ig u re s  quoted above from the  SEKA 
heport  were changed when the p ro je c t  reached the SPO f o r  f u r t h e r  economic 
ev a lu a tio n ,  i t  i s  p la u s ib le  th a t  vre should srend more time on i t s  f i n a l  
ev a lua tion  made by the S ta te  Planning O rgan isa tion  (SPO). This w i l l  be 
reserved  fo r  Chapter 7°
But i t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to  by-pass the  p re lim in a ry  eva lu a tio n  of 
the p ro je c t  by 8EKA w ithout emphasising the  weaknesses and c ru d i ty  th e re o f ,
( 1 ) ,Ib id .  p . 20
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which may be re p re s e n ta t iv e  of the  p ra c t ic e  in  almost a l l  s im i la r  pub lic  
investment ag en c ie s .
The fo llow ing  s ec t io n  w i l l  d iscu ss  the EEKA's p ro je c t  appraisal, 
method in  r e s p e c t  to  (a) lo c a t io n  of the  paper p ro je c t ;  (b) fo re ig n  excixange 
savings from the  p ro je c t ;  (c ) employment e f f e c t  of the  p ro je c t :  (d) value
added r e s u l t i n g  from the p r o je c t ;  and f i n a l l y ,  (e) the  commercial p r o f i t a b ­
i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  they  have a p p l ie d ,
1. F i r s t ,  the lo c a t io n  of the  paper p ro je c t  in  Gaycuma.
I t  was s ta te d  in  the  SEKA Report t h a t  Gaycuma was chosen as a 
lo c a t io n  f o r  the  paper p la n t  fo r  the fo llow ing  reasons; ( i )  i t s  proxim ity  
to  the  Kastomonu and Bolu f o r e s t s  from which the  raw m a te r ia ls  are  to  be 
obtained; ( i i )  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of w ater supply (Yenice R iver) ;  ( i i i )  the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of e l e c t r i c  ener,gy supply in  the  reg ion ; ( iv )  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of adequate t r a n s p o r t  and communication f a c i l i t i e s .
I t  i s  a f a c t  t h a t  the  Gaycuma P la n ts  a re  not f a r  d i s t a n t  from the 
f o r e s t r y  in d u s t ry  which e x i s t s  in  Bolu  and Kastomonu reg io n ,  and t h a t  these  
reg ions  could provide the  r i g h t  k ind of raw m a te r ia ls  f o r  k r a f t  paper and 
c e l lu lo s e  p ro d u c ts .  I t  i s  th e  es tim ate  of the  SEKA Report t h a t ,  the 
Gaycuma p r o je c t  would re q u ire  annually  IO4.856  m3 ( s o l id  cubic m etres) in 
pine wood, 112.923 solid cubic m etres  in  f i r s ,  and 1C9.828 s o l id  cubic metres 
in beech wood.
However, the  im portant element here  i s  the  t r a n s p o r t  c o s ts  of 
th ese  raw m a te r ia l s  from the f o r e s t r y  up to  the  Gaycuma p la n t s .  From the
( 2)f ig u r e s  given by the  SPO, I  have roughly  c a lc u la te d  th a t  annual t r a n s p o r t  
cOsts o f  th ese  raw m a te r ia ls  w i l l  c o n s t i tu te  3.3 por cen t of th e  t o t a l  
o p e ra t in g  c o s ts  ( t o t a l  annual op e ra t in g  co s t  be ing  125,597«000 TL, and 
t r a n s p o r t  c o s ts  be ing  4.150.000 TL). From t h i s  simple e s t im ate  one might 
conclude t h a t  t r a n s p o r t  c o s ts  do not re p re se n t  a la rg e  percentage and th i s  
may support the  R ep o r t 's  a s s e r t io n  th a t  the lo c a t io n  of the  p r o je c t  in 
Gaycuma does not involve s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s ts .  But t h i s  alone i s  not enough 
to  j u s t i f y  a lo c a t io n  f o r  such a l a rg e - s c a le  p ro jec t*
( 1 ) See SEKA Report, o p .c i t . ,  p . 8
( 2 )A re c en t  typed document obta ined  from B. B enderliopk i,  a p lanner a t  the  
SPO. Ankara, December 1969*
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The remarks th a t  the p ro jec t  i s  very c lo se  to the nearby fores i s  
and th at there- i s  a s u f f i c i e n t  amount of water supply and transport and 
energy f a c i l i t i e s  do not provide s u f f i c i e n t  support f o r  such a choice*
None o f ' t h e s e  advantages s ta ted  above was q u a n tif ied  econom ically  
to  make the choice  a f e a s ib l e  one; nor, I was t o ld ,  was there any other  
a lt e r n a t iv e  piposed a g a in st  the Gaycuma p r o je c t .  In the absence of any 
other a l t e r n a t iv e  investment proposal fo r  lo c a t io n ,  we are not in  a p o s it io n  
to  pursue the argument to  i t s  lo g i c a l  co n c lu s io n .  But i t  can be pointed  
out th at the choice  o f  lo c a t io n  was made y b t j  h a s t i l y  and without any thought 
o f  would-be a l t e r n a t i v e s .  At any r a te ,  research on p ro jec t  a l t e r n a t iv e s  in  
Turkey has not been adequate and t h i s  problem remains one of the fundamental 
weaknesses o f  the SPO and other public  a g en c ies .  Thus, t h i s  drawback i s  not  
t y p ic a l  o f  the Gaycuma project*
2. Foreign-exchange savings o f  the p ro jec t  was simply ca lcu la ted  
by tak ing fo r e ig n  exchange value (F .O .B .) o f  the k r a f t  paper that was 
p rev iou s ly  imported and now i s  to  be d om est ica lly  produced. In the e s t im a t­
ion  o f  fore ign  exchange sa v in g s ,  they chose the cement in d u str y 's  import 
p rice  fo r  k r a f t  paper as (F .O .B .) ^ 160 d o lla r s  per ton , and m u lt ip lied  t h i s  
with the amount th a t  was su b s t i tu te d  by lo c a l  production*
This may make sense i f  the  Gaycuraa p lant i s  producing the k r a f t  
paper a t  import p a r ity .  But, from the standpoint o f  s o c ia l  eva luation  o f  
pu blic  p r o je c ts  t h i s  i s  not so , s ince for  fo re ig n  exchange savings we should 
find  the fo re ig n  exchange which corresponds to the d if fe r e n c e  between the 
o f f i c i a l  exchange ra te  and "accounting" fore ign  exchange r a te .  This i s  
necessary , as we s h a l l  argue in  Chapter 7 that o f f i c i a l  exchange ra te  under­
est im ates  the " in tr in s ic"  value of the fo re ig n  exchange and thus computation 
on the b a s is  o f  o f f i c i a l  exchange ra te  would lead to  o verest im ation . I t  
appears the SEKA planners have not taken in to  account t h i s  a sp ect  o f  s o c ia l  
ev a lu a t io n .
Accounting p r ic e s  f o r  exchange ra te  was l a t e r  introduced by the 
SPO planners durina the p r o je c t ' s  second eva lu ation :  t h i s  vri 11 be d e a lt  with
in  Chapter 7*
Moreover, fore ign  exchange savings were on ly  confined to  the  
s u b s t i tu t io n  o f  k r a ft  paper; and ohter paper products (sem i-chem ical c e l lu lo s e  
k r a ft  l in e r )  were not brought in to  the a n a ly s i s .  For some reason the fore ign
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exchange sav ings  th a t  might stem, in the fu tu r e , from the  s u b s t i tu t io n  of  
other paper products are not e s t im a ted .
B e s id e s ,  fo re ig n  exchange earnings fo r  savinf^s are not always o f  
d ir e c t  character; some may be in d ir e c t  saving’s or d is s a v in g s .  For in s ta n c e ,  
the Gaycuma p lant by req u ir in g  the wood products ( i . e .  timber) from the fo r e s tr y  
industry  i s  i n d i r e c t l y ,  by consnmption, reducing the l a t t e r  in d u s tr y 's  exports  
o f  timber, which earns fo re ig n  exchange in the fore ign  market. Again, the  
execution  o f  the p ro jec t  in question  may create  ex ter n a l economies to  the 
transport and d is t r ib u t io n  se c to r s  by inducing an expansion in t h e ir  a c t i v i t i e s ;  
and the in cr ea se  in t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  may, in  tu rn , require more fo re ig n  
exchange spending.
These kinds o f  re f in ed  an alyses  have not been carr ied  out by the  
SEKA planners; nor by the SPO, as we s h a l l  see  la ter*
5. The va lue added of the Gaycuma p ro jec t  has been defined  and 
estim ated in a very curious way, where i t  i s  s ta ted  th a t  va lue added i s  the  
d if fe r e n c e  between the annual s a le s  value o f  products minus annual operating  
c o s t .  This i s  a wrong d e f in i t io n  o f  the va lue  added and i t  should in stead  
be defined as the d if fe r e n c e  between the s a le s  va lue  o f  the production o f  the 
p ro jec t  and the purchases from other e n te r p r is e s ,  i . e .  raw m a te r ia ls ,  eneryv, 
f u e l ,  tran sport e t c . ,  and i s  num erically  equal to  the t o t a l  va lue o f  s a la r i e s ,  
wages, r e n t ,  i n t e r e s t  and p r o f i t s *  I t  can be net or gross  value added, 
where to obtain  the l a t t e r  in d ir e c t  ta x e s ,  su b s id ie s  and d ep rec ia t ion  ought to  
be included .
Apart from the awkward d e f la t io n  o f  the va lu e  added, the SEKA 
Report did not attempt to include the value added in the b e n e f i t s  s id e  of the 
p r o je c t ,  when i t  was compared to i t s  i n i t i a l  c o s t .  As we s h a l l  see  bei.ow, 
the SEKA organ isa t ion  attempted to  base i t s  investm ent d e c is io n  rr im arily  
on the commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r io n ;  the value added cr e a te d , fore ign  
exchange sav in gs  provided and e:.ployment generated were considered as o f  
secondary importance. This , o f  course, stems from the fa c t  th a t  eva luation  
o f  the p ro jec t  was carried  out from the standpoint o f  a p r iva te  firm and 
not a p u b lic  e n te r p r is e .
4 . Employment e f f e c t  of the Gaycuma p ro jec t  was a l s o  carried  cut  
with extreme s im p l ic i t y  and, perhaps, without r e c e iv in g  due a t t e n t io n .
The d ir e c t  employ/ment e f f e c t  o f  the p ro jec t  i s  very  minimal as 
can be seen from the above t a b le s .  Total manpower requirement o f  the projec"
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was estim ated  to  be 755 peop le , out o f  which 225 are u n sk i l le d  workers*
I t  was s tr e s se d  in the SEKA Report th a t  employment o f  t o t a l  755 
would mean, in d ir e c t ly ,  .providing b e t te r  l i v i n g  c o n d it io n s  fo r  3755 people,  
i f  each lam ily  co n s is ted  o f  5 members.
This es t im ate  cannot be taken s e r io u s ly  as rep re se n t in g  the 
employment e f f e c t  of the Gaycuraa p r o je c t .  I t  could probably be considered  
as a mede-up p o l i t i c a l  dev ice  to  estim ate  employment e f f e c t  o f  the p ro jec t  
in  Zonguldak Region.
Instead o f  con cen tra ting  on in d ir e c t  economic employment b e n e f i t s  
o f  the p r o je c t  on other c lo s e ly - l in k e d  s e c to r s ,  the SEKA exp erts  p r a c t i c a l ly  
ignored t h i s  a sp ect  o f  the problem. I t  could be suggested  th at the execution  
o f  the p r o je c t  would have a considerab le  employment e f f e c t  in the lo g g in g  
operations in the fo r e s t r y  in d u stry ,  in transport a c t i v i t i e s  and perhaps in  
the con stru ction  s e c to r  due to undertaking a housing scheme fo r  the employees.
Surely  the Gaycuma p ro jec t  w i l l  induce a d d it io n a l  employment in the 
fo r e s tr y  s e c to r  where logg in g  operations would be expanded in  order to  meet 
the raw m a ter ia ls  requirements of the p r o je c t .  S im ila r ly ,  th» same e f f e c t  
can be extended to  the transport s e c to r  which would be expanding fo l lo w in g  the  
r i s e  in output in the fo r e s t r y  s e c to r .
The r e lev a n t  question  here i s  to  f ind  d ir e c t  and in d ir e c t  employ­
ment e f f e c t s  r e s u l t in g  from a p r o je c t .  These in d ir e c t  employment e f f e c t s  
may be very important in the case of general unemployment and i t  i s  ad v isab le  
to  est im ate  them in  s p i t e  o f  p r a c t ic a l  and conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s .
A q u a n t i ta t iv e  estim ate  o f  d ir e c t  and in d ir e c t  employment o f  labour  
in  any given s e c to r  can be made by means of a reg io n a l input-output t a b le .
The technique to  use here i s  the in te r - in d u s tr y  m atrix m u lt ip l i e r  which r e la t e s  
the in crease  in  a s e c to r  o f  f i n a l  demand tr  the in term ediate  inputs renuired  
to  meet i t .  For in s ta n c e ,  the in crease  in f in a l  demand o f ,  say, exrorts  of  
k ra ft  paper and k r a f t  l i n e r  w i l l  have a p red ic ta b le  impact on the lo c a l  
timber in dustry  ( f o r e s t r y  s e c to r )  and other supplying in d u s t r ie s .  This in  
turn w i l l  have e f f e c t s  on su p p lier s  further  back, a l l  o f  which can only be 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  examined wn'th the aid of an in te r - in d u s tr y  inrux-output t^ b le .
I f  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to con stru ct  a reg ion a l input-output ta b le  
showing the r e la t io n s h ip  in that region between households, in d u s tr ie s  and
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autonomous f i n a l  demand s e c to r s ,  then each round o f  the m a tr ix -m u lt ip l ie r  
could be determined fo r  investment made in any s e c to r .
The point i s  th a t  to  prepare such a ta b le  fo r  a region  (or a l l
r eg ion s)  i s  p o s s ib le ,  but i t  may be a major e x e r c is e  in i t s  own r ia h t .  I t
may be p o s s ib le  to f ind  reg io n a l  inmosts and exports and make es t im a tes  o f
reg io n a l f i n a l  demand, but the b a s ic  problems in  regard to  a reg io n a l in put-
output ta b le  are many. F i r s t ,  lack  o f  a l l  kinds o f  data a t  rég ion a l l e v e l .
This in c lu d es  l.ack of knowledge on reg ional consumption, investm ent, reg io n a l
trade and in te r - in d u s tr y  t r a n s a c t io n s .  Second, the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  f in d in g  the
in te r - in d u s tr y  d e s t in a t io n  o f  in te r -r e g io n a l  import f low s  to s e c to r s  w ithin
the r e g i o n . D a t a  on import and export s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  each region  need to
be c o l l e c t e d .  At t h i s  stage  o f  course, a d is t in c t io n  needs to  be made between
( 2^*imports o f  each commodity from abroad and from "the r e s t  o f  the country".
Third, o ther d i f f i c u l t i e s  are a lso  inherent in the system of input-output
a n a ly s i s .  That i s  the constancy of  the input c o e f f i c i e n t s .  This b a s ic
assumption however, can be treated  as u n r e a l i s t i c  s in ce  ( i )  in te r -r e g io n
c o e f f i c i e n t s  are l i a b l e  to change; ( i i )  te c h n ic a l  changes in  products and
(3)p rocesses  may up se t the s t a t i c  l in e a r  assumptions.
I t  i s  sometimes suggested  th at na tion a l imput-output c o e f f i c i e n t s  
can be used at reg io n a l l e v e l  in  view o f  r e g io n a l d a ta  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  But 
i t  i s  absuj’d and m is lead ing  to  fo l lo w  such a procedure s in c e ,  as D. B. S te e le  
has pointed out, "national c o e f f i c i e n t s  r e f l e c t  the n a t io n a l product-mix which 
d i f f e r s  from the reg ion a l product-mix by the degree o f  reg ion a l s p e c i a l i s a t ­
ion"*^^^
As fa r  as input-output a n a ly s is  i s  concerned Turkey i s  on ly  a 
beginner in  t h i s  f i e l d  and req u ires  more data, experience and time in  order 
to  con stru ct  an appropriate and u s e fu l  in te r - in d u s tr y  m a tr ix - ta b le . Turkey
(^^D. B. S t e e le ,  Regional m u lt ip l ie r  in  Great B r i ta in ,  O .E .P .,  V o l .21, N o.2, 
J u ly  1 969 , P . 2 7 0
(2)^n  ^ V/ilson, The Regional M u lt ip l ie r  -  A, C rit iq u e ,  O .E .P . , V o l .20, November
1 968 , D o .3, p . 383
( 3)^^/professor T. V/ilson argues th a t ,  though some attem ot can be made to  fo r e c a s t  
such te c h n ic a l  chanaes and apply them in to  a p r e d ic t iv e  matrix the r e s u l t s  
o f such an experiment sho^'ld be treated  with caution  and such an a n a ly s is  
should be nr de on the n a t io n a l rather than on the reg iona l l ^ v e l . Ib id ,  
p n .383” 384.
(^^D. B. S t e e le ,  Regional M u lt ip l ier  in Great B r i ta in ,  O .E .P . , o p .c i t . ,  p . 270
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was not even able to  draw up a complete input-output ta b le  a t  national-econom ic  
l e v e l  l e t  a lone con stru ct in g  such a ta b le  a t  reg io n a l l e v e l  (see  Chapter 2 ) ,
In the absence o f  such complex s tu d ie s ,  however, an a l t e r n a t iv '  
would be to  e s t im a te  the forward and backward e f f e c t s  th a t  are nearest  to  
the p r o j e c t . I n  t h i s  context two important fa c to r s  should be taken in to  
account: ( i )  the s i z e  of the p r o je c t ,  ( i i ) . t h e  e x is te n c e  of id le  capacity  
in  the c l o s e l y  linked lo c a l  in d u s tr ie s .
I f , f o r  in s ta n c e ,  in  the derived a c t i v i t i e s  ( i . e .  timber industry  
and transport s e r v ic e s )  there seems to  be some u n u t i l iz e d  c a r a c ity ,  no
( 2a d d it io n a l  investm ent w i l l  take place and the whole o f  the extra value added " 
and extra employment can be ascribed to  the paper m i l l  p r o j e c t . I t  should  
be noted however th a t ,  i f  derived employment i s  assumed as an in d ir e c t  
b e n e f i t ,  the investment required for  such derived emnloyment should be 
est im a ted .
The e v a l u a t i o n  o f  th e  p r o j e c t  in  term s o f  employment e f f e c t  may be 
u s e f u l  in  sh o w in g  u s  a p a r t i a l  a s p e c t  o f  th e  p r o j e c t  and in  some c a s e s  may 
r e c e i v e  s p e c i a l  im p o r ta n c e ,  b u t  n o n e t h e l e s s  a s  I  have made c l e a r  in  Chapter 4 
(A ppendix  A ) ,  employment e f f e c t  o f  a p r o j e c t  a lo n e  sh o u ld  n o t  be c o n s id e r e d  
a s  a p r i o r i t y - r a n k i n g  d e v ic e *
I t  i s  s ta ted  in  the SEKA Report th a t  the p r o je c t ,  in  add ition  to 
the above mentioned b e n e f i t s ,  would ensure a sy stem atic  e x p lo i ta t io n  of  
timber production: and consequently  i t  could be a con stru ctive  element towards
a modern f o r e s t r y  management. This would be considered as an in d ir e c t  b e n e f i t  
to the n a t io n a l economy.
I t  i s  true that domestic raw m ater ia ls  w i l l  be u t i l i z e d  e x te n s iv e ly  
by d ir e c t in g  them to the paper indu stry . Forestry  products (tim ber, woods,
( -  Mf
( 2 )
TIN  anual on Economic Development P r o je c ts ,  United N ations. New York 
195 8 ,  -0 .224.
Of course, in t h i s  case there w i l l  be an in d ir e c t  value added e f f e c t  bv the 
in crease  in p r o d u c t iv ity  in both timber apd transport in d u s tr ie s .  Doth 
in d u s tr ie s  w i l l  employ more people to  meet the in term ediate input demand of  
the paper m il l  *
( 3)^ The reg io n a l m u lt ip l ie r  e f f e c t  shov,ld a lso  be taken in to  account. Regional 
m u lt ip l ie r  which i s  an in v er se  function  o f  marginal propensity  to save an-' 
marginal propensity  fo r  import can s t im ula te  an a d d it io n a l  output in  a 
region ana t h i s  in turn, a d d it io n a l employment. This po in t w i l l  be taken 
UP in Charter 8*
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e t c . )  may be more e f f i c i e n t l y  e x p lo ited  in order to meet the demand o f the  
paper and c e l lu lo s e  p la n ts .  I t  remains to  be seen however, i f  the Gaycuma
p ro jec t  w i l l  s t im u la te  a w ell-organ ised  fo r e s t r y  management. C erta in ly  there  
i s  an in d ir e c t  b e n e f i t  hidden here , but tlu.s does not seem to  have been 
-explored enough and i s  merely l i s t e d  in a Q u a li ta t iv e  manner.
5. F in a l ly ,  the most important shortcoming of the SEKA ' s eva lu ation  
method was the choice o f  an investm ent c r i t e r io n .  As I mentioned e a r l i e r ,
SEÏLA planners adopted a simple accounting p r o f i t a b i l i t y  method which i s  used 
in various forms by the p r iva te  e n te r p r is e s .
The b a s ic  reasons fo r  departing from the commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
c r i t e r io n  as fa r  as the p u b lic  s e c to r  i s  concerned were f u l l y  explained in  
Chapters 3 and 5 o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  But s t i l l  i t  may provide a b e t te r  under­
standing  i f  we concentrate  on some of i t s  a sp ec ts  h ere .
The above c r i t e r ia  can be refuted  on many grounds, but I sh a l l  
place them in two ca tegor ies*
1 .  F i r s t ,  t h e  form s o f  a c c o u n t in g  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a p p l i e d  by th e  
SEKA a re  a u i t e  an i n f e r i o r  v e r s i o n  o f  th e  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r u l e .
Advanced formas o f  the p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  include in te r n a l  ra te  of return  
(iBIi) and present value c r i t e r i a  (PV) (sep Chapter 3 ) «
As was pointed out e a r l i e r ,  the commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  the  
Gaycuma p ro jec t  was s p e c i f i c a l l y  given in terms of p r o f i t  before t n x / s a le s  
r a t io :  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  t a x / s a l e s  r « t io :  and p r o f i t s  before tax /investm ent
r a t io  ( s e e  Table 3)* These r a t io s  are derived from the simple accounting  
approach a f t e r  e s t im a t in g  annual income, annual op eratin g  c o s t  and d er iv in g  
gross p r o f i t s .
No inform ation i s  a v a i la b le  to  see  i f  those  r a t io s  are compared 
w ith  other paper p r o je c ts  included in  the paper indu stry  or whether f^ey are 
compared merely to  the borrowing ra te  of in t e r e s t  which i s  in  the order o f  
7 per c e n t . (^ )
According to  the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  which d erive  from simple 
accounting auuroach, p r o je c ts  are often  evaluated  from fo r e c a s t s  o f  operation al
^"^The S ta te  Investment Bank (SJB) i s  the main source o f  in te r n a l  f inance  
for  pu b lic  p r o je c t s .  I n te r e s t  ra te  charged b’'- the Bank v a r ie s  betwe-n 7 
per cent and 9 per cen t .
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accounts and by working out a ra te  of return from a comparison o f  earnings  
with the t o t a l  amount in v e s te d .
I n d u s tr ia l  p r o je c ts  are evaluated by u s in g  the es t im a tes  of in v e s t ­
ment c o s ts  and op eration a l co s t  for  the f i r s t  years o f  the p r o je c t ,  or 
sometimes fo r  a "normal" operating  year . Given income and expenditure,  
d p rec ia t io n ,  p r o f i t s  and payable ta x e s  are worked out fo r  the f i r s t  y ea rs .
In p r a c t ic e  the simple accounting ra te  o f  re'burn i s  ca lcu la ted  by comparing
the various  exp ress ion s  fo r  p r o f i t s  before or a f t e r  d ep rec ia t io n ,  before or
a f t e r  ta x ,  w ith c a p i t a l  in v e s te d .
The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  or eq u iva len t  annual r a te  o f  return on investment  
i s  o ften  expressed as
B -  C -  D B -  G ,
I  I
vdiere B, C and B are annual f low s o f  (c r o s s )  b e n e f i t s ,  current  
ccsbs and d ep rec ia t io n ;  I i s  the i n i t i a l  c a p ita l  o u t la y ,  and d i s  the annual 
ra te  o f  d e p rec ia t io n  as a f r a c t io n  o f  the i n i t i a l  investm ent (d = B / l ) .
According’ to  t h i s  r u le  an eva lua tion  w i l l  rank p ro jec ts  according
to  the h ig h e s t  p: or a f t e r  s e t t in g  a minimum value o f  p those  p ro jec ts
' ( 2)which s a t i s f y  p^ p w i l l  be undertaken. ^
( 3 )D espite  the f a c t  th a t  these  c r i t e r ia  are q u ite  easy to  apnly,  
they have many shortcomings among which the most important ones are:
a) I t  i s  not p o s s ib le  in p ra c t ic e  to  come to  any d ef in ib e  conclusion  
nor i s  i t  p o s s ib le  in  p a r t ic u la r  to compare two p r o je c ts  by look ing  a t  an 
average ra te  o f  return or a s e r ie s  o f  yea r ly  r a te s  o f  re "burn for  a number o f  
years  in the l i f e t i m e  of a p r o je c t .  Two p ro jec ts  could only be compared, i f  
one o f  them shows a h igher ra te  o f  return than the o ther  a t  a l l  t im es .
'^^^The ra te  o f  retr.rn i s  sometimes ca lcu la ted  by r e la t in g  the average p r o f i t s  
over a period o f  s e v e r a l  years  or over the whole ‘l i fe sp a n  o f the p ro jec t  
to tho value o f  the investm ent*
( 2) I t  must be mentioned in t h i s  connection that gross p r o f i t  as a percentage  
of  investm ent i s  the exact rec iu r o c a l  o f  the pay-back p eriod .
( i . e .    I_
Annual oross p r o f i t  3 -  G'' - D
( 3)/ f t s  advantages are , f i r s t ,  l ik e  th e in te r n a l  r a te  o f  return i t  r e u i r e s  only  
p ro jec t  data fo r  ranking and, second, p i s  much e a s ie r  to  c a lc u la te  than 
in t e r n a l /
(4) See o v e r le a f .
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B esid es  some kind o f  standard would have to  be la id  down -  what would 
be the low est f ig u r e  fo r  the average return as ca lcu la ted  here a t  which a 
p ro jec t  would be regarded as p r o f ita b le ?
b) In p r a c t ic e  (as  in  the case o f  the Gaycuma p r o je c t )  r a te s  of  
return are o ften  c a lcu la ted  only  fo r  th e e a r ly  years of the p r o j e c t ' s  l i f e t i m e ,  
on the grounds that the fu ture  i s  not known. In o th er  words, t h is  c r i t e r io n  
a p p lie s  to  p r o je c ts  where annual f low  of net b e n e f i t s  i s  assumed constant*
But to  decide in favour of a p ro jec t  by u s in g  t h i s  so r t  o f  c r i t e r io n  
i s  t a c i t l y  to  assume th a t  the r e s u l t s  o f  the f i r s t  years w i l l  bo repeated a t  
l e a s t  fo r  the period o f  years required to w r i t e - o f f  the i n i t i a l  investment*
In case t h i s  assumption i s  not j u s t i f i e d  then s u f f i c i e n t  data must be a v a i la b le  
to  c a lc u la te  '.he present va lu es  of ex]iected returns* T h is , in  o th er  words, 
im plies  moving to  a b e t t e r  investment c r i t e r io n  - i . e .  present value (PV) 
c r i t e r io n .
c) One would a ls o  need to be able to compare cash f low s and thus 
ra te s  o f  return with d i f f e r e n t  d is tr ib u t io n s  over t im e. I t  was to  t h i s  end 
that the d isco u n tin g  technique was introduced*
Only the PV apuroach g iv e s  a c le a r  exp ress ion  o f  the t o t a l  net  
b e n e f i t s  exrected  from a p r o je c t  and does so in  a manner which in v o lv e s  
c o n s is te n t  t im e-w eighting  fo r  a l l  p r o je c t s .  Therefore, the  present value  
(PV) approach should be preferred  to a l l  o th ers .
d) Like the in te r n a l  ra te  o f  return c r i t e r io n ,  accounting ra te
o f  return c r i t e r io n  (annual) does not d is t in g u is h  the s i z e  o f  a p r o je c t  s in ce  
i t  merely ranks p r o je c ts  on the b a s is  o f  t h e ir  annual r a te  o f  return .
Whereas t o t a l  net b e n e f i t s  and the s i z e  o f  an investm ent should be given due 
consideration*
I t  can ke concluded th a t  annual p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r io n  shares th e  
same advantages and d isadvantages with the IBP, but i t  has more lim ited
(co n td .)  in te r n a l  ra te  o f  return (IRR). For i t s  d isadvantages s e e  above s e c t i o n
(^^Por an ap n ra isa l  o f  accounting rate  of return se^  ^ IvM.B. L i t t l e  & A. J .  
M irr lees ,  Manual o f  I n d u s tr ia l  P ro ject  A nalysis  in  D eveloring Countries -  
Methodology ^no Case s tu d ie s .  V o l . I .  OECD. Beveloument Centre s t u d i e s .
P a r is ,  1968 . Chan, IV, n u .158-139
(^)por a c r i t i c p i  survey oi' various investment c r i t e r i a ,  see  A. k . Sen,
S tep h en  A. H a rn l in  ■''nd Thomas V /e is sk o n f ,  L e c t u r e s  on S o c i a l  C o s t - B e n e f i t  
A n a l y s i s  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  P r o j e c t  f o r m u la t io n  and E v a l u a t i o n .  ITi! -  I n d u s t r i a l  
D evelopm ent O r g a n iz a t io n ,  June 1 9 6 7 ,  0 , 6 4 . "Use o f  PV au uroach  f o r  comua'"- 
i n g  b e t  b e n e f i t s  in  d i f f e r e n t  t im e p e r i o d s  c a l l s  f o r  a c h o i c e  o f  d i s c o u n t  
r a t e :  t h i s  w i l l  be ex p n in ed  in  d e t a i l  in  C hapter 8 .
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a p p lica t io n  and i s  e a s ie r  to  compute. As i s  the  case in p a y -o f f  period  
ru le  the s im p l ic i t y  of p may recommend i t  for screen ing  purposes, hut the  
s o c ia l  present value (SPV) i s  u lt im a te ly  the most r e l i a b l e  one,
I I .  The second uroblem which a r i s e s  in  connection with the accounting  
ra te  o f  return i s  th a t  i t  i s  an extrem ely  in f e r io r  device  used by the p rivate  
se c to r  in investm ent d e c i s io n s .  I t  i s  not even w idely  used in p r iv a te  s ec to r  
l e t  a lone fo r  public  en terprise*
As was pointed out the SEKA being a public  e n terp r ise  should have 
aimed a t  a b e t t e r  c r i t e r io n  which could take in to  account not p r iv a te  p r o f i t ­
a b i l i t y  but s o c ia l  p r o f i t s  which comprise a l l  th ese  e f f e c t s  o f  the p ro ject  
I have mentioned e a r l i e r .  As I have argued in  Part I I ,  and s h a l l  a lso  ar^Tue 
in the fo llo w in g  chapters ,  the most appropriate c r i t e r io n  fo r  s o c ia l  ev a lu a t­
ion o f  investm ents i s  the  s o c ia l  present value (SPV) method which u t i l i s e s  
the d iscou n tin g  technique and s o c i a l  p r ices  whidi are sometimes termed "shadow" 
or "accounting” p r ic e s ,
V- C onclusion; In the above s e c t io n s  I have on ly  attempted to draw
Home a t t e n t io n  to  various a sp ects  of the prelim inary eva luation  carried out by 
the SEKA on the Gaycuma p r o je c t .  Very b r i e f l y  some o f  the fundamental weak­
n esses  have been emphasized.
As i t  stands the SEKA' s p ro jec t  eva luation  method does not conform 
to  any o f  the b as ic  p r in c ip le s  which ought to  be follow ed in p ro jec t  ev a lu a t­
io n .  The accounting p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r ia  they have chosen i s  not an. 
appropriate c r i t e r io n  to apply fo r  public  investment p r o je c t s .  The SEKA' s 
eva luation  method as a whole appears to be extremely sim ple , incomplete and 
one which may lead to  wrong investment ch o ic e s .
I t  i s  worth s t r e s s in g  th a t  in  my b a s ic  a n a ly s is  o f  the Gaycuma 
p ro jec t  I w i l l  not be u s in g  f ig u r e s  presented in  the SEKA's Report which I 
have examined in the above s e c t io n s .  In stead , I s h a l l  concentrate more on 
the f ig u r e s  given in the SPO A p r a isa l  Form for the Gaycuma p r o je c t .  Ky 
fundamental c r i t i c i s m  th ere fo re ,  w i l l  be on the SPO's p ro jec t  eva lu ation  method 
and the choice o f  inves-bment c r i t e r ia  fo r  the s e le c t io n  o f  in d u s t r ia l  p r o je c t s .  
This w i l l  be the su b jec t-m atter  of th'  ^ fo l lo w in g  two chapters (7  and S ) .
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CHAPTER 7
GAYCUl'iA PROJECT AS EVALUATED BY THE SPO
I n trod u ction; In what fo llo w s  I s h a l l  describe the method used 
by the SPO in the eva luation  o f  the Gaycuma p r o je c t  and l a t e r  explore the  
drawbacks o f  t h e ir  eva luation  system in the l i g h t  o f  the th e o r e t i c a l  frame­
work I have introduced in Part I I  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  I t  must be s tr e s se d  that  
eva luation  o f  the p ro jec t  by the SPO c o n st itu ted  the second and the f i n a l  
stage o f  the evahation which has formed the b a s is  fo r  the in c lu s io n  of  the  
p roject  in  the investment programme. The f ig u r e s  which are given in the  
SPO's Appraisal Eorm'' '^  ^ are d i f f e r e n t  from the ones presented in  Chapter 6. 
Thus, the a p p ra isa l  form w i l l  be the b a s is  f o r  our a n a ly s is  in t h i s  chapter®
I . TOTAL INVESTHCNT; As can be seen from Table 1, t o t a l  investm ents  
o f  the Gaycuma p ro jec t  reached 385»2 m il l io n  T, L ira , domestic component 
being 239«8 m il l io n  T. Liras and fo re ig n  currency component o f  145*4 m il l io n  
T. L ir d s .(^ )
The foreign-exchange component o f  the investment was corrected  by 
applying a shadow fo re ig n  exchange r a te .  In the SPO's a p p ra isa l form the 
shadow fo re ig n  exchange was assumed to  be 35 per cent above the o f f i c i a l  r a te .  
The SPO p lanners ,  in  co n tra st  to the SEKA org a n isa t io n , seemed to  be aware 
o f  the d is to r t io n  which e x is te d  in  the fore ign  exchange market. The way t h i s  
rate  was determined i s  not c l e a r ,  but i t  may have been one which was chosen  
crudely without conducting the required s tud ies*
The t o t a l  investm ent in Table 1, th e r e fo r e ,  in c lu d es  domestic and 
fore ign  exchange component o f  the investment plus the ad d it io n a l fore ign
■^Most o f  the public  investment r r o je c ts  are presented according to  the SPO's 
Appraisal Forms, which are prepared beforehand and l a t e r  d is tr ib u te d  to  
various government agencies*
( 2 j
/There i s  a minor d if fe r e n c e  between the value of  t o t a l  investm ents given  
in the SEKA Report and the SPO A ppm isa l Form, For in s ta n ce ,  in the SEKA 
Report, t o t a l  investm ent was estimated to be 387 =0 m il l io n  T .L .,  fore ign  
currency component being 145o4 m il l io n  T .L .,  and domestic currency bAing 
241*6 m i l l io h  T.L*
The d if fe r e n c e  i s  s ta ted  t^ be e n t ir e ly  due to  the fa c t  that in ’^ e^st-* 
ments  ^n the SPO Appraisal Form represented the a c iu a l  f  i p w e s , e s ^ r c i^ l ly  
for  years I 966 and I 9 6 7 . B. B en derliog lu . A p r iva te  untyped docum-nt,
SPO, Dec. 1969, n .2 .
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exchange r e s u l t i n g  from annly inv  a shadow fo-reign exchange ra te  to  thf  ^ l a t t e r  
component o f  'the t o t a l  investm ent, v/hen the fo re ig n  exchange ra te  i s  adjusted  
•upward by 33 per cent th is  brings the "shgdow" fo re ig n  exchange ra te  \iv 
to  1 X = 12.07 T .L .,  in s tead  o f  o f f i c i a l  ra te  o f  1 /  = 9 .08  T. L iras .
I I . I<Ufr ADD]^: the  second Table which, i s  included in the  
SPO's A ppraisal Form i s  about the value added r e s u l t in g  from ’bhe p ro jec t  
(see  Table 2 ) .  The va lue added i s  defined as comprising s a l a r i e s ,  wanes, 
d ep rec ia t io n ,  i n t e r e s t ,  r en t ,  t r x e s ,  p r o f i t s  and o th ers ,
Th'  ^ y ea r ly  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  value added i s  given in the Tab3e as 
in cr ea s in g  with the u t i l i z e d  ca p a c ity  o f  the p la n t .  In 1970 the value added 
i s  given as 58.000 thousand T .L .,  in crea s in g  to  119*336 thousand T.L, in 1973»
Table 1 . TITVESTMWTS
Thousand TL*
Years 1966 I 967 1988 I 969 1970 Total
1. Domestic Currency 11,900 6 6 . 64O 6 6 . 5OO 46,380 4 8 ,6 5 6  ^ ^ ^ ,8 5 6
2. Foreign Currency 27.590 I 8 . I 6O 56 .510 19*400 23.819 145.479
3 . ( 2 ) X 0 .3 3  9 .187 6 .0 4 7  18.817 6 .4 6 0  7 .9 5 0  48.441
4 . Total ( 1+2+3 ) 4 8 .6 7 7  90.847 141.627 7 2 .2 4 0  80 .385  435.776
Table 2. VALUE ADDED BY THE PROJECT
■ Thousand TL
Years ( l ) 1970 1971 1972 1973
1. S a la r ie s  and Wapces 6 .4 5 0 9 .7 0 0 9 .7 0 0 9 .7 0 0
2. Depre cia tion. 2 1 .7 0 0 21 .700 21 .700 21.700
3 . I n t e r e s t 1 5 .7 0 0 15 .700 1 5 .7 0 0 15 .700
4 . Rent M. - - -
5 . Taxes 1 3 .9 0 0 34 .900 38.100 38 .500
6. P r o f i t s -  260 26.100 51 .6 0 0 32 .7 0 0
7. j /th p rs _____________________ ____ _________________ ___________________510 _ ________970__________________ 1 .0 5 8  _ 1 .0 3 6
8 . Total Value Added (A) _________ 58 .000  _ ÀO9 .0 7 0  _ _ _ . l i 7 . 836_ . . . . . ..bl9.."556
( 1 ) The cap ac ity  u t i l ized  i s  4I rer cent in 1970 , 88 per cent in 1'
and 100 per cent in 1972 and 1 973 .
( 1 ) 0 ,0 8  X '(3Accounting fo re ia n  exchange rate  w i l l  be  ^ 2 .99 ILL., hirhr
than the o f f i c i a l  r a te ,  b r in ain- the i n t r i n s i c  va lue to  l /  = 9 ,08+2.99:  
12,.07  T .L iras .
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The in c re a se  in  the value added in  the  f i r s t  4 y-^ars o f  ^'he p ro je c t  opera tion  
i s  due to  a r i s e  in the  c a p a c i ty  from 4I  per cen t in 1970 to  88 per cent in  
1971 and 100 per cent in 1972 and 1973* With the  capacity/ hein-’' f u l l  a f t e r  
1973} the  value  added was assumed to  remain the  same f o r  the  r e s t  of the  
p r o j e c t ' s  l i f e .
The f ig u r e s  given f o r  sal,- r i e s  and wages in c lu d e ,  as we saw in 
Chapter 6, payments f o r  h igh le v e l  a d m in is t r a to r s ,  te c h n ic ia n s ,  s k i l l e d  and 
u n sk i l le d  w orkers. Since du ring  the  opera tion  of the  p la n ts  the  t o t a l  number 
of personnel, i s  e stim ated  to remain 755} the f ig u re  fo r  s a l a r i e s  and wages 
i s  given to  be the  same fo r  the  f i r s t  years  of the  p r o je c t  (w ith  the  exception 
of 1970 , where the cap ac ity  i s  sm a l l) .  The pa?/ment to  personnel amounts to  
9.7  m i l l io n  T, b i rd s  per annum.
D eprec ia tion  in  the  SFO's A ppraisal Form was c a lc u la te d  on the  
b a s is  of the  l i n e a r  d e p re c ia t io n  method which im plies  t h a t  the  volume of 
investm ent in  the  form of renewable f ixed  a s s e t s  (machinery, b u i ld in g  e t c . )  
i s  d ivided by the  number of y ears  of l i f e  assigned to them*
S im ila r ly ,  when t o t a l  investment of 433.766.000 T.L, i s  d ivided by 
the l i f e s p a n  of the  p ro je c t ,  which i s  20 y e a rs ,  the  annual d ep re c ia t io n  to  be 
app rop ria ted  amounts to  T.L. 21*700 (more exac t f ig u re  i s  21.688 thousand 
Turki sh 1i r d s ) .
The i n t e r e s t  ch a rares included in th e  value added Table are  c a lc u la te d  
s e p a ra te ly  from the d e p re c ia t io n  charges. The i n t e r e s t  charges are  shov/n 
in terms of "eq u iv a len t  annual cost"  of the c a p i t a l  subject- to  d e p re c ia t io n  
and i n t e r e s t  charges . The computation of d e p re c ia t io n  and i n t e r e s t  cost 
annually  can be derived  from the  fo llow ing  formula:
C a p i ta l  Recovery F ac to r  ( c . r . f . )  = -^  +
where i  i s  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  n the number of years  and I  the 
o r ig in a l  investm en t.  The f i r s t  term of the r i g h t  hand s id e  / i v e s  the annual
( 1 ) „ VThe main d i f f e r e n c e  between t h i s  method and the s in k in g  fund merhod i s  th a r  
the former makes no assumption as to  the  d e s t in a t io n  of th e  r e s e rv e .  Sink­
ing  fund m-thod assumes t h a t  a f ixed  quota a t  compound i n t e r e s t  w i l l  te  
deposited  a t  the  end of each year in o rder  to  r ro v id e  a sum equal to  the  
o r ig in a l  investm ent . "Sinking fund fa c to r "  can be expressed as:
( s . f . f , )  = ------------— , where I  i s  the  i n i t i a l  investm ent, i  the r a t e
(1 + i) " -  1
of i n t e r e s t  and n th/---> l i f e s p a n  of the  asse t*  Here the amount of am ortiz ­
a t i o n /
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l i n e a r  d e p re c ia t io n  cost and the  second term g ives the  annual i n t e r e s t  i ) s t s ,  
Since o r ig i n a l  investm ent involved hy the p ro je c t  I  = 433.776.000 T .L ,,  
n = 20 y ears  and th e  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  applied  1 = 7 pe r  c en t ,  l i n e a r  de]':?ec- 
i a t i o n  c o s t  and a ’-'pual i n t e r e s t  co s t  becomes:
433 . 776.000  0 . 07 ( 20+1 )
c . r . i .  = - -  20 + ^2^x 20"
c . r . f .  = 21.689.000 + (0 .0367) X I
c . r . f .  = 21.689.000 T.L. + i 5 . 6i 9 .OOO T.L.
D eprec ia tion  I n t e r e s t  c o s t
The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  ap p lied  by the SPO i s  7 pe r cen t and both 
œ m puta tions  were based on t h i s  r a t e .  This r a t e  i s  the  minimum r a te  th a t  
was ap n lied  to  p ub lic  i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  by the  S ta te  Investm ent Dank.^^^
Taxes (item  5) nre a lso  included in  va lue  added as a d i r e c t  
component. There i s  no exp lana tion  in r e fe re n c e  to  tax es  in the p ro je c t  
p resented  to  the  SPO, but i t  seems th a t  t h i s  f ig u re  re p re se n ts  d i r e c t  and 
in d i r e c t  taxes  taken to g e th e r .  Taxes seem to  c o n s t i tu t e  the  l a r g e s t  d i r e c t
component of the  value  added as can be seen from T a b le .0.
D ire c t  taxes  here  inc lude  c o r ro ra t io n  ta x  which i s  lev ied  as 35 
per cent over gross p r o f i t s  to  be achieved by the  Gaycuraa p la n t .  The 
i n d i r e c t  ta x ,  on the  o th e r  hand, i s  the  production ta x  which i s  charged on 
the  value of g ross p roduction  as 15 pe r  cen t over the  l a t t e r .
P r o f i t s  ( item  6) r e p re s e n t  ne t p r o f i t s  a f t e r  deducting  co rnora tion  
ta x  which i s  mentioned above. At the beginning the  paper and c e l lu lo se
p la n t  (1970) i s  working a t  41 per cent cap ac ity  and thus  i t  i s  making a
lo s s  of 2-60,000 T. L i ra s .  But t h i s  lo s s  i s  recovered in  1971 by reach ing  
a c ap ac ity  of 88 per cen t and the  p la n t  i s  making a p r o f i t  of 26.100.000 
T, L i ra s .  Also, a p r o f i t  of 31,600.000 T.L. and 37-700.000 T.L, in 1972
(c o n td .)  a t io n  i s  comuuted by m u lt ip ly in g  the o r ig in s]  investm ent with the 
"s in k in g  fund f a c to r " .  For both formulae, see United Nations -  Manual on 
Economic Development P r o je c t s ,  New York, 1958. rp ,132-136.
(^^The S ta te  Investment Bank (SIB) may sometimes charge a r a t e  which i s  above 
7 per cen t ceuending on the  n a tu re  of the p r o je c t .  In p ra c t ic e  the  r a te  
th e re fo re ,  v a r ie s  between 7 pe^: cent and 9 r e r  c en t .  An in te rv iew  with 
B. B enderliog lu , SPO, J a n . -F e b . ,  Ankara, I 969 .
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and 1973 r e s p e c t iv e ly  ( in  the  l a s t  two years  the  u t i l i z e d  cap ac ity  i s  ICO 
per c e n t ) . ^
The f ig u r e s  aiven under "o thers"  ( i tem  7 ) inc ludes  items such as 
s o c ia l  s e c u r i ty  funds and insurance  charges*
I I I .  FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARIONGS: In Table 5 the  foreign-exchange
earn ings (o r  sav ings) of the  Gaycuma u ro je c t  a re  shown in  terms of g ross and 
n e t v a lu e .  I t  i s  s ta te d  in the  SPO A pnraisal Form t h a t  the nro.ject does not 
involve fo re ig n  exchange snending during  the  o p e ra t io n  of the  m ner and
( 2 )c e l lu lo s e  p la n ts .  / Conseauently , the  n e t  fo re ig n  exchange savings of the  
p ro je c t  i s  s im i la r  to  the  gross fo re ig n  exchange savings (compare item ( l )  
w ith  item ( 2) ) .
The gross  fo re ig n  exchange savings r e s u l t i n g  from the  p ro je c t  i s  
derived by m u lt ip ly in g  ( c i f )  import p r ic e s  o f  lo?aft paper, k r a f t - l i n e r  and 
semi-chemical c e l lu lo s e  which a re  d o m estica lly  produced, with the  volume of 
p roduction  s u b s t i t u t i n g  the  im porta tion  of th ese  goods. (See Table 3>a) ,
In  the  SPO A ppra isa l  Form, i t  i s  pointed out th a t  ( c i f )  import p r ic e s  are  
1.600  T.L. f o r  k r a f t  paper and k r a f t - l i n e r ,  700 T.L. f o r  semi-chemical 
c e l lu lo s e ,  the  l a t t e r  r i s i n g  to  900 T.L. in  1975. The ( c i f )  import pi"ices 
f o r  th ese  s u b s t i tu te d  paper products  belong to the  y e a r  I 964 . In the  
p re lim in a ry  ev a lu a t io n  of the  fo re ig n  exchange sav ings , th e  ahove-'mentioned 
import p r ic e s  a re  used as a f i r s t  approxim ation. These p r ic e s  were l a t e r  
changed. ^
Table 5 . P r o j e c t ’ s Foreign Exchange Savings (o r  Earnings) 
____________________________________ (Thousand Turk ish  L ira s )
Years 1970 1971 1972 1975
1. Foreign Exchange
Savings (o r  Earnings) 60.800 I I 7 .OOO 126.000 126.000
2. Foreign Exchange 
Spending
3 . Net Foreign Exchange
 Sav inas  (o r  Earnings)____60_.J300______lJ:2rOQP_____ 126,000____ 1,?^*0Q0_
4 .  ( 3) X 0 .3 3 3 (B)____%..268_______ 6 0 . 93)5______ .63_.952_______6 3 .952
 ^ ^Though the p la n t  i s  working: a t  ICO per cent c ap a c i ty  th e re  i s  a d i f f e re n c e  
in p r o f i t s  in 1972 and 1973 and th i s  i s  due to  0i f fe ro n t  composition in the 
product-m ix. In te rv iew  with B. B enderliog lu , Ankara, I 969 .
( 2)This p o in t  i s  a lso  confirmed in  the recen t tyrped document I obtained from 
B. B enderliog lu , a P lanner a t  the  SFO, Ankara (L ec .1969) .  This im plies  
th a t  f u e l s ,  chemicals and a l l  o th e r  o pe ra ting  items a re  do m est ica lly  pro­
vided accord ing  to  the  inform ation  given*
(?)/
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Table 3 a .
Thousand T. L iras
P la n t  Import p r ic e s  Years Production  Foreign Exch*
s e l l i ng p r ic e s  L.ciTJ1.964)_____________ Q uantity  ( ton ) Value Savings ( c i f )
K ra f t-p a p e r  
2.500  T'L
K r a f t - l i n e r
2.500 t-L
Semi-chemical 





c e l lu lo s e  l.jOOr.L 900
1970 27.000  +  1 1 .0 0 0  97.000  60*800
1971 46.000 + 19.000
+11 .000 + 8 .0 0 0 195.000 117.000
1972 46.000 + 19.000
+ 20 ,000  + 11*000 197.000  126 .000
1973 46.000  + 19.000
+ 20 .000  + 1 1 .0 0 0  197.000  126 .000
However, the  fo re ig n  exchange savinas of th e  Gaycuma p ro je c t  
a re  c a lc u la te d  as the  amount which corresponds to the  d i f f e r e n c e  betvreen the 
o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e  and the  "shadow" fo re ig n  exchange r a t e  (see  Table 
3, row 4 )* T herefo re , fo re ig n  exchange savings th a t  are  c a lc u la te d  a t  
o f f i c i a l  r a t e  a re  m u l t ip l ie d  by 0.33 per cent in  o rd e r  to  f ind  the  r e a l  
fo re ig n  exchange savings of the  p r o je c t .  The fo re ig n  exchange savings in 
the f i r s t  fo u r  yea rs  of the  p lan t  o p e ra tion  are  then  found to  be 20,268 
thousand T, L iras  in 1970, 60,995 thousand T.L. in  1971 arid 63*952 thousand 
T.L. both in  1972 and 1973-
IV. BEHEFin^S TO THE CON SLIDERS - C orrec tion  from Consumers'
P o in t of View:
In the  A ppra isa l  Form s e l l i n g  u r ic e s  of the  th re e  major p roducts ,  
t h a t  i s  k r a f t  r a p e r ,  k r a f t - l i n e r  and semi-chemical c e l lu lo s e ,  a re  given 
before  the  p ro je c t  comes in to  ex is ten ce  and a lso  a f t e r  the  p ro je c t  i s  
completed. The s e l l i n g  p r ic e s  before  the  p ro je c t  a re  given as 1,200 T.L. 
per ton f o r  semi-chemical c e l lu lo s e ,  2,640 T.L. per ton fo r  k r a f t  paper and 
2,540 T.L, pe r ton f o r  k r a f t  l i n e r  (see Table 4 ) .  Sa les  p r ic e s  a f t e r  the
.-chemical c e l lu lo se  
CO TL. re  s u e c t iv e -
( co n td ,)/ y \
\^^(CLF) lm""ort p r ic e s  f o r  k r a f t  paper, k r a f t - l i n e r  and sem 
were l a t e r  changed as 16''6 TL. (pe r  to n ) ,  1656 TL., and ■ 
l y * 'Jhir change, i t  i s  s-ii d , was due to  moire r e f in e d  inform ation  rb ta in -  d 
by the  SPO a t  th r  ti+ie of a r a r o i s a l .  B, B enderliog lu , A p r iv a te  l e t t e r ,  
December I 969 , Ankara,
( 1 )These f ig u r e s  a re  wrong s ince  th e re  i s  an e r r o r  in  the  murtip l i c a t io n  
c a r r ie d  or.t in row A of Table 3« This w i l l  be co rrec ted  in C h - r te r  8.
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p r o je c t ,  on the  o th e r  hand, a re  estim ated  to  be 1,150 TL per ton fo r  se ii l-
( 1 'chemical c e l l u lo s e ,  2,500 TL p e r  ton fo r  k r a f t  paper and k r a f t  l i n e r ,  •
Then the  SFO A ppra isa l Form has taken the  d i f fe re n c e  between t ne 
s a le  p r ic e s  of the  f a c to ry  products  before  and a f t e r  the  p ro je c t  as r e p re s e n t ­
ing  a p r ic e  d i f f e re n c e  per ton of these  goods* ' As can be seen from Table 4» 
row 5, u n i t  p r ic e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  50 TL per ton of semi-chemical c e l lu lo s e ,  
and 40 TL pe r  ton o f  both  k r a f t  paper and k r a f t - l i n e r .
Table 4 . C orrec tion  from the  Consumers’ P o in t of View '"in terms
of p r ic e  red u c t io n s)
Years 1970
1 s t  y e a r
1971 1973
2nd y e a r   ............ __________
 1 2_..; 1
1.
3 .
S e l l in g  p r ic e  of 
the  product before  
the  p ro je c t  ( TL)____
S e l l in g  p r ic e  of the  
product a f t e r  the
(TL)_________
Unit pr.i ce d i f f e r -
________
1200 ‘2540.2540  1200 ,2540:2540
J I I .5O-
*+Production  volume - 
-?A.. s u b s t i t u t i on ( to n )  ^ _ j 38.000
5 . C orrec tion  f o r  Con­
sumers (3x4) C* + 1520
.... n_5P_ ^2500 
 50______ 40







Notes: 1 r e f e r s  to  semi-chemical c e l lu lo se
2 r e f e r s  to  k ra f t - p a p e r
3 r e f e r s  to  k r a f t - l i n e r
■^These f ig u re s  a re  in  terms of thousand Turkish L i r a s . 
-X"*There i s  no production  of semi-chemical c e l lu lo s e  in the 
f i r s t  y ea r  of the  p la n t  o p e ra t io n .
(1)Production  c o s t  of the  fa c to ry  i s  estim ated to  be 2,506 TL r e r  t r n ,  f o r  
k r a f t  paper, 2,306 TL per ton  f o r  k r a f t  l i n e r ,  and 870 TL oer ton fo r  sem: 
chemical c e l l u lo s e .  These fi^cm'p- s^ a re  given in  a recen t  document I 
obtained from the SPO. (U. B enderliog lu , a p r iv a te  l e t t e r ,  Ankara, 
December 1969).
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Given the  t o t a l  volume of domestic p roduction  th a t  i s  s u b s t i t u t i n g  
f o r  imports in e«'ch group of pa^er products and a lso  the  p r ice  d i f fe re n c e  
per u n i t  (p e r  ton) in each in d iv id u a l  p roduct, b e n e f i t s  th a t  a re  accru ing  
to consumers in terms of p r ic e  reduc tions  are  worked out.^^^ This i s  done 
simply by m u lt ip ly in g  the former (item  4 ) with the l a t t e r  f ig u re  (item  3) .  
Consequently the b e n e f i t s  acc ru ing  to consumers a re  presented  to be 1,520 
thousand TL. in 1970, 3»510 thousand TL. in  1971 and 4,110 thousand TL. in 
1972. The l a t t e r  f igu re ,w h ich  corresponds to  the f u l l  c ap ac ity  of the  p la n t ,  
was assumed to be co n s tan t  throughout the  l i f e  of the  p r o je c t .
The b e n e f i t s  to  consumers’ aspec t of the  p ro je c t  eva lu a tio n  r a i s e s  
many im portan t problems. For in s ta n ce ,  questions  which can be asked are ;
- a re  the  co s t  assumptions r e a l i s t i c  ones?
“ a re  the  t r a n s p o r t  co s ts  to  the  consumer cen tre s  taken in to  
account?
- how f a r  a re  the  es t im ates  of s a le  p r ic e s  o f  th e  f ' c t o r y  
r e a l i s t i c ?  e t c .
These questions  w i l l  be taken up in  more d e t a i l  in Chapter 8*
V. EMFLOYFLiFT FFFFCT OF THE PROJECT: Employment e f f e c t  of the
Gaycuma p ro je c t  i s  in d ica ted  in  the  SPO A ppraisal Form only in re fe ren ce  
to  the u n s k i l le d  labour . Wages paid to the  u n sk i l le d  v/orkers a re  ad justed  
downward by app ly ing  a shadow wage ra te ,w h ich  i s  taken as a h a l f  of the  
market wage r a t e  in th a t  reg io n . The SPO have simply m u lt ip l ied  the  wage 
payments to  u n sk i l le d  labour (Table 5, item ( l ) )  by the pre-determ ined 
c o e f f i c i e n t  of 0 .5  so as to ob ta in  the co rrec ted  wage payments to the 
u n s k i l le d  workers.
The SPO p lanners  appear to  be aware of th e  f a c t  th a t  the market 
wage r a t e  of u n s k i l le d  workers w i l l  overestim ate  the " in t r i n s i c "  value of 
labour. But th e re  i s  no in form ation  a v a i la b le  to exp lain  why the market 
wage r a t e  was co rrec ted  downward by 50 per cen t.  Also I  have not been able
( j )
 ^ ' / I t  was explained to  me th a t  the reason why the s e l l i n g  p r ic e  of imrorted 
goods i s  h ig h e r  than the  domestic s e l j i n g  p r ic e  o f  th e  same products a f t e r  
the p ro je c t  i s  because the  former inc ludes customs duty , t r a n s p o r t  cos t  
and p r o f i t  margin of the im porter .
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t o  f in d  w h eth er  t h i s  a d ju s tm e n t  was c a r r i e d  o u t  on th e  b a s i s  o f  r e g i o n a l  un­
employment prob lem  o r  o v e r a l l  unemployment c o n d i t i o n s  p r e v a i l i n g  in  th e  
c o u n t i y .
F u r th e r ,  a s  can be se e n  from th e  A p p r a i s a l  Form, th e r e  i s ,  a s  in  
t h e  c a s e  o f  S’EKA R e p o r t ,  no r e f e r e n c e  to  i n d i r e c t  employment b e n e f i t s  t h a t  
m ig h t  a c c r u e  t o  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  a s  a con seq u en ce  o f  in n l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  th e  
Gaycuraa p r o j e c t . T h e  s h o r tc o m in g s  o f  th e  SPO method on t h i s  p rob lem  w i l l  
be d i s c u s s e d  in  more d e t a i l  in  th e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r .
V I . TOTAL BENEFIT FLOWS: As can be see n  from  T a b le  6 ,  t o t a l  f l o w s
o f  b e n e f i t s  co m p r ise  t o t a l  v a l u e  added, f o r e i g n  ex ch a n g e  s a v i n g s  r e s u l t i n g  
from th e  p r o j e c t ,  b e n e f i t s  t o  consum ers and employment e f f e c t  o f  th e  p r o j e c t .
T o t a l  b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  p r o j e c t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  from 80,353 thou sand  
T .L . i n  1 9 7 0  t o  188,248 th ou sand  T .L .  in  1973 a s  a c o n seq u en ce  o f  a change in  
th e  u t i l i z e d  c a p a c i t y  o f  th e  p l a n t s .  The t o t a l  b e n e f i t  f l o w  in  1973 i s  
assumed t o  rem ain  c o n s t a n t  th r o u g h o u t  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  p r o j e c t  s i n c e  t h i s  
f i g u r e  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  th e  f u l l  c a p a c i t y  o p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  p l a n t .  A n oth er  
assu m p tio n  h e r e  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be no p r i c e  ch a n g es  d u r in g  t h e  l i f e s p a n  
o f  th e  p r o j e c t  t o  a l t e r  th e  f i g u r e s  g iv e n  i n  t h e  T a b le .
As i s  m ention ed  e a r l i e r ,  th e  SPO p la n n e r s  h a v e  in t r o d u c e d  shadow  
p r i c e s  b o th  f o r  f o r e i g n  ex ch a n g e  r a t e  and m arket wage r a t e  o f  u n s k i l l e d  
w o r k e r s .  The p r i c e s  a p p l i e d  in  th e  co m p u ta t io n  o f  a l l  o t h e r  c o s t  and 
b e n e f i t  i t e m s  a re  m arket p r i c e s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  t r a n s p o r t  and e n e r g y  c o s t s  
w h ich  e n t e r  o p e r a t i n g  c o s t s  o f  th e  p r o j e c t  a re  c a l c u l a t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
m arket p r i c e s .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a c c o u n t in g  p r i c e s  have been p a r t i a l l y  adopted ,  
The i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  k in d  o f  p r i c i n g  p o l i c y  a s  f a r  a s  p r o j e c t  e v a l u a t i o n  
i s  co n cern ed  w i l l  be d e fe r r e d  u n t i l  th e  n e x t  ch a p ter *
I t  i s  a l s o  w orth  s t r e s s i n ,^  t h a t  the t o t a l  b e n e f i t  f l o w s  which a r e  
in c lu d e d  in  T a b le  6 a r e  d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  and do n o t  i n c l u d e  i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  
o f  t h e  p r o j e c t .  As we s h a l l  arg u e  l a t e r ,  m ost o f  th e  b e n e f i t s  a re  v i a  
backward and forw ard  l i n k a g e s  and t h e s e  ought t o  be b ro u g h t  i n t o  c o s t - b e n e f i t
^ ' ^ I t  i s  s t a t e d  by B. B e n d e r l i o g l u ,  a p la n n e r  o f  th e  SPO, t h a t  "employment 
e f f e c t "  c r i t e r i o n  was n o t  a p p l i e d  in  th e  p r o j e c t  e v a l u a t i o n  by th e  SPC',
I  am t o l d  t h a t  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  h « s  n o t  been d e v e lo p e d  enough t o  have seme 
a p i ' l i c a b i l i t y  d u r in g  th e  f i r s t  P la n .  o ee  B, B e n d e r l i o g l u ,  a p la n n e r  in  
th e  SPO, a p r i v a t e  u ntyped  l e t t e r ,  December I 9 6 9 , p . 2.
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Table Employment E f f e c t  of the  P ro je c t
  ____________________       Thousand^ T L i r q s ____
Years 1970 1971 1972
1. Pa^.rment to  U nsk illed
Labour (T. L irq s) 1,130 1,700 1,700
2, C o e f f ic ie n t 0 .5 0 .5 0 .5
3. Employment E f fe c t
( 1 x 2 )  D 565 850 850
Table 6. T o ta l  B en e f i t  Flows of the P ro je c t
Thousand T, L iras
Years 1970 1971 1972 1973
T ota l Value Added A 58.000 109.070 117.836 119.336
Net Foreign Exchange 
Savings (C orrec ted) B 20*268 60.955 63.952 63.952
C orrec tion  f o r  Consumers
C
1.520 3.510 4.110 4.110
Employment E f f e c t  B 565 850 850 850
TOTAL (A+B+C-hl)) 80.353 174.385 186.748 188.248
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a n a ly s is  f o r  an ap p ro p r ia te  assessment of the  p r o je c t .
V I I . PRESENT VALUE OF INVESTM3NT AND BEiiEFIT FLOV/S
Table 7 n re sen ts  the  c a p i t a l  o u tlay  of the  Gaycuraa r r o j e c t  which 
i s  spread over f iv e  y e a rs ,  s t a r t i n g  from I 966 to  1970*
The p re sen t  worth f a c to r s  ( pwf) which a re  included in  the  Table 
correspond to  a d iscount r a t e  of 12 per c en t .  In o th e r  words, the  SPO 
p lanners  have chosen a 12 per cent d iscount r a t e  f o r  computing the p re sen t  
value of c a p i t a l  flows as w ell as b e n e f i t  f low s. As converted to  I 966 
base y ear ,  the  p resen t  va lue  o f investment disbursements i s  worked out to 
be 3O8 , 2;14 thousand T .L ,,  in s te ad  of i t s  market value of 453,776 thousand 
T,L.
Table 7» P resen t Worth of the Investment Expenditure
Years Flow of Investment 
Expenditure
Presen t Worth 
Fac tor; a t  
12 pe r cent
P resen t  Worth of 
Investment
1 48.677 .8929 43.463
2 90.847 .7972 72.423
3 141.627 ..7I I 8 100.810
4 72.240 .6355 45.908




S im ila r ly ,  p resen t worth f a c to r s  which correspond to a 12 per 
cen t d iscount r a t e  are app lied  to  the  b e n e f i t  flows of the  p ro je c t  in order 
to  b r in g  them back to p re sen t  day. The p resen t value of t o t a l  b e n e f i t  
flows amounts to  824,664 thousand T, L irqs (see  Table 8 ) .
The choice of a d iscount r a t e  fo r  p re sen t  value (PV) computations, 
i s  the  most im portant problem in  the s o c ia l  b e n e f i t  c o s t  a n a ly s i s .  The 
t h e o r e t i c a l  d iscu ss io n  on th'=’ s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a te  and the  re le v a n t  d iscount 
r a te  f o r  underdeveloped c o u n tr ie s  w i l l  be reserved  fo r  the  fo llow ing  
ch ap te r .  The basic  reasons f o r  choosing a 12 per cent d iscoun t r a t e  in 
Turkey w i l l  a lso  be ap p ra ised .
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V III .  BSFEjTT-COST MTIO; The b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  o f  the  
Gaycuma p ro je c t  was simoly worked out by d iv id in g  the  t o t a l  p re sen t value 
of b e n e f i t s  during  the  l i f e s p a n  of the  p ro je c t  (which i s  20 y ea rs )  by 
the t o t a l  p resen t value of c a p i t a l  expenditure  involved during  i t s  c o n s tru c ­
tion. p e r io d .  The b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  of the  Üaycuma p ro je c t  was found to  
be 2.67} which was taken as a base fo r  the admission o f the p ro je c ts
The b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  = PV of B en e f i t  flows
PV of Investment flows
_ 824.664 
3 0 8 .214 2.67
Table 8 . P resen t Worth of the Plow of B en e f i ts
Years B en e f i t  Plows P resen t Worth 
Pac tor: 12 
pe r  cent
P resen t  worth of 
B en e f i ts
5 8 0 . 3 5 3 ' 5 6 7 4 45.592
6 174.385 . 5066 88.343
7 186.748 .4523 84.4668 1 8 8 . 2 4 8 .4039 76.033
9 188,248 .3606 67.882
10 188.248 .3220 60,615
11 188.248 . 2 8 7 5 54.121
12 M .2567 48.323
13 I I .2292 43.146
14 11 . 2046 38.515
15 II .1827 34.392
16 11 .1631 30.703
17 II .1456 27.408
18 I I .1300 24.472
19 I I .1161 21,855
20 I t .1037 19.521
21 I I .0926 17.431
22 I t . 0 8 2 6 15.549
23 I I . 0 7 3 8 13.89224______ I I ___ % 0 6 5 9 ___ _______ 12_,40_5_
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ClUPTJIFt 8.
APPRAISAL AM) CRITICISM OF THE S P 0 PLACERS' EVALUATION
In what fo llow s, the  v a rio u s  a sp ec ts  of the SPG's p r o je c t  ev a lu a tio n  
technique adopted in  the Caycnma p ro je c t  w i l l  be a sse ssed .  Some of the
po in ts  which w i l l  he r a is e d  in  th i s  Chapter are  r e le v a n t  no t only to  Caycuina 
p ro je c t  but to  a l l  pub lic  in d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s .  The Tables I r e f e r  to  in  
the  following s e c t io n s ,  a re  the  ones c i t e d  in  Chapter ?•
I -  D e f in i t io n  of Value Added
The major problems involved in  p r o je c t  a n a ly s is  a re  the  composition of the 
value added c re a te d  by the p ro je c t  and the p r ic e s  to  be used in  computing 
various  items inc luded  in  the value added. These two is su e s  w i l l  be examined 
in  tu rn  in  r e sp e c t  to the Caycuma paper and C ellu lo se  p r o je c t .
The value added i s  fo rm ally  expressed as the d i f f e r e n c e  between the sa le s  
value of the es tim ated  p roduction  in  the p ro je c t  and the purchases from o ther 
e n te r p r i s e s  ( i . e .  raw m a te r ia l s ,  energy, fu e l ,  lu b r i c a n t s ,  t r a n s p o r t  e t c . )  
and i s  num erica lly  equal to  the t o t a l  of s a l a r i e s ,  wages, r e n t ,  i n t e r e s t  and 
p r o f i t s ^ .
Value added can be e i t h e r  n e t  or g ross and es tim ated  a t  f a c to r  co s t  or market 
p r ic e  according to whether d e p re c ia t io n  on in d i r e c t  tax es  and su b s id ie s  are 
excluded. I f  the  former, value added i s  c a lc u la te d  on a n e t  b a s is ;  i f  the 
l a t t e r ,  i t  i s  computed a t  f a c to r  c o s t .
From the layou t of Table 2, one can see th a t  value added concept t h a t  the 
p lanners  have used i s  the  g ross value added a t  market p r ic e s  s ince d e p re c ia t io n  
and in d i r e c t  taxes a re  inc luded . Fqu the n e t  value added (NTA) to be caJcu- 
l a t e d  d e p re c ia t io n  should be excluded from the gross p roduction  v a lu e , This 
w i l l  give n e t  value added a t  market p r ic e s .  I f ,  on the o ther hand, d ep rec ia ­
t io n ,  in d i r e c t  taxes and su b s id ie s  are  deducted from the gross p roduction  
value then th a t  w i l l  give n e t  value added (NVA) a t  f a c to r  c o s t .
From/
1, U.N. -  Manual on Economic Development P r o je c t s .  United N ations, 
New York, 1958. p . 220.
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From the s tan d p o in t  of a p r iv a te  f irm , what i s  re le v a n t  i s  the  ne t va li  e 
added a t  f a c to r  c o s t .  In  o the r  words, gross p roduc tion  minus d e p re c ia t io n ,  
i n d i r e c t  taxes  and s u b s id ie s .  But fo r  a pub lic  p r o je c t  ev a lu a t io n  d e p rec ia ­
t io n ,  and in d i r e c t  taxes  ( taxes  on in p u ts )  should be inc luded  fo r  the value 
added e s t im a te s .  Therefore , the p la n n e r s ’ concept of value added whict 
inc ludes  d e p re c ia t io n  i s  an ap p ro p r ia te  one.
A c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of an im portant p o in t may a lso  be r e le v a n t  h e re .  Computation 
of value added f o r  pub lic  and p r iv a te  s ec to rs  w i l l  d i f f e r  in  re sp ec t  to  the 
trea tm en t of d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  taxeso D ire c t  taxes  and in d i r e c t  taxes are  
excluded from the  value added e s t im a tio n  of the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  because the 
main goal i s  to  maximise p r o f i t s  n e t  of ta x es .  From pub lic  s e c to r  p o in t  of 
view, d i r e c t  taxes  need to be included in  the t o t a l  Value Added. The in ­
d i r e c t  ta x e s ,  on the o ther  hand, w i l l  n e c e s s i ta te  a f u r th e r  adjustm ent which 
w i l l  be taken  up l a t e r  on. This p o in t  i s  o f te n  confused and may a lso  lead  
to  some se r io u s  m isunderstanding on the  p a r t  of Value Added computation. Tpe 
p r in c ip le  behind the d e f in i t i o n  and e s t im atio n  of Value Added must be borne in  
mind when dea lin g  w ith  investment a p p ra i s a l .
The second problem a r i s e s  when i t  i s  asked what p r i c e s ,  market or shadow 
p r i c e s ,  to apply in  the computation of value added and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the 
var ious  items i t  comprises.
I t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  acknowledged th a t  market p r ic e s  in  developing co u n tr ie s  are 
o f te n  u n s u i ta b le ,  but th e re  i s  l e s s  agreement on the  degree of market imper­
fe c t io n s  and hence on the  need to evolve shadow p r i c e s .  Some economists who 
a re  s c e p t ic a l  of a proper de term ina tion  of shadow p r ic e s  argue th a t  market 
p r ic e s  fo r  a l l  t h e i r  im pefections should be p re fe re d .  Most economists, 
however, argue t h a t  market p r ic e s  a re  d e fe c t iv e  fo r  the reasons which I have
e x ten s iv e ly  explained in  Chapter 3^, and thus so c ia l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is
2cannot be imagined w ithout the a p p l ic a t io n  of shadow p r ic e s  .
Market p r ic e s  would re p re se n t  the t ru e  value of goods and se rv ice s  i f  the 
law of supply and demand opera tes  f r e e ly  under p e r f e c t  com petitive  cond itions  
w ith  f u l l  employment of a l l  re sou rces  and complete m o b il i ty  of a l l  f a c to r s .  
I f , /
1. For a f u l l  d iscu ss io n  of market im perfec tions  see Chapter 3*
2, A compromise i s  sometimes reached by re c o n c i l in g  the  disadvantages of 
both market and shadow p r ic e s .  I t  i s  suggested to draw up two column 
schedule of the  c o s ts  of a p ro je c t  expressed both in  market and in  
shadow p r i c e s .  That way a double check may be provided . D.hk Cost- 
B enefit  A nalysis  of Socia l P r o je c t s .  ' Research I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Social 
Development and Office of Social A f f a i r s .  Report No.7 . ,  Geneva, A p r i l ,  
1966, p . 22.
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I f ,  because of any in te r f e r e n c e ,  o b s tac le s  or r e g u la t io n s ,  these  cond itions  
do no t e x i s t  then  the p r ic e  system w i l l  be d i s to r t e d .  I t  w i l l  no t c o r re s ­
pond any longer to th a t  id ea l  system of equ ilib rium  nor re p re se n t  the Ac,lue 
of the fa c to r s  from the p o in t  of view of the so c ie ty  as a whole.
I t  i s  then  necessa ry  to c o r re c t  market p r ic e s  in  order to  ob ta in  what has 
been termed th e  ’’so c ia l  c o s t” of the  f a c to r s .  In  o the r  words: Should
custom d u t ie s  and t a r i f f s  be included in  the  c o s t ,  or should the c o s t  of 
imported goods be c a lc u la te d  a t  the o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e ,  or should the 
market wage r a te  be the p r ic e  of labour which is  in  su rp lus  in  underdeveloped 
c o u n tr ie s?
The answers to such questions  r a i s e  p r ic in g  problems; p r ic e  m odif ica tions  
f a l l  in to  two groups: (a) e l im in a tin g  the e f f e c t  of taxes  or su b s id ie s  from
the p r ic e s ,  (b) use of so -c a l le d  so c ia l  opportun ity  c o s ts  of fa c to rs  of 
p roduction .
The f i r s t  p r ic e  m o d if ica t io n  inc ludes  the e l im in a t io n  of in d i r e c t  taxes  and 
su b s id ie s  in  o rder to o b ta in  the t ru e  p r ice  of goods and se rv ice s  produced. 
For in s ta n c e ,  i f  the re  a re  custom d u t ie s  on the raif m a te r ia ls  imported these  
in d i r e c t  taxes  should be excluded from the market c o s t  of raw m a te r ia l s .
A lso , i f  th e re  i s  a s a le s  tax  imposed on p r ic e s  then  t h i s  amount of tax  must 
be e lim ina ted  i f  the  t ru e  s a le  p r ic e  i s  to be e s t im a te d ,
The p r ic e s  of f a c to r s  of p roduction  ( labour, c a p i t a l  and fo re ig n  exchange) 
must a lso  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  opportun ity  co s ts  and th i s  in  p r in c ip le  i s  s c a r c i ty  
p r i c e s .  These p r ic e s  depend on the supply and demand fo r  such fa c to r s  of 
p roduction . Although such co s ts  can o f ten  be taken as being expressed by 
the market p r ic e s  of the  resources  in  q uestion  in  developed c o u n t r ie s ,  the 
same cannot be sa id  fo r  developing co u n tr ie s  where c a p i t a l ,  c o s t  and fo re ig n  
exchange r a t e  are  underestim ated  and labour c o s t  i s  overestim ated . Hence 
c a p i t a l  c o s t  ( i n t e r e s t  r a t e )  and fo re ig n  exchange r a t e  need an upward a d ju s t ­
ment while the labour c o s t  needs a downward ad justm ent in  order to r e f l e c t  
t h e i r  s c a r c i t y  va lues^ .
1. These adjustm ents become more apparent e s p e c ia l ly  when public  
p ro je c t s  are  concerned. When d ec is io n  has to be taken by the 
pub lic  a u th o r i ty  and Jias to be j u s t i f i e d  in  terms of inc rease  in  
the s o c ia l  w elfare  which i t  produces many market p r ic e s  no longer 
r e f l e c t  the v a lu a t io n  of so c ie ty  as a whole. This i s  so because 
of the ex is tence  of market im perfections  and of consumers' surplus 
r e s u l t  in  p r ic e s  which d i f f e r  s ig n i f i c a n t ly  from those which would 
ob ta in  in  co n d itio n s  of f r e e  com petition . There a re  many reasons 
fo r  r e j e c t i n g  market p r ic e s  fo r  output and f a c to r s  of production 
and s u b s t i t u t i n g  them w ith  so c ia l  p r ic e s .  Those were however 
d iscussed  in  leng th  in  Chanter
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Because market im perfec tions  r e s u l t  in  p r ic e s  d i f f e r e n t  from those which would 
he obta ined  under f r e e  com petitive  cond itions  the p u b lic  a u th o r i ty  has to 
a d ju s t  market p r ic e s  by f a c to r s  which make allowance fo r  the  es tim ated  degree 
of im perfec tion  .
For these  p r ic e  ad justm ents  market resea rch  techniques and demand and supply 
e l a s t i c i t i e s  would be req u ire d  in  order to  determine the  "shadow” p r ic e s  to 
be used in  C o s t-b e n e f i t  a n a ly s i s .
a -  Wages and S a la r ie s
Let us turn ' to the  Caycuma paper p r o je c t .  Wages and s a l a r i e s  arc  included 
in  the value added (Table 2 ) ,  bu t i t  seems th a t  they  a re  valued a t  market 
p r ic e s  r a th e r  than so c ia l  p r i c e s , I t  i s  a common p ra c t ic e  in  p ro je c t  evalu­
a t io n  to apply market p r ic e s  fo r  h igh le v e l  personnel and s k i l l e d  workers, 
but t h i s  i s  no t c o r r e c t  when u n s k i l le d  workers are  va lued .
I f  market p r ic e s  a re  used fo r  the u n s k i l le d  workers they w i l l  then be over­
estim ated  on the grounds th a t  the  market wage r a t e  does n o t r e f l e c t  t h e i r  
t ru e  value from the s o c i e ty 's  p o in t  of view. What i s  r e le v a n t  here i s  the 
so c ia l  opportun ity  c o s t  of labour employed by the p r o je c t .
I f ,  by drawing such u n s k i l le d  labour in to  employment no a l t e r n a t iv e  opportu­
n i t i e s  a re  foregone, the wages paid  should no t e n te r  in to  the  sum of so c ia l  
c o s t s .  In  t h i s  case so c ia l  opportun ity  cos t  of labour i s  zero . But i f  a 
new fa c to ry  i s  to  be c o n s tru c ted  where a h igh level, of p ro d u c t iv i ty  per man 
i s  a n t ic ip a te d ,  and i t  has to  employ labour p rev io u s ly  occupied in  low pro ­
d u c t iv i ty  a g r i c u l tu r a l  work the  so c ia l  co s t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  ( the  case of under- 
eraploynent). Though the wages which the fa c to ry  would pay re p re se n t  the 
w orkers ' c o n tr ib u t io n  to  the value of manufactured p roduc tion , the s a c r i f i c e  
involved in  d i r e c t in g  such labour to the in d u s try  from a g r ic u l tu re  i s  equ i­
v a le n t  to the wages paid  to those workers in  the  l a t t e r  a c t i v i t y .
T h e r e f o r e , /
1, For ex tens ive  l i t e r a t u r e  on the d i f f e re n c e s  between so c ia l  and
in d iv id u a l  w elfa re  fu n c tio n  see H. T^rvcy, On Divergencies between 
Socia l Cost and P r iv a te  Cost, Economica, August, 1963, p p .309-313; 
a l s o ,  A.E, B res t  and R, l\j ivey , Cost B enefit  A na lys is :  A 6^ r^vey
in  Surveys of Economic Theory, A.E. Ass. Royal Econ. Soc ie ty ,
V o l . I l l ,  Resource A llo c a t io n ,  New York, 1966, pp* l64-l68 .
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Therefore , i t  must be asked beforehand from v/aich a c t i v i t y  labour w i l l  be 
d iv e r te d  fo r  employment in  the p ro je c t  and what i s  the s o c i e ty 's  lo ss  of 
p roduction  w i l l  be as a consequence of the  p r o je c t .
In  the Value Added ta b le  p resen ted  by the SPO wages seem to be valued a t  
market p r ic e s  w ithout given due a t t e n t io n  to the  im p lic a t io n s  r e s u l t in g  from 
o pportun ity  c o s t  of u n s k i l le d  labour. Caycuma paper p la n t  employs u n s k i l le d  
labour idiich i s  d iv e r te d  from a g r i c u l tu r a l  a c t i v i t i e s o  The Zonguldak reg ion  
i s  one of the  reg ions w ith a high le v e l  of unemployment and, th e re fo re ,  the 
so c ia l  c o s t  of labour employed by the p ro je c t  should be somewhere below the 
market wage r a te ^ ,
A p r a c t i c a l  so lu t io n  w i l l  be to consider as o pportun ity  c o s t ,  in  a given case , 
the average income of a l l  u n s k i l le d  labour in  the country  or a rea  c a lc u la te d  
by d iv id in g  t o t a l  wages paid  by the t o t a l  number of workers whether employed 
or n o t .
Another a l t e r n a t iv e  i s  to  use "accounting" wage r a t e s  which w i l l  p re v a i l  under 
co n d it io n s  of eq u il ib r iu m . But because of d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved in  measuring 
the consequences of investm ents on fu tu re  accounting p r i c e s ,  a rough estim ate  
may be s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  the a c tu a l  fundamental d is e q u i l ib r iu m  a f f e c t in g  the 
market p r ic e .  The p ro je c t  can be evaluated  using  a c e r t a in  percentage of the 
average market r a te  fo r  wages, i . e .  50 , 60 , 70 percent'" .
In  the d e te rm ina tion  of shadow wage r a t e s  the fo llow ing g u id e lin e s  should be
borne in  mind:
(a) I f  i t  i s  c e r t a in  th a t  some of the labour would be p rev ious ly  
unemployed and th e re  were no p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of replacement in  
o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s  a so c ia l  c o s t  of zero might be a ss igned . I f
labour i s  d iv e r te d  from a low p ro d u c t iv i ty  s e c to r  ( i . e .  Agri­
c u l tu re )  in to  h igh  p ro d u c t iv i ty  s ec to r  the  wage r a te  which
w i l l  e n te r  c a lc u la t io n s  w i l l  be the labour c o s t  in  the  previous 
3
occupation  .
1. A h igh  le v e l  of unemployment does not always lead to a dec lin e  in  
wage r a te s  s ince le g a l  minimum ra te s  may be e s ta b l ish e d  on c o l le c t iv e  
c o n tra c ts  or o ther  f a c to r s  may have t h e i r  e f f e c t .  Hence market p r ic e s  
do n o t r e f l e c t  the  t ru e  s o c ia l  cos t  of labour and should be rep laced
by a S-hadow wage r a t e .
2. See J ,  Tinbergen, Tpe Design of Development, B altim ore , 1966, p. ^6
3. I f  workers are  d iv e r te d  to  o ther reg ions the expenditure  on tlie 
■provision of housing, t r a n s p o r t ,  water supply and o ther se rv ice s  
must a lso  be taken  in to  accounto
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(b) There w i l l  be greater  d if fe r e n c e s  between s o c ia l  co s t  and 
market p r ice  fo r  u n s k i l le d  labourers and n o n -sp e c ia l is e d  
workers. Correction of the market c o s t  of labour w i l l  be 
more j u s t i f i e d ,  when the s tr u c tu r a l  con d ition s  causing the 
open or d isg u ised  unemployment are more deep-rooted ,
(c )  I f  there i s  an unemployment b e n e f i t  ( tr a n s fe r  payments) paid  
to u n sk i l le d  workers t h i s  amount w i l l  need to be deducted  
from the marginal opportunity co s ts  of workers. Conversely, 
i f  Wages are squeezed below marginal opportunity  c o s t s  by 
monopsony p r a c t ic e s .
(d) In the absence of more s p e c i f i c  data, a percentage of market 
p rice  can be adopted based on a v a i la b le  c r i t e r i a  and adopted 
to a l l  labour in  a l l  p ro jec ts  under comparison.
I t  should be added, however, th a t  th ese  percentages need to  
be changed l a t e r  in  order to see what e f f e c t s  the changes 
would have on the f in a l  order of p r io r i t y  of p r o je c t s .  I t  i s  
hard to  b e l ie v e  th a t  shadow wage rate  would forever  remain below 
the actu a l wage. Unemployment, underemployment, market imper­
f e c t i o n s ,  a l l  the fa c to r s  that make for  a d iscrepancy between 
actu a l and shadow wages are th ings  that one would expect to be 
s u b s ta n t ia l ly  reduced i f  not e lim inated  as an economy develops  
s u c c e s s f u l ly  , Therefore, a dynamic approach must be used fo r  
a more accurate assessm ent of rea l wage rates*
Correcting future labour c o s ts  c a l l s  fo r  est im ates  of fu ture
unemployment and supply and demand c o n d it io n s ,  Snch fo r e c a s ts
however, should be l e f t  to the cen tra l  government w hile  public
a.gencies should co rr ec t  market p r ic e s  according to  the lo c a l




On th is  p o in t ,  see A.C. lïarberger, Techniques of P ro jec t  A ppraisal,  
N ational Economic Planning -  National Bureau Conference S er ie s  No.
19, New York, 196?. p p .132-134, p . 142.
See A.ik P r e s t  and R, Turvey, C ost-Benofit A na lysis :  A Survey,
in  Surveys of Economic Theory, A.E, A. Royal Economic S oc ie ty , V o l . I l l  
Resource A llo c a t io n ,  New York, 1966, p . 166*
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(e) The fo llow ing  im portan t p o in t  must a lso  he c a r e f u l ly  observed: 
i t  may be e a s ie r  to a llow  fo r  the  ov e rp ric in g  of labour which 
i s  used in  c o n s tru c t in g  or opera ting  a p r o je c t  than  to  allow 
fo r  o v e rp r ic in g  of equipment, f u e l ,  m a te r ia ls  which a re  over­
p r iced  because they too include  in  t h e i r  c o s ts  overpriced  
la b o u r^ .
T herefore , i f  c o r re c t io n  i s  made f o r  p ro je c t  labour c o s ts  only, 
the  r e l a t i v e  so c ia l  c o s t  of p ro je c t  labour and of o th e r  inpu ts  
may be d i s t o r t e d  more than  i f  no c o r re c t io n  a t  a l l  i s  made.
b -  Taxes
As f a r  as taxes  a re  concerned, from the  Value Added Table (No.2 ) ,  i t  can be 
guessed th a t  taxes  inc lude  both d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  ta x e s .  There i s  no 
adequate in fo rm ation  in the Caycuma P ro je c t  regard ing  taxes  and t h e i r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,
I was to ld ,  however, by the re sp o n sib le  p laim er a t  the SPO th a t  th e re  were 
two types of taxes  involved in  the p r o je c t ,  Tpe Caycuma Paper P lan t  as a 
p a r t  of 8EKA s t a t e  economic e n te rp r i s e  i s  l i a b l e  to  pay a co rp o ra t io n  tax  
of 35 p e rcen t  of the  g ross  p ro f i t s *  Tj e^ o th e r  tax  i s  p roduc tion  tax  which 
Is  in  the o rder of 15 p e rcen t  to  be le v ie d  on the p roduc tion  c o s t .
Given the fo llow ing  two assumptions one can deduce d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  taxes  
in  the  fo llow ing  maimer:
(1) F i r s t  assumption i s  t h a t  taxes (item  5) inc lude  both  d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  
ta x es .
(2 ) Second assumption i s  t h a t  by p r o f i t s  (item  6) i t  i s  im plied n e t  p r o f i t  
a f t e r  d i r e c t  tax  i s  pa id .
I f  these  two assumptions happen to  be c o r r e c t  p r o f i t s  before  d i r e c t  tax  can 
be c a lc u la te d  as fo llow s: Since in  1970 th e re  i s  a lo s s  in s te a d  of p r o f i t s
taxes  in  th a t  year w i l l  r e p re se n t  only in d i r e c t  taxes  pa id  to  inpu ts  during 
the o p e ra t io n  of the  p la n t .
B u t/
1 , I b i d ,  p , l6 6
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But in  1971 p r o f i t s  before  taxes  w i l l  be the sum of co rp o ra te  tax  paid  (55 
p e rcen t)  and the  n e t  p r o f i t  a f t e r  taxes  (65 p e rc e n t ) .
P r o f i t  be fo re  Corporate Tax 100 percen t
Corporate Tax 55 pe rcen t
Net P r o f i t  a f t e r  Corporate Tax 65 p e rcen t
Gross P r o f i t s  befo re  D ire c t  Tax i s  paid  becomes:
GP = 26,100  X 100 = 40 , 153,8 TL^
Thus, the  d i f f e r e n c e  between Gross P r o f i t s  (before  co rp o ra te  tax )  and the 
n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  give us d i r e c t  taxes :
40,153,8  ~ 26 , 100.0  = 14 , 053.8  D irec t  Taxes,
From t h i s  i n d i r e c t  taxes  can be found by deducting d i r e c t  taxes  from t o t a l
taxes (item  5):
Total Taxes = 34,900
D ire c t  Taxes = 14,053
I n d i r e c t  Taxes 20,847
Thus, i n d i r e c t  taxes  w i l l  tunount to  20,847 thousand T. L iras  in  1971»
For 1972, the  same method can be ap p lied  in  order to  f in d  out gross p r o f i t s  
before  tax  and d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  components of taxes  (item  5 ) .
Gross P r o f i t s  = 31,600 x 100 = 48,615,3
65
Gross P r o f i t s  before  D irec t  Tax (Corp.Tax) = 48,615,3
Net P r o f i t s  A fte r  D ire c t  Tax = 31,600,0
D ire c t  Tax 17\015,3
D ire c t  Taxes being Isnown, in  d i r e c t  taxes w i l l  be:
38,000 -  17,015 = 21,085
Thus in d i r e c t  taxes w i l l  amount to 21,085 thousand T. L iras  in  1972. In 
o ther  words, in d i r e c t  taxes  c o n s t i tu te  55 pe rcen t of the t o t a l  taxes paid 
by the  P r o je c t .
I n /
1. A ll f ig u re s  here  are  in  terms of thousand Turkish Lira;
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In  1973, p r o f i t s  before  tax ,  d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  Taxes, u s ing  the same method 
w i l l  be:
Gross P r o f i t s  before D ire c t  Tax = 32,700 x 100
63
= 30,307,6
Gross P r o f i t s  before  D ire c t  Tax 
(Corp. Tax) = 30,307,6
Net P r o f i t s  a f t e r  D ire c t  Tax = 32,700,0
D ire c t  Tax 17,607,6
I n d i r e c t  Taxes become: Total Taxes -  D ire c t  Taxes
38,300 -  17, 607,6  = 20,893.
In d i r e c t  Taxes in  1973 amount to  20,893 thousand T, L ira s  or re p re se n t  34.2 
pe rcen t of t o t a l  ta x e s .
Coming back again  t o  the trea tm en t of d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  ta x es ,  one may- 
f i r s t  begin  by s t a t i n g  the f a c t  th a t  the  is su e  involved h e ro , w i l l  rep re se n t  
d i f f e r e n t  a n a ly s is  from the pub lic  and p r iv a te  s e c to rs  p o in ts  of vieAf.
I t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  agreed th a t  while p r iv a te  p r o f i t  making d e c is io n  would a llow  
f o r  income and p r o f i t  tax  payments; t h i s  may no t  be the  case as f a r  as a 
pub lic  s e c to r  i s  concerned. In  the  l a t t e r  s e c to r  d i r e c t  taxes  must be in ­
cluded in  the value added computations s ince d i r e c t  taxes  paid  w i l l  c o n s t i tu te  
a r e a l  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  the  n a t io n a l  income.
For p r iv a te  e n te r p r i s e  the  goal i s  to  maximise the n e t  of tax  y ie ld  earned 
on the c a p i t a l  ou ts tand ing  in  a p r o je c t .  Thus, from the  p o in t  of vieif of 
p r iv a te  e n te r p r i s e ,  n e t  r e c e ip t s  comprise p r o f i t s  le s s  taxes  when paid plus 
d e p re c ia t io n .  In  o ther  words, cash r e c e ip t s  a re  valued  a t  ne t b a s is  by 
deducting tax  payments from t h e i r  gross p r o f i t s .
I t  follows th a t ,  in  a p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  d i r e c t  taxes  w i l l  be excluded from the 
value added c a lc u la t io n s  while they must be included in  the  A^alue added of a 
pub lic  p r o je c t .^
On t h i s  p o in t ,  see A.E. P re s t  and E. Turvey, Cost B ene fit  i ln a ly s is :
A Survey, E .J .  December 1965; (R eprin t)  in  Surveys of Economic Theory, 
A.E,A, Eoyal Economic Soc ie ty  V o l . I l l ,  Resource A l lo c a t io n ,  New York, 
1966, p . 165; a lso  see I.N.D. L i t t l e  and J.A. M irr le e s ,  Socia l Cost- 
B en e f i t  /m a ly s is .  Ü.E.C.D. Development Centre S tud ies  -  Manual of 
In d u s t r ia l  P r o je c t  A nalysis  in  Developing C oun tr ies ,  V o l . I I ,  P a r i s ,
1969, p p .18-20.
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Let us t u rn  now to i n d i r e c t  taxes .  Sqme economists suggest  measuring 
taxed inpu ts  a t  t h e i r  f a c to r  cos t  r a t h e r  than a t  t h e i r  market value* This 
implies t h a t  in  the c a l c u l a t i o n  of raw and a u x i l i a r y  m a te r i a l s  ( imported or 
domest ica l ly  provided) the p r ic e  to apply i s  not market value but f a c to r  
co s t  of these  m a te r i a l s .  Therefore ,  i n  case raw m a te r i a l s  are  imported,  
custom d u t i e s  and t a r i f f s  need to be e l imina ted  from market v a lu es .  Tpe 
same a p p l i e s ,  i n  the  case of subs id ie s  and sa le s  t ax es .
The purpose of e l im in a t in g  the in f luences  on p r i c e s  of taxes  and subs id ie s  
i s  to ob ta in  the value of goods and s e rv ice s  a t  the t rue  c o s t  of the f a c t o r s .  
For example, g r e a t e r  or l e s s e r  custom d u t i e s  or s a l e s  taxes  cause v a r i a t i o n s  
in  s e l l i n g  p r i c e s  u n r e l a t e d  to  the productive e f f o r t  involved,
G
I f  the re  i s  a s a l e s  tax  of^monetary u n i t s  per u n i t  so ld  i t  i s  easy to sub­
t r a c t  t h i s  from the market p r ice  and the  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  the monetary value of 
t h a t  unit*  Also,  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to e l imina te  custom d u t i e s  on the same 
b a s i s ,
S im i la r ly ,  in  the  Cayciuna Paper P r o j e c t ,  f o r  a c o r r e c t  computation of 
production  c o s t ,  the custom d u t i e s  on imported raw m a te r i a l s  must be deducted 
from the market value in  order to reach the r e a l  co s t  of the m a te r i a l s  used.  
S im i la r ly  a c o r r e c t io n  would be needed on the p a r t  of s u b s id ie s ,  though the re  
i s  no in d i c a t io n  of these  being provided to the Caycuma Paper P lan t^ .  I t  i s  
simple to c o r r e c t  fo r  the  subs id ised  p r ic e  of the  product when the subsidy 
i s  d i r e c t l y  provided, but almost impossible i f  i t  i s  the i n d i r e c t  r e s u l t  of 
o ther  measures as would be the case ,  i f  a raw m a te r ia l  were obtained cheap 
because t r a n s p o r t  was subs id i sed .  However, the im p l ica t ions  of t h i s  po in t  
should be kept in  mind during p r o j e c t  a p p r a i s a l s .
I t  i s  sometimes argued t h a t  measuring taxed inputs  a t  t h e i r  market va lue  i s
ap p rop r ia te  when the t o t a l  supply of the input in  ques t ion  has a zero e l a s -  
2t i c i t y  of supply , This problem a r i s e s  when an imported item i s  sub jec t  to  a 
s t r i c t  quota .  In the case of computing the cos t  of imported inpu t  with a 
f a i r l y  high leve l  of t a r i f f  p ro te c t io n ,  i t  i s  argued t h a t  p r ice  inc lud ing  
duty i s  the b e s t  measure of soc ia l  cos t  because in  the  absence of p ro te c t io n  
t h e /
1, From the recen t  document I  obtained from the SPO i t  appears t h a t  the 
Paper M i l l " p r o j e c t  does not  requ i re  subs id ie s  and in  f a c t  tiie P lan t  
i s  expected to meet the  burden of producing c r a f t  paper a t  a h igher 
co s t  than the c . i . f ,  import p r i c e .  B, Bonder lioglu ,  A P r iv a t e  
Untyped L e t t e r ,  December 1969, Ankara, p . 3*
2o See A.R, P r e s t  and 11, l\-[rvey, Cost-Be'nefit Analys is ;  A Survey,
E . J ,  December, 1965, p . 693.
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the  c o u n t ry ' s  equ i l ib r ium  r a t e  would be lower^.
But i f  imports are  provided domest ica l ly  and they have an e l a s t i c  supply,
t h e i r  f a c t o r  cos t  may be a b e s t  measure -  i . e .  e l im in a t io n  of i n d i r e c t  t ax es .
Since almost a l l  of the  raw m a te r i a l s  and other Inputs  requ i red  by the Paper
2P la n t  are  provided dom es t ica l ly  and because these  inpu ts  w i l l  have an e l a s ­
t i c  supply (the p la n t  i s  lo ca ted  very c lose  to the cen t re  of raw m a te r i a l s  
which are  to  be provided by Bolu and ICastomonu F o res t s )  f a c t o r  cos t  of inputs  
r a t h e r  than market value i s  r e l e v a n t .
I t  seems d i f f i c u l t  to observe i f  such a d i s t i n c t i o n  has been made by the 
p lanners  when dea l ing  wi th  i n d i r e c t  taxes  charged on input  f a c t o r s .  Without 
having the annual opera t ing  cos t  f ig u re s  of the p r o j e c t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to 
t e l l  i f  i n d i r e c t  taxes  ( t a r i f f s  and production taxes )  are  e l imina ted  from the 
v a lu a t io n  of raw m a te r i a l s ,  a u x i l i a r y  raw m a te r i a l s  and o ther  expenditure  
items*
One may conclude t h a t  the  i s sue  of taxes  has no t  been made c l e a r  by the 
Turkish p lanners  while they appra ised  publ ic  investment p r o j e c t s .  But, none­
t h e l e s s ,  the in c lu s io n  of d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  taxes  in  the  Value A^ded Table 
can be apposi te  from publ ic  s e c to r  po in t  of view.
c -  P r o f i t s
As was mentioned in  the e a r l i e r  s ec t ions  the p r o f i t s  i tem in  the  Value Added 
Table appears to be p r o f i t s  a f t e r  taxes  by which we mean ne t  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  
c o rpo ra t ion  taxes  are  excluded. In deal ing  w i th  the taxes  under the given 
assumptions ,  we were ab le  to compute gross p r o f i t s  before  taxes  as fo llows;
Gross P r o f i t s  Net P r o f i t s
Years Thousand T.L. Thousand T.L.
1970 -  ■ -  260
1971 40 ,153,8  26,100
1972 48 ,615,3  31,600
1973 50,307,6 32,700
1* Ib id .  p . 693 .
2. I t  i s  a l r ead y  s t a t e d  in  the  o r ig i n a l  p r o j e c t  submitted by 
SEICA en te rp r i se*
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Annual p r o f i t s  (ne t )  which amount to 32,700 thousand T.L. in  1973 are  supposed 
to remain constan t  throughout the  l i f e  pe r iod  of the Paper Mill* This i s  
based on the assumption t h a t  output and input p r i c e s  would remain the  same 
over the l i f e  of the  a s s e t .
I t  i s ,  however, sometimes argued th a t  in  es t im at ing  the expected cos ts  and 
revenues fo r  a p r o j e c t  allowance should be made fo r  the  e f f e c t s  of any general  
i n f l a t i o n  of the  p r ic e  l e v e l  a n t i c i p a t e d  during the l i f e  of the p r o j e c t  .
This i s  a complex problem to take in to  account in  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s i s  and 
since genera l  i n f l a t i o n  can be expected to  have a s im i l a r  e f f e c t  on both cos ts  
and revenues the re  may be no need to b u i ld  i t s  impact in to  the c a l c u l a t i o n  of 
p r o f i t s  and cash flows. But, none theless  i t  i s  necessary  to take account of 
changes in  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  where i t  i s  f o r e c a s t  t h a t  the  movements of p r ic e s  
and co s t s  of items r e l e v a n t  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  investment p r o j e c t  are  l i k e l y  to 
d i f f e r  from the i n f l a t i o n  of p r i c e s  and cos ts  in  g e n e ra l .  The r e le v a n t  cos ts  
and p r i c e s  would inc lude wages and s a l a r i e s  and the  c o s t s  of raw m a te r i a l s  and 
a u x i l i a r y  m a te r i a l s  requ i red  by the P r o j e c t ,  as wel l  as expected movements in  
the  p r ice  ob ta inab le  f o r  the  goods produced in  r e l a t i o n  to p oss ib le  movements in 
p r i c e s  in  genera l^ .
Though es t imate  of p r o f i t s  or revenues stemming from an investment p r o j e c t  
should be c a r r i e d  out according to r e l a t i v e  p r ic e  and co s t  changes in  output  
and f a c t o r  inputs  t h i s  i s sue  in  p ra c t i c e  i s  reduced to a s i t u a t i o n  where fu tu re  
demand fo r  the products  and sa le s  revenue and p r i c e s  received and opera t ing  
cos ts  would be assumed to  be the same during the o pe ra t ion  of the P la n t ,
I t  appears  t h a t  the SPO planners  have followed t h i s  simple assumption in  
e s t im at ing  the revenue and opera t ing  cos ts  of the Paper P r o j e c t ,  Annual 
P r o f i t s  a re  taken to mean simply the d i f f e r en ce  between market value of annual 
s a le s  and annual opera t ing  c o s t s ,
3From a re c en t  document obta ined from the SPO i t  appears t h a t  opera t ing  
expenditure  of the Caycuma Paper P lan t  includes  i tems such as raw m a te r i a l s ,  
a u x i l i a r y  raif m a te r i a l s ,  t r a n s p o r t  of raw m a te r i a l s ,  a u x i l i a r y  m a te r i a l s ,  
f u e l ,  energy and water ,  labour ,  s a l a r i e s  and wages, d e p re c ia t io n ,  ad m in is t ra ­
t i v e  c o s t s ,  insurance and o th e r s ,  s e l l i n g  cos ts  and i n t e r e s t  charges .
Accord ing/
1. See N.E.D.C. -  Investment A ppra isa l ,  Great B r i t a i n ,  National Economic 
Development Council ,  1967, p . 8.
2. N.E.D.C, -  Investment Appra isa l ,  Ib id ,  p . 8.
3o Mr, B. Bender lioglu ,  p lanner  a t  the  SPO. A P r iv a t e  L e t t e r ,  December,
. 1969, Ankara, p . 3.
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According to t h i s  infoimiation annual opera ting cos t  of the  Paper Mill .uiounts 
to 125;597 thousand T. L i ra s^ .
As I have po in ted  out e a r l i e r  most of these  opera t ing  co s t  elements need to 
be computed on the  b a s i s  of s o c ia l  p r i c e s  in s tead  of market prices*  However, 
the re  i s  no in d i c a t i o n  of t h i s  being done by the p lan n e r s .
1. This f ig u re  does not  inc lude the working c a p i t a l  requ i red  
by the  P la n t ,  I b id .  p . 4.
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I I .  Foreign-Excliange Savings
Following the value added c a lc u l a t i o n s  the p lanners  have t r i e d  to see the 
i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t  of the Caycuma Paper Mill in  terms of fo re ig n  exchange savings 
or earnings  s ince  the p r o j e c t  i s  an i r a p o r t - su h s t i tu t i o n  in  the  k r a f t  paper and 
c e l l u lo s e  in d u s t ry .  Foreign exchange savings a t  the  o f f i c i a l  r a t e  i s  the 
amount of fo re ig n  exchange t h a t  has been saved as a r e s u l t  of producing these  
paper products  dom es t ica l ly .  At the o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e  ( l  /  = 9 T .L . ) ,  
gross fo re ig n  exchange savings stemming from the execution of the p r o j e c t  are  
60,800 thousand T* L i ras  in  1970, 117,000 thousand T, L i ras  in  1971, 126,000 
thousand T .L iras  in  1972 and 126.000 thousand T. L i ras  in  1973 r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  
(see Table 3 ,  Chapter 7 ) .
For n e t  fo re ig n  exchange savings to be computed, f o r e ig n  exchange expenditure 
on raw m a te r i a l s ,  equipment and chemicals has to be deducted from the t o t a l  
value of fo re ig n  exchange savings .  However, s ince  the paper m i l l  does not 
requ i re  raw m a te r ia l s  or chemicals from abroad^ as they are  f u l l y  provided in  
the domestic market,  n e t  fo re ign  exchange savings i s  then the same as the gross 
fo re ig n  exchange savings (see Table 3)*
As a next s tep  the  p lanners  have app l ied  a fo re ig n  exchange c o r r e c t io n  of the 
order of 33 percen t  to the above f ig u re s  so as to f in d  the r e a l  leve l  of 
fo re ign  exchange savings .  In  o ther  words, t h i s  implies  t h a t  the fo re ign  
exchange savings are  valued a t  the exchange r a t e  of 1 /  = 12 T.L ,,  in s tead  of 
the o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e  of 1 /  = 9 T.L. But the c o r r e c t  measure of 
fo re ign  exchange b e n e f i t s  due to the p r o j e c t  i s  n e i t h e r  the fo re ig n  exchange 
savings valued a t  1 /  = 12 T.L. nor the fo re ign  exchange savings valued a t  the 
o f f i c i a l  r a t e .  The n e t  fo re ig n  exchange savings i s  the  amount which c o r re s ­
ponds to the d i f f e r e n c e  between these  two r a t e s .
Let us take the fo re ig n  exchange savings in  the f i r s t  year  1970:
( i )  Foreign  exchange savings  a t  ( C . I .P . )  import p r ice  i s  given 
as 60 ,8000y000 T.L. This i s  the fo re ign  exchange savings 
valued a t  o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e .
( i i )  Fore ign exchange savings a t  the " s o c i a l ” p r ic e  of exchange 
r a t e /
1. Mr. B. Benderl ioglu  a t  the  SPO has made i t  c l e a r  to  me th a t  
the paper m i l l  does not requ i re  raw m a te r i a l s  from abroad*
A Typed L e t t e r ,  December, 3969? p . 3*
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r a t e  becomes^:
60.800.000 X 1.333 = 81,046,000 T.L.
( i i i )  Net fo re ig n  exchange savings of the paper m i l l  i s  the d i f fe ren ce  
betAfeen ( i i )  and ( i ) .  Tims, the n e t  fo re ig n  exchange savings 
in  1970 becomes:
81.046.000 -  60,800,000 = 20,246,000 T.L.
The fo re ig n  exchange savings fo r  o the r  years  can be c a lc u la t e d  
on the same b a s i s .
This i s  so because fo re ig n  exchange savings on market r a t e  are  included to  
some ex ten t  in  the value  added c a l c u l a t i o n s .  There fore ,  fo re ign  exchange 
savings corresponding only to the d i f fe rence  beti'/een the o f f i c i a l  r a t e  and 
the  equ i l ib r ium  r a t e  w i l l  be necessary .
Whils t  the p lan n e r s '  reasoning behind the in c lu s io n  of o n e - th i rd  of the  n e t  
fo re ig n  exchange earnings  as the  r e a l  fo re ign  exchange saved by the p r o je c t  
i s  convincing , the f ig u r e s  corresponding to these  fo re ig n  excliaiige b e n e f i t s  
a re  no t  a cc u ra te ly  c a lc u l a t e d .  In  f a c t  the re  i s  a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  e r r o r  in  
roAv 4 of Table 3 ,  (Chapter 7 ) of the  Caycuma Paper M i l l ' s  a p p ra i s a l  form.
I t  i s  s u r p r i s in g  to no t ice  t h a t  such an e r r o r  has no t  been discovered fo r  a 
p r o j e c t  Afhich has a l ready  been approved and executed.  I f  f ig u res  fo r  fo re ign  
exchange savings are  co r rec ted  the PV of t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  and thus b e n e f i t  cos t  
r a t i o  may change cons iderab ly .  This element of e r r o r  w i l l  be taken in to  
account when I  compute p re sen t  value of b e n e f i t  and c o s t  streams a t  d i f f e r e n t  
d iscount  r a t e s ,  (See s e c t io n  X ) . Nor i s  the re  any exp lana t ion  of the Avay 
the shad01/ fo re ign  exchange r a t e  of 1 /  = 12 T.L. was derived fo r  p r o je c t  
a n a ly s i s .
Their  reasoning  in  working out the co r rec ted  n e t  fo re ig n  exchange savings 
appears  to be a c o r r e c t  one fo r  the following reason; Suppose t h a t  the Paper 
Mill  p r o j e c t  did not e x i s t  and Turkey was s t i l l  importing k r a f t  paper ,  k r a f t -  
l i n e r  and semi-chemical c e l l u lo s e  which are now to be produced domest ica l ly ;  
now, in  t h i s  case the  fo re ig n  exchange expenditure  incurred  in  the impor ta t ion  
of these  paper goods would have been ad jus ted  by adding a 33 percent  fo re ign  
exchange/
1, 1.333 c o e f f i c i e n t  of fo re ig n  exchange r a t e  means t h a t  the exchange r a t e  
has been revalued 33 percent  higi .er  than the o f f i c i a l  r a t e .  hence , 
t h i s  corresponds to 1 /  = 12 T. L i ra s .  This i s  ano ther  i/ay of ca lcu ­
l a t i n g  the fo re ig n  exchange savings given in  Table â?  Chapter 7. There, 
the ne t  fo re ig n  exchange savings are  simply m u l t ip l i e d  by the c o e f f i c i e n t
0.333  in  order to  f in d  the  r e a l  fo re ig n  excnange b e n e f i t s  of the p r o j e c t .
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exchange pena l ty  to  i t s  value based on the o f f i c i a l  r a t e .  Hence, because 
these  paper products a re  no longer imported the n e t  fo re ig n  exchange earnings  
of the  p r o j e c t  w i l l  be equal to the amount of fo re ig n  exchange corresponding 
to the d i f f e r en c e  between the "shadoi/" and " o f f i c i a l "  r a t e s .  The fo re ign  
exchange savings a t  o f f i c i a l  and shadow exchange r a t e s  a re  p resen ted  in  
Table 1.
TABLE 1
Foreign Exchange Savings a t  O f f i c i a l  
and -Shadow Rates
(OOP T .L . )
1970 1971 1972 1973
1. Foreign  Exchange Savings a t  
O f f i c i a l  Rate 60,800 117,000 126,000 126,000
2 . Foreign Exchange Expenditure — . — -
3. Net Foreign Exchange Sav ings /  
Earnings 60,800 117,000 126,000 126,000
4. Net Foreign  Exchange Savings at^^^ 
"shadow" exciiange r a t e  (3 x 1*333) 81,046 155,610 167,958 167,958
5 . Net Foreign Exchange Savings a f t e r / „ \  
C orrec t ion  (4 -  3 ) 20,246 38,961 41,958 41,958
Note: ( l )  Adjus ting  the exchange r a t e  as 33 pe rcen t  h igher
than  o f f i c i a l  r a t e  implies t h a t  fo re ig n  exchange
c o e f f i c i e n t  w i l l  be 1.333*
(2 ) These f ig u r e s  do not correspond to the f ig u re s
given in  T a b le '3,  in  Chapter 7, s ince  the m u l t i ­
p l i c a t i o n  e r r o r  has been co r rec ted .
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A. Determinat ion of the Accounting Exchange lUite: !
On t h i s  s u b jec t  I could no t  f ind  s u f f i c i e n t  in format ion  from the SPO. ^
However, Mr. Ï .  Kivanc who i s  a plaimer a t  the SPO has in d ic a ted  in  h i s  [
a r t i c l e  t h a t  var ious  f a c t o r s  have been taken in to  account in  the de te rmina tion  \
of the shadoA/ fo re ig n  exchange r a t e .  According to him, these  f a c to r s  inc lude  ;
d i r e c t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on fo re ig n  currency,  exports  a,nd imports p o s i t i o n ,  the I
purchasing poi/er of the  domestic currency, and a comparison of domestic p r i c e s  
and world p r i c e s  fo r  goods i/hich are  important in  the domestic production and i
consumption^. On the o ther  hand, the re  are  even sugges tions  t h a t  the  shadoi/ I
exchange r a t e  i/as simply determined on the b a s i s  of the  p r ic e  of the  U.S. I
2 Id o l l a r  i n  the  blaok-market . I
I
Consequently, the  SPO has decided to use a shadoi/ exchange r a t e  of 1 /  = 12 T.L.i
in s te ad  of the  o f f i c i a l  r a t e  of 1 /  = 9 T.L. in  the a p p r a i s a l  of public  indus-  [
t r i a l  p r o j e c t s .  |
?
In  the absence of s a t i s f a c t o r y  in format ion  and a coherent explana t ion  of the i
s o c ia l  p r i c e  of fo r e ig n  exchange by the SPO, one can only presume th a t  one of ^
the following methods has been adopted.
(1) The f i r s t  s o lu t io n  i s  to use the weighted average of a l l  import and 
exports  r a t e .  This approach i s  based on the theory  t h a t  though in  p ra c t i c e  
the re  are  many exchange r a t e s  not a l l  w i l l  be over-valued nor a l l  undervalued.
I t  i s  argued t h a t  d e sp i t e  the f a c t  t h a t  the average would not be completely 
f r ee  from these  e f f e c t s ,  i t  may be n ea re r  to the  equ i l ib r ium  r a t e  than any |
c u r r e n t ly  in  use .  j
But t h i s  method i s  o f ten  r e j e c t e d  on the grounds t h a t  a l l  the r a t e s  may 
conceivably  be e i t h e r  over or undervalued or a t  l e a s t  the m a jo r i ty  of them. 
Therefore ,  to  use the  average r a t e  might then in t roduce  an e r ro r  g r e a t e r  than 
th a t  which i s  supposed to be co r rec ted .
( 2 ) Another method i s  perhaps to use the " p a r i t y  r a t e "  c a lc u la te d  on the 
b a s i s  of the theory  of the  purchasing power of d i f f e r e n t  c u r re n c i e s .  The 
index of purchasing poi/er of a currency in i t s  oi/n country  i s  the  r e c ip ro c a l  
of the p r ice  index. This implies  t h a t  the h igher  the p r ice  l e v e l s  the  loi/er 
the purchasing power. The "purchasing power p a r i t y "  theory  suggests  t h a t  
the equ i l ib r ium  exchange r a t e  betA/een any ti/o cu r ren c ie s  i s  determined by, or 
t e n d s /
1. See T. Kivanc, Yati rim P r o j e l e r i n i n  Ekononii Yonunden Degorlendir i lmes i  - 
A l t e r n a t i f  P r o j e l e r  Arasinda Bir Secim Cal ismasi,  DPT. Nisan,  1965,
pp. 20-21.
2. Hr. B. Benderl ioglu  has A/r i t ten  to me stating that the  black-market price 
of ij.S.Do I lar A/as 12 T.L. i n  1966 and that i t  ro se  noA/ to 15,50 T.L,
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tends to be equal to ,  the  r a t i o  of the  i n t e r n a l  purchasing power of the two 
monies ( r e c ip r o c a l  of some p r ic e  l e v e l )  in  the r e s p e c t iv e  co u n t r ie s^ .
The theory  of " p a r i t y  purchasing power (PPP)" of a currency assumes t h a t ,
2o ther  f a c to r s  being equal , the r e l a t i v e  v a r i a t i o n  of the  exchange r a t e  
between c u r ren c ie s  A/ill be p ropo r t iona l  to the r e l a t i v e  v a r i a t i o n  of the  pur-  
chas ing power in  the  r e s p e c t i v e .co un t r ie s  .
Let us i l l u s t r a t e  the p o in t  by a simple but r e a l i s t i c  example. Suppose we 
have tA/o c o u n t r i e s .  A'and B A/here the former denotes Turkey and the l a t t e r ,  
the U.S.A. Suppose a l so  p r ice  indices  have va r ied  in  the two c o u n t r i e s .  The 
base year  i s  I 96O. and 100 re p re se n ts  the domestic p r ic e  index in  both cou n t r ie s  
and a l so  the p r ice  r a t i o  t h a t  i s  the purchasing power in  t h a t  yea r .
The equ i l ib r ium  exchange r a t e  in  the base year i s  9*05 T.L. per U.S. D ol la r .
I f  the p r ice  index in  Turkey rose from 100 to 200 and in  the  U.S.A. i t  rose 
from 100 to I 3O over the  per iod  1960-1966^, the neAv r a t i o  between the purcha­
sing powers i n  I 966 w i l l  be -
B 100
=  130 =  200 =  1 .5 3
FP 130
200
Since p r i c e s  mo Am u n propor t iona l ly  the p a r i t y  equ i l ib r ium  would change 
according to the  r e l a t i v e  v a r i a t i o n s  in  the purchasing poA/er of the  Turkish 
L i ra  and the U.S.A. d o l l a r .
Tlie/
See G. Haber le r ,  A Survey of In t e r n a t io n a l  Trade, In t e r n a t io n a l  
Finance Sec t ion ,  Department of Economics, P r ince ton  U n ive rs i ty ,
Ju ly  1961, N o . l .  p p .43- 31 . The p r ice  leve l  here  i s  u s u a l ly  a
general  p r ic e  l e v e l  e i t h e r  a t  wholesale or a t  r e t a i l  (consumer p r i c e s ) .
Other f a c t o r s  in  t h i s  con tex t  are  connected wi th  the supply and 
demand of fo re ig n  currency.  These f a c to r s  inc lude  the p ropens i ty  to 
import ,  the  lev e l  cf income and the in f lu x  of fo r e ig n  a id  from abroad. 
See U.N, Manual on Economic Development P r o j e c t s ,  New York, 1958. p . 204,
For the "abso lu te"  and the " r e l a t i v e "  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  Purchasing 
PoA/er P a r i t y  Doctr ine ,  see Bela Balassa ,  The Purchasing PoA/er P a r i t y  
Doctr ine :  A l lo a p p ra i s a l , J .P .E .  Vol.72, December, 1964, No,6. p p .584-
596.
I am assuming here t l ;a t  annual p r ic e  increase  in  Turkey i s  I 6 pe rcen t  
and in  the U.S.A. i t  i s  5 pe rcen t .
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The above f ig u re  in d i c a t e s  the  increase  of the r a t i o  of the p r ic e  ind ices  
from 100 to 153 and the t ru e  fo re ig n  exchange r a t e  fo r  1966 becomes;
9.05 X 1.53 = 13.8 T. L i r a s .
The p a r i t y  exchange r a t e  i s  simply obtained by m u l t ip ly ing  the exchange r a t e  
fo r  the  base year  A/hich i s  assumed to be equ i l ib r ium  by the  r a t i o  of the 




lo Domestic p r i c e  index in  Turkey
(T. L i ra )  A 100 200
2ç Domestic P r ice  index in  the
0 . 8 . A. (Dollar)  B 100 130
3 . Index of the P r ice  Rat io  A 100 153
B
4, P r ev a i l in g  Exchange Rate 9.05 9*05
5o P a r i t y  Exchange ‘Rate 9.05 13*8
I t  must, however, be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h i s  method i s  a l so  not  f r ee  from some 
t h e o r e t i c a l  object ions*  The r e l a t i v e  v a r i a t i o n  of the exchange r a t e  beti/een 
two cu r renc ies  w i l l  be p ro po r t iona l  to the  r e l a t i v e  changes in  the purchasing 
powers in  both co u n t r ie s  provided o ther  f a c to r s  are  equal.  But i f  f a c to r s  
l ik e  p ropens i ty  to import and the l e v e l  of income change overtime p a r i t y  ex­
change r a t e  cannot be assumed to change p ro p o r t i o n a l ly .
The proponents of t h i s  d oc t r ine  s t r e s s  the importance of the monetary f a c to r s  
and /
1 * The e q u i l i b r i u m  exchange r a t e  i s  t h a t  r a t e  A/hich keeps the 
ba lance  of payments i n  eq u i l ib r i iu n .
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and, see tJie c a u s a t i o n  rurming from the  money supply  to p r i c e s  and to exchange
r a t e s ^ .  But a t  the  same t ime th e y  n e g l e c t  changes i n  income l e v e l s  and in
demand and supply r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  An im por tan t  p o i n t  A/hich i s  r a i s e d  in  the
d o c t r i n e  of P urchas ing  PoA/er P a r i t y  i s  Avhat p r i c e s  to  use f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
comparisons. I f ,  f o r  example, i n t e r n a t i o n a l  comparison of changes in  p r i c e s
i s  based  on w ho lesa le  p r i c e s  t h è s e  i n d i c e s  might  n o t  be a p rope r  dev ice  to
use  s in c e  th e y  a re  o f t e n  h e a v i l y  weigh ted  wi th  t r a d e d  goods .  T h e re fo re ,  i t
i s  argued t h a t  the  p r i c e s  of  the se  goods may r e f l e c t  changes i n  the world
2
market  r a t h e r  th a n  domestic  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e s  . G. H a b e r le r  has  a l s o
p o in t e d  ou t  t h a t  th e  w ho le sa le  p r i c e  index A /hich i s  h e a v i l y  A/eighted w i th
p r i c e s  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  t r a d e d  goods w i l l  be a poor  guide f o r  judg ing  the
3e x i s t e n c e  and magnitude of a fundamental  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  . He goes on to 
s t a t e  t h a t  " the  moral  may seem to  be t h a t  A/e should  use  an index of domestic  
p r i c e s  ( c o s t  of l i v i n g )  or  of  c o s t s  (wages) A/hich do n o t  a d j u s t  so q u ic k ly  
and would show a d i s p a r i t y  i f  e q u i l i b r i u m  has n o t  been  reached^ .
Bela B a la s sa  has  a l s o  argued  t h a t  s t r u c t u r a l  changes should  be taken  in to  
acc oun t .  The p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e  may n o t  be a un ifo rm one bo th  in  s e c t o r s  
p ro d u c in g /
1, L.B, Yeager sugges ts  t h a t  " the  causa t ion  runs much more s t ro n g ly  from 
p r ic e  l e v e l s  to exchange r a t e s  than the o ther  way around" and he 
a t tempts  to support  t h i s  argument on tA/o accounts .  F i r s t ,  t h a t  tr ade  
flows a f f e c t  domestic p r i c e s  only s l i g h t l y  and second, t h a t  movements
in  the general  I ' r ice  l eve l  are  determined by changes in  the  money supply.  
See L.B, Yeager, A R e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of Purchasing Power P a r i t y ,  J .P .E .  
December, 1958, p . 522. These p ro p o s i t io n s ,  however, are  r e fu te d  on the 
grounds t h a t  Yeager ' s  p ropos i t ions  do not accept the marginal cos t  p r ic in g  
and commodity a r b i t r a g e  A/hich A/ould lead  to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e q u a l i s a t i o n  
of the  p r ice s  of t raded  goods, Apso, Yeager 's  assumption th a t  constancy 
of money supply would check "fore ign- induced  i n f l a t i o n "  implies the accep­
tance of a simple v e r s io n  of the  q u a n t i ty  theory  of money. In sho r t ,  
he excludes the p o s s i b i l i t y  of demand and cos t -push  i n f l a t i o n .
2, See Bela Balassa ,  Tqe Purchasing PoA/er P a r i t y  Doctrines A Reappra isa l ,  
J . P . E . , V o l .72, December, 19Ô4, No,6, p . 592.
3. See G* Haber ler ,  A Survey of I n t e r n a t io n a l  Trade Theory, I n t e r n a t io n a l  
Finance Sec t ion ,  Department of Economics, P r ince ton  U n ive rs i ty ,  J u ly  
1961, N o . l ,  p . 49.
4.  Ib id ,  p . 49.
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producing t raded  goods and the  serv ice  s ec to r .  I f ,  f o r  in s tance ,  in  the 
former s e c to r  th e re  i s  a uniform increase  in  the p r o d u c t iv i t y  and a smal le r  
r i s e  in  the p r o d u c t iv i ty  of the se rv ice  s e c to r ,  then the p r ice  r a t i o  heU/een 
the traded  commodities A/i 11 remain unchanged A/hile the r e l a t i v e  p r ic e s  of 
non- traded  goods A/ill r i s e .  But, noA/, because the l a t t e r  does not e n te r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  Purchasing Power P a r i t y  c a l c u l a t i o n s  w i l l  i n c o r r e c t l y  
r e f l e c t  the  need fo r  adjustment in excJiange r a t e s ^ .
The purchasing power p a r i t y  doc t r ine  could s t i l l  f in d  a p p l i c a t i o n  i f  produc­
t i v i t y  in c rease s  and wage adjustments  were i d e n t i c a l  in  every country ,  and i f  
A/e a lso  assume n e u t r a l  p roduction and consumption e f f e c t s*  Poss ib ly ,  under 
those r e s t r i c t i v e  assumptions ,  p a r a l l e l  changes in  the  general  p r ice  l e v e l  w i l l  
take p lace  and the d o c t r ine  w i l l  give the c o r r e c t  a n s A /e r ;  i n  t h i s  case ,  of 
course ,  the re  i s  no need fo r  ad ju s t in g  the r a t e  of exchange.
But the PPP doc t r in e  i s  expected to provide guidance in  cases  A/here p r i c e s  in
ind iv idua l  co u n t r ie s  do not move in  a p a r a l l e l  fa sh ion ,  Bela. Balassa has
emphasized the f a c t  t h a t  changes in  the  general  p r ice  l e v e l  A/ould be determined
in  the process  of techno log ica l  improvements and wage adjustments  n e i t h e r  of
A/hich can be expected to folloA/ the same course in each country. In this case
an i n t e r - c o u n t r y  comparison of changes in  the genera l  p r i c e  level  cannot be
used to in d ic a te  the  need for  m odif ica t ions  in  exchange r a t e  p a r i t i e s *  He
a lso  draws our a t t e n t i o n  to the importance of non-monetary f a c to r s  in  the
process  of p r ice  de te rm ina t ion .  In  h i s  judgment " in  the presence of d i s p a r a te
changes in  p r o d u c t iv i t y  and p r i c e s  in  the sec to rs  of t raded  and rion-tradcd
goods the r e l i a n c e  on general  p r ice  ind ices  fo r  decid ing on exchange r a t e  ad-
2jus tments  appears to  be misplaced .
The conclusions  which might be derived from the w r i t i n g s  on the purchasing 
poA/er p a r i t y  d o c t r ine  can be summarised as fo llows:
Bela B a l a s s a ,  Tlie P u rchas ing  PoA/er P a r i t y  D o c t r in e :  A R e a p p r a i s a l ,
o p . c i t .  p . 593'  He f e e l s  t h a t  in  a more g e n e ra l  model,  the  impact 
on th e  g e n e ra l  p r i c e  l e v e l  of p r o d u c t i v i t y  improvements in  s e c t o r s  
p roduc ing  t r a d e d  goods can be examined under  a l t e r n a t i v e  assumptions  
w i th  r e g a rd  to  changes i n  money wages*
See Bela Balassa ,  op .c i t .  p . 595. For a more thorough d i scuss ion  of 
the theory of Purchasing Power P a r i t y  see Bela Balassa ,  The purchasing 
PoA/er P a r i t y  Doctr ine ;  A Reappra isa l .  J .P .E ,  V o l .72, December, 1964 
p p .592-596.
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( i )  That p r ic e  ind ices  heav i ly  weighted i / i th  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
t raded  goods i / i l l  not a p p ro p r ia t e ly  i n d ic a te  the need fo r  
m odif ica t ions  i n  exchange r a t e s .
( i i )  That the  f a m i l i a r  models of i n t e r n a t io n a l  t rade  should be 
amended by g iv ing  e x p l i c i t  c o n s id e ra t io n  to non- t raded  goods*
( i i i )  That more u se fu l  r e s u l t s  can bo obtained i f ,  in s t e a d  of
a t tem pt ing  to r e l y  on aggregate  ind ices  more a t t e n t i o n  i s  paid
to the behaviour of s e c to r a l  ind ices  with  ap p ro p r ia te  d isagg re ­
gation^ .
I t  can, t h e r e f o r e ,  be poin ted out t h a t  the in t r o d u c t io n  of non-t raded goods 
can enhance the rea l i sm  of these  models. I f ,  non- t raded  goods are  in co r ­
pora ted  i n  the model, the r e l a t i o n s h i p  beti/een purchasing poA/er p a r i t i e s  and 
exchange r a t e s  can be more meaningful and provide b e t t e r  i n t e r - c o u n t r y  com­
p a r i s o n s .  This r e l a t i o n s h i p  can a l so  be h e lp fu l  to judge the overva lua t ion  
or underva lua t ion  of a currency  and changes in  the degree of over or under­
v a lu a t io n .
1. Ib id .  p *596.
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B« Foreign Exchange Savings-to~Input R a t i o ;
In the  fol lowing s ec t io n ,  an a ttempt w i l l  be made to  c a l c u l a t e  the Caycuma 
Paper P l a n t ' s  " fo re ign  exchange s av in g s - to - in p u t  r a t i o " . ^  I t  may seem usefu l  
to i n v e s t ig a t e  the  ex ten t  to which the fo re ign  exchange investment has been 
u t i l i s e d  in  r e l a t i o n  to the r e tu rn s  from i t .  In  o ther  A/ords, A/e are i n t e r e s ­
ted  here ,  f i r s t ,  to see the fo re ig n  exchange earnings  per u n i t  of fo re ig n  
exchange inves ted  i n  the  p r o j e c t ,  and secondly,  fo re ig n  exchange savings per 
u n i t  of c a p i t a l  investment inc lud ing  domestic and fo re ig n  exchange components.
I t  might be expec ted  from an  e v a l u a t o r  to  A/ork ou t  the  f o r e i g n  exchange 
ea rn in g s  to  i n p u t  r a t i o  f o r  the purpose of d i s c o v e r i n g  the  degree  of u t i l i s ­
a t i o n  i n  th e  s c a rce  f a c t o r s  of t h e  economy. \\diere t h e r e  i s  an acu te  sh o r tag e  
of  f o r e i g n  exchange i t  makes sense to  see the  e f f e c t  of  the  p r o j e c t  on the 
ba lance  of  payments i n  terms of f o r e i g n  exchange ea rn in g s  and spending*
I t  must be s t r e s s e d  a t  the o u t s e t  t h a t  t h i s  r a t i o  i s  no t  supposed to be used 
as a ranking device fo r  p r o j e c t  s e l e c t i o n .  As A/as made c l e a r  in  Chapter 4 
(Appendix A), balance of payments e f f e c t  c r i t e r i o n  can be a misleading tool  
in  the s e l e c t i o n  of p r o j e c t s  and the re fo re  i t  can only be u se fu l  to in d ic a te  
to us the  p a r t i a l  a spec t  of the  p r o j e c t  examined. This i s  A/hat should be 
expected from the r e s u l t s  which A/ill- be derived below.
F o re ig n  exchange p r o d u c t - t o - i n p u t  r a t i o  can be A /r i t ten  as  f o l lo w s ;
- j r  = I f
i  ( l  + i p  /  1 = 1 ( l  + i )"
A/here B f  deno tes  f o r e i g n  exchange e a rn in g s  or  s a v in g s .  I f  f o r e i g n  exchange 
component of inve s tm en t ,  n l i f e  of  the  p r o j e c t  and i  the  d i s c o u n t  r a t e .
Annual fo re ig n  exchange savings streams of the  Paper Mil l  a re  given in  Table 
I3bj in  the p r o j e c t  Appra isa l  Form (See Chapter 7 ) .  As can be noted fo re ign  
exchange seivings of the p r o j e c t  i s  the amount which corresponds to the 
d i f f e r en c e  between the fo re ig n  exchange savings valued  a t  " so c ia l "  exchange 
r a t e  and o f f i c i a l  exchange rate* I t  has been mentioned e a r l i e r  t h a t  there  
i s  a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  e r ro r  in  Table 'Sq roA/ ( 4 ) ( in  Chapter 7 ) ,  but i f  t h i s  
e r ro r  i s  co r rec ted  the fo re ig n  exchange savings of the Paper P r o jec t  become 
as follows (See Table j ) ,
1* For d e f i n i t i o n  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  see,  U.N, Manual on Economic Develop­
ment P r o j e c t s ,  United Nations ,  New York, 1958. p p .250-231; and see 
Chapter 4, Appendix A.
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TABLE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE HARNINGS/OR SAVINGS
OF THE PAPER
( In  000 T.L.
PLANT
1970 1971 1972 1973
1 . Foreign Exchange Ea rn ings /o r  
Savings 60,800 117,000 126,000 126,000
2o Foreign  Exchange Expenditure - - - -
3o Net Foreign  Exchange Earnings 60,800 117,000 126,000 126,000
4. Corrected Net Foreign  Exchange/ , \  
Earnings -  (3 x 0.333) 20,246 38,961 41,958 41,958
yource ;
Note :
Table in  Chapter 7*
(l) The previous  f ig u r e s  A/ere 20,268 thousand T.L.,  
60,995 thousand T .L . , and 63,952 thousand T.L, 
r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( l )  F i r s t ,  fo r e ig n  exchange savings stemming from the p r o j e c t s  opera t ion  
have to be t r a n s l a t e d  to the  p resen t  value a t  the s o c ia l  d iscount 
r a t e  A/hich i s  app l ied  by the SPO. Here I  s h a l l  assume t h a t  the  
SPO's r a t e  of d iscoun t  of 12 percent  i s  a reasonable  r a t e  to apply 
fo r  t h i s  purpose^.  But t h i s  does not imply t h a t  t h i s  i s  the b e s t  
d iscount  r a t e  to apply i n  Turkey fo r  p r o j e c t  ev a lu a t io n ,  as I s h a l l  
argue in  Sec t ion  VII.
P resen t  va lue  of annual fo re ign  exchange streams are  ca lc u la te d  in  
Table 4,
1. I t  should be noted th a t  the est imate  of d iscount  r a t e  to be used i s  
e s p e c i a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  i n  the case of fo re ign  exchange. I f  the l a t t e r  
i s  in  s h o r te r  supply than c a p i t a l ,  i t s  u t i l i s a t i o n  A/ould e n t a i l  Iiigher 
r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t  than those  on c a p i t a l  in  g e n e ra l .
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TABLE 4
FBESExNT VALUE OF FOREIGN EXCLANGE ' DmŒFITS: 
At i  = 12^, n = 20 









( l )  P resen t  Worth 
Fac tor  a t  12^ 
Discount
( 2) P resen t  Value 
of fo re ig n  
Exchange Savings
Table A, p . 152.
( 2) /
5 20,246 .5674 11,487,5
6 38,961 .5066 19 , 737,6
1 41,958 .4523 18,977,6
8 41,958 ,4038 16 , 942,6
9 41,958 .3606 15 , 130,0
10 41,958 .3219 13 , 506,2
11 41,958 .2874 12,058,7
12 41,958 .2566 10 , 766,4
13 41,958 .2291 9 , 612,5
14 41,958 .2046 8,384,6
15 41,958 .1826 7 , 661,5 ;
16 41,958 .1631 6,843,3
17 41,958 .1456 6 , 109.0
18 41,958 .1300 5 , 454,5
19 41,958 .1161 4,871,3
20 41,958 .1036 4,346,8
21 41,958 .0925 3,881,1
22 41,958 .0826 3,465,7  1
23 41,958 .0737 3 , 092,3  I
24 41,958 .0658 2 , 760,8
TOTAL 185,290,0
Notes:  ( l ) For p re sen t  worth f a c to r s  a t  12 pe rcen t  d iscount  
r a t e  see A .J .  Merre t t  and A. Sykes Capi ta l  Budgeting
and Company Finance,  Longmans, London, 1969, Appendix
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Notes (continued)
(2 ) I t  should be noted th a t  the above FV c a l c u l a t i o n  can a lso  be
worked out much simpler by using the "p resen t  worth f a c t o r  fo r  
uniform s e r i e s " .  F i r s t ,  the  f ig u r e s  of the  f i r s t  two years  
a re  m u l t i p l i e d  with  the " s ing le  p re sen t  worth f a c to r "  (pwf) 
s e p a r a t e ly .  These are  11,479,4 T.L. and 19,714,2 T.L. r e s ­
p e c t i v e ly .  Second, s ince  fo re ign  exchange streams in  the 
remaining 18 years  are running in  a uniform s e r i e s  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
to  m u l t ip ly  the annual fo re ig n  exchange stream with  the " s e r i e s  
p re sen t  worth f a c to r "  which corresponds to 18 year s  and a 12 p e r ­
cen t  d iscount  r a t e .  Therefore ,  41,958 x 7*250 = 304,195,5 T.L. 
Third,  the l a t t e r  f ig u re  must be brought to  the base year value by 
m u l t ip ly ing  i t  with  the " s ing le"  p re sen t  worth f a c t o r  which i s
0.5066 (pwf' “ 12^ b -  5 ) * This gives us 154,105,4 T.L. Thus PV 
of fo re ig n  exchange savings over 20 years  becomes:
11 , 479,4 + 19,714,2 4 154 , 105,4 = 185,299,0 T.L.
P resen t  value of fo re ig n  exchange earn ings /sav ings  amount to 185,290,000 T.L. 
on the b a s i s  of a 12 pe rcen t  d iscount  r a t e  .
( 2) The second s tep  i s  to separa te  the fo re ig n  exchange components of the 
investments  involved in  the p r o j e c t .  The fo re ig n  exchange component 
of investment a f t e r  being r e - c o r r e c t e d  by applying a 33 percent  "shadow" 
fo re ig n  exchange r a t e  has been converted to  the p re sen t  value on the 
same d iscount  r a t e ,  i . e .  12 percen t  (See Table 5 ) .
TABLE 5
















PV of Foreign Exchange 
P resen t  Worth Component of











Notes:  ( l )  Fore ign Exchange component of Investment in  a d d i t io n
to i t s  market value a lso  includes  a 33 pe rcen t  fo re ign  
exchange/
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exchange pen a l ty  (premium).
( 2 ) Source: From Table 1, Chapter 7*
Ij^e p re sen t  value of fo re ig n  exchange p o r t io n  of investment a t  12 perce t  
d iscount  r a t e  amounts to 140,201,900 T. L i ra s .
( 3 ) Third s tep  i s  to p lace  these  f ig u t e s  we have obta ined in  the formula
we have c i t e d  above. Tpe fo re ig n  exchange- to- input  r a t i o  of the Paper 
Mill  P r o j e c t  becomes:
(a) PV of fo re ig n  exchange sav ings /earn ings  
(For X = 12fb, n = 20)
Bj, = 185,290,000 T.L.
(b) PV of fo re ig n  exchange component of Investment 
(For i  = 12#, n = 2o)
Ijg = 140,201,900 T.L.
(c) Foreign Exchange B e n e f i t s - t o - I n p u t  Rat io :
77 _ 185.290,000  
 ^ “ 140,201,900
7T = 1 . 3 2
Apart  from the fo re ig n  exchange s av in g s - to - in p u t  r a t i o  i t  i s  a lso  u se fu l  to 
work out the r a t i o  of fo re ig n  exchange e a r n i n g s / s a v i n g s - t o - t o t a l  c a p i t a l  
investment .  This r a t i o  w i l l  simply in d ica te  the  f o r e ig n  exchange r e tu rn s  
per  u n i t  of c a p i t a l  inves ted .  E spec ia l ly  in  import s u b s t i t u t i n g  p r o je c t  
i t  might be d e s i r a b le  to  know the r e tu rn s  on t o t a l  investment cost  in  terms 
of fo re ig n  exchange sav ings .
For t h i s  r a t i o ,  we need PV of fo re ig n  exchange savings throughout the l i f e  
of the p r o j e c t  and PV of t o t a l  investment cos t  of the  p r o j e c t .
Since we know t h a t  PV of fo re ig n  exchange b e n e f i t s  i s  185,290,000 T.L. and 
PV of toi  
c a p i t a l /
t a l  investment i s  308,293,000 T.L.^ the fo re ig n  exchange product-to-
This f ig u r e  inc ludes  the fo re ign  exchange c o r r e c t io n  in troduced on the 
fo re ign  exchange component of t o t a l  investment,  (See Ch.7, Table 7 ) .  
One of the reasons  fo r  applying "shadow" 1 r i c e  fo r  fo re ign  exchange is  
to give spec ia l  p r i o r i t y  to p ro je c t s  which a re  us ing more of domestic 
raw m a te r i a l s ,  machinery and equipment, over p r o j e c t s  us ing imported 
goods. The second reason of course,  i s  to f in d  the  r e a l  value of the 
scarce fo re ign  exchange.
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c a p i t a l  r a t i o  becomes:
I T  = 185 , 290,000
508,293,000
IT = 0.60
I t  follows t h a t  the  f o r e ig n  exchange p ro d u c t - to - in p u t  r a t i o  i s  1,32 and the 
fo re ig n  exchange p r o d n c t - t o - c a p i t a l  r a t i o  i s  0 . 60 . The former r a t i o  can be 
considered as a s a t i s f a c t o r y  f igu re  because i t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the Paper K i l l  
p r o j e c t  w i l l  liave a considerab le  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  on the  balance of payments. 
This a l so  implies  t h a t  d i r e c t  recovery of c a p i t a l  in  fo re ign  exchange i s  
f a i r l y  r ap id  in  the Caycuma P r o j e c t .
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I I I ,  Correcbion From the Consumers' Po in t  of View:
Another c o r r e c t io n  in  the b e n e f i t s  stemming from the  Caycuma P r o jec t  i s  in  
connection w i th  the b e n e f i t s  accru ing to the consumers.
Tlie Unit  p r ice  d i f f e r e n c e  between s e l l i n g  p r ice  of the  product before  the 
P lan t  and s e l l i n g  p r i c e  of the paper products a f t e r  the  Caycuma P lan t  comes 
in to  ex is tence  i s  a t t r i b u t e d  to  consumers as b e n e f i t s  in  terms of l e s s  payments 
by them. Uni t  p r ic e  d i f f e r en c e  per ton  i s  est imated  to be 50 T .L i ra s /p e r  
ton  for  semi-chemical c e l l u lo s e  and 40 T .L i ra s /p e r  ton  fo r  both k r a f t  paper 
and k r a f t  l i n e r  (See Table in  Chapter ? ) .  These d i f f e r e n c e s  in  p r i c e s  mean 
th a t  consumers w i l l  be paying l e s s  in  t h e i r  spending as compared to the p re ­
p r o j e c t  p e r iod .  Total  b e n e f i t s  to consumers w i l l  thus  be the outcome of these  
u n i t  p r ice  d i f f e r e n c e s  m u l t ip l i e d  by the volume of import  s u b s t i t u t i o n  in  
r e sp ec t iv e  paper p roduc ts .
The p lan n e r s '  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  these  b e n e f i t s  r e s u l t i n g  from p r ice  reduc t ions  
with  the es tab l ishm ent  of the Cayciuna Paper P lan t  should be included, in  the 
t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  i s  a t  the  o u t s e t  r a t h e r  dubious.  In my th ink ing  the in c lu s io n  
of these  b e n e f i t s  w i l l  be a double-counting s ince  these  b e n e f i t s  a re  merely 
t r a n s f e r r e d  from p r iv a t e  importers  (as t h e i r  p r o f i t s )  to  the  consumers. 
Therefore ,  i t  can be argued th a t  the  b e n e f i t s  hero are  only moving from one 
group of the s o c ie ty  to ano t l ie r .
One may take the argument one s tep  f u r t h e r .  Because the  paper products  in  
ques t ion  are  no longer imported the government w i l l  forego the custom d u t ie s  
i t  used to g e t  from the p r iv a te  en trepreneurs  when they imported them. The 
government, t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  be c r e a t in g  i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  to consumers on the 
one hand, and i t  w i l l  a l so  be foregoing a loss  equ iva len t  to  the amount of 
custom d u t ie s  c o l l e c t e d  from the impor ta t ion  of these  goods.
One may conclude t h a t  what i s  r e l e v a n t  from the  s o c i e t y ' s  po in t  of view i s  not 
the  d i f f e r en c e  between the previous  and new s e l l i n g  p r i c e s  by the p r iv a te  and 
government agenc ie s ,  (S .E .E ,)  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  but the n e t  d i f f e r en c e  between t h i s  
and the custom d u t i e s  foregone owing to non- im porta t ion  of these  goods anymore. 
This means t h a t  the b e n e f i t s  accru ing to consumers must be reduced as much as 
custom d u t i e s  l o s t  by the government a u t h o r i t i e s ^ .
This may be very  important p a r t i c u l a r l y  where the marginal u t i l i t y  of 
government r e c e i p t s  are  very high when the government i s  fac ing  a se r ious  
budget prob1em.
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But the Turkish p lanners  appear no t  to he d i s tu rb ed  by the complicat ions  t h i s  
w i l l  give to in  the  e s t im a t io n  of b e n e f i t s  to consumers^.
Besides,  i t  i s  sometimes suggested t h a t  in  the case of f i n a l  products  the
b e n e f i t s  accru ing  from investment p ro j e c t s  cannot be measured by m ul t ip ly ing
the a d d i t i o n a l  quantum of output  e i t h e r  by the old or the  new p r ice  s ince  the
former g ives  an overes t im at ion  and the l a t t e r  an underest imat iono P r e s t  and
Turvey argue t h a t  an average p r ice  between the old  and new p r ice  could be more 
2convenient . In  case the demand curve i s  l i n e a r  an unweighted average of 
before  and a f t e r  p r i c e s  may be s u f f i c i e n t ,  bu t more i n t r i c a t e  techniques  would 
be needed i f  the  demand curve i s  no t  l inea r*
The same d i f f i c u l t i e s  can a l so  a r i s e  when cos ts  are  in  question* I t  i s  
necessary  to a d j u s t  p r i c e s  of f a c to r s  so as to e l im ina te  any r e n t a l  element 
which i s  measured by excesses over t r a n s f e r  earnings  in  t h e i r  next b e s t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  use .  There i s  a s im i la r  problem to the demand s ide in  t h a t  as 
more and more of a f a c t o r  i s  absorbed in  any one l i n e  of output the p r ice  of 
the a l t e r n a t i v e  product which i t  might have been making r i s e s  f u r th e r  and 
fu r ther*
One i s  faced once again  with  a choice to make between va lu ing  f a c to r s  a t  the
o r ig i n a l  p r i c e  ( p r i c e s  p r i o r  to the expansion of output  of commodities in
q u e s t io n ) ,  the  u l t im a te  p r i c e ,  or some in te rmedia te  l e v e l .  I f  i t  i s  a l i n e a r
supply curve ,  a p r ic e  half-way between the old and new p r ic e  w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t
3as i t  i s  in  the case of demand .
lo Another important p o in t  here i s  whether s e l l i n g  p r i c e  of the Paper
P lan t  has been f ixed  according to consumer cen te r s  or production 
c e n te r .  The k r a f t  paper and k r a f t  l i n e r  w i l l  be consumed by the 
cement and f e r t i l i z e r  i n d u s t r i e s .  Since these  i n d u s t r i e s  are  s i t u ­
a ted  elsewhere in  the country  the t r a n s p o r t  cos ts  of paper products 
to the consumption cen te r s  should be taken in to  account .
2. This s i t u a t i o n  may p a r t i c u l a r l y  a r i s e  when the s ize  of the investment
so la rge  t h a t  old p r i c e s  may be a f f e c t e d .  In  o ther  words, production 
may inc rease  by a lump in s tead  of small increments .  In such cases ,  
n e i t h e r  the old p r ic e  nor the new p r ice  would c o r r e c t l y  es timate  the 
b e n e f i t s .  kha t  i s  needed, as P r e s t  and Turvey have suggested "a 
measure of the  a d d i t io n  to the area  under the demand curve,  which i s  
on the assumption t h a t  the marginal u t i l i t y  of money remains unchanged, 
in  the sense of a s se s s in g  what the r e c ip i e n t s  would pay r a t h e r  than go 
without them". I t  i s  added l a t e r  as a p r a c t i c a l  s o lu t io n  to use an 
average p r ic e  between the  old and the new p r i c e .
See A.d. P r e s t  and H, Turvey, Cost-Bonefi t  Analys is :  A Survey,
E .J ,  o p ,c i t .  p . 691 .
3o See A.Pl.. P r e s t  and R. Turvey, Ib id .  pp .691-692,
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IV. Employment E f fe c t
The employment e f f e c t  of the  Caycuma p r o j e c t  as can be seen from Table éT 
(Chapter , i s  no t  very  c l e a r  as there  i s  no exp lana t ion  of what the 
p lanners  have in tended to  do.
In  my th in k in g ,  however, the re  are  two p o s s ib le  exp lana t ions  of the  employ­
ment e f f e c t  they have included in  the b e n e f i t  flows of the  p r o j e c t .
The f i r s t  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  wages which are  valued a t  makret p r i c e s  are  
c o r re c ted  by applying a "shadow wage" r a t e  which i s  50 percen t  lower than 
the market wage r a t e .  Therefore ,  in s tead  of tak ing  the market value of 
wage payments the so c ia l  cos ts  of labour are  taken to be included in  the 
va lue added c a l c u l a t i o n s .
But i f  wages are  a l r e ad y  included in  the value added Table,  which appears 
a p o s s i b i l i t y ,  t h i s  means t h a t  wages are  included twice in  the b e n e f i t s  
computations,  once a t  the market va lue  added Table and once a t  the s o c ia l  
cos t  as re p re se n t in g  the employment e f f e c t  (See T a b l e d ) .  There seems 
to be a double counting as f a r  as wages are  concerned.
The second p o s s ib le  exp lana t ion  which sounds more convincing i s  t h a t  
market wage r a t e s  which are  app l ied  to u n s k i l l e d  workers do not r e f l e c t  
t h e i r  r e a l  c o n t r ib u t io n  to the n a t io n a l  income or in  o ther  words t h e i r  
marginal p r o d u c t iv i t y .  The market wages may be squeezed below the marginal 
oppor tun i ty  co s t  of labour  by monopoly p r a c t i c e s .  Thus, fo r  a c o r r e c t  
r e p r e s e n ta t i o n  of the employment e f f e c t  the wages valued a t  market p r ic e s  
a re  put up by a c o e f f i c i e n t  of O.5O so as to  reach the so c ia l  oppor tuni ty  
cos ts  of workers.
This second p o s s i b i l i t y  may exp la in  Table ^  but i t  i s  s t i l l  d i f f i c u l t  to 
unders tand  how in  view of the  la rge  unemployment pocket in  the Zonguldak 
reg ion ,  the s o c i a l  oppor tun i ty  cos ts  of u n s k i l l e d  workers can be above the 
market wage ra te*  On the con t ra ry ,  one may th in k  wages valued a t  market 
p r i c e s  should be ad jus ted  downwards r a t h e r  than upwards as the p lanners  
d id .
Though the p lanners ,  fo r  cos t  b e n e f i t  e s t im a t io n s ,  have inc luded employ­
ment e f f e c t  in  terjiis of wage payments ( in  monetary u n i t s ) ;  the r e a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n /
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where E denotes employment e f f e c t ,  In t o t a l  investment cos t  and. L u n s k i l l e d  wor­
kers  employed by the p r o j e c t .  As can be seen, employment e f f e c t  i s  the  r a t i o  
between investment and the u n s k i l l e d  workers employed by t h i s  investment*
Taking the corresponding f i g u r e s  from the Caycuma Paper P r o j e c t ,  the employment 
e f f e c t  becomes:
E = J7 . L. ^ 1,927,000 T.L.
225( 2 )
This means t h a t  to  employ one u n s k i l l e d  laboure r  1,927,000 T, L i ras  are  needed 
which makes the p r o j e c t  a h igh ly  c a p i t a l  in tens ive  one. This ,  however, i s  not 
s u r p r i s in g  because the p r o j e c t  by na tu re  i s  c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  and req u i re s  more 
s k i l l e d  workers than u n s k i l l e d  workers.
I t  may, however, be noted t h a t  I  have here  only inc luded d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  whereas 
the exclus ion  of i n d i r e c t  employment e f f e c t s  may underestimate  the p r o j e c t s '  
t o t a l  employment b e n e f i t s ,  Wlien raw m a te r i a l s  are  provided dom est ica l ly  the 
employment in  i n d u s t r i e s  provid ing these  raw m a te r i a l s  w i l l  a l so  in c rease .
For in s t a n c e ,  the Paper Mil l  p r o j e c t  w i l l  c re a te  a d d i t io n a l  employment oppor­
t u n i t i e s  in  the f o r e s t r y  and t imber in d u s t ry ,  t r a n s p o r t  and se rv ices  s e c t o r s .
As I have poin ted  out in  Chapter 6, the i n d i r e c t  employment which w i l l  be 
generated  in  these  i n d u s t r i e s  should be a sc r ibed  to the Paper Mill  p r o j e c t ;  the 
expansion in  the supplying in d u s t r i e s  w i l l ,  of course,  r eq u i re  a d d i t io n a l  
workers in  order to meet the  requirements  of the  paper p l a n t .  As was imide 
c l e a r  in  Chapter 6, an es t imate  of a l l  these  i n d i r e c t  employment e f f e c t s  w i l l  
involve the use of a reg iona l  inpu t -ou tpu t  matr ix  t a b l e .  However, such an 
exerc ise  i s  not p oss ib le  to conduct i n  the  absence of reg iona l  i n t e r - i n d u s t r y  
f i g u r e s .  Nor i s  i t  the purpose of t h i s  study to a t tempt  to  es timate  such 
i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s .  Though these  kinds  of reg iona l  analyses  are  d i f f i c u l t  to
conduct and compute, none the less ,  they  should be considered  in  p ro j e c t
• 1 3a p p r a i s a l s .
Fur thermore/
1. For employment e f f e c t  c r i t e r i o n  see Appendix A in  Chapter 4,
2, The t o t a l  number of workers i s  753? out of which u n s k i l l e d  workers 
are  only 225.
5 , For a d i s cu s s io n  on i n d i r e c t  employment e f f e c t  see Chapter 6,
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Furthermore,  i n d i r e c t  employment e f f e c t s  in  i n d u s t r i e s  consuming f i n a l  goods 
should a l so  he inc luded .  The in d u s t r i e s  which w i l l  consume the f i n a l  goods 
are  cement and f e r t i l i z e r  i n d u s t r i e s  which w i l l  use the k r a f t  paper and k r a f t  
l i n e r  i n  packing t h e i r  cement and f e r t i l i z e r  p roduc ts .
F i n a l l y ,  when general  unemployment e x i s t s  expendi ture  upon a p r o j e c t  by 
c r e a t in g  a m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t  w i l l  provide a d d i t i o n a l  r e a l  incomes in  the 
r e s t  of the  economy. This a d d i t io n a l  income in  tu rn  may a l so  induce f u r t h e r  
employment e f f e c t .
As I  have mentioned b r i e f l y  in  Chapter 6, the  r eg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t  of 
a s ec to r  (o r  p r o j e c t )  should a l so  be taken in to  c o n s id e ra t io n .  The following 
s e c t io n  i s  an a t tem pt  to def ine  what the  reg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  i s  and to  examine 
the ex ten t  to which the reg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  i s  a r e l e v a n t  and important con­
cept  in  r eg iona l  development s tudies*
Before I  in t roduce  the  formula of the m u l t i p l i e r  i t  i s  u se fu l  to unders tand 
why i t  i s  r e l e v a n t  to  r eg iona l  problems. To loiow the value of m u l t i p l i e r  
(=k) enables us to have some i n d i c a t io n  of the  consequences fo r  reg ional 
income and employment of po l icy  measures which involve the  i n j e c t i o n  of in v e s t ­
ment in to  the reg ion  . I t  could a lso  provide q u a n t i t a t i v e  in d i c a t io n s ,  in  
terms of reg iona l  income and employment e f f e c t ,  a r i s i n g  from expenditure  
e n t a i l e d  by the p o l ic y .  Of course,  some sec to r s  w i l l  have a g r e a t e r  impact 
on reg iona l  income and employment through t h e i r  c o n t r a c t i o n  or expansion than 
o th e r s .  This i s  where i t  i s  u se fu l  to know the m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  of p a r t i c ­
u l a r  s ec to r s  and i n d u s t r i e s .  I f  d i f f e r en c es  were s u f f i c i e n t l y  la rge  i t  might
be worthwhile g iv ing  c o n s id e ra t io n  to the idea of r eg iona l  incen t ives  schemes
2based on a s e c to r  m u l t ip l i e r " ' .  Besides,  m u l t i p l i e r  a n a ly s i s  emphasises t h a t  
regions  should no t  be considered in  i s o l a t i o n  f o r  the simple reason t h a t  money 
in j e c t e d  in to  a reg ion  o f ten  leaks  out in to  o ther  regions* This could be 
important no t  only fo r  s ing le  reg ion ,  as i t  shows the d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  the  way 
of inc reas ing  i t s  income, but a l so  from n a t io n a l  s tan d p o in t .  For example, 
money in j e c t e d  in to  one reg ion  flows to a la rge  e x ten t  in to  o the r  reg ions ,  
some of which may have a l ready  been a f f e c t e d  by excessive  demands.
F in a l ly ,  /
1* See K ,J .  A l len ,  Tpe Regional M u l t ip l i e r :  Some Problems in
Es t imat ion ,  in  "Regional and Urban Studies -  A Socia l  Science 
Approach" Edi ted  by J .B . Cullingworth and S,C, Orr,  George 
A l len  & Unwdii L t d . ,  London, I 969 . p p .81-82,
2 , I b i d ,  p . 82*
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F in a l ly ,  the m u l t i p l i e r  in d i c a t e s  the  r eg iona l  i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p  and i t s  
q u a n t i ty  shows the  ex ten t  of these  and the ex ten t  of the  problems l ike .ly  to 
a r i s e  in  r eg iona l  development^.
The ques t ion  here i s  t h a t  i f  a c e r t a i n  money i s  i n j e c t e d  in to  an economic 
system the income of t h a t  system inc reases  no t  by the value of t h a t  i n j e c t i o n  
but by some m u l t ip le  of i t .
Let us i l l u s t r a t e  the p o in t  by a simple example* I f  1000 T.L. i s  in j e c t e d
in to  an economy in  the  form of,  say,  Road Building programme, then the income
2of the road b u i ld e r s  inc reases  by 1000 T. L i ras  . Some of t h i s  ex t ra  1000 
T .Liras  i s  spen t ,  suppose,  on bread and thus in c rease s  income of the  bread 
producers .  They, in  tu rn ,  spend t h e i r  ex t ra  money on o the r  commodities, 
inc reas ing  the income in  these  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  fo llows th a t  the  income of one 
group, by i t s  expendi ture ,  adds to the income of another  group. When the 
i n i t i a l  i n j e c t i o n  goes round, i t  n a t u r a l l y  genera tes  f u r t h e r  income.
The m u l t i p l i e r  i s  a f ig u r e  which in d ic a te s  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  of f i n a l  income 
to the i n i t i a l  i n j e c t i o n .  I f ,  f o r  in s tan ce ,  as a consequence of i n j e c t i o n
of the  1000 T.L. the income of the  system was to r i s e  by 2000 T.L. then the
m u l t i p l i e r  would be 2.
Second ques t ion  i s  to f in d  what determines the s ize  of the m u l t ip l ie r*  The 
answer to t h a t  w i l l  depend on whether the economic system i s  a c losed economy 
or an open one. In a c losed  economy, the m u l t i p l i e r  can be w r i t t e n  as :
k = or —^  where c denotes marginal p ro p en s i ty  to consume and
S' marginal p ropens i ty  to save.  As can be seen, the  smal ler  i s  a or the 
l a r g e r  i s  c the  g r e a t e r  w i l l  be the m u l t i p l i e r .  I f  the i n i t i a l  i n j e c t i o n  of 
money i s  passed on i n t a c t  a t  each round then the re  i s  no l i m i t  to the f i n a l  
income change -  the m u l t i p l i e r  in  t h a t  case would be i n f i n i t e  . In a c losed  
economy savings are  considered to be the leak .  At each round not a l l  of the 
increase  in  income i s  spent but some w i l l  be saved. The inc rease  in  income 
of the next round i s  consequent ly  l e s s  by the amount of savings than the 
p re v io u s /
1. Ib id ;  p . 82.
2. The assumption in  the example i s  t h a t  a l l  productive  cos ts  are 
labour  costs*
3. Without any leakages  a l l  of the a d d i t io n a l  income w i l l  be spent 
(c = l ) ,  and the  m u l t i p l i e r  would be i n f i n i t y :
k = 1 = 1 = 1 = o o
" l - c  1-1 0
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p rev ious  round* The p r o p o r t i o n  of the  i n c r e a s e d  income which i s  savtc. i s  
c a l l e d  the  "margina l  p r o p e n s i t y  to  save" .  In  c a l c u l a t i n g  the  m u l t i p l i e r  
however,  t h e r e  i s  no need to take  o f f  the  sav ings  a t  each  round* The simple 
assumption  h e re  i s  t h a t  marg ina l  p r o p e n s i t y  to  save i s  the  same a t  eacn round,  
On t h i s  a ssumpt ion  the  m u l t i p l i e r  i s  i n v e r s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  the  marg inal  propen­
s i t y  to  save ( s ) .  I f  s = 0 . 2 ,  i . e .  20 p e r c e n t  of  i n c r e a s e  i n  income i s  
saved,  then  th e  m u l t i p l i e r  (k)  i s  5* (k -  .
The essence  of r e g i o n a l  m u t l i p l i e r  l i e s  in  the  s i z e  of  p o s s i b l e  " leakages"
a l l  of which reduce  the  marg ina l  p r o p e n s i t y  to  consume ( c ) .  In a c lo sed
economy, i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  to  see sav ings  as  the  only  l e a k  b u t  i n  an open 
economy ( c o n s id e r i n g  i n t e r - r e g i o n a l  and f o r e i g n  t r a d e )  the  fo l l o w in g  le aks  
need to  be t a k en  i n t o  accoun t^ .
( i )  s av ings  ( s )
( i i )  payment of  t a x e s  (bo th  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  t a x e s )  ( t ) .
( i i i )  purchase  of  goods produced in  o th e r  r e g io n s  and abroad  (m).
2Since  the  m u l t i p l i e r  i s  i n v e r s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  the above l e a k s
k = 1 .
s + t  + m
This i s  the  formula which cou ld  be used  i n  e s t i m a t i n g  r e g i o n a l  m u l t i p l i e r .
I t  must be r e a l i s e d  he re  t h a t  the  v a r i a b l e s  i n  th e  formula shou ld  be measured 
i n  m arg ina l  te rras.  In  o t h e r  words,  we need d a t a  to  f i n d  the  marg ina l  p ro ­
p e n s i t y  to  save ,  t h e  marg ina l  p r o p e n s i t y  to  pay d i r e c t  t a x e s  i . e .  the  p ro ­
p o r t i o n  of  a d d i t i o n a l  income p a id  i n  t a x e s ,  and d a t a  to  f i n d  the  marg ina l  
p r o p e n s i t y  to  import  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  s e m i - f i n i s h e d  goods and consumer goods 
from o th e r  r e g io n s  as w el l  as  abroad .
In  the  absence  of  r e g io n a l  d a t a  to  e s t im a te  th e s e  m arg ina l  p r o p e n s i t i e s  to 
l e a k /
1, See K .J .  A l l e n ,  The Regional  M u l t i p l i e r ;  Some Problems i n
E s t i m a t io n ,  o p . c i t .  p*84, and D.B. S t e e l e ,  Regional  M u l t i p l i e r s  
i n  G rea t  B r i t a i n ,  O.E.P.  V o l . 21, J u l y ,  1969, No. 2 pp -268-239
2* In  an open economy the  fo l l o w in g  e q u a t io n  h o ld s :  
c H* s ‘I- t  •(- m = 1.
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leak  the a l t e r n a t i v e  o f ten  i s  to use the average p r o p e n s i t i e s ^ .  To 
es t imate  values  fo r  the leaks  on aggregate da ta  and average p ro p e n s i t i e s  
may c o n s t i t u t e  an a l t e r n a t i v e  method, but i t  r e q u i re s  exhaustive  c a lc u l a t i o n s  
and i t  may a l so  no t  give an accura te  r e s u l t  fo r  the  m u l t ip l i e r *
I t  should,  however, be emphasised t h a t  marginal p r o p e n s i t i e s  of s ,  t  and m 
may no t  co incide  wi th  the average p ro p e n s i t i e s  to leak .  I f  marginal pro­
p e n s i t i e s  were s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  the  average p ro p e n s i t i e s  then a more accura te  
measure of the reg io n a l  m u l t i p l i e r  can be obtained*
The assumption th a t  average r a t e  of d i r e c t  taxes  a re  equal to  marginal r a t e s  
cannot be assumed to  be va l id*  Of course,  i t  i s  normal to  expect t h a t  
marginal r a t e s  of t a x a t io n  a re  well  above the average r a t e .
Again, leaks  from expenditure  may in d ic a te  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  between average 
r a t e s  and marginal ra te s*  Leaks w i l l  be g r e a te r  us ing  marginal as opposed 
to average r a t e s  i f  the a d d i t i o n a l  expenditure  a r i s i n g  out of h igher  incomes 
i s  spent on those goods which have a h igher  than average leak .  I t  must be 
noted t h a t  any change in  leaks  through increased  income i s  l a r g e ly  dependent 
on changed expenditure  p a t t e r n .
The m u l t i p l i e r  w i l l  be s t i l l  smal ler  i f  we cons ider  the  ex ten t  to which i t  i s  
necessa ry  fo r  t h a t  reg ion  to import m a te r i a l s  and sem i- f in ished  products  s ince 
t h i s  involves  payments going outs ide  the reg ion  and t h i s  rep re sen ts  an a d d i t i ­
onal l e ak .  Therefore ,  fo r  an accura te  es timate  of the  m u l t i p l i e r ,  marginal 
p ropens i ty  to import these  above goods and consumer goods should be ca lcu la ted .
A s/
K.J ,  Al len  in  h i s  e s t im ates  of S c o t t i sh  reg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  has 
app l ied  th ree  d i s t i n c t  methods; f i r s t ,  a crude aggregate  method 
which takes  average p r o p e n s i t i e s  to leak; second, average pro­
p e n s i t i e s  with  d isaggrega ted  d a ta ;  t h i r d ,  t l i i s  i:iethod uses  marginal 
p r o p e n s i t i e s  to l e ak .  l i is  a n a ly s i s  has demonstrated t h a t  reg iona l  
m u l t i p l i e r  fo r  Scotland v a r i e s  according to the method used.
Regional m u l t i p l i e r  es timated on average p r o p e n s i t i e s  to leak and on 
aggregate  da ta  gives  a m u l t i p l i e r  of 2.2 fo r  Sco t land .  When marginal 
p ro p e n s i t i e s  to leak  are  used the reg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  becomes 1,52 
which i s  the most r e l i a b l e , f i g u r e . For d i f f e r e n t  methods of e s t i ­
mating reg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  See K.J.  A llen ,  The Regional M u l t i p l i e r :  
Some Problems in  Es t imat ion ,  op .c i t .  pp .89-94,
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As f a r  as the  Zonguldak reg ion  and the Caycuma Paper Mill  in  Turkey are 
concerned, i t  i s  very  d i f f i c u l t  to conduct a reg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  a n a ly s i s .
For such a n a ly s i s  one would need reg iona l  as well  as n a t io n a l  da ta  ( inc lud ing  
i n t e r - r e g i o n a l )  in  order to be ab le  to es timate  average and marginal p rc -  
p e n s i t i e s  to  the  abovementioned leakages .  The da ta  req u i red  fo r  the 
Zonguldak reg ion  inc ludes  reg iona l  output, personal  income, savings ,  taxes 
(both d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t ) ,  consumption, expor ts  and imports from o ther  
reg ions  and abroad^. In the absence of such s p e c i f i c  da ta  r e l a t e d  to the 
Zonguldak reg ion ,  i t  i s  ha rd ly  poss ib le  to c a r ry  out a r eg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  
a n a ly s i s  fo r  t h a t  reg ion  or any o the r  region in  Turkey fo r  t h a t  m a t te r .
N ever the le ss ,  i n  an appendix a t t a ch ed  to t h i s  Chapter (Appendix A) an 
a ttempt  has been made to  es timate  the reg iona l  m u l t i p l i e r  fo r  Zonguldak region, 
Following t h a t  the m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t  of the Caycuma Paper P lan t  w i l l  a l so  be 
worked out by using the c o e f f i c i e n t s  of leakages in  Zonguldak reg ion .  As I 
have s t r e s s e d  e a r l i e r  the  m u l t i p l i e r  could a l so  be used a t  s e c to r a l  lev e l  or 
i n d u s t r i a l  l e v e l .  I t  may be of some s ig n i f i c a n ce  to see the e f f e c t s  of 
p a r t i c u l a r  types of money in j e c t e d  in  terms of reg iona l  income and employment. 
This i s  where i t  may serve some use to Imow the m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  of the 
Paper Mill  p r o j e c t  which w i l l  c r e a te  an a d d i t io n a l  income in  the Zonguldak 
reg ion .  Because of lack  of da ta  i t  i s  impossible to  es t im ate  the exac t 
magnitude of the marginal p r o p e n s i t i e s  to leak ,  but on some rough assumptions 
which are  based on aggregate  da ta ,  these  p ro p e n s i t i e s  have been c a lc u la t e d  
fo r  the Zonguldak reg ion .  The Caycuma Paper P l a n t ' s  income e f f e c t  through 
the working of the  m u l t i p l i e r  has a lso  been es timated  on t h i s  bas is  (See 
Appendix A to Chapter 8 ) ,
1, Leaks reducing personal  income inc lude ( i )  savings ,  ( i i )  d i r e c t  
taxes ,  ( i i i )  n a t io n a l  insurance c o n t r ib u t io n s .  Those leaks  
which are  a func t ion  of expendi ture  include (a) i n d i r e c t  t a x a t io n
(b) purchases  from o ther  reg ions .  F in a l ly ,  imports of food and 
consumer goods from abroad as a percentage of r eg iona l  personal  
consumption. Tqe f i g u r e s r e l a t e d  to these  leaks  are  necessa ry  for 
an es t imate  of m u l t i p l i e r .
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V. Total B enef i t  Flows
As Table ( ( ^ i l l u s t r a t e s ,  t o t a l  b e n e f i t  flows comprise value  added in  terms of 
c o n t r ib u t io n  to  the n a t i o n a l  income, ne t  fo re ig n  exchange savings ,  i n d i r e c t  
b e n e f i t s  accru ing  to the consumers in  terras of l e s s  payments, and f i n a l l y  
employment e f f e c t  provided by the p r o j e c t .
V/e have a l ready  commented on a l l  those d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  flows th a t  
r e s u l t  from the  Caycuma P r o j e c t ,
Tiie i n c lu s io n  of a l l  these  b e n e f i t s  a re  c o r r e c t  in  p r i n c i p l e ,  but the  way they 
have been c a lc u l a t e d  i s  incomplete and inadequate .
There i s  s t i l l  ano ther  problem t h a t  i s  c lo se ly  connected wi th  the es t im at ion
of t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  whether they are  in  public  or p r iv a t e  s e c t o r .  This i s  the
trea tm ent  of ex te rn a l  e f f e c t s  or secondary b e n e f i t s .  Handling of secondary
b e n e f i t s  u s u a l l y  known as e x t e r n a l i t i e s  or sometimes termed " s p i l lo v e r "
e f f e c t s  c r e a te s  some problems* When the re  is  f u l l  employment the re  r e a l l y
are  no secondary b e n e f i t s  . B res t  and Turvey observed t h a t  so long as the
cond i t ions  fo r  optimal resource  a l l o c a t i o n  are  f u l f i l l e d  we need nor worry
2about the  secondary b e n e f i t s  but only the primary b e n e f i t s  .
But in  r e a l i t y  n e i t h e r  does f u l l  employment e x i s t  nor a re  the optimum resource 
a l l o c a t i o n  condi t ions  f u l f i l l e d .  So one cannot ru le  out the quest ion  of 
cons ider ing  e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  When the re  i s  a Keynesian unemployment any i n v e s t ­
ment i s  b e t t e r  than no investment and one should take in to  account the volume 
of m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  of t h a t  investment.  Thus, a s o c ia l  overhead c a p i t a l  
p ro j e c t  by c r e a t in g  ex te rna l  economies can be more p r e fe ra b le  to another 
p r o j e c t  with  a h ighe r  d i r e c t  e f f e c t .  An es timate  of c a p i t a l  p r o d u c t iv i ty  in  
terms of d i r e c t  value added has no sp ec ia l  advantage as  a c r i t e r i o n  of 
eva lua t ion ,  as demonstrated by those p ro je c t s  producing se rv ice s  such as 
e l e c t r i c a l  energy, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  u s u a l ly  of low d i r e c t  value added but 
c o n s id e r a b l e /
1. See R.N, McKean, E f f i c i en c y  in  Government Through Systems Analysis  -  
With Emphasis on Water Resource,  New York, J ,  Wiley & Sons, I n c . ,  
1958, p . 158.
2. See A.R. F r o s t  and It. Turvey, Cost-Bonefit  A na lys is :  A Survey, in 
"Surveys of Economic Theory", Anorican Economic A ssoc ia t ion  and Tqe 
Royal Economic Soc ie ty ,  Macmillan, S t .  M ar t in 's  P re s s ,  New York, 1966 
p p . l 6 l - l 6 2 .
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considerab le  i n d i r e c t  importance.  I f  they are  judged by the d i r e c t  c r i t e r i o n  
they would no t  be given p r i o r i t y  whereas considered i n d i r e c t l y  they have a 
h igher  p r i o r i t y  r a t e .  Hence i t  i s  important t h a t  both d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  of the  investment should be taken in to  account.
The common p r a c t i c e  as f a r  as these  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  a re  concerned i s  to d i s ­
t i n g u i s h  between " t e c h n o lo g ic a l " and "pecuniary" sp i l lo v e r s*  We want to 
Itnow whether the re  has been any inc rease  in  output  due to the pro jec t*  Such 
an inc rease  i n  output takes  place  in  the  presence of t echno log ica l  e x t e r n a l i ­
t i e s  which a f f e c t  the  volume of phys ica l  output  of the  producers to be obta ined 
from t h e i r  phys ica l  in p u t s .  In o ther  words, t e chno log ica l  s p i l l o v e r s  r e f e r  
to  incremental  output and should be considered.  But t h i s  does no t  happen in  
the case of pecunia ry  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  which a f f e c t  only the p r ice  of o the r  
producers '  goods. That i s  to say i n  the case of the l a t t e r  the re  i s  no n e t  
a d d i t i o n a l  b e n e f i t ,  bu t  merely a t r a n s f e r  of income from one place to another 
and t h e i r  i n c lu s io n  w i l l  mean double counting^.
Because of p r a c t i c a l  measurement l i m i t a t i o n s  i t  o f t e n  happens t h a t  only the 
immediate or  primary e f f e c t s  of the p r o j e c t  a re  taken in to  account.  But fo r  
a sound and c o r r e c t  a p p ra i s a l  of investment p ro j e c t s  the  i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  
should a l so  be inc luded.
I n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  are  of two types;  "backward" e f f e c t s  and "forward" e f f e c t s .
"Backward" value added w i l l  be a t t r i b u t a b l e  to the p r o j e c t  investments only 
in  so f a r  as demand der ived  from the p r o j e c t  can be s a t i s f i e d  without new 
investment,  t h a t  i s  to say by f u l l y  u t i l i z i n g  i d l e  c ap a c i ty .  be t  us take an 
example; i f  f o r e s t r y  in d u s t ry  i s  producing a t  l e s s  than normal capac i ty ,  
owing to the  lack of a s u i t a b l e  market,  but a new source of demand i s  opened 
to i t  by the i n s t a l l a t i o n  of a paper and c e l l u lo s e  p l a n t ,  the  bas ic  investments 
f o r  inc reased  output  a l r e ad y  e x i s t .  Consequently,  the new values  added can 
be l a r g e ly  a sc r ib e d  to the Caycuma p r o j e c t ' s  investments*
Forward e f f e c t s  a l so  need to  be included in  t o t a l  b e n e f i t s .  I f ,  fo r  want of 
su p p l ie s ,  the e n t e r p r i s e  which w i l l  use  the goods and s e r v ice s  of the  p r o j e c t  
a s /
For an ex tens ive  d i s cu s s io n  of t echno log ica l  and pecuniary  S p i l lo v e r s ,  
see R.N. McXoan, E f f i c i e n c y  in  Government T h r o u g h  Systems Ana lys is ,  
d .  Wiley & Sons, I n c . ,  New York, 1958, p p .134-150. (esp.  Chapter S) .
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as input f a c t o r s ,  has i d l e  i n s t a l l e d  capac i ty ,  these  f a c to r s  can he u t i l i z e d  
wi thout  f u r t h e r  investment* I t  may be supposed in  consequence,  t h a t  t i e  
increased  income genera ted  in  the e x i s t i n g  e n te r p r i s e  comes from the p r o j e c t  
investments  with  which an improved p ro d u c t - c a p i t a l  r a t i o  has been produced^.
In  both types of i n d i r e c t  value added, there  must be unutilized capac i ty  in  the 
b e n e f i t in g  e n t e r p r i s e ;  a l so  u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h a t  c ap ac i ty  must not e n t a i l  any 
f u r t h e r  investment.  I f  both cond i t ions  are  f u l f i l l e d  in  p r i n c i p l e ,  the value 
added accru ing  to the e x i s t i n g  e n te r p r i s e  can be a t t r i b u t e d  to  the p r o j e c t .
N ever the less ,  the  measurement of i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  becomes more complex and
l e s s  p re c i s e  in  p ro p o r t io n  to t h e i r  d is tan ce  from the p r o j e c t  as the  dynamic 
2cen t re  . This i s  unavoidable and the  l i m i t a t i o n s  of such types of es t imates  
should be taken in to  account and i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  should be c a lc u la te d  only 
in  so f a r  as they c o n t r ib u te  in  any s i g n i f i c a n t  degree to eva lua t ion  c r i t e r i a .
Total  b e n e f i t s  included in  T^ble 6? are  c a lc u la te d  on the  assumption th a t  there  
w i l l  be no p r ice  changes in  raw m a te r i a l s ,  no f l u c t u a t i o n s  in  fo re ign  exchange 
r a t e ,  no change in  the oppor tun i ty  co s t  of f a c to r s  of product ion ,  i . e .  shadow 
wage r a t e  and shadow c a p i t a l  c o s t .  S t i l l  another assumption is  t h a t  s e l l i n g  
p r i c e s  of the  Caycuma P lan t  w i l l  remain the same dur ing  the economic l i f e  of 
the p r o j e c t .
I t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  agreed t h a t  i f  p e r f e c t  equ i l ib r ium  e x i s t s ,  the market forces  
w i l l  a c t  i n  such a way t h a t  the  p r i c e s  of goods w i l l  be equal to the marginal 
cos t  of raw m a te r i a l s ,  labour ,  c a p i t a l  and o ther  inpu ts  requ i red  in  production .  
In t h e i r  tu rn ,  the p r i c e s  of labour ,  c a p i t a l  and fo re ign  exchange w i l l  be equal 
to the oppor tun i ty  c o s t  of the r e sp ec t iv e  f a c to r s  such cos t  being defined as 
the amount by which production  would be reduced in  an o v e r - a l l  economy i f  the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of such inpu ts  were to decrease  in  a u n i t .  'Ihe p r ice s  of 
labour ,  c a p i t a l  £iud fo r e ig n  exchange are  th e re fo re  those which w i l l  balance 
supply and demand in  r e l a t i o n  to these  f a c t o r s .  I f  the  economy i s  expanding 
and every t ing  i s  p rope r ly  fo reseen ,  p r i c e s  w i l l  a l so  r e f l e c t  fu tu re  demand and 
supply in  such a way t h a t  equ i l ib r ium  w i l l  be maintained over the  long- term.
B u t /
Value added moy^  a l so  a r i s e  in  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s t a g e .  I f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
continues  to func t ion  on tlie b a s i s  of e x i s t in g  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  and f ixed  
investments ,  the value added may be a t t r i b u t e d  to the  p r o j e c t ' s  i n v e s t ­
ments *
I n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  can be t raced  v ia  inpu t -ou tpu t  t a b l e s .  Chenory, however 
suggests  t h a t  i f  shadow p r i c e s  arc  app l ied  to inpu ts  and outputs i n d i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  w i l l  be a l ready  taken care of,  but t h i s  view i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  s t i l l  
under d i s cu s s io n .
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But none of these  cond i t ions  r e a l l y  e x i s t s  in  underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s ,  and, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  cu r re n t  p r i c e s  can ha rd ly  r e f l e c t  fu tu r e  demand and supply con­
d i t ions*
Therefore ,  a r e - c u r r e n t  problem in  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s i s  of a public  i n v e s t ­
ment i s  t h a t  of decid ing  whether the  cu r ren t  or expected market v a lu a t io n  of 
the  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  which i t - g e n e r a t e s  are  a p p ro p r i a t e .  In a world of 
changing p r i c e s  we w i l l  face d i f f i c u l t y  i f  we es t imate  and compare p ro je c t s  
on the b a s i s  of c u r r e n t  prices* Since p r i c e s  w i l l  change over time, a d j u s t ­
ments need to be made to  the expected p r i c e s  of fu tu r e  outputs  and inputs  to 
a llow fo r  a n t i c i p a t e d  changes in  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  of the  items involved. This 
means t h a t  changes i n  market p r i c e s  of outputs  and inpu ts  must be borne in  mind 
when ev a lu a t io n  of a p r o j e c t  i s  c a r r i e d  out* S t i l l ,  i f  shadow p r i c e s  are  used 
fo r  f a c t o r s  of product ion ,  these  p r i c e s  must not be assumed to remain cons tan t .  
For in s tan ce ,  so c ia l  labour  cos t  cannot be p re d ic ted  to be always 50 percent  
of the  market wage r a t e  throughout the l i f e  of the p r o j e c t ;  nor the cos t  of 
c a p i t a l  w i l l  remain cons tan t^ .  S im i la r ly ,  p r i c e s  of fu tu r e  outputs  need to 
be es t imated  and c u r r e n t  p r i c e s  of outputs  must not be assumed to be cons tan t  
during the l i f e  of the p r o j e c t .  The p r i c e s  of outputs  can be a f f e c t e d  by 
var ious  f a c t o r s  such as changes in  demand and supply of in p u ts ,  technology, 
and o v e ra l l  and i n d u s t r i a l  growth in  fu tu r e  years*
But in  the  "Caycuma Paper and Cel lu lose"  P r o j e c t ,  Turkish p lanners  seem to  be 
assuming no p r ic e  changes over time both in  inputs  and outputs  values* Their 
est imate  of d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  values  added i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  very  much s im p l i ­
f i e d  and in s te ad  of adopting a dynamic approach where p r i c e s  are  allowed to
2
change percentage-wise  in  fu tu r e  years  , they have been con ten t  with  the 
a p p l i c a t i o n  of s t a t i c  assumptions.
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved in  a llowing fo r  expected p r i c e  changes in inputs  and 
outputs  a re ,  of course,  obvious; but t h i s  s t i l l  does no t  he lp  but make the 
eva lu a t io n  a l e s s  p re c i s e  and i n s u f f i c i e n t  one.
In ray opin ion, what i s  needed here  i s  t h a t  to measure b e n e f i t s  in  terras of 
c o n s t a n t /
1. For the  change in  inpu t  p r i c e s ,  See A.R. P r e s t  and R. Turvey, Cost 
B ene f i t  Analysis :  A Survey, E . J .  December, 1965, p . 691.
2* These es t im ates  of course requ i re  market re sea rch  and fu tu r e  f o r e c a s t s  
on the p a r t  of demand and supi)ly condi t ions  i n  c a p i t a l ,  labour and 
fo re ig n  exchange markets as well  as es t imate  of the economic growth in  
the future*
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cons tan t  p r i c e s ,  or to measure the b e n e f i t s  in  terms of c u r r e n t  p r i c e s ,  but 
in  t h a t  case  we have to d e f l a t e  or i n f l a t e  according to the circumstances*
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VI. Total  Investment
So f a r ,  I have been concerned with  the b e n e f i t s  s ide  of the p r o j e c t ,  but i n i t i a l  
c a p i t a l  cos t  too,  may c re a te  some complex problems which need to  be taken in to  
co n s id e ra t io n .
The investment expenditure  of the Caycuma P r o j e c t  has not been given i n  d e t a i l  
i n  the SPO Appra isa l  Form. The only da ta  we have a re  the  breakdown of t o t a l  
investment between domestic and fo re ign  currency components.
However, from a recen t  document I have obtained from the SPO^, there  i s  some 
in format ion  in  re fe rence  to items included in  domestic investment and fo re ign  
investment.  But,  i t  must be poin ted  out t h a t  the items which are  mentioned, 
are  not given in  numerical  form*
According to t h i s  new in format ion ,  domestic component of investment comprises 
expenditures  on s i t e  ou t lay  and s i t e  p rep a ra t io n ,  water supply,  bu i ld ings  
( f a c to ry  b u i ld in g s ,  o f f i c e  b u i ld in g s ,  soc ia l  housing scheme), domestic machin­
ery  and equipment; t r a n s p o r t  cos t  and insurance of imported machinery, domes­
t i c  t r a n s p o r t ,  assembling cos t  of machinery, f u r n i t u r e ,  manpower and t r a i n i n g ,  
unexpected c o s t s ,  cos ts  of s h i f t i n g  to opera t ion ,  custom d u t i e s  and t a r i f f s ,  
i n t e r e s t  charges during the co n s t ru c t io n  period*
Foreign currency  component of investments on the o ther  hand, inc ludes  (F.O.B.) 
import p r ice  of machinery and equipment, payments to fo re ign  personnel fo r  
the  assembling and c o n s t r u c t io n  ope ra t ion .
As i s  the case with  the  b e n e f i t s  of the  p r o j e c t ,  investment outlay  of the  
p r o j e c t  which comprises the above-mentioned items needs to be valued a t  so c ia l  
co s t  r a t h e r  than a t  market p r i c e s .
In the Caycuma p r o j e c t ' s  investment out lay ,  only the fo re ig n  exchange compon­
ent of investment has been ad jus ted  according to a shadow fo re ig n  exchange 
r a t e  which i s  assumed to be 33 percen t  above the o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e  (see 
Table . In o ther  words, the fo re ign  exchange component has been co r rec ted
upwards by adding to the market value of machinery and equipment imported a 
premium/
B. Benderi ioglu ,  a p lanner a t  the SPO., A p r iv a te  untyped document 
on Caycuma P r o j e c t ,  December, 1909, Ankara, p . l .
226
premium of 0.333 (or 33 pe rcen t )  in  order to a r r i v e  a t  the soc ia l  cost  of 
these  i tems. Thus, the value of fo re ign  exchange p a r t  of investment i s  
equal to the fo re ign  exchange spent a t  o f f i c i a l  r a t e  p lus  the amount of 
fo re ig n  exchange premium corresponding to the d i f f e r e n c e  between the o f f i c i a l  
and shadow exchange r a t e ^ .
But t h i s  fo re ig n  exchange c o r r e c t io n  i s  the only one th a t  was undertaken by 
the p lanners  as f a r  as the  imported machinery and. equipment are  concerned.
Yet s im i l a r  c o r r e c t io n s  w i l l  be needed on the domestic economic f r o n t .
Social  co s t  of the Caycuma Investments must a l so  be es timated  in  conforming 
with  the p a r t i c u l a r  circumstances of each i tem included.  For in s tan ce ,  in 
a d d i t io n  to the fo re ign  exchange c o r r e c t io n ,  the following adjustments need 
to be taken in to  account:
( i )  customs d u t i e s  must be e l imina ted ,
( i i )  unskilled labour involved must be valued according  to i t s  
oppor tun i ty  cos t  and t h i s  can be expressed in  terras of 
percentage of the  market va lue .  S k i l l ed  labour which 
inc ludes  engineers  and a d m in i s t r a to r s ,  however, can be 
valued on the b a s i s  of market p r ice s  as i s  common p r a c t i c e .
( i i i )  domestic m a te r i a l s  and equipment should be es t imated  ne t  of 
i n d i r e c t  taxes* In  o ther  words, i n d i r e c t  taxes  w i l l  be 
suppressed in  order  to compute the so c ia l  co s t  of the 
m a te r i a l s  and equipment involved.
( iv)  In a d d i t i o n  to th e se ,  the cos ts  of domestic supply of 
water and energy, and t r a n s p o r t  during the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of 
the  p la n t s  need to be p r iced  on the b a s i s  of "accounting" 
p r i c e s ,  r a t h e r  than a c tu a l  market prices*
1. An a d d i t i o n  of the  0.333 c o e f f i c i e n t  to the  fo re ig n  exchange r a t e  
w i l l  b r ing  the o f f i c i a l  r a t e  up to 1 / =  12 T .L iras  ag a in s t  i t s  
o f f i c i a l  r a t e  of 1 /  = 9 T. L i ras .  I t  must be noted th a t  in s tead  
of adding 33 percen t  of the fo re ign  investments to the  fo re ign  
exchange component, the same r e s u l t  can be simply obta ined by 
m ul t ip ly ing  the l a t t e r  with a c o e f f i c i e n t  of 1.33 in  order to 
compute the co r rec ted  value of the fo re ign  c a p i t a l  ou ts tand ing  in  
the p ro jec t*
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VII Discount Rate
The economic ev a lu a t io n  of publ ic  investment p ro j e c t s  i s  done through the 
a p p l i c a t i o n  of b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t io *  This means t h a t  t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  and 
investments are  conver ted  in to  the p re sen t  value on the  b a s i s  of a p re ­
determined d iscount  r a t e .
The shadow d iscount  r a t e  which i s  ap p l ied  in  the e v a lu a t io n  of b e n e f i t  and 
co s t  floiÆ of the  Caycuma p r o j e c t  i s  12 percent^ ;  as can be no t iced  from the 
p re sen t  worth f a c t o r  inc luded in  Tables ^  and
Given t h i s  r a t e  of d iscoun t ,  the b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  of the  Caycuma p ro j e c t  
was found from the following formula:
^  In  
n = 1 r i T T J "r m j "
n
n ^ i TTTTT”
B = ^  ^ = 824.664
n In
1 T m rC = 7q—T -v-yn = 308.214
R = ®/c = 824.664
308.214 
E = 2.67
The p resen t  va lue  of b e n e f i t s  and cos ts  and consequently  the choice of p r o j e c t s  
w i l l  l a r g e l y  depend upon the d iscount r a t e  s e l e c t e d .  Thus, i t s  f u l l  examin­
a t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l .
The de term ina t ion  of d iscoun t  r a t e s  fo r  investments  a p p r a i s a l  r a i s e s  many 
ques t ions  which ought to be taken in to  account.
For in s tan ce ,  which r a t e  of d iscoun t ,  p r iv a te  or s o c i a l  should be used?
Should the so c ia l  t ime-prefe rence  r a t e  or soc ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  
be the choice? Miat a re  the  arguments behind these  two bas ic  methods? Is  
the re  a need fo r  choosing h igher  d iscount  r a t e s  fo r  developing co un t r ie s  as 
compared/
1. Tlie 12 percen t  s o c ia l  d iscount r a t e  i s  the r a t e  which i s  determined 
above the mark e t  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  by the government and the planners 
This r a t e  i s  app l ied  to almost a l l  public  investment p r o j e c t s  as 
in d ica ted  in  the P r o j e c t  Eva lua tion  Forms prepared by the SPO.
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compared to developed, co u n t r ie s?  Do we need to have d i f f e r e n t  d iscount 
r a t e s  fo r  va r ious  s ec to r s  of the  publ ic  s ec to r?  Does the d iscount  r a t e  change 
over time? e t c .
As a m a t te r  of f a c t ,  the  ques t ion  of d iscount  r a t e  has been considered ex ten-
I 2s iv e ly  in  the  p a s t  and up to the p re sen t  day by au thors  l i k e  Pigou , Sen , 
Ecks te in^ ,  McKean^, Marglin^,  E e ld s te in ^ ,  Baumol^ and Henderson^; but none of 
them has come up wi th  any s ing le  simple c l e a r - c u t  s o lu t io n  to the  problem of 
determining an app rec iab le  and workable discount  r a t e .
The problem of d iscoun t  r a t e  does no t  only a r i s e  because of the imperfec t ion  
of the c a p i t a l - m a r k e t , but a l so  because of the se r ious  argument on the p r iv a te  
time p re fe rences  versus  s o c ia l  time pre fe rences  in  r e s p e c t  to the w e l l -be ing  
of p re sen t  or fu tu r e  g en e ra t io n s .
The debates  which have t r i e d  to e lu c id a te  the  s u b jec t iv e  element in  the choice 
of d iscount  r a l e  by the  a u t h o r i t i e s  have cen tred  on two types of d iscount  
r a t e s ;  ( l )  the s o c ia l  time p re ference  r a t e  (STP), and (2 ) the soc ia l  oppor­
tu n i t y  c o s t s  of c a p i t a l  (SOC),
The case f o r  the  STP d iscount  r a t e  was based on the a s s e r t i o n  th a t  consumers'  
sovere ign ty  cannot be a measure of in te r - t em pora l  v a lu es ,  namely, t h a t  i n d iv id ­
u a l s  take a "myopic" view of t h e i r  01m fu tu re  i n t e r e s t s  and they a t t a c h  an 
in cons ide rab ly  /
lo A.C. Pigeu, The Economics of Welfare,  London, Macmillan & Cqo L t d . ,
1950, p . 25 .
2o A.K. Sen, On Optimizing the Rate of Saving, E . J . ,  September, I 96I ,  
p . 487.
3 . 0, Ecks te in ,  A Survey of Tpe Theory of Publ ic  Expenditure,  Public
Finances ;  Needs, Sources, U t i l i z a t i o n ,  P r ince ton  U n iv e r s i ty  P ress ,
,N.B.E,R.^, 1961, p p .453 , 454- 460 ,
4o R. McKean, E f f i c i e n c y  In  Government Through Systems Ana lys is ,  op .c i t .
p p .115- 127.
5 . S.A. Marglin,  The Social  Rate of Disco wit and the Optimum Rate of 
Investment.  QJE. February,  I 963 ,
6 . M.S. F e ld s t e in ,  The Socia l  Time Preference  Discount Rate in  Cost-  
B enef i t  Analysis ,  E . J .  March, 1964.
7 . W.J. Baumol, On The Socia l  Rate of Discount,  iVER. September, I 968 , 
Vol.LVIII,  No.4.
80 P.O. Henderson, Notes on Publ ic  Investment C r i t e r i a  in  the  United 
Kingdom. B u l l e t i n  of the  Oxford U nive rs i ty  I n s t i t u t e  of Economics 
and S t a t i s t i c s ,  V o l .27, 1965o
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incons iderab ly  small value to the  consumption of fu tu re  genera t ions^ .  / s a  
r u l e ,  both the ind iv id u a l  and soc ie ty  place  a h igher  va lue  on p resen t  con­
sumption than on fu tu re  consumption. But the  r a t e s  of time pre ference  of 
the two do not co incide  because the f a c to r s  which govern the p references  of 
each have d i f f e r i n g  v a lues .  These f a c to r s  a re :  expec ta t ion  of l i f e  ar.d
o the r  r i s k s ,  p r i v a t e  as opposed to public  w e l fa re ,  a n t i c i p a t e d  sca les  ana 
p a t t e r n s  of expenditure  and growth r a t e s  of income.
I t  t h e re fo re  becomes necessary  t h a t  the government should choose and impose
a d iscount  r a t e  which r e f l e c t s  the time p references  of the  soc ie ty  as a
2whole. Economists l i k e  Pigou, Dobb, Holzman and Sen , a re  in  favour of 
imposing on the public  a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  the Welfare of fu tu re  genera t ions ,
3
while Ecks te in  and Marglin be l ieve  t h a t  the i n t e r e s t s  of fu tu re  genera t ions  
should be recognized to  the ex ten t  t h a t  the  cu r ren t  publ ic  sanctions  them 
through the democratic p rocess .
F e l d s t e i n ' s  view i s  to allow a d m in is t r a t iv e  de termina t ion  of the Socia l  Time,
p re ference  w i th  whatever weight to the welfare  of fu tu re  genera t ions  these
4
democratic ad m in i s t r a to r s  would allow . In  o ther  words F e ld s te in  argues t h a t  
f o r  public  investment dec is ions  market-determined eva lua t ion  of fu tu re  con­
sumption must be r e j e c t e d  in  favour of a p o l i t i c a l l y - d e t e r m in e d  soc ia l  time 
pre ference  fu n c t io n .  He goes on to argue t h a t  a so c ia l  time pre fe rence  r a t e  
should be "a normative r a t e  r e f l e c t i n g  the government's ev a lua t ion  of the 
r e l a t i v e /
lo A.C. Pigon argued t h a t  ind iv idua ls  a re  s h o r t - s ig h t e d  about the  fu tu re  
and th a t  government in te rv e n t io n  i s  needed to give adequate weight to 
the  welfa re  of fu tu re  gene ra t ions .  See A.C. Pigon, The Economics of 
Welfare,  op .c i t .  p p .24-30.
2o Holzman argues t h a t  t ru e  consumer sovereignty  r e q u i re s  t h a t  the  "washes 
of consumers of the  fu tu re  be presen ted  in  the dec i s io n " ,  See F.D. 
Holzman, Consumer Sovereignty and the Rate of Economic Development, 
Econ. I n t e r n a z i o n a l e , May 1958; A.R. Sen a lso  argues t h a t  a democratic 
s o lu t io n  to an in te r tem pora l  problem is  impossible i f  the opinions of 
a l l  who arc  concerned must be considered.  Thus, i t  must be a govern­
ment r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to s e l e c t  a r a t e  which r e f l e c t s  so c ia l  t ime- 
p ref  erence of the  so c ie ty .  See, on Optimizing the Rate of Savings,
E .J ,  September, 1901, p . 486.
3. S.A. Marglin,  The Socia l  Rate of Discount and the Optimum Rate of 
Investment.  qJE, February,  I 963 , p . 15.
4o M.S. F e ld s te in ,  The Socia l  Time Preference Discount Rate in  Cost- 
B enef i t  Analysis ,  E . J .  March, 1964, p . 367.
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r e l a t i v e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of consumption a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o in t s  in  t im e" .
He a l so  f e e l s  t h a t  the  r a t e  chosen by the government should be used to 
d iscount  the stream of consumption which i s  foregone by so c ie ty  because the 
pub l ic  p r o j e c t  under co n s id e ra t io n  has been undertaken.  In o ther  words, 
F e ld s t e in  advocates  the  e s tab l ishm ent  of a l i n k  between a s o c ia l  time p r e f e r ­
ence r a t e  and the  e s t im a t io n  o f , t h e  s o c ia l  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  of a public  
p r o j e c t .
The o the r  type of d iscount  r a t e  i s  based on the s o c i a l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of 
c a p i t a l  ou ts tand ing  in  the p r o j e c t .  This measures the value to so c ie ty  of 
the p roduct ion  (or consumption) which the funds t h a t  i t  pre-empts would liave 
generated  in  the nex t  b e s t  use to which they might have been p u t ,
0. Ecks te in ,  fo r  in s ta n ce ,  s t ro n g ly  argues the case fo r  e s t a b l i s h in g  so c ia l
oppor tun i ty  c o s t .  Since the re  are  imperfec tions  in  the  p r iv a t e  economy and
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  the  c a p i t a l  market, oppor tuni ty  cos t  must be measured and
u t i l i z e d  as a c r i t e r i o n  in  determining public  budgets and must be valued a t  a
3so c ia l  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t .
This approach, however, w i l l  requ i re  the  measurement of marginal r a t e s  of 
r e t u r n /
1, M.S. F e ld s t e in ,  Opportunity Cost Calcu la t ions  in  Cost-Benef i t  Analys is ,  
Public  Finance,  No.2 . ,  1964, p d l S ,  and h i s ,  Tj^ e^ Socia l  Tfme Preference  
Discount Rate in  Cost-Benef i t  A na lys is .  E . J .  March, 1964, p . 367.
F e l d s t e i n ' s  in d i f f e r en c e  curve analyses  have shown to  us t h a t  the  s o c ia l  
time p re fe rence  r a t e  can vary through time in  response to changes in  the 
consumption le v e l  and growth r a t e s ,  I'he r a t e  of popula t ion  growth and 
the pure time preference  r a t e .  Thus, i t  i s  wrong to assume th a t  STP i s
merely a fu n c t io n  of time* See Ib id ,  p p .378-379.
2o See M.S. F e ld s t e in ,  Net Social  Benef i t  and the  Public  Investment Decis ions ,
O.E.P. March, 1964; and a l so ,  above a r t i c l e ,  p . 379. F e ld s t e in ,  a l so  
sugges ts  to d i s t i n g u i s h  between: (a) market p re fe re n ce s ,  (b) prefe rences  
expressed tiirough b a l lo t -b o x ,  (c) what the government in  i t s  wisdom th inks
i s  good fo r  t h i s  genera t ion  and fu tu re  genera t ions  taken toge the r .  See
M.S. FeHstein ,  Tpe Socia l  Time Preference  Discount Rate in  Cost-Benefi t  
A na lys is ,  E . J .  March, 1964, p p .364, 365, 366.
3o 0. EcksieLn, A Survey of Tpe Theory of Public Expenditure ,  op .c i t .  p . 463. 
Ecks te in  and K r u t i l l a  have worked on soc ia l  oppor tun i ty  c a l c u la t io n s  by 
assuming a tax cu t as an a l t e r n a t i v e  to The Public  P r o j e c t .  Tpey con­
s ide red  the ways in  which a l i k e l y  tax cu t would a f f e c t  income groups and 
then asked how the no t iona l  r e c i p i e n t s  would u t i l i z e  t h e i r  hypo the t ica l  
r e c e i p t s .  Consequently they have a r r iv ed  a t  a weighted average r a t e  of 
r e t u r n .  Under some assumptions the oppor tuni ty  c o s t  of c a p i t a l  in  the 
U.S.A. in  the  l a t e  1950' s  was found to be 5 " 6 p e rc en t .  See 0, Ecks te in  
and J.V. K r u t i l l a ,  Multiple  Purpose River Development Studies  in  Applied 
Economics Ana lys is ,  John Hoi,kins F^ess,  Balt imore I 96I ,  Chapter 4, 
p p .78-127 .
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r e t u r n  on p r iv a t e  investment s ince  i t  has not ye t  been proved th a t  the 
marginal e f f i c i e n c y  of p r iv a te  investment r e a l l y  equals the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  
Even i f  such a measure i s  made, i t  may be r e l e v an t  only in  so f a r  as cos ts  
evaluated  co n s i s ted  e x c lu s iv e ly  of d isp laced  p r iv a t e  investment^ .
Under p e r f e c t  compet it ion  the measurement of the  s o c ia l  oppor tuni ty  cos t
incurred  by a p r o j e c t  would p re sen t  no problems. I t  would simply be the sum
2of the p r i c e s  paid fo r  the f a c to r s  of production used in  the p r o j e c t  ; but
in  a world of market im perfec tions  (not l e a s t  in  the c a p i t a l  market) ,  o ther
means have to be found of measuring s o c ia l  opportun i ty  c o s t .  I t  can be
measured as a sum of money -  d iscounted p resen t  value of the  streams of
consumption t h a t  would have been obtained i f  the p r o j e c t  in  ques t ion  had not
been undertaken or as a r a t e .  McKean argues t h a t  when the re  i s  no market
p e r f e c t io n  and the re  i s  a f ixed  budget the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of the
marginal p r o j e c t  w i l l  rep re sen t  the opportuni ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  and t h i s
3should be used as s o c i a l  d iscount r a t e  .
A number of o ther  s o lu t io n s  have been suggested in  p r a c t i c e  in  order to 
measure the d iscoun t  r a t e  needed in  c o s t - b e n e f i t  ana lys is*  One course i s  to 
make allowance fo r  market imperfec tions  in  the market fo r  investment funds*
In o ther  words, impeded access to c r e d i t ,  varying degrees of informat ion and 
r i s k  premia w i l l  be taken in to  con s id e ra t io n .
Another course i s  to choose the r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  pa id  by the government on i t s  
public  debt ;  and f i n a l l y ,  a weighted average of market i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  
c a l c u l a t e d /
1* A.R. P r e s t ,  and R. Turvey, Cost-Benefi t  Analysis :  A Survey, A.E.A.,
op .c i t .  p . 171.
2. Wlien a l l  of a f ixed  budget i s  to be spent,  the re  w i l l  be no need 
fo r  an oppor tuni ty  cos t  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t .  McKean has even argued 
t h a t  i n  t h i s  case the re  i s  no need fo r  a so c ia l  d iscount  r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t  e i t h e r  and the market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t .  
See R.N. McKean, E f f ic ien cy  in Government Through Systems Analys is ,  
John Wiley & Sons, I n c . ,  New York, 1958.,  p p .78-79*
This i s  t r u e ,  only i f  the maxiraand i s  not the p re sen t  worth of 
b e n e f i t s  l e s s  c o s t s ,  f o r  i f  i t  i s  some r a t e  of d iscount  i s  obviously 
req u i red ,
3 . R.N. McKean, o p .c i t . ,  p p .82-120, 121, (Esp. Chapter 3 ) .
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c a lc u la t e d  in  the  b e l i e f  t h a t  the  r e s u l t  r e p re se n ts  the marginal p r iv a te  time 
p re fe rences  of the  c i t i z e n s  who provide the  funds v ia  borrowings or t ax a t io n ^ .
However, a l l  these  methods have been l a r g e ly  c r i t i c i s e d  fo r  being incomplete,  
mis leading and impracticableo I t  must a lso  be noted t h a t  the method of 
f inanc ing  the p r o j e c t  ( i . e .  borrowing, t a x a t io n ,  or by monetary po l icy )  w i l l  
have a cons iderab le  e f f e c t  on the  type of so c ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  and the 
app ro p r ia te  way of measuring i t .
Not only i s  the p r iv a t e  cap i ta l - raa rke t  r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t  as a measure of the 
s o c ia l  time preference  s t ro n g ly  a t t a ck ed ,  but the p r a c t i c a l  so lu t io n s  suggested 
above have been regarded  as no t  r e p re s e n ta t i v e  of s o c i a l  time preferenceso
I t  follows from the above arguments t h a t  d iscuss ions  on s o c ia l  time preference  
r a t e s  and s o c ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  d iscount r a t e s  do no t  cu t very  much ice  in  
most empir ica l  works and the re  has no t  been a success fu l  and convincing a p p l i ­
c a t io n  of these  n a t io n s  in  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s i s .  Nor do the ideas  about
2al lowing fo r  fu tu r e  changes in  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  seem to rece ive  much a t t e n t i o n . '
Genera lly  speaking, the ru le  i n  p r a c t i c e  has been to choose an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
or r a t e s  on the  b a s i s  of observed r a t e s  r u l i n g  a t  the time fo r  c a l c u l a t i n g  
p re sen t  valueso
Thus, the choice of d iscount  r a t e s ,  in  view of a l l  these  am bigu i t ie s ,  may s t i l l
3remain a m a t te r  of va lue  judgment as Ecks te in  has po in ted  out ,
As /
1, This type of d iscount  r a t e  was app l ied  by J.V.  K r ù t i l l a  and Ü. Ecks te in  
in  Multipurpose River-Basin  Development, 1938» Chapter 4.  This method 
was however s t ro n g ly  c r i t i c i s e d  fo r  no t  being p r a c t i c a b l e .  There are  
lo g i c a l  and s t a t i s t i c a l  problems a sso c ia ted  with  ass ign ing  tax  c u t s  to 
d i f f e r e n t  income groups.  Apso as H i r s c h l e i f e r  poin ted  out the composite 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  f i n a l l y  der ived  has an unknown allowance fo r  a r i s k  premium 
in  i t ,
2* J ,  Margolis was the f i r s t  to sugges t  t h a t  the d iscount  r a t e  fo r  eva lua t ing  
publ ic  investment p r o j e c t s  need not  remain co n s ta n t ,  but he did  not 
develop the idea much f u r t h e r .  See Jiis, Tpe Economic Evaluation of Water 
Resource Development, March, 1959» p . 102,
E e ld s te in ,  however, takes  up the idea and argues t h a t  the  SÏP r a t e  may vary 
through t ime, i f  S o c i e ty ' s  l o c a t io n  in  the consumption space ciiaages or i f  
the shapes or p o s i t io n s  of the  i n d i f fe r en c e  curves do not remain cons tan t .  
See h i s  In d i f fe ren ce  Curves Analys is ,  in  "The Socia l  Time Preference  
Discount r a t e  in  Cost-Benef i t  Ana lys is" .  E . J ,  March, 1964, p . 376.
3. 0. Ecks te in ,  A Survey of Tpe Theory of Public Expenditure ,  op .c i t .  p,460.
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As f a r  as underdeveloped co u n t r ie s  are concerned, the  ques t ion  of determining 
so c ia l  d iscount  r a t e  becomes more d i f f i c u l t .  The market i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  
no t  an app ro p r ia te  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of the  value of c a p i t a l  in  underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s .  A problem of c a l c u l a t i n g  the cos t  of c a p i t i t a l ,  t h a t  i s  to say 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  may a r i s e  s ince  they are  u s u a l ly  f ixed  by sp ec ia l  government 
r e g u la t i o n s .  Owing to the shor tage  of c a p i t a l  and the i m p l i c i t  imperfec t ion  
of the market in  developing cou n t r ie s  the r e a l  cos t  of c a p i t a l  w i l l  most 
probably exceed the  maximum cos t  au tho r i sed  by the Law or o ther  r e g u la t i o n s .  
Thus, shortage of c a p i t a l  w i l l  lead  to a r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  h igher  than the 
market one .
In developing co u n t r ie s  one may observe a number of r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t .  For 
in s tance  i n  Turkey in  the organised c a p i t a l  market,  c a p i t a l  can be borrowed 
a t  a r a t e  between lie -  Sfo while the re  a l so  e x i s t s  an d isorgan ized  market in 
r u r a l  a reas  where money i s  borrowed a t  50 percent  of i n t e r e s t  or even more.
One may then ask the ques t ion  of how to determine the so c ia l  discount r a t e  
fo r  ev a lua t ing  pub l ic  investment p r o j e c t s .  I t  i s  not an easy ques t ion  to 
answer s ince  the re  a re  a la rge  number of f a c to r s  which may a f f e c t  t h i s  decis ion .
(1) In  my th ink ing ,  however, developing coun t r ie s  should use a soc ia l  
d iscount  r a t e  s ince  market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  does not r e f l e c t  the t rue  
value  of c a p i t a l .  I f  the  c a p i t a l  i s  underpr iced  and no shadow p r ice  i s  
used,  c a p i t a l  in t e n s iv e  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  be favoured. I f ,  on the  o ther  
hand, h igher  ( s o c i a l )  d iscount  r a t e s  are  used,  many of the  investment 
p r o j e c t s  of the developing coun t r ie s  may no t  appear p r o f i t a b l e  and t h i s  
can hamper t h e i r  re source  u t i l i z a t i o n .
Bût i t  can be argued t h a t  a d iscount r a t e  h igher  than market r a t e  w i l l
a t  l e a s t  have the advantage of r e j e c t i n g  p r o j e c t s  with  a r a t h e r  low r a t e
2of r e t u r n ,  i . e .  t r a n s p o r t  and luxury housing p r o j e c t s  •
(2 ) Developing c o u n t r ie s  should apply a r a t e  of d iscoun t  which is  h igher  than 
the d iscoun t  r a t e s  used in  developed c o u n t r i e s .  I t  i s  arguable  t l ia t  
developing co u n t r ie s  by us ing  a h igher r a t e  w i l l  be able  to pass p ro je c t s  
with  a high r a t e  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  which w i l l ,  in  tu rn ,  achieve h igher r a t e s  
o f /
1. The de te rm ina t ion  of a s o c ia l  d iscount  r a t e  i s  th e r e f o r e  a mat te r  of -
Do Governments in te rvene  in  c a p i t a l  markets with  any e f f e c t iv e n e s s ,  
and how well  organised and u n i f i e d  i s  the c a p i t a l  market in  a country?
2t. I t  i s  sometimes argued tha t  d i f f e r e n t  d iscount  r a t e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t
s ec to r s  or p ro j e c t s  may be needed, but opinions on t h a t  a re  div ided 
on the grounds t h a t  such d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  would be t e ch n i c a l ly  very 
d i f f i c u l t  and probably incorrec t*
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of growth of income and thus  a h igher  leve l  of welfa re  f o r  fu tu re  g enera t ions .
Developed co u n t r ie s  are  no t  depressed by the lack  of c a p i t a l  and they may be 
ab le  to lower the s o c ia l  d iscount  r a t e  in  order  to take care  of fu tu re  gener­
a t io n s  to a g r e a t e r  ex ten t  than the  developing c o u n t r ie s  would be able  to do. 
The developed c o u n t r i e s . can forego the r i s k  of applying a lower so c ia l  d iscount 
r a t e  which would u l t im a te ly  give p r i o r i t y  to p ro j e c t s  with  h igher  c a p i t a l -  
i n t e n s i t y  and with  long d u ra b i l i ty *  But t h i s  i s  what the  underdeveloped 
country  cannot a f f o r d .
Advanced co u n t r ie s  w i th  t h e i r  abundant c a p i t a l  resources  are  able  to consider  
the so c ia l  time pre fe rence  r a t e  as well  as the s o c ia l  opportun i ty  cos t  of 
c a p i t a l .  In  o ther  words, they can take care  of p re sen t  and fu tu r e  genera t ions  
simultaneously} but in  developing c o u n t r i e s ,  they should f i r s t  be concerned 
about the  p re sen t  gene ra t ion  which happens to be poorer ,  r a t h e r  than the  fu tu re  
genera t ion  which would be b e t t e r  o f f  anyhow.^
Only when a country  i s  s tagna t ing  and where only a major r e s t r i c t i o n  of cu r ren t  
consumption can put l i f e  in to  i t s  development programine may one wish to make 
s a c r i f i c e  fo r  tomorrow, fo r  without i t ,  the fu tu re  g enera t ion  w i l l  be as im­
poverished as the p re sen t  one.
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of income in  favour of the poor of t o d a y 's  genera t ion  r a t h e r  
t h a n /
1. W, Bauraol and A.C. I larberger f ee l  t h a t  by and la rge  the fu tu re  can be 
l e f t  to take care  of i t s e l f .  There i s  no need to lower a r t i f i c i a l l y  
the so c ia l  r a t e  of d iscoun t  in  order to inc rease  f u r t h e r  the p rospect ive  
weal th  of fu tu re  gene ra t ions .
W. Baumol argues t h a t  "the r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  should be s e t  by the market 
and the needs of publ ic  po l icy  . . . .  and no a ttempt should be made to 
subs id ise  the fu tu re  by a r t i f i c i a l  reductions  in  d iscount  r a t e s  designed 
only f o r  t h a t  purpose".  lie a l so  i n s i s t s  t h a t  " . . .  an appropr ia te  
ins trument would be a s e t  of s e l e c t iv e  subs id ies  r a t h e r  than a low general  
d iscount  r a t e  t h a t  encourages i n d i s c r im in a te ly  a l l  s o r t s  of investment 
programmes whether or no t  they are  r e l e v a n t " .  See W, Baumol, On The 
Socia l  Rate of Discount.  AER. Vol.  LVIII,  No,4 . ,  September, 1968, pp. 
801-802.
AoC. Harberger has a lso  argued on the s im i la r  l i n e s  by s t a t i n g  th a t  
" in t e r g e n e r a t io n  comparison, as a normative problem a r i s e s  only i f  we 
expect the fu tu re  genera t ions  as a whole to be poore r than we are* There 
is  no normative reason fo r  making the p re sen t  (poor) genera t ion  save more 
than i t  wants to in  order to make fu tu re  r i c h e r  genera t ions  s t i l l  r i c h e r " .  
See A.C* Ilarberger,  Techniques of P r o jec t  A ppra isa l ,  National Economic 
Planning, National Bureau Conference Se r ie s ,  No,9 . ,  New York, 196?, p . 140.
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than the fu tu re  poor i s  no t  an argument a g a in s t  government a c t i v i t y .
Obviously, more government p ro je c t s  are  needed, but t h i s  does not imply 
more long term p r o j e c t s .  What we need i s  more but l e s s -d u r a b le  government 
investments and a low r a t e  of d iscount  on publ ic  p r o j e c t s  i s  p r e c i s e ly  the  
wrong way to  go about t h e i r  achievement.
One can go along p a r t l y  w i th  Ee lds te in^  to suggest  t h a t  f o r  publ ic  investment 
d e c i s io n s ,  a shadow p r ice  which r e f l e c t s  both so c ia l  time preference  and 
soc ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of funds should be the choice* B^t in  my opinion,  
more weight should be given to so c ia l  opportuni ty  co s t  of c a p i t a l  when under­
developed cou n t r ie s  a re  in  q ues t ion .  Besides,  the so c ia l  d iscount r a t e  should 
be a r a t e  which may r e f l e c t  government judgment of the  r e l a t i v e  soc ia l  u t i l i t y  
of consumption a t  d i f f e r e n t  po in ts  in  t ime. A dynamic approach which takes  
in to  account the  fu tu r e  changes in  d iscount r a t e s  i s  needed*
Despite  the d i f f i c u l t y  of determining an ap p rop r ia te  d iscount  r a t e  fo r  under­
developed c o u n t r i e s ,  the re  are  s t rong arguments in  favour of applying a r a t e
2of d iscount  of 10 pe rcen t  . Tinbergen, fo r  in s t a n c e ,  has argued t h a t  10 per
cent  or a l i t t l e  more may be a s u i t a b l e  r a t e  of d iscount  to  apply in  developing
3cou n t r ie s  i n  the  case of a lack  of the  in format ion needed ,
The i n t e r e s t  fo r  d iscount ing  must be chosen with  the utmost care s ince  very
small d i f f e r e n c e s  t r a n s l a t e  in to  very la rge  d i f f e r e n c e s  of cu r ren t  va lues .  
N a tu ra l ly ,  a v a r i a t i o n  in  the r a t e s  of d iscoun t  used in  the  c a l c u l a t i o n  may 
th e re fo re  a f f e c t  the order of p r i o r i t y  of the p r o j e c t s .  Thus, i f  the d i f f e r ­
ence between the market r a t e  and so c ia l  discount r a t e  i s  not taken in to  account
ser ious  e r r o r s  may be incurred  in  a l l o t t i n g  p r i o r i t y  to p r o je c t s  with a r e ­
l a t i v e l y  high c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  in  r e l a t i o n  to n a t io n a l  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
c a p i t a l .
F i n a l l y /
1. M.S. F e ld s t e in ,  The Socia l  Time Preference Discount Hate in Cost-  
Benef i t  Analys is ,  E . J .  March, 1964. p . 379.
2. On t h i s  p o in t ,  see U.K. Cost-Benef it  Analysis  of Socia l  P ro jec t s  
Research I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Social  Development and Office  of Social  
A f f a i r s ,  Report  No, 7, Geneva, A p r i l ,  1966, p . 23; and a lso  J* 
Tinbergen, The Design of Development, Tpe John Hopkins P ress ,
Bal t imore,  I 966 , p p .39, 86.
3 . J .  Tinbergen p o in t s  out t h a t  fo r  "phe equi l ibr ium r a t e  of i n t e r e s t " ,  
f a c t o r s  l i k e  (a) the r a t e  a t  which i t  w i l l  be p o s s ib le  to  a t t r a c t  
a d d i t i o n a l  c a p i t a l ;  and (b) the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of marginal p ro je c t s  
co r re c ted  fo r  r i s k  such as i n f l a t i o n  can be taken in to  cons idera tion* 
Thus, he adds t h a t  "Even i f  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  ob ta in  f igu res  of any 
accuracy, i t  would be wise to t r y  f igu res  of the o rder  of 10 percent 
and over,  i f  only to observe the consequences". See the Autiiors,
The Design of Development, The John Hopkins P res s ,  Balt imore I 966 , p . 39
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F in a l ly ,  one may conclude th a t  a h igher  d iscount r a t e  i s  more advantageous 
than the lower one, s ince ,  a t  l e a s t  the former w i l l  avoid  m isa l lo ca t io n  of 
f a c to r  use by r e j e c t i n g  the i n f e r i o r  p ro je c t s^ .
In view of a l l  these  d i s cu s s io n s  the p lanners '  d e c i s io n  to choose a d iscount  
r a t e  of 12 pe rcen t  seems to be a reasonable  one. This i s  in  l ino  with the 
recommendations suggested by many economists but I f e e l  in s te ad  of applying 
only one r a t e  of d i scoun t ,  a t  l e a s t  two r a t e s  of soc ia l  d iscount  should be 
app l ied  before  a r r i v i n g  a t  the  f i n a l  d e c i s io n  and p r i o r i t y  ranking .
In o ther  words, p r o j e c t s  need to  be checked on the b a s i s  of var ious  d iscount 
r a t e s .  I t  must be noted t h a t  in  a mixed economy with  market imperfections  
and m u l t ip le  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  no s ing le  d iscount r a t e  can be taken as a measure 
of both time p re ference  and the p r o d u c t iv i ty  of c ap i t a l*
Besides,  the chosen d iscoun t  r a t e  of 12 percent  has been assumed to remain 
cons tan t  dur ing the  economic l i f e  of p ro jec ts*  But as we Imow, 8TP r a t e  need 
n o t  be co n s tan t  as i t  may vary  according to  changes i n  the  consumption leve l  
and growth r a t e s ,  the r a t e  of popula t ion  growth and the pure time preference  
r a t e ^ .
S im i la r ly ,  a so c ia l  d iscount  r a t e  based upon the s o c i a l  opportuni ty  cos t  of 
c a p i t a l  may depend on f a c to r s  which w i l l  a f f e c t  the  marginal p r o d u c t iv i ty  of 
c a p i t a l .  These f a c to r s  a re^ î  (a) the r a t e  of c a p i t a l  formation,  (b) the 
r a t e /
1, An a p p l i c a t i o n  of a so c ia l  d iscount  r a t e  based on so c ia l  oppor tuni ty
c o s t  of c a p i t a l  w i l l  be more re le v an t  to Turkey 's  c o n d i t io n s ,  Spnce
' by a h igh d iscoun t  r a t e ,  investment funds w i l l  be mainly a l l o c a t e d  to
productive  s ec to r s  and p r o j e c t s  with  a high r a t e  of r e t u r n  r a t h e r  than 
to so c ia l  overhead c a p i t a l  p ro je c t s  which can pass the t e s t  only i f  a 
lower d iscoun t  r a t e  i s  taken.  In our th ink ing ,  product ive  p ro je c t s  
which can even pass the t e s t  of a h igher d iscount  r a t e ,  w i l l  c o n t r ib u te  
more to the welfa re  of p resen t  as well  as fu tu re  gen e ra t io n s .  This 
conclus ion  suppor ts  our argument in  the e a r l i e r  chap te rs ,  t h a t  investment 
funds need to be a l l o c a t e d  to productive  s ec to rs  and p r o j e c t s ,
2, See M.S. F e ld s t e in ,  The Social  Time Preference  Rate in  Cost-Benef it
Analysis ,  op .c i t .  pp*374-~375. F e ld s te in  a l so  concludes t h a t  "slowly
but continuously  r a i s i n g  the pure-t ime d iscount r a t e  seems to be the 
bes t  compromise between those who would not have s o c i e ty  look end less ly  
in to  the f u tu r e ,  and those who can see no normal j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  not 
doing so".  Ib id ,  p p .378-379. Socia l  Time pre fe rence  r a t e  may remain 
cons tan t  only i f  the re  i s  a constan t  e l a s t i c i t y  of marginal u t i l i t y  
fu n c t io n .  See M.S. F e ld s t e in ,  op ,c i t .  p . 371.
3, See A.C. I larberger,  Techniques of P r o je c t  A ppra i sa l ,  National Economic 
Planning, National Bureau Conference S e r ie s ,  No.9, New York, 1967»
p . 136
237
r a t e  of labour - fo rce  growth, (c) the n a tu re  and degree of " n e u t r a l i t y "  or 
"n o n -n e u t r a l i ty "  of t e ch n ica l  advance (d) the n a tu re  of changes in  the p a t t e r n  
of demand, (e) p a r t i c u l a r l y  of r e l a t i v e  s h i f t s  toward or away from c a p i t a l -  
i n ten s iv e  i n d u s t r i e s .
C lear ly  some of these  f a c to r s  w i l l  produce a s e c u la r ly  r i s i n g  r a t e  of marginal 
p ro d u c t iv i t y ,  otliers w i l l  produce a s e c u la r ly  d e c l in in g  r a t e .  Therefore ,  
the re  a re  s t rong  reasons to be l ieve  t h a t  marginal p ro d u c t iv i t y  of c a p i t a l  w i l l  
change in  the long-term fu tu re  and the  f a c to r s  causing t h i s  change have got 
to be taken  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  during the  de termina t ion  of an appropr ia te  
d iscount  ra te*
This r a t e  should,  of course ,  be modified whenever the re  a re  good reasons to 
expect t h a t  in  the fu tu re  the ty p ic a l  r a t e  of s o c ia l  marginal p ro d u c t iv i ty  of 
c a p i t a l  w i l l  d i f f e r  from th a t  observed in  the p a s t ;  fo r  the p re sen t  and near  
fu tu r e  y e a r s ,  i t  should be modified when the re  i s  evidence of an abnormal 
s c a r c i t y  or g lu t  of i n v e s t i b l e  funds .
lo Harberger has a lso  concluded tJiat the  pas t  average so c ia l  r a t e  of
r e t u r n  to c a p i t a l  i s  the  b e s t  f i r s t  approximation of the r a t e  d e s i r a b le  
fo r  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s <. Ib id ,  p. 141*
*38
V III .  P resen t  Value C r i t e r io n :
As can be seen from the Caycuma P r o je c t  ev a lua t ion  form (Chapter 7 ) ,  the 
c r i t e r i o n  app l ied  by the p lanners  i s  the p re sen t  va lue  r u l e  which gives a 
b e n e f i t  co s t  r a t i o  of 2 .6 .  This has been the general  ru le  app l ied  in  i n v e s t ­
ment p r o j e c t s  examined and evaluated  by the S ta te  Planning Organisation  (SPO),
One may ask: I s  the p re sen t  value ru l e  an a p p ro p r ia te  one fo r  underdeveloped
co u n t r ie s?  Before we answer t h i s  ques t ion ,  i t  would seem e s s e n t i a l  to d iscuss  
b r i e f l y  two of the  investment c r i t e r i a ,  namely the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  and 
p re sen t  va lue .  There i s  ex tens ive  l i t e r a t u r e  on the  s u b je c t ,  but I w i l l  
merely t r y  to show t h e i r  advantages and disadvantages  when they are  used as 
an investment d ec i s io n  ru l e ^ .
Let us f i r s t  s t a r t  with  the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  r u l e .  The i n t e r n a l  r a t e  
of r e t u r n  of an investment means the r a t e  of d iscount  which makes the p re sen t  
value of the  p r o j e c t s '  r e c e i p t  stream equal to the p re sen t  value of i t s  cost  
stream or, p u t t i n g  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  the  r a t e  of d iscount  which makes the p resen t  
va lue zero^.
When the re  i s  no c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g ,  t h i s  ru le  sugges ts  t h a t  p lanners  should 
in v e s t  u n t i l  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  from incremental  investment i s  no 
h igher  than the market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t ;  thus ,  p ro j e c t s  which have an in t e r n a l  
r a t e  of r e t u r n  h igher  than the  market i n t e r e s t  r a t e  w i l l  be s e l e c te d  fo r  
implementation and p r o j e c t s  with  a r a t e  of r e t u r n  lower than the market r a t e  
w i l l  be re jec ted*
I f  a p r o j e c t  has a h igher  y i e l d  than the  market r a t e ,  i t s  p re sen t  value w i l l  
be p o s i t i v e  when p r o j e c t s '  cos t  and r e c e ip t s  stream are  discounted  a t  the 
m arke t /
P resen t  va lue  and i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  r u le s  were b r i e f l y  mentioned
in  Chapter 3» Here, a comparison between the two w i l l  be made in  more
d e t a i l •
I f ,  fo r  in s ta n ce ,  a /lOO investment provides / 5  per year  in  p e rp e tu i ty ,  
i t s  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  i s  5 pe rcen t ;  t h a t  i s  w i th  a d iscount  r a t e  
of 5 percent  the p re sen t  va lue of the r e c e i p t  stream would be the same 
(/lOO) as t h a t  of the c o s t  stream*
The in t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  i s  defined as the value of i  which s a t i s f i e s
the equation:
% -  °p - 1 = 0  
(1 + i )P
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market r a t e .  I f  the p r o j e c t s '  y i e l d  i s  l e s s  than the  market r a t e  the i n v e s t ­
ment w i l l  have a nega t ive  p re sen t  worth when the  l a t t e r  r a t e  i s  used to 
d iscount  the s treams^.  The i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  of the f i r s t  p ro j e c t  no t  
covered by the budget w i l l  be the marginal r a t e  of r e t u r n .  I f  the  n e t  b e n e f i t  
streams from a l l  p r o j e c t s  in  the l i s t  were then d iscounted  a t  t h i s  r a t e  a l l  
those with  h igher  i n t e r n a l  r a t e s  would have p o s i t i v e  p re sen t  values  and would 
c l e a r l y  be p r e f e r r e d  to  those with lower i n t e r n a l  r a t e s  which would have 
negat ive  p re sen t  worths:
As f a r  as c a p i t a l  budget i s  unconst ra ined ,  both i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  and
p re sen t  value r u le s  w i l l  give i d e n t i c a l  r e s u l t s  and a choice  between them would 
2no t  m at te r  much ,
As i t  looks, i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru l e  would pick the c o r r e c t  s e t  and w i l l  
a l so  have the m er i t  of e l im ina t ing  the repea ted  c a l c u l a t i o n  of each p r o j e c t s '  
p re sen t  value a t  va r ious  d iscount  r a t e s .
But i t  i s  always the  case t h a t  the  problem i s  not to decide on the b as is  of
absence of c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g ,  bu t  r a t h e r  on the b a s i s  of c a p i t a l  r a t io n in g
which e x i s t s  both in  developing and developed c o u n t r ie s  fo r  var ious  reasons.
In  o the r  words,  the re  are  c o n s t r a in t s  which l i m i t  the freedom of a c t i o n  of the
departments or i n d u s t r i e s  concerned and prevent them from undertaking a l l
p r o j e c t s  which a re  in  p r in c ip l e  accep tab le .  These c o n s t r a i n t s  can be phys ica l ,
3o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  or f i n a n c i a l  .
As f a r  as the pub l ic  s e c to r  i s  concerned, the c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  can be imposed 
a t  /
lo For an ex tens ive  d i s cu s s io n  on the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  and presen t  
value r u l e ,  see 11.N, McKean, E f f ic iency  in  Government Through Systems 
A na lys is ,  John Wpley & Sons, I n c . ,  New York, 1958, p p .75-91j P.D. 
Henderson, Notes on Public  Investment C r i t e r i a  in  the  United Kingdom. 
B u l l e t i n  of the Oxford U n iv e r s i ty  I n s t i t u t e  of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s ,  
V o l .27, 1965. ,  p p .55- 62 , and. Myles M. Dryden, Capi ta l  Budgeting: T rea t ­
ment of U ncer ta in ty  and Investment C r i t e r i a ,  S c o t t i s h  Journal of P o l i t i c a l  
Economy, V o l . I I ,  February,  1964, p p .235-241.
2,  See P.D, Henderson, Notes on Public  Investment C r i t e r i a  in  the  United 
Kingdom. B u l l e t i n  of the Oxford U n ive rs i ty  I n s t i t u t e  of Economics and 
S t a t i s t i c s ,  V o l .27, N o . l ,  February I 965 , p . 62; Myles M. Dryden has a l so  
po in ted  out t h a t  under l im i ted  assumptions t h a t  i s ,  p e r f e c t l y  competi­
t i v e  c a p i t a l  markets,  completely d i v i s i b l e  p r o j e c t s  and no in te rdependen­
c ie s  among the p r o j e c t s ,  the two c r i t e r i a  lead to the same choice* See 
h i s  Capi ta l  Budgeting: Treatment of U ncer ta in ty  and Investment C r i t e r i a ,
S c o t t i s h  Journa l  of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, V o l . I I ,  February 1964, p . 241,
3* P.D, Henderson, o p . c i t * ,  p*75«
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a t  th ree  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s .  F i r s t ,  the government may have ru le s  to l i m i t  
the t o t a l  of pub l ic  expendi ture ,  both on c u r re n t  and c a p i t a l  account i n  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  p e r iod .  I t  may be wished t h a t  public  expenditure  should not exceed 
some s p e c i f i c  p ropo r t ion  of t o t a l  n a t io n a l  income.
Second, the re  may be q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i m i t  on the t o t a l  pub l ic  investment,  r a t h e r
than publ ic  expenditure  as a whole.
Third,  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i m i t  may a l so  be imposed on the  c a p i t a l  expenditures  
of p a r t i c u l a r  agencies  whether departments or i n d u s t r i e s  so t h a t  each of these  
has to work w i th in  the l i m i t  of the  pre-determined c a p i t a l  budget*
The l a s t  case i s  very  r e l e v a n t  to the  investment agencies  in  developing
c o u n t r ie s  where they are  expected to  reach an ap p ro p r ia te  dec i s io n  w i th in  the
c a p i t a l  budget devoted to them. In  t h i s  case the t o t a l  budget should not be 
spent un less  the  money co s t  of the p r o je c t s  which have p o s i t i v e  p re sen t  worth 
under whatever d ec i s io n  ru le  has been adopted,  reaches  or exceeds the budgeted 
amount. Where the cos ts  of such p r o je c t s  exceed the budget then genuine 
c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  fo r  t h e  agency may be said  to  e x i s t .
Here the re  a re  two common a l t e r n a t i v e  r a t io n in g  devices  which can be used to 
keep c a p i t a l  expendi ture  w i th in  the c o n s t r a i n t s .
The f i r s t  i s  the r a t e  of i n t e r e s t .  The planners  or a n a ly s t s  can r a i s e  the 
r a t e  a t  which fu tu r e  b e n e f i t s  a re  d iscounted u n t i l  the  co s t  of the  p ro je c t s  
with  a p o s i t i v e  p re sen t  value f a l l s  w i th in  the c a p i t a l  budget.  This i s  
tantamount to d iscount ing  a t  the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of the marginal 
p r o j e c t ,  t h a t  i s  the p r o je c t  which by t h i s  method of ranking i s  the  l e a s t  
deserv ing of those t h a t  win a place in  the budget .
The second a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  to f in d  the p resen t  va lue  of each p ro je c t  by d i s ­
counting a t  a pre-deterrained so c ia l  t ime-preference  r a t e ;  to rank p ro j e c t s  
according to t h e i r  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o s ,  and to work down the  l i s t  u n t i l  the 
budget i s  exhausted*
A choice between these  two devices may be in f luenced  by the independent 
judgment/
1. On the marginal r a t e  of r e tu rn  as being used as a d iscount  r a t e  in
p resen t  value c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  see ll.N. McKean, E f f i c i en c y  in  Government 
Through Systems iVnalysis -  A ihind Corporation Research Study, John 
Wiley & Sons, I n c . ,  Now York, 1958, p p .82-89.
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judgment on the r e s p ec t iv e  m eri ts  of the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  ru le  aiil. the 
p re sen t  va lue  r u l e .  This brings  us to the p re sen t -v a lu e  investment ru le  which 
i s  widely adopted in  p r o j e c t s  a p p r a i s a l s .
The p resen t  value investment ru le  implies choosing the  p ro j e c t  which has the 
l a r g e r  p re sen t  va lue when the streams of b e n e f i t s  and co s t s  are  discounted,  
by a pre -dete rmined r a t e .  The formula fo r  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  can be w r i t t e n  as 
fo llows:
where b r e p re se n ts  annual cash flows of the p r o j e c t ;  n re p re se n ts  l i f e  of 
the p r o j e c t ;  i  pre-deterra ined d iscount  r a t e ;  c p rospec t ive  cos t  streams, 
and s scrap  va lue .
The r a t i o  between the p re sen t  va lue  of b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  w i l l  be the ranking 
device upon which the choice of investment p r o j e c t s  w i l l  depend; provided 
the r a t i o  i s  above u n i ty .
I f  independent p ro je c t s^  are  the case ,  of such investments  the  p lanners  should 
undertake those which have p o s i t i v e  p resen t  worths when the  streams are  d i s ­
counted a t  the  pre-dete rmined ra te*
The same r u l e  can a l so  be app l ied  to  in te rdependent p ro jec ts  inc luding  those
which are  mutually  ex c lus ive .  In t h i s  case the a n a ly s t  would choose t)iose
p ro je c t s  which have the h ig h e s t  p re sen t  worths when the streams are  d iscounted
2a t  the s p e c i f i c  r a t e  .
Under no c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  and a p e r f e c t l y  func t ion ing  c a p i t a l  market,  the 
discount  r a t e  i s  the market r a t e  which is  equal to the marginal r a t e  of r e tu r n .
But as f a r  as c a p i t a l  r a t i o n i n g  i s  concerned, an in v e s t in g  agency would have no 
reason to use the market r a t e  fo r  d iscount ing .  The investment budget might 
e i t h e r /
1, Those p r o j e c t s  whose cos ts  and r e c e ip t s  do not depend upon whether 
or not any of the o ther  ventures  are  undertaken.
2. Those p r o j e c t s  a re  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  with  the h ig h e s t  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  
of r e tu r n .
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e i t h e r  f a l l  sho r t  of or go beyond the po in t  where the marginal y i e l d  equalled
the market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t ^ .  In t h i s  case ,  McKean argues t h a t  the d iscount
r a t e  should be the marginal r a t e  of r e tu rn  t h a t  i s  the y i e l d  t h a t  could be
2earned in  the next b e s t  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  open to the in v e s to r  .
McKean's idea  of us ing  the marginal r a t e  of r e tu r n  as the  d iscount  r a t e  seems 
to be very  near  to the  concept of us ing s o c ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  as 
the d iscount  r a t e .  But t h i s  i s  not as simple as that*  F i r s t  of a l l ,  use of 
the  marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  as the  d iscount  r a t e  r e s t s  on the assump­
t i o n  t h a t  i t  i s  the  marginal r a t e  t h a t  can be earned. I f  n e t  r e c e ip t s  can 
be re in v e s te d  a t  the  marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  i t s  use as the d iscount  r a t e  gives
3
the r i g h t  answers . But i f  n e t  r e c e i p t s  cannot in  f a c t  be re in v e s te d  a t  
t h a t  r a t e  because of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  reasons ,  then t h a t  " i n t e r n a l  r a t e "  i s  not 
the  marginal r a t e  of r e t u r n  and i s  no more r e l e v a n t .
Moreover, t h i s  d iscount  r a t e  i s  im prac t icab le  s ince  every s e t  of investment 
p r o je c t s  w i l l  have a d i f f e r e n t  marginal p r o je c t  and marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of 
r e t u r n ,  and a l so  t h i s  marginal r a t e  of r e t u r n  may change over time*
4
Fu r th e r ,  use of the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  as d iscount r a t e ,  does 
not take in to  account the  so c ia l  t irae-pre fe rence  of the  s o c ie ty  which i s  q u i te  
important*
In  my opin ion,  what we need i s  a s o c ia l  d iscount r a t e  which can r e f l e c t  both 
the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of c a p i t a l  (oppor tun i ty  cos t )  and s o c ia l  
t ime-preference  r a t e  of the government who a c t  on beha l f  of the so c ie ty .
In view of the  p re sen t  va lue  r u l e ,  those p r o je c t s  with  p o s i t i v e  p resen t  worths 
t h a t  exhaust  the budget c o n s t i t u t e  the c o r r e c t  s e t ,  the one t h a t  y i e ld s  the 
maximum/
1, See R.N. McKean, op .c i t .  p . 82.
2,  See R.N. McKean; E f f i c i e n c y  in Government Through Systems Analysis ,  
op .c i t . ,  p . 82.
3, On t h i s  poin t  see R, Turvey, P resen t  value Versus I n t e r n a l  Rate of 
Return  -  An Essay in  the Theory of the Third Bes t .  E . J .  March, 1963* 
p . 95.
4, When the re  i s  no c a p i t a l  r a t io n in g  the marginal r a t e  becomes: i f
investment i s  pushed u n t i l  no a d d i t io n a l  p r o j e c t s  y i e l d  more than the 
market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  then the l a t t e r  i s  the  marginal ra te*  I t  
must be noted however, t h a t  one must know the p r e f e r r e d  s e t  of i n v e s t ­
ments before  he can determine the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of re turn*
R.N. McKean suggests  t h a t  one course i s  to d iscount the stream of ne t  
b e n e f i t s  a t  var ious  r a t e s  and f ind  the d iscount r a t e  a t  which the 
budget i s  exhausted by p r o je c t s  with a p o s i t i v e  p re sen t  wu)rth or with 
ga in  streams whose p resen t  va lue  exceeds those of t h e i r  cos t  streams *
17  X J K 1 f t  I  < . - w .  4 -    i i  "  / v / v
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maximum p re sen t  worth with the given investment budget when the streams are  
discounted  a t  the  s o c ia l  r a t e  of r e t u r n .
IVlien mutually  exclus ive  p r o j e c t s  are  concerned, the va r ious  combination of 
p r o j e c t s  would be evalua ted  a t  each discount  r a t e  and the f i n a l  s e t  w i l l  inc lude 
the combination t h a t  had the l a r g e s t  p resen t  value a t  t h a t  d iscount  r a t e ,
Ali  t h i s  does not mean th a t  marginal in t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  i s  not a usefu l  
device to apply; on the  con t ra ry ,  i t  can be used as a f i r s t  approximation to
an app rop r ia te  so c ia l  d iscount ra te*  As we have argued in  the  preceding
sec t io n s ,  an .underdeveloped country  must give more weight to the so c ia l  oppor­
tu n i t y  cos t  of c a p i t a l  as the necessa ry  d iscount r a t e  to adopt in  p r o j e c t  
a p p r a i s a l .  Besides,  the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of the marginal 
p r o j e c t  can be used as the c r i t i c a l  minimum r a t e  to be s a t i s f i e d  by a l l  p r o je c t s  
included in  the  programme.
I f  the n e t  r e c e i p t s  from a l l  p ro j e c t s  in  the l i s t  a re  discounted  a t  t h i s  r a t e ,  
a l l  those with h igher  i n t e r n a l  r a t e s  would have p o s i t i v e  p re sen t  worths and 
those with lower i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn s  would have negat ive  p re sen t  worths .  
Thus, provided marginal r a t e  of r e t u r n  i s  used as d iscount  r a t e  the ranking w i l l  
be the same under both investment c r i t e r i a ^ .
Which investment ru le  i s  more advantageous and super io r  than the  other?  In  my 
opinion the re  a re  many reasons which make the p resen t  value (PV) super io r  to
the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  r u l e .  These a re ;
( i )  I t  i s  p ro ced u ra l ly  much s impler to apply than the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  
r u l e .  The l a t t e r  i s  sometimes ambiguous because p re sen t  worth can be zero a t  
two or more d iscount  ra tes*
In  normal case a p r o j e c t  i s  a s so c ia t e d  with two phases where an i n i t i a l  period 
of nega t ive  net  b e n e f i t s  i s  followed by the second phase in  which the stream of 
n e t  b e n e f i t s  i s  p o s i t i v e .
When the s ign  of the st ream of b e n e f i t s  changes once only (as above) from 
n e g a t i v e /
1, See E.i\. McKean, E f f ic ien c y  in  Government Througli Systems Analysis ,  
op .c i t . ,  p . 89; He po in ts  out t h a t  i f  p r o je c t s  above (or below) the 
marginal p r o j e c t  were ranl<ed according to t h e i r  p resen t  worths the 
ranking would s h i f t  as the d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s  were used fo r  discount ing.  
However, the s h i f t  in  ranking wu)uld not matter  i f  a l l  p r o j e c t s  above 
tlie marginal p r o je c t  were undertaken and a l l  the  p r o je c t s  below the 
marginal p r o j e c t  were excluded* See I b i d . ,  p p .85-89.
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negat ive  to  p o s i t i v e ,  the re  i s  a s ing le  unique s o lu t i o n  fo r  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e
of re turn*  This i s  the case where, in  th e  l a t t e r  p e r iods ,  gains  exceed
opera t ing  c o s t s .  I f ,  however, the re  i s  more than one change of s ign so t h a t
the pe r iod  of the  l i f e  of the p r o j e c t  f a l l s  in to  more than two phases,  there
w i l l  then he more than one value  fo r  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n .  Sometimes
1the  values  of the  r a t e s  may no t  even he r e a l  v a lu es .
Because of the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of non-uniqueness the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  has
been g r e a t l y  c r i t i c i s e d  as a general  ru le  and i t  has c e r t a i n l y  a disadvantage
2from which the p re sen t  value ru le  i s  completely f r e e ,
( i i )  The use of p re sen t  value does,  and the use of i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  
does n o t ,  involve  a d iscount  r a t e  rep re sen t in g  our r e l a t i v e  eva lua t ion  of 
c u r r e n t  and postponed r e tu rn s  and c o s t s .  I f  the government or so c ie ty  cares  
about the  r e l a t i v e  f u t u r i t y  of gains  and lo s s e s ,  i f  t h a t  i s  to say, the 
o b je c t iv e  i s  a p re sen t  value the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  i s  the wrong c r i t e r i o n
In o ther  words,  the  p re sen t  value ru le  r e f l e c t s  the so c ia l  time pre ference  
r a t e  which i s  d i f f e r e n t  than th a t  of the p r i v a t e  time p re ference  r a t e  which 
i s  rep re sen ted  by the market i n t e r e s t  ra te*  In t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  c r i t e r i o n  
however, does not  take  care of t h i s  soc ia l  time p re fe rence  func t ion ,
( i i i )  /
1, The s i t u a t i o n  becomes more c r i t i c a l  and ser ious  when the re  are  th ree  
phases in  one p r o j e c t ,  where the stream of n e t  b e n e f i t s  i s  f i r s t ,  
negat ive  than p o s i t i v e ,  and then  negative  aga in .  Examples fo r  having 
non-rea l  va lues  fo r  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  a r e ;  investments which 
involve te rminal co s t s  fo r  damage, d isposa l  or r e s t i t u t i o n ,  i . e .  mine 
s h a f t s  which lead  to subsidence,  nuc lea r  power and i ro n -o re  works. On 
the non-uniqueness of the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  see,  P.D. Henderson, 
Notes on Public Investment C r i t e r i a  in  the United Kingdom, B u l l e t i n  of 
the Oxford U n iv e r s i ty  I n s t i t u t e  of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s ,  V o l .2 ? . ,  
February,  1965» p p .61-62, and Myles M. Dryden, Capi ta l  Budgeting: 
Treatment of U ncer ta in ty  and Investment C r i t e r i a ,  S c o t t i s h  Journa l  of 
P o l i t i c a l  Economy, V o l . I I ,  February, 1964, p p .239-240,
2. P.D, Henderson argues t h a t  in  the  usual  case (normal) where a unique 
s o lu t io n  e x i s t s  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  should be the choice ,  op. 
c i t . ,  pp .6 l -62 ;  P ro fesso r  A ,J .  Merre t t  and A, Sykes a re  a l so  in  favour 
of i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  where they s t a t e  t h a t :  "Our main con­
c lu s io n  i s  t h a t  fo r  the v a s t  m a jo r i ty  of simple c a p i t a l  budgeting 
d e c i s io n s ,  we cons ider  t h a t  y i e ld  i s  both t e c h n i c a l l y  and p r a c t i c a l l y  
su p e r io r  to n e t  p re sen t  va lue .  In these  r e l a t i v e l y  simple s i t u a t i o n s ,  
the disadvantages  of ne t  p resen t  value cons iderab ly  outweigh i t s  
t e ch n ica l  s im p l i c i t y " .  See t h e i r  book: Tqe Finance and Analysis  of 
C ap i ta l  P r o j e c t s ,  Longmans, I 963 , p p .148-149, and A.J .  M er ie t t ,  Net 
P resen t  Value vs * The I n t e rn a l  Kate of Return Yet Again, S c o t t i sh  
Jou rna l  of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, Vol.XII,  February,  I 965 , No. 4 . ,  t p . l l ? -  
118.
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( i i i )  Bes ides,  while i n  p re sen t  va lue  ru l e  discount r a t e  can be changed over 
t ime, i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  considers  only a uniform discount r a t e .
Ill the  case of p re sen t  va lue ,  one i s  no t  committed to  us ing  the same r a t e  of 
d iscount  throughout the l i f e  of p r o je c t s  * Thus, the  p lanners  are  e n t i r e l y
f r ee  to  adopt any time p re ference  func t ion  which can be v a r i e d  according to 
circumstanc es*
Also,  as a r e s u l t ,  computations of the  p re sen t  value of the p r o j e c t s  fo r  
d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s  of d iscoun t  provide a r e l i a b l e  and sound dec i s io n  when i n v e s t ­
ment p r o j e c t s  a re  s e l e c t e d .
( iv )  When mutually  exclus ive  p r o j e c t s  a re  in  q ues t ion ,  the ranking according 
to i n t e r n a l  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  po in ts  to the wrong s e t .  Let us i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  
po in t  by an example.
Suppose we have p r o j e c t s  A, B and C and a l so  suppose A and B are  mutua lly  
1exclus ive
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where i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  i s  the  r u l e ,  B and C are  b e s t  investments .
But suppose the r a t e  of r e t u r n  on the next b e s t  investment,  D i s  3 percent  
which i s  then the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of re turn* I f  the not b e n e f i t  
streams are  d iscounted a t  t h a t  r a t e ,  A becomes a b e t t e r  p r o je c t  than B and 
the c o r r e c t  s e t  of p ro j e c t s  i s  A plus  C.
But i t  must be noted t h a t  i f  A and B were not mutually  ex c lus ive ,  both would 
be undertaken  and A and B would be the b e s t  p a i r  of investment p ro jec ts*
In t h i s  case ,  a simple ranking by in t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  would po in t  to 
the c o r r e c t  s e t .  But as f a r  as the two p r o j e c t s  a re  mutually  exclus ive ,  
simple i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  i s  the wrong c r i t e r i o n ,
(v) /
1* This example i s  taken from R.N. McKean, op .c i t .  p . 90.
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(v)  More im p o r ta n t ,  to  ranli p r o j e c t s  acc o rd ing  to  th e  p r e s e n t  va lu e  r u l e  
g ives  a c l e a r  and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  id e a  of the  p r e s e n t  va lue  of  n e t  b e n e f i t s  
a c c r u in g ,  w hile  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  would ranlt p r o j e c t s  on the b a s i s  
of t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  r e g a r d l e s s  of the  s c a l e  of n e t  b e n e f i t s  
p ro v id ed .  A small  p r o j e c t  w i th  a h ig h e r  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  b u t  with  a l e s s  
p r e s e n t  n e t  r e c e i p t s  w i l l  be p r e f e r r e d  to  a p r o j e c t  w i th  a 1ower i n t e r n a l  
r a t e  of  r e t u r n  bu t  w i th  a l a r g e r  p r e s e n t  va lue  of  n e t  b e n e f i t s .  This  i s  
o bv ious ly  a wrong c h o ic e .
Thus, t h e r e  i s  a  danger  t h a t  p r o j e c t  s i z e s  and the  com binations  of i n t e r ­
r e l a t e d  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  n o t  be ta ken  i n t o  account  when i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  
r u l e  i s  adop ted .
( v i )  I t  i s  sometimes ag ree d  t h a t  a d i s t i n c t i o n  must be made between the
simple i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  r u l e  and th e  more improved v e r s i o n  of  i t ,  t h a t
1i s  F i s h e r ' s  " r a t e  of  r e t u r n  over c o s t "  r u l e .
F i s h e r ' s  "Rate of  R e tu rn  over Cost"  r u l e  im p l ie s  t a k i n g  th e  s tream of d i f f e r ­
ences  between the  n e t  b e n e f i t s  of  th e  two p r o j e c t s  and c a l c u l a t i n g  the 
i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  on t h e s e .  This  r a t e  i s  then  compared wi th  th e  p r e ­
de te rmined  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t .  Here w i th  a g iven  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  the  two
r u l e s ,  t h a t  i s  p r e s e n t  va lue  and i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  r u l e s  w i l l  g ive  the
2same r e s u l t  p rov ided  t h a t  a  unique i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  e x i s t s  .
Tlie s imple i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  r u l e ,  on the o t h e r  hand,  would rank 
p r o j e c t s  acc o rd in g  to  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  o r  i n  o th e r  words,  the  
p r o j e c t s  which have r a t e s  of r e t u r n  g r e a t e r  th a n  t h e  borrowing r a t e  or  some 
a r b i t r a r y  r a t e  would be q u a l i f i e d  f o r  s e l e c t i o n *
The s imple i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  r u l e  however has  been argued to  be i n ­
c o r r e c t  s i n c e  a l a r g e r  p r o j e c t  may liave a lower i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  than  
a s m a l l e r  one b u t  s t i l l  have a r a t e  of  the  d i f f e r e n c e  of the  o u t l a y s  which 
e x c e e d s /
1. On F i s h e r ' s  Rate of  Re tu rn  over Cos t ,  see M.S. F e l d s t e i n ,  and J . S .  
Flemming, Tpe Problem of Timo-strcam E v a l u a t i o n ;  P r e s e n t  Value 
ve r s u s  I n t e r n a l  Rate of  Return  R u l e s . B u l l e t i n  of  Oxford U n iv e r s i t y  
I n s t i t u t e  of Economics and s t a t i s t i c s ,  V o l .26, February  1964, p p . 80-81
2. But i f  t h e r e  i s  more tha n  one i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  the  choice  on 
bo th  c r i t e r i a  w i l l  g ive  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s .  See M.S. F e l d s t e i n  and 
J . S .  Fleming,  o p . c i t .  p p . 80-81-82.
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exceeds the minimum re q ù i re d .  When t h i s  minimum i s  the  market r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t  i t  does of course,  re p re se n t  the oppor tun i ty  cos t  of the  f inance .
So when the  marginal r a t e  of r e t u r n  exceeds the minimum i t  r e p re se n ts  a b e t t e r  
investment than the next b e s t  a l t e r n a t i v e  use of the  funds i t  r e q u i r e s .
While simple i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  f a i l s  to take i n to  account the problem 
of s i z e ,  th  
cos t"  r u l e .
e  problem can be avoided by us ing F i s h e r ' s ^  " r a t e  of r e t u r n  over
Let us take an example. The two incompatible p r o j e c t s  a r c  A and B and both
2have unique i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ;
Stream A : ..100 2, 10, 15, 20, 25, 35, 30, 30
Stream B : -1 0 0 5, 15, 25, 30, 25, 20, 20, 20
Stream (A-B) 0 -3, "5, —10, -10, 0, 15, 10, 10
I t  i s  computed th a t  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of A i s  10 pe rcen t  and th a t  of 
B i s  11 p e rc en t .  The simple r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  would t e l l  us to choose 
B. But i f  we take F i s h e r ' s"Rate of Return over c o s t " ,  we find t i ia t  i t  i s  6 
percent  fo r  (A-B) and (B-A). A s  the Stream (A~B) changes s ign from negative  
to  p o s i t i v e ,  i t  r e p re se n t s  a p r o f i t a b l e  investment a t  any i n t e r e s t  r a t e  l e s s  
than 6 pe rcen t ;  only a t  r a t e s  above 6 percent  would (B-A) be p r o f i t a b l e .
Thus, on F i s h e r ' s  ru l e  one would choose A i f  the minimum value  of the r a t e  of 
r e t u r n  were l e s s  than 6 percen t  and B i f  i t  were more. This i s  exac t ly  the 
same as the  p resen t  value ru le  fo r  F i s h e r ' s  r a t e  of r e t u r n  over cos t  i s  t h a t  
r a t e  which equates the  p resen t  va lues  of the two p r o j e c t s .  At 5 percent fo r  
in s ta n ce ,  A has p re sen t  value 29 and B 27.6;  a t  9 pe rcen t  the  order i s  reversed  
with  A a t  4 .2  and B a t  6 .7^ .
From the above example, i t  follows t h a t  the simple r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  i s  
wrong and the  F i s h e r ' s  " r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le"  should be app l ied  in s tead ,  as i t  
p o in t s  to the  same r e s u l t  as the  p re sen t  va lue  formula with  a constant  d iscount  
r a t e ,
(a) But even t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  ru le  i s  not 
f r e e /
1. For an ex tens ive  t rea tm ent  of F i s h e r ' s  Rate of Return over Cost,  see 
A.A, Alcliian, The Rate of I n t e r e s t ,  F i s h e r ' s  Rate of Return over Cost,  
and Keynes' I n t e r n a l  Rate of Return,  A.EE, December, 1955, p . 938.
2« For the sake of mere i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  t h i s  example i s  taken from F e ld s te in
and Fleming 's  The Problem of Time-Stream Evaluation; P resen t  Value versus 
I n t e rn a l  Rate of Return Rules . op .c i t .  p . 82.
«"I XT O  TP 1 .1  .  .h  J  . .  T r
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f r e e  from weaknesses,  as in  some cases  non-uniqueness a r i s e s .  I t  i s  a 
s im i l a r  case w i th  the  simple i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  r u l e .
(b) Besides the comparison of the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n ,  both simple and 
the incremental  r a t e s  of r e tu r n ,  with  any c u r re n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  may seem 
i r r e l e v a n t ,  i f  the  r a t e  i s  assumed to change over the l i f e  of the p ro jec t*  
Wliereas in  the  case of P resen t  Value ru le  p lanners  a re  not committed to 
using a cons tan t  r a t e  of d iscount ,  a l l  the time*
(c) Fu r the r ,  i t  i s  much e a s i e r  to compute^ and compare the p resen t  values  
of incompatible p r o j e c t s  than to  c a lc u l a t e  F i s h e r ' s  r a t e  of r e t u r n  over cos t  
fo r  a la rge  s e t  of p r o j e c t s .  For example, i f  one wishes to evalua te  com­
b in a t io n s  of independent p r o j e c t s ,  i t  i s  much s impler to add p resen t  values  
than to r e c a l c u l a t e  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  of the  o v e ra l l  time s treams. 
The p re sen t  va lue of two independent p r o je c t s  taken tog e th e r  i s  the  sum of
t h e i r  s ep a ra te  p re sen t  va lues .  But no such simple ru l e  can be devised fo r
2combining r a t e s  of r e t u r n  .
All  these  d i scuss ions  lead  us to  the conclus ion  th a t  p re sen t  value ru l e  i s  
s uper io r  to i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  whatever i n t e r p r d a t i o n  i s  given to 
i t .  I t  i s  a lso  the most r e l e v an t  c r i t e r i o n  to apply  in  underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s .
One may, th e r e f o r e ,  f e e l  t h a t  the  Turkish P lanners '  d e c i s io n  to adopt the 
p re sen t  valqe ru l e  as the  c r i t e r i o n  i s  a c o r r e c t  one. But t h i s  does no t  
mean t h a t  the  p re sen t  value formula i s  always the c o r r e c t  dec i s ion  ru le  in  
whatever form i t  i s  a p p l ie d .
One of the  shortcomings of t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  is  t h a t  the  s e l e c t i o n  of an 
a p p r o p r i a t e /
1. Dr. M.M. Dryden argues t h a t  the re  are  no good n o n - th e o r e t i c a l  reasons 
f o r  r e j e c t i n g  the p resen t  value method and t h a t  a s t rong  case can be 
made fo r  p r e f e r r i n g  the p re sen t  value to i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n .
He main ta ins  t h a t  the p re sen t  value i s  e a s i e r  to c a l c u l a t e  than 
so lv ing  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  by t r i a l  and e r r o r  method. He a lso  
adds t h a t  "Thus, in  p r a c t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  of having to  choose the be s t  
p r o j e c t s  from a s e t  of proposals  . . . .  i t  i s  ev ident t h a t  a v a r i e t y  of 
s ide  c a l c u l a t i o n s  must be made in  order to t r e a t  cases  in  which the 
i n t e r n a l  r a t e  i s  not a p p l i c a b le .  Not a very t i d y  scheme ;" See M.M, 
Dryden, Reply,  on "Net P resen t  Value versus  the I n t e r n a l  i.iate of Return 
Yet Again".  S c o t t i s h  Journa l  of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, VoloXII, Feb.,  I 965 
No.4 . ,  p p . 120-121*
2o See M.S. F e ld s t e in  and J . S .  F lemmingThe  Problem of Time Stream 
■Evaluation; P resen t  Value versus  In te rn a l  Rate of Return Rules . ,  
op. c i t . ,  pp ,82-83.
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ap p rop r ia te  d iscount  r a t e  i s  not always easy* As was d iscussed  in  Sec t ion  
VII,  the re  i s  no t  a c l e a r - c u t  s o lu t io n  to the de te rm ina t ion  of the soc ia l  
d iscount r a t e .  The arguments vary  between us ing  the  so c ia l  time pre ference  
r a t e  or the  s o c ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  or us ing a so c ia l  discount 
r a t e  which i s  the combination of both ^ . These two methods have been exten­
s iv e l y  debated in  theory  and p r a c t i c e  and the s e l e c t i o n  of e i t h e r  i s  bound to
2
involve se r ious  ob jec t io n s  .
However, looking a t  the  Caycuma Paper p r o j e c t ,  one may f e e l  t h a t  the  s e l e c t io n
of a d iscount  r a t e  of 12 percen t  i s  l a r g e l y  based upon the  second method, t h a t
i s  to  say,  so c ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l .  I  was t o l d  by one of th e
planners  a t  the  SPO, th a t  in  the  s e l e c t i o n  of t h i s  d iscoun t  r a t e  the  s o c ia l
oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  had played a dec i s iv e  p a r t ,  though the in f luence
3
of o ther  f a c t o r s  was a l so  taken in to  account .
This,  a t  f i r s t  b lush ,  may seem a reasonable  method in  view of the s c a r c i t y  of 
c a p i t a l  i n  the  country* But in  our th ink ing  we f e e l  t h a t  the  p lan n e r s '  
choice of p re sen t  value ru le  may be hampered i f  the  d i scoun t  r a t e  chosen does 
not  a l so  r e f l e c t  the  s o c i a l  time p re ference  fu n c t io n  of the  soc ie ty  as a whole, 
As F e ld s te in  has poin ted  out,  the so c ia l  d iscount r a t e  to  be used in  p re sen t  
value formula should be determined both on the b a s i s  of s o c ia l  time preference  
r a t e  and the  s o c i a l  oppor tuni ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l .
Another weakness of the p re sen t  value formula ap p l ied  by the planners  i s  t h a t  
i t  may lead  to wrong investment dec is ions  so long as the s e l e c t i o n  of p r o je c t s  
i s /
lo For a very u se fu l  a n a ly s i s  on Socia l  Discount R a te , see P.D. Henderson 
op .c i t . ,  p p .62-74. McKean's sugges t ion  of us ing the marginal i n t e r n a l  
r a t e  of r e t u r n  as the proper d iscount r a t e  i s  a p r a c t i c a l  one, but i t  
i s  no t  always f r ee  from se r ious  o b je c t io n s .
2.  I t  i s  mainly fo r  t h i s  reason th a t  use of i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  has 
been suggested to be the choice .  I t  i s  claimed t l ia t  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of 
r e t u r n  w i l l  avoid the su b jec t iv e  value judgment a s s o c ia t e d  with the 
de te rm ina t ion  of a pp rop r ia te  d iscount r a t e .  On t h i s  p o in t ,  see A .J .  
M er re t t ,  Net P resen t  Value vs .  The In te rn a l  Rate of Return, Yet Again,  
S c o t t i s h  Journa l  of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, Vol.XII,  February,  1965, pp* 
117- 118 .
3. In determining shadow i n t e r e s t  r a t e  the fo llowing f a c to r s  were s a id  to 
be taken in to  co n s id e ra t io n :  the r a t e  of r e t u r n ,  on marginal %:rojects, 
bank r a t e  app l ied  by the Centra l  Bank, i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  on i n d u s t r i a l  and 
Commercial c r e d i t s  and a lso  the r a t e s  app l ied  by ^rgi^vate money-lenders. 
See, Tarik  Kivanc, Yati rim P r o j e l e r i n i n  Ekouomi Yonunden D e g e r l e n d i r i l -  
mesi -  A l t e r n a t i f  P r o j e l e r  Arasinda Bir  Seciin Cal ismasi,  DRÏ, Nisan,
1965, p . 19 .
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i s  made accord ing to b e n e f i t  cos t  r a t i o  a lone .  The r a t i o  only t e l l s  us 
whether or not some r e t u r n  can be expected from the p r o j e c t  and t e l l s  us 
l i t t l e  about the  r e l a t i v e  m er i t s  of p ro j e c t s  whose r a t i o s  are  g r e a t e r  (or 
l e s s )  than u n i ty .  In  o ther  words, i f  the  convent ional  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  
i s  ap p l ied ,  a p r o j e c t  t h a t  has high gross  r e tu rn s  and opera t ing  cos ts  w i l l  be 
a t  a r e l a t i v e  d isadvantage whatever i t s  p o t e n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to net  worth.
When dea l ing  w i th  one p r o j e c t  only the dec is ion  ru le  which depends on the 
b e n e f i t  cos t  r a t i o  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  admit t ing  t h a t  p r o j e c t ;  but when more 
than one independent p r o j e c t  i s  considered,  the choice  should depend not on 
the b e n e f i t  cos t  r a t i o  alone but on the  s ize  of the  p re sen t  value of ne t  
b e n e f i t s  of each p r o j e c t  (N?V), The g e n e ra l ly  accep tab le  f o m  of the  c r i t e r i o n  
would be the maximisation of gains  minus cos ts  so long as both can be expressed 
i n  the same monetary u n i t .  Thus, one may main ta in  t h a t  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  
by i t s e l f  i s  very  decept ive  s ince  i t  revea l s  nothing about the  abso lu te  sca le  
of ga ins and c o s t s .  This i s  an important p o in t  which the p lanners  ought to 
cons ider  s e r io u s ly .^
1. 0. Ecks te in  s ta t e s ,  t h a t  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  can be an appropr ia te
c r i t e r i o n  fo r  c e r t a i n  kinds of investment dec is ions  -  t h a t  i s  to 
say fo r  s e l e c t i n g  among p r o je c t s  which do not d i f f e r  l a r g e ly  in 
re sp ec t  to c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  or r i s k i n e s s .  In o the r  words, the t e s t  
can be confined to choosing among p ro je c t s  t h a t  have s im i la r  turnover 
and r i s k s .
I t  i s  meaningful to apply b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  where the b e n e f i t s  are  
the same i.ii both p ro jec ts*  In t h i s ,  case the r a t i o  of cos ts  of both 




The fol lowing conclusions  can be dra^m. from the d i scu ss io n s  in the preceding 
sec t ions  :
(1) While in  the  absence of c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  the argument in  favour of 
s e l e c t in g  one ru le  r a t h e r  than another does not appear to  be dec i s iv e ,  in 
the case of c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  which g r e a t l y  e x i s t s  in  developing coun t r ie s  
the p re sen t  value c r i t e r i o n  i s  super io r  to i n te rn a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  on 
formal grounds as wel l  as in  convenience of ope ra t ion ,
ïlie p resen t  va lue  ru le  has more advantag;es than the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n
ru le  on the ground t h a t  use of a s p ec i f i c  c e n t r a l l y  determined so c ia l  d iscount 
r a t e  may be very s i g n i f i c a n t  and on the  ground t h a t  i t  i s  much simpler to 
apply .  As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  when in t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  i s  app l ied ,  the re  
w i l l  be the complex problem of non-uniqueness (even negat ive  va lues)  which 
has been considered to be a f a t a l  ob jec t ion  to i t s  f u l l  use .  No doubt t h i s
i s  a disadvantage from which the p resen t  value ru le  i s  completely f r e e .  On
the o ther  hand, even i f  c o s t  f lows of some years  happen to be nega t ive ,  the 
p resen t  va lue  ru le  can give p o s i t iv e  r e su l t s*
(2 ) By and la rg e ,  the choice between the two r u le s  may be a f fe c t ed  by a 
judgment on the  prevalence of c a p i t a l  r a t io n in g  and on the bes t  way of 
s e le c t in g  p r o j e c t s  under these  co n d i t io n s .  Therefore,  the  choice of c r i t e r i o n  
w i l l  mainly depend on what budget i s  considered,  what aims are  adopted when 
the c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  i s  the case and a lso  on the p a t t e r n  of time p re fe rences .
I t  i s  t h e re fo re  necessa ry  t h a t  the  government should see to what ex ten t  and 
in  what ways a r b i t r a r y  forms of f i n a n c i a l  r a t io n in g  are  in  fo rce .  This is  
important not only t h a t  where such c o n s t r a in t s  e x i s t  they can be e l imina ted ,  
but a lso  in  order t h a t  so long as c a p i t a l  r a t io n in g  is  unavoidable in  p a r t i c ­
u l a r  cases the investment agencies  concerned are  us ing the app rop r ia te  dec i s ion  
ru le  fo r  ranking p r o j e c t s . ^
( 3) hhe ther  i n t e r n a l  r a l e  of r e t u r n  or p resen t  value r u l e  i s  used the a n a ly s t  
i s  faced  with  some d i f f i c u l t i e s .  In the former case i t  i s  necessary  to 
s p e c i f y /
P.D. Henderson argues t h a t ,  imposit ion of a r b i t r a r y  c o n s t r a i n t  on 
public  expendi ture  s im p l i f i e s  the ta sk  of dec is ion  making, but i t  
does so only a t  the  cos t  of ensuring t h a t  the dec is ions  made w i l l  
be w^orse than they need have been. he a lso  argues t h a t ,  f o r  a 
sound dec i s ion  making it. should be a government p o l ic y  to e l im ina te  
a l l  k inds  of r a t i o n in g  in  so fa r  as they can be seen to e x i s t .
See P.D. Henderson, o p .c i t . ,  p p .76- 77 .
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spec i fy  a minimum acceptable  r a t e  of r e tu r n  which p r o j e c t s  must reach in  
order to q u a l i fy  fo r  s e l e c t i o n .  In  the l a t t e r  case ,  a pre-determined r a te  
of i n t e r e s t  has to  be used in  d iscount ing  ne t  benef i t s*
The choice of a r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  i s  very important,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when the 
p re sen t  value ru le  i s  a p p l ie d .  The h igher  the r a t e  chosen the g r e a t e r  bias 
in  favour of p r o je c t s  with  r e l a t i v e l y  low i n i t i a l  expenditure  and b e n e f i t s  
which accrue e a r l i e r  r a th e r  than l a t e r .  Therefore ,  whenever a l t e r n a t i v e  
p r o je c t s  e x i s t  which d i f f e r  in  time p r o f i l e s  of t h e i r  p rospec t ive  n e t  bene­
f i t s ,  the r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  used fo r  d iscount ing  may have a dec is ive  inf luence  
on the choice^.
Total  amount of pub l ic  investment w i l l  a l so  be a f f e c t e d  as well  as the cora- 
p o s i t i o n  of a given amount fo r  the lower the chosen r a t e  the  h igher  t h i s  
t o t a l  w i l l  tend to be* Thus, the choice of a r a t e  which implies  a sp e c i f i c  
v a lu a t io n  of e a r l i e r  r a t h e r  than l a t e r  cos ts  and b e n e f i t s  i s  not j u s t  a 
m at te r  of a ph i lo soph ica l  i n t e r e s t ,  but may have a considerable  in f luence  on 
publ ic  investment programmes,
(4 ) I f  d iscount  r a t e  i s  h igher  than the  marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn ,
2many p r o j e c t s  with  p o s i t i v e  p re sen t  values  could ha rd ly  q u a l i fy  fo r  s e l e c t i o n .  
Thus, i t  i s  more reasonable  to use a r a t e  t h a t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with the degree 
of c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  imposed a t  h igher  l e v e l s ,  and a l so  c o n s i s t e n t  with 
a t t i t u d e  towards the fu tu re  t h a t  i s  implied by h igher  l e v e l - d e c i s io n s .
A discount  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  i s  some­
times ap p rop r ia te  because policy-makers may have time p re fe rences  or sub­
j e c t i v e  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  t h a t  d i f f e r  from the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n .  
Po l icy-makers /
lo I f  the  d iscount r a t e  i s  low, p ro je c t s  with high c a p i t a l  investment 
and with  a lower annual opera t ing  c o s t ,  are  p re fe ra b le  to those 
p r o je c t s  with  a smal le r  c a p i t a l  ou t lay  but wmth a high annual opera ting 
c o s t .  I f  discount r a t e  goes up p rog res s ive ly  those p r o j e c t s  with a 
l a r g e r  investment lose  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  super io r i ty*
2, A more p ra c t i c a b l e  and reasonable  method i s  to use the marginal in t e r n a l  
r a t e  of r e tu rn  as the f i r s t  approximate discount r a t e  as f a r  as we are  
deal ing  wi th  cons t ra ined  c a p i t a l  budget. Thus, i f  the  cos ts  and streams 
are  d iscounted a t  tlie i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn ,  of the next best  value 
the  p r o j e c t s  chosen w i l l  have p o s i t iv e  p re sen t  worths and the  one r e j e c ­
ted w i l l  have zero or negat ive  p resen t  w^orths. The f i n a l  t e s t  i s  the 
maximization of p re sen t  worth fo r  a given investment budget, when the 
streams are d iscounted a t  the marginal in t e r n a l  r a t e  of return* See 
R.N. McKean, E f f i c i en c y  In Government Through Systems Analysis ,  op ,c i t .  
pp,99“10U.
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Policy-makers may have p e s s im is t i c  views about long-run  prospec ts  and a t t a c h  
a g re a t  weight to adopt in  the  near f u t u r e .  Wiile they cannot increase  
consumption and reduce the government investment budget,  they can d iscount 
the fu tu re  a t  a h igh r a t e  -  h igher  than the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  
of c a p i t a l ,  or v ice  ve rsa  i f  the policy-makers a re  op t im is t ic*
I t  i s  my judgement t h a t ,  in  thq  de termina t ion  of s o c i a l  discount r a t e  (shadow) 
the fo l lowing f a c to r s  should be taken in to  co n s id e ra t io n :
( i )  the  co s t  of loanable  funds (market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t )
( i i )  the r a t e  of r e t u r n  in  s im i la r  investments ,
( i i i )  the r a t e  of r e t u r n  of c a p i t a l  in  o ther a l t e r n a t i v e s  (opp.
cos t  of c a p i t a l ) ,
( iv )  the  general  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t e  of the  e n t e r p r i s e .
(v) the r i s k  element involved in  the p r o j e c t .
(v i )  the  minimum r a t e  of r e t u r n  expected from the investment 
by policy-makers .
( v i i )  so c ia l  time preference  r a t e  of the  government who a c t s  
on beha l f  of the s o c ie ty
(a) what the  government thinlys i t  i s  good fo r  the 
p re sen t  g enera t ion .
(b) what the  government thinlts  i t  i s  good fo r  
p re sen t  and f u tu r e  genera t ions  taken to g e th e r .
( 5 ) I t  should a lso  be s t r e s s e d  investment p r o je c t s  should be appra ised  and 
evalua ted  in  terms of o ther  c r i t e r i a  as w e l l .  Apprais ing p r o je c t s  according 
to i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  ru le  can be q u i te  use fu l  in  provid ing a double- 
check over the s e l e c t i o n  of p r o j e c t s .  A comparative and d e t a i l e d  study of 
a l l  p r o j e c t s  in  terms of va r ious  investment c r i t e r i a  w i l l ,  of course,  lead 
to a b e t t e r  judgement and d ec i s io n  than the  case of us ing  only one investment 
rule*
I t  i s  fo r  t h i s  reason t h a t  in  Section X, I  s h a l l  be examining the Caycuma Paper 
Mil l  i n  terms of i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  c r i t e r i o n .
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IX. The C o r re c t io n  of An E rro r
As was remarked e a r l i e r ,  in  the computation of the fo re ig n  exchange savings 
of the p r o j e c t  the  SPO Planners  have made an e r ro r  in  the  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  of 
item ( 3 ) with  (4) in  Table 3 (See Chapter ?)•  In o the r  words, the net  
fo re ign  exchange savings in  Table 3 were given as 20,268 thousand T .L ira  f o r  
197c, 60,995 thousand T .L ira  fo r  1971 and 63,952 thousand T .L ira  both in  
1972 and 1973.
But i f  the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  e r r o r  i s  co r rec ted ,  the f o r e ig n  exchange savings 
in  the above years  become 20,246 thousand T .L i ra ,  38,961 thousand Ï .L .  and 
41,958 thousand T.L. r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( fo r  these  f ig u r e s  see Section I I ,  Table l )  
I f  t h i s  important c o r r e c t io n  i s  c a r r i e d  to the t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  t a b le  the t o t a l  
b e n e f i t s  w i l l  change correspondingly .  Total  b e n e f i t s  in  tu rn  become 80,331 
thousand T.L. i n  1970, 152,391 thousand T.L. in  1971» 164,754 thousand T.L. 
in  1972 and 166,254 thousand T.L. in  1973» (Soe Table 6)
Now i f  we conver t  the  t o t a l  b e n e f i t  flows to the p resen t  va lue  again  on the
b a s i s  of th e  SPO's r a t e  of d is c o u n t  of 12 p e rc e n t  th e  PV of t o t a l  b e n e f i t
streams over the  l i f e s p a n  of the  p ro j e c t  becomes 732,686,1 T.L. (See Table
7 ) .  S im i la r ly ,  i f  c a p i t a l  expenditure  i s  conver ted to  the  p resen t  value
2i t  w i l l  amount to 308,293,0 T.L. . Thus, the b e n e f i t  co s t  r a t i o  of the 
Paper Mill  P r o j e c t  tu rns  out to be 2*37 in s tead  of SPO's r a t i o  of 2.6
B e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  -
( a t  i = 12, n = 20) 508,295,0
W c  = 2.37
1. P re v io u s ly  t h i s  f ig u r e  was 824,664,0 T .L ir a ,  See C hap ter  7 ,




 ( In OOP T.L,)
1970 1971 1972 1973
1, Value Added (A). 58,000 109,070 117,836 119,336
2. Foreign Exchange 
Savings (B) 20,246 38,961 41,958 41,958
5. Benef i t s  to Consumers (c) 1,520 3,510 4,110 4,110
4. Employment E f fe c t (D) 565 850 850 850
5. TOTAL (A + B + C + 80,331 152,391 164,754 166,254
Note ; ( l )  These f i g u r e s  re p re se n t  the  b e n e f i t  flows a r r iv e d
a t  a f t e r  the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  e r ro r  has been co r rec ted .
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TABLE 7
PV OF TOTAL BENEFIT FLOWS OF THE PAPER MILL;
At i  = 12#, n = 20.
 ______________ ( In  OOP T.L.)______________ _______
Years
Annual 
Benef i t  
FI ows
(a) Present  Worth 
Fac tor :  a t  12# 
Discount Rate
PV of
B enef i t
Plows
5 80,331 .5674 45 , 579,8
6 152,391 .5066 77 , 201,2
7 164,754 .4523 74,518,2
8 166,254 .4039 67 , 149,9
9 166,254 .3606 59 , 951,1
10 166,254 .3220 53,533,7
11 166,254 .2875 47,798,0
12 166,254 .2567 4 2 , 677,4
13 166,254 .2292 38,105,4
14 166,254 .2046 34 , 015,5
15 166,254 .1827 30 , 374,6
16 166,254 .1631 27 , 116,0
17 166,254 .1456 24,206,5
18 166,254 0I 30O 21 , 613,0
19 166,254 .1161 19 , 302,0
20 166,254 .1037 17,240,5
21 166,254 .0925 15,378,4
22 166,254 .0826 13 , 732,5
23 166,254 0O737 12 , 252,9
24 166,254 .0658 10,939,5
TOTAL 732 , 686,1
Note: (a) For p resen t  worth f a c to r s  a t  12# discount  
r a t e  see A .J .  Merret t  and A. Sykes, Capi ta l  
Budgeting and Company Finance, Longmans, 
London, 1969, Appendix Table A, p . l 5 2 .
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I  have argued in  Sec t ion  VII,  t h a t  the discount r a t e  chosen by the  SPO aas
been a t  the  lower end of the  d e s i r ab le  soc ia l  d iscount  r a t e  fo r  Turkey. In
f a c t ,  I have c o n f l i c t i n g  in format ion  as to the  value of the  12 percent  discount
r a t e  ap p l ied  by the SPO, The ques t ion  i s :  whether the  r a t e  of d iscount  of
12 percen t  corresponds to the a c tu a l  market i n t e r e s t  r a t e  or to the so c ia l
oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l ?  During the in te rv iew  I had with, the SPO in
Ankara^ I was t o ld  by one of the planners  t h a t  the 12 pe rcen t  d iscount  r a t e
r e p re se n ts  roughly the s o c i a l  oppor tun i ty  Cost of c a p i t a l  in  the second bes t
a l t e r n a t i v e o  But in  the r ecen t  document I  have rece ived  from the SPO i t  i s
s t a t e d  t h a t  the 12 percen t  d iscount  r a t e  i s  in  a c tu a l  f a c t  the  market r a t e  of
i n t e r e s t  which inc ludes  a l l  kinds  of banking charges .  I t  i s  sa id  tJiat tlie
normal r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  v a r i e s  between 7 percent  and 9 pe rcen t  and i f  o ther
2bank expenses a re  included t h i s  w i l l  pu t the borrowing r a t e  a t  12 percen t  .
I f  t h i s  i s  t rue  then the discount r a t e  the SPO planners  have applied in  the 
PV c a l c u l a t i o n s  i s  a market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  and not a s o c ia l  r a t e  of discount 
which should r e f l e c t  the so c ia l  opportun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  which i s  p re ­
empted by the  c a p i t a l  budget.  I t  i s  f a i r l y  reasonable  to argue t h a t  the 
so c ia l  oppor tun i ty  co s t  of c a p i t a l  i s  liiglier than the SPO have chosen and i t  
may be necessa ry  to r a i s e  i t  to 14 or 15 pe rcen t .  Bes ides,  the a d m i s s i b i l i t y  
of any p r o j e c t  should be decided not on the b as is  of one d iscount  r a t e  only
but more than one d iscount r a t e  as R.N. McKean has poin ted  out in  h i s  w e l l -  
3
known book . E s p e c ia l ly  t h i s  poin t  becomes more r e l e v an t  to underdeveloped 
cou n t r ie s  where the re  are  la rge  v a r i a t i o n s  in  the i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  app l ied  
because of an imperfec t  c a p i t a l  market and government in te rv e n t io n s  in  the 
func t ion ing  of the  market^. Thus, i t  i s  not p la u s i b l e  to  conduct the PV 
an a ly s i s  s o le ly  on the b a s i s  of a simple d iscount  r a t e  s ince  t h i s  would not 
be a meaningful r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of the  s o c ia l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  in  
these  circumsta n c e s o
Another /
1. An in te rv iew  with  SPO o f f i c i a l s ,  January-Eebruary I 969 , Ankara,
Turkeyo
2o A P r iv a t e  untyped l e t t e r  from the SPO. B. Bender l iog lu ,  SPO, Dec.,
1969, Ankara.
3 . See 11.N. McKean, E f f ic ien c y  in  Government through Systems Analys is .
John Wiley & Sons, I n c . ,  New York, 1958, p p .124-125.
4. I f  the re  were a p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  mar1:et and no u n c e r t a in t y  the re  would 
bo a unique r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  which would be tiie r a t e  of time prefe rence  
expressed by the c a p i t a l  market given the investment o p p o r tu n i t i e s  a v a i l ­
able  and p re d ic te d .  But i f  the re  i s  u n c e r t a i n t y , as indeed there  always 
i s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w i l l  diverge  in  so f a r  as the discount r a t e s  are  used 
to a llow fo r  r i s k ,  and these  r i s k s  may vary between p r o j e c t s .
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Another po in t  i s  t h a t  the  S ta te  Economic E n te rp r i s e s  should provide fo r  a 
r i s k  premium over the  co s t  of borrowingso F in a l ly ,  i t  can be maintained th a t  
investment in  the  publ ic  s ec to r  should y i e ld  more or l e s s  as high a r e t u r n  as 
in  the p r iv a t e  s e c to r .  This makes sense in  the  case of Turkey, s ince  S ta te  
Economic E n te rp r i s e s  are  running prof it -maximiz ing i n d u s t r i e s .
In  Great B r i t a i n ,  fo r  example, government p ro j e c t s  a re  g e n e ra l ly  requ ired  to 
earn a t  l e a s t  as much as t h e i r  opportuni ty  cos t  in  the  p r iv a t e  s ec to r  which is  
measured by the cos t  of borrowings to the government p lus  a r i s k  premium^.
On the assumption t h a t  a r a t e  of d iscount  of 14 pe rcen t  i s  a rough es timate  
of the  s o c i a l  oppor tun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  in Turkey, the  PV of t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  
and t o t a l  c a p i t a l  expenditure  of the  Caycuma Paper P r o j e c t  w i l l  give us a 
lower b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o .  I f  we apply the 14 pe rcen t  discount r a t e  the PV 
of t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  streams of the p r o je c t  becomes 600,247,400 T.L. and the PV 
of t o t a l  c a p i t a l  expenditure  becomes 292,686,000 T.L. (See Table 8, and 9)« 
Thus, the b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  of the  Paper P lan t  a t  14 percen t  discount r a t e  
becomes 2.0  as compared to  a r a t i o  of 2.3 a t  the  12 percen t  d iscount  r a t e .
1 Y c  = 2.05
This simple exerc ise  in d ic a te s  t h a t  the Caycuma Paper P r o j e c t  w i l l  s t i l l  
q u a l i f y  fo r  s e l e c t i o n  even a t  the  so c ia l  d iscount r a t e  of 14 percen t .  I t  
a l so  i n d ic a te s  t h a t  the  Paper Mill P r o je c t  i s  f a i r l y  s e n s i t i v e  to the choice 
of the r a t e  of d i s co u n t .  Therefore ,  t h i s  may emphasise the  f a c t  t h a t  the 
SPO should be very  c a r e fu l  in  determining the value of the  d iscount r a t e .
In  the above s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s i s  I  have d e l i b e r a t e l y  omitted the v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  the shadow fo re ig n  exchange r a t e .  This i s  fo r  the simple reason t h a t  an 
i n s e r t i o n  of the same c o e f f i c i e n t  of fo re ign  exchange pena l ty  to the numerator 
and denominator of the above b e n e - f i t  cos t  formula would make no d i f f e r en c e  
to the u l t im a te  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o .  I t  should a lso  be s t r e s s e d  th a t  taking 
v a r i a t i o n s  in  the  shadow wage r a t e  w i l l  not c a r ry  much weight as in f luenc ing  thi 
b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o s  of the  p r o j e c t .  As can be seen from Table 6, wage payments 
c o n s t i t u t e /
See C.D. F o s te r  and M.E. Boesley, Es timating the Socia l  Benef it  
of Const ruct ing an underground Railway in  London, in  "Headings in 
Welfare Econouiics" Edi ted by h . J .  Arrow and Ï ,  Sc itovsky,  George 
Allen & Unwin Limited,  1969° ppo473-475•
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c o n s t i t u t e  only 0*5 percent  of t o t a l  b e n e f i t  f lows.
I t  must a l so  be added th a t  the  investment d e c i s io n  should not be based on
the b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  a lone ,  but fo r  a more meaningful eva lua t ion ,  i t  should
take account of the ne t  p re sen t  value of the p r o j e c t .  As 11.N, McKean^
has emphasised,  one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t i a l  t e s t s  i s  the maximization
of p re sen t  worth fo r  a given investment when the streams are  d iscounted a t  the
2marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  .
At the d iscount  r a t e  of 12 percent  the NPV of the Paper Mill  i s  424,393,100 
T.L. (732 , 686 , 100- 308 , 293 , 000) and a t  14 percen t  d iscount  r a t e  the NI^ V i s  
307, 561,400 T.L. The c r e d i b i l i t y  of the p r o je c t  should be decided on the 
b a s i s  of i t s  c o n t r ib u t io n  to the n a t io n a l  economy and the above r e s u l t s  
i n d ic a te  t h a t  the  Paper Mil l  p r o j e c t  i s  an accep tab le  p r o j e c t  both on the  
b a s i s  of b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  and n e t  p re sen t  value rulco
1. See li.N, McKean, E f f ic iency  in  Government Through Systems Analysis  
John Wiley & Sons, I n c . ,  New York, 1958, p . 117.
2 .  But as we have pointed out elsewhere,  a d iscount  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t  
from the marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  i s  sometimes appropr ia te  
because policy-makers may have time p references  or su b jec t ive  r a t e s  
of r e tu r n  t h a t  may d i f f e r  from tlie marginal i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of re tu rn ,
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TABLE 8
PV OP TOTAL BENEFIT FLOWS OF TBE PAPER MILL
At i  = 14^, n = 20 years  
( In  000 T.L.). .. . ■ ■
Annual P resen t  Worth P resen t  Value
B enef i t Fac tor  fo r  14^ of b e n e f i t





5 80,331 .5193 41,715,8
6 152,391 .4555 69,414,1
7 164,754 .3996 65,835,6
8 166,254 .3505 58,272,0
9 166,254 .3075 51 , 123,1
10 166,254 .2697 44,838,7
11 166,254 .2366 39,335,6
12 166,254 '.2075 34 , 497,7
13 166,254 ,1820 30 , 258,2
14 166,254 .1597 26,550,7
15 166,254 ,1400 23 , 275,5
16 166,254 .1228 20,415,9
17 166,254 .1078 17 , 922,1
18 166,254 .0945 15 ,711,0
19 166,254 ,0829 13,782,4
20 166,254 .0727 12,086,6
21 166,254 .0638 10 , 607,0
22 166,254 .0559 9 , 293,5
23 166,254 .0491 8 , 165,0





VALUE OF CAl’ITAL INVîfîSÏMENT FLOWS:
At i  
( In
= 14^;, n = 20 
000 T.L .)
(b) Present  Worth Presen t  Value
(a) Investment Factor fo r of Investment
Years Flows 145^  Discount Flows
1 • 48,677 .8771 42 , 694,5
2 90,847 .7694 69,897,6
3 141,627 ■ .6749 95,584,0
4 72,240 .5920 42 , 766,0
5 80,385 .5193 41,743,9
TOTAL 433,776 292 , 686,0
Note : (a) For c a p i t a l  investment f ig u r e s  see
Chapter 7,  Table 1
(b) For p re sen t  worth f a c to r s  a t  14^ d iscount
r a t e ,  see AoJ. MerLett and A. Sykes, Capi ta l  
Budgeting and Company Finance , Longmans, 
London, 1969, p . 152.












X, In ternal Hate of Rpturn of the Paper M ill P ro jec t:
A -  For a sound investment dec is ion  in  choosing among p r o je c t s  i t  i s  
necessary  to see i f  o ther  investment c r i t e r i a  w i l l  a l so  pass the  p ro je c t s  
proposed or designed fo r  the investment programme. Before a r r i v in g  a t  the 
f i n a l  dec i s io n  fo r  ranking,  t a b le s  i n d ic a t in g  comparatively a l l  meri ts  and 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  of a l l  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  be a very usefu l  exerc ise  fo r  r e f in ed  
ev a lua t ion .
S im i la r ly  here I w i l l  be computing the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of re tu rn^  of the  Caycuma
Paper P r o je c t  which the p lanners  have not done fo r  one or another reason.
Before t h a t ,  a c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of a very important po in t  i s  in  order here .
Generally  speaking, the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  ru le  i s  widely appl ied  in
business  accounting by p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  P r iva te  s e c to r ,  as a r u l e ,  looks
a t  a p r o je c t  from a d i f f e r e n t  angle* Contrary to the  publ ic  s ec to r  the
p r iv a te  en trepreneur  (or f irm) i s  b a s i c a l l y  concerned wi th  maximizing t h e i r
2ne t  of tax  income by which w^e mean n e t  p r o f i t s  plus  d e p re c ia t io n  p rov is ion  . 
P.D. Henderson has a lso  poin ted out t h a t  " i t  i s  wrong to  inc lude dep rec ia t io n  
in  c o s t s ,  s ince  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  imputed cos t  i s  a l ready  f u l l y  allowed fo r  by 
counting the i n i t i a l  investment as a negative  cash flow a t  the time i t  takes
• X
place" . What follows from t h i s  sta tement  i s  t h a t  annual cash flows (ACF) 
which are  to be used fo r  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu r n  computations should, in  
a d d i t io n  to ne t  p r o f i t s  (excluding ta x e s ) ,  a lso  inc lude d e p rec ia t io n .  I t  must, 
however, be poted th a t  d e p re c ia t io n  should be understood to include both 
i n t e r e s t  change plus  the recovery of the i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  involved.
The ne t  cash r e c e i p t s  must be t r e a t e d  in  exac t ly  the same w^ ay whether the 
eva lua t ion  c r i t e r i o n  i s  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  (d iscounted cash flows method) 
or p re sen t  va lue .  The only d i f fe rence  here i s  t h a t  publ ic  s ec to r  w i l l  include 
taxes  paid  in  the  annual cash flows while p r iv a te  s e c to r  would exclude them 
from t h e i r  ca lcu la t ion*
Having/
1. This method goes under var ious  names inc luding  discounted  cash flow
(DCF) r e tu r n ,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  index, compound i n t e r e s t  r a t e  of r e tu r n  
and i n v e s t o r s '  r e tu r n ;  the former, however, i s  the most widely used 
concept,
2o In  general  annual cash flow comprise p r o f i t s  l e s s  taxes  plus  deprec ia t ion ,
For t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  see A .J .  Merre t t  and A, Sykes, Cap i ta l  Budgeting and
Company Finance,  Longmans, London, 1969, p p .1-2.
3. See P.D, Henderson, Notes on Publ ic  Investment C r i t e r i a  in the United
Kingdom, B u l l e t i n  of the Oxford Univers i ty  I n s t i t u t e  of Economics and 
S t a t i s t i c s ,  V o l .2?, February, 1963, N ô . l . ,  p . 59»
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Having in  mind t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  of cash flows (or r e c e i p t s )  and hy using the 
same f ig u r e s  given i n  the  Caycuma P r o j e c t  Appra isal  Form (See Chapter 7 ) ,  we 
can c a l c u l a t e  the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of the investment in  the fo llowing 
fa sh ion ,^
As I poin ted  out e a r l i e r ,  the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of any p r o je c t  i s  t h a t  
d iscount r a t e  which equates t o t a l  p resen t  value of cash flows to i t s  o r ig i n a l  
c a p i t a l  investment.  This r a t e  of discount would make the n e t  p resen t  value 
(NPV) of the  p r o j e c t  equal zero.
In  order  to f in d  the exact value of the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  (or d iscounted 
cash flow re tu r n )  of the  Caycuma Hoject ,  I  s h a l l  apply  two d i f f e r e n t  d iscount  
r a t e s ;  one a t  the  upper l i m i t  and the o ther  a t  the  lower l i m i t  so t h a t  we 
can have one p o s i t i v e  n e t  p re sen t  value and one nega t ive  p re sen t  va lue .  In
other  words, the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  i s  found simply by i n t e r p o l a t i o n .
( 1 ) F i r s t ,  according to  the above d e f i n i t i o n  the annual cash flows of the 
Paper Mill  P r o j e c t  a re  der ived  and these  are  presen ted  in  Table 10, Following 
t h i s ,  annual cash flows of the p r o je c t  a re  converted to  the presented  value
a t  the  d iscount  r a t e  of 12 p e rc en t .  This i s  done by m ul t ip ly ing  the annual
cash flow of each year  with  the p resen t  worth f a c to r  f o r  each year which
2corresponds to 12 pe rcen t  d iscount r a t e  . This i s  computed fo r  20 years  f o r  
the l a t t e r  i s  the economic l i f e  of the p r o j e c t .  The p resen t  value of cash 
flows discounted  a t  12 percen t  w i l l  be:
310, 193,000 T.L. (See Table 10 and f ig u re  a ) .
(2 ) Second, annual cash flows are  again converted to the  p re sen t  v a lu e ,
t h i s  time a t  the d iscount  r a t e  of 14 pe rcen t .  Tj e^ computation ou t l ined  in
( 1) w i l l  be repeated  in  the same way. The p resen t  worth f a c to r s  which 
correspond to 14 percen t  d iscount r a t e  are  given in  Table 11. Tijg p re sen t  
value of cash flows over 20 years  a t  14 percent d iscount  r a t e  becomes:
254 , 257,100 T.L.
( 3) /
I t  should be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  I am here  assuming th a t  the s e l l i n g  
p r i c e s  of the products crea ted  by the Paper P lan t  a re  s im i la r  
whether the P lan t  i s  in  the hands of Public or P r iv a t e  Sector,  
and a lso  t h a t  the  same volume of product w i l l  be produced under 
both s e c to r s .
I t  i s  perhaps necessary  to poin t  out t h a t  my purpose i s  to see 
whether the Paper P r o je c t  would have been an accep tab le  one from 
the p r iv a t e  eva lu a t io n  po in t  of view.
For t a b l e s  i n d i c a t in g  p resen t  worth f a c to r s  a t  va r ious  discount 
r a t e s ,  see A .J .  M erre t t  and A. Sykes, Capi ta l  Budgeting and Company 
Finance,  Longmans, London, 1969? p p .150-153 (csp.  Appendix Table A); 
a l so ,  F.L. Grant and U'.G. I reson ,  P r in c ip le s  of Engineer ing Economy,






























PAPER WILL: AT i  = 120, n 20
(1 ) Annual 
Cash Flows
37.140.000



















TOTAL 1 , 361 , 340,000
(2 ) P resen t  Worth 
Fqctor a t  12fc 
Discount
T.L,
P resen t  Worth 
Of Cp sh Flows
.5674 21 , 073,200
. 5066 32 , 169,100
.4523 31,208,700
.4039 28,313,300
.3606 25 , 278,000
.3220 22 , 572,200
.2875 20 , 153,700
.2567 17 , 994,600
.2292 16 , 066,900
.2046 14,342,400
.1827 12,807,200
.1631 11 , 433,300
.1456 10 , 206,500
.1300 9 , 113,000
.1161 8 , 138,600
.1037 7 , 269,300
.0925 6,484,200
.0826 5 , 790,200
.0737 5 , 166,300
.0658 4 , 612,500
310, 193,200
Note: ( 1 ) Annual C^sh flow inc ludes  ne t  p r o f i t s
(excluding taxes )  plus  d e p re c ia t io n  and 
i n t e r e s t .
(2 ) For p re sen t  worth f a c to r s  see A.J .  M erre t t  and 
Ae Sykes, Capi ta l  Budgeting and Company F inance , 
Longmans, London, 1969, p . 152, (Appendix Table a )
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(3) Thi rd ,  c a p i t a l  investment of the p r o j e c t  i s  conver ted to the  p resen t  
va lue a t  the  same d iscount  r a t e ,  Tpe presen t  va lue of c a p i t a l  ou t lay  i s
308,293,000 T.L. (See Chapter ? ) .
(4 ) Four th,  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  w i l l  be found by apply ing in te rp o la t io n ^
(a) At 12 pe rcen t  d iscount r a t e  the p re sen t  va lue  of cash flows 
minus c a p i t a l  ou t lay  w i l l  be:
310, 193,2 -  308 , 293,0 = 1 , 900,2  T.L.
(b) At 14 pe rcen t  d iscount  r a t e  p resen t  value of cash flows
minus c a p i t a l  o u t lay  of the p r o je c t  w i l l  be:
254 , 257,1 “ 308,293,0 = -  54 , 035,9
At the c o r r e c t  DCF r a t e  the  c a lc u la t e d  ne t  p re sen t  va lue  i s  zero,  but we
have one p o s i t i v e  ne t  p re sen t  value of T.L. 1,900,2  and one negative  ne t
p re sen t  value of T.L. “ 54,035,9* The c o r r e c t  DCF r e t u r n  i s  somewhere 
between 12 pe rcen t  and 14 pe rcen t  and t h i s  can be found by i n t e r p o l a t i o n .
Net p re sen t  va lue  a t  12 percen t  : + 1,900,2
Subtrac t  ne t  p resen t  value a t
14 percen t  - 54,035,9
D if ference  in  Net P resen t  Values 55,936,1
Th^ e r e a l  d iscount  r a t e  which equates b e n e f i t  flows to i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  ou t lay  
w i l l  be 0.05  ( 1 , 900 , 2 ) of the way between 12 percent  and
( 55 , 936, 1 )
14 percent*
Hence, the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of the  Paper Mill  P r o j e c t  becomes: 
r  = 12^ + 1 , 900,2
55
r  = 12^ + Ü.03  X ( 2 ) 
r  = 12)& + 0.06
r  = 12.06 percent
1, For i n t e r p o l a t i o n  method, see A.J .  Herretf and A. Sykes, 
Ib id .  p p . 12- 16*
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TABLE 11
PRESENT VALUE OF AlfNUAL CASH FLOV/S OF THE
Pi\PBR MILL : At i  = Ihfo, n = 20
T-L
Years
( 1) Annual 
Cash Flows
( 2 ) P resen t  Worth 
Facto r  a t  14/& 
Discount






5 37,140,000 .5193 19,286,800
6 63 , 500,000 .4555 28,924,200
7 69 , 000,000 .3996 27,572,400
8 7 0 , 100,000 .3505 24,570,000
9 70 , 100,000 .3075 21 , 555,700
10 7 0 , 100,000 .2697 18 , 905,900
11 70 , 100,000 .2366 16 , 585,600
12 70 , 100,000 .2075 14 , 545,700
13 70 , 100,000 .1820 12 , 758,200
14 70 , 100,000 .1597 11 , 194,900
15 70 , 100,000 .1400 9,814,000
16 70 , 100,000 .1228 8 , 608,200
17 70 , 100,000 .1078 7 , 556,700
18 7 0 , 100,000 .0945 6,624,400
19 70 , 100,000 .0829 5,811,200
20 70 , 100,000 .0727 5 , 096,200
21 70 , 100,000 .0638 4 , 472,300
22 7 0 , 100,000 .0559 3,918,500
23 7 0 , 100,000 .0491 3,441,900
24 . 70 , 100,000 *0430 3,014,300
TOTAL 1 , 361 , 340,000 254 , 257,100
Note: ( l )  Annual C^sh Plow includes  ne t  p r o f i t s
(excluding taxes)  plus  d e p re c ia t io n  
and i n t e r e s t
( 2 ) For p resen t  worth f a c t o r s ,  see A .J .
M erre t t  and A. Sykes, Cap i ta l  Budgeting 
and Company Finance,  Longmans, London,
1969, p . 152.
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TABLE 12 











a t  12#
14#
Discount
Fac to rs .
Discounted 
Cash Flows 







5 37,140,0 .5674 21 , 073,2 .5193 19,286,8
6 63,500,0 . 5066 32 , 169,1 .4555 28,924,2
7 69,000,0 .4523 31,208,7 .3996 27 , 572,4
8 70,100,0 ,4039 28,313,3 .3505 24,570,0
9 70 , 100,0 .3606 25 , 278,0 .3075 21,555,7
10 70,100,0 .3220 22 , 572,2 .2697 18,905,9
11 70 , 100,0 .2875 20 , 153,7 .2366 16,585,6
12 70 , 100,0 .2567 17 , 994,6 .2075 14,545,7
13 7 0 , 100,0 .2292 16 ,066,9 .1820 12,758,2
14 70 , 100,0 .2046 14,342,4 .1597 11 , 194,9
15 70 , 100,0 .1827 12,807,2 .1400 9,814,0
16 70 , 100,0 .1631 11 ,433,3 .1228 8,608,2
17 70,100,0 .1456 10 , 206,5 .1078 7 , 556,7
18 70 , 100,0 .1300 9 , 113,0 .0945 6,624,4
19 70,100,0 .1161 8 , 138,6 .0829 5,811,2
20 70 , 100,0 .1037 7 , 269,3 .0727 5 , 096,2
21 70 , 100,0 .0925 6,484,2 .0638 4 , 472,3
22 70 , 100,0 .0826 5 ,790,2 .0559 3,918,5
23 70 , 100,0 .0737 5 , 166,3 .0491 3,441,9
84 70 , 100,0 .0658 4 ,612,5 .0430 3,014,3
TOTALS 310, 193,2 254 , 257,1
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I t  follows th a t  the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  of the  Caycuma P ro jec t  i s  above 
the borrowing r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  which i s  between 7 pe rcen t  and 8 percent» This 
i s  in  f a c t  the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  app l ied  to i n d u s t r i a l  c r e d i t s  provided by the 
S ta te  Investment Banli. ^
As f a r  as the  market r a t e  of i i t e re s t  i s  taken as a base the p ro j e c t  i s  s t i l l  
admissib le  on the b a s i s  of the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  r u l e .  But, a s  compared 
to the  so c ia l  d iscount  r a t e  which i s  assumed to be 12 pe rcen t ,  the p r o j e c t  
becomes a marginal p ro jec to
However, I  am here  concerned with  the ques t ion  of showing whether the Paper Mill
P r o je c t  would have been undertaken by the p r iv a te  f i rm, i f  the  i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of
r e t u r n  r u l e  i s  a p p l ie d .  In  ac tu a l  f a c t  the re  i s  some evidence to suggest  t h a t
inferest  r a t e  charged, on borrowing by the p r iv a te  s ec to r  from the I n d u s t r i a l
2Development Bank, i s  almost 10.5 percent  . But i f  r i s k  and u n c e r t a in t y  i s  taken
in to  account the r a t e  could be assumed to  be h igher  and probably in  th e  order of 
12 p e rc en t .  Bes ides ,  the  oppor tun i ty  cos t  < 
n a t iv e  investment i s  ve ry  near  to  14 p e rc en t ’
of c a p i t a l  in  the next bes t  a l t e r -
.3
I t  fo llows t h a t  the  Caycuma P r o j e c t  i s  an unacceptable  p r o j e c t  on the b a s i s  of 
p r iv a te  eva lua t ion  when the discounted cash flows ru le  i s  adopted.
B " In the  following s e c t io n ,  I s h a l l  a t tempt  to f ind out i f  the p r o je c t  would 
be accep tab le  from th e  p o in t  of view of p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  i f  p re sen t  value ru le  
was app l ied .
Under the  following assumptions and us ing the same f ig u r e s  from the P r o jec t  Form, 
p re sen t  va lue  and b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  fo r  the p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  can be e a s i l y  
computed.
The assumptions here  a r e :
(1) Cash r e c e i p t s  (or f lows) comprise p r o f i t s  l e s s  t a x es ,  plus  d ep rec ia t io n  
p ro v is io n ,
(2 )/
The new e s ta b l i s h e d  S ta te  Investment Bank, provides  c r e d i t s  to public  
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s  a t  a normal r a t e  of 7 percen t  and 8 p e r c e n t , .
This r a t e ,  however, may vary  according to tlie na tu re  of the p r o j e c t ,
A p r iv a t e  document obta ined from the SPO, iVnkara, Turkey, December, I 969 ,
In te rv iew with  Bozkurt Benderl ioglu ,  a t  t h e  SPO, jhikara,  J a n . - F e b .1969 .
I  was t o l d  during the in te rv iew held with  Bozkurt Benderlioglu  t h a t  the 
opportun i ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  i s  assumed to be 14 pe rcen t .  In te rv iew, 
January-Februaryj 1969» Ankara.
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(s )  S e l l in g  p r ic e  of th e  products  provided by the p l a n t  w i l l  be the same 
under p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .
( 3 ) Same volume of products  are  produced under p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .
(4 ) The d iscoun t  r a t e  app l ied  in  the  c a l c u l a t i o n  of p re sen t  value of 
b e n e f i t s  flows and c a p i t a l  flows i s  the  same, i f  the p ro j e c t  i s  undertaken
by the p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  I n .o th e r  words, the s o c i a l  d iscount  r a t e  i s  again  
assumed to be 12 percent* This assumption^however, w i l l  be l a t e r  re laxed  so 
as to  r e f l e c t  the  p r i v a t e  t ime p re ference  r a t e  which i s  n a t u r a l l y  a h igher  
ra te*
For the sake of s im pl i fy ing  our a n a ly s i s ,  f i r s t ,  a d iscount  r a t e  of 12 percent 
w i l l  be ap p l ied  to the  conversion of p r iv a te  b e n e f i t s  and investments to  the 
p re sen t  value»
The p re sen t  value of p r iv a t e  cash flows are  p resented  in  Table 10. We know 
t h a t  t o t a l  annual cash flows of 20 years  converted to the p re sen t  va lue  amount 
to  310, 193,2  T. L i r a s .  The p re sen t  value of investment flows are  a l so  
presen ted in  Table I 3 . There i s ,  however, an important po in t  to  make here»
The computation of investment from th e  publ ic  s ec to r  po in t  of view has included 
a fo re ign  exchange pen a l ty  of 33 pe rcen t ,  which must be excluded from the y ear ly  
investment flows so as to a r r i v e  a t  i t s  value a t  market p r i c e s .  Thus, fo re ig n  
exchange adjus tment which was c a r r i e d  out on the fo re ig n  exchange component of 
investment w i l l  not be necessary  here  and i t  must be e l im ina ted  in  our p resen t  
value  c a l c u l a t i o n  of investment flows»
The r a t i o  between p re sen t  va lue  of p r iv a te  b e n e f i t s  over the  p resen t  value of 
c a p i t a l  investment w i l l  give us the  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  of the Caycuma P r o j e c t .
P r iv a t e  Benef i t -Cost  r a t i o  = ^
273, 193,2  
= I 0I 3
C lear ly ,  the p r iv a te  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  i s  very low as compared to the publ ic  
b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  of 2.37» One m y  conclude th a t  the Caycuma p ro je c t  eva lua­
ted  by the p r iv a t e  s e c t o r  on the  b a s i s  of p resen t  value r u l e  i s  much le s s  
admissib le  and a t t r a c t i v e *
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TABLE 13
PRESENT WORTH OF INYESTMIInT EXPE^miTLRE
(0 00 T.L ,)
Years
Investment 
Plows ( l )
P resent  
Worth Factor 
( a t  12 percent)
P resen t  Value 
of
Investment
1 39,490 .8929 35 , 260,6
2 84,800 .7972 67 , 602,5
3 122,810 .7118 87,416,1
4 65,780 .6355 41,803,1
5 72,455 .5674 41,110,9
TOTAL 385,355 273 , 193,2
Note ; ( l )  The fo r e ig n  exchange adjustment which i s  in
the order of 33 percent i s  excluded from 
annual inve s tm ents .
I f  i t  i s  compared to other a l t e r n a t iv e  p r ivate  p r o je c t s ,  i t  may not p o s s ib ly  
pass the t e s t  and q u a l i fy  fo r  s e le c t io n .  This could be assumed to be a 
minimum acceptab le  r a t io  by the p r iva te  sector*
So fa r  we have app lied  the s o c ia l  d iscount rate  in  the above computations; 
i t  must however be noted th a t  the discount rate  of the pr iva te  sec to r  may not 
co inc id e  w ith  the d iscount rate  of the public  s e c to r .  Tj^ e p r iva te  en tre­
preneur may p lace  more weight on the opportunity c o s t  o f  c a p ita l  and l e s s  on 
the s o c ia l  tirae preference ra te  which r e f l e c t s  the w elfare  of future gener­
a t io n s .  Moreover, the r i s k  premium and u n certa in ty  involved  in  undertaking  
p ro jec ts  by the p r iva te  s e c to r  may be grea ter  than i f  th ey  were undertaken 
by the p ublic  s e c to r .  Therefore, these  and other considerations^  iiiciy e n ta i l  
an a p p l ic a t io n  of a d i f f e r e n t  d iscount rate  for  the p r iva te  e n te r p r ise .  As
I have pointed  out e a r l i e r ,  p r iva te  borrowings from the In d u str ia l  Development 
2Bank‘d i s  in  the order of 10.5 pe rcen t .  The r i s k  premium and u n c e r t a in ty  and 
a lso  the  oppor tuni ty  cos t  of c a p i t a l  in  the n e x t -b e s t  investment opportuni ty  
may/
1, For the arguments on the s o c ia l  discount r a te ,  see S ec t io n  VII in  
t h i s  Chapter.
2. IDB i s  a bank e s ta b lish ed  a long time ago to  provide medium and. 
long term c r e d i t s  fo r  the p r iva te  in d u s tr ia l  p r o je c t s .
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may permit  us to assujae t h a t  the  p r iv a t e  d iscount  r a t e  i s  14 pe rcen t .^
The f a c t  t h a t  the p r o j e c t  i s  unacceptable  becomes c l e a r e r  when the same 
p r o j e c t  i s  evalua ted  on the b a s i s  of a p r iv a te  d iscount  r a t e  which i s  qu i te  
d i s t i n c t  from the s o c ia l  d iscount r a t e  appl ied  by the SPO. Tj e^ p resen t  
value of cash flows and c a p i t a l  flows based on 14 percen t  discount r a t e  are  
p resen ted  in  Tables 11 and 14*
TABLE 14





Presen t  Worth 
Fac tor  
(14 percen t)
P resen t  Worth of 
Investment Flows
1 39,490 .8771 34 , 636,6
2 84,800 .7694 65 , 245,1
3 122,810 .6749 82,884,4
4 65,780 .5920 38,941,7
5 72,455 .5193 37 , 625,8
TOTAL 385,335 259 , 333,6
The p r iv a t e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  on the bas is  of 14 pe rcen t  d iscount r a t e  
becomes ;
P -  253,257,1 
259,333,6 
Pg = 0.97
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  the p r iv a te  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  i s  l e s s  than u n i ty  and the 
p r iv a te  e n t e r p r i s e  may be in  a p o s i t i o n  to r e j e c t  the p r o j e c t  on the grounds 
t h a t  i t  does no t  cover i t s  c a p i t a l  c o s t .
The fo llowing observat ions  can be i n f e r r e d  from the  above a n a ly s i s ;
F i r s t ,  i t  can be seen t h a t  the  public  s ec to r  on the b a s i s  of p resen t  value 
ru le  based on a d iscount r a t e  as high as 14 percen t  (even much h ighe r)^  would
3s t i l l  pass the p r o j e c t  , while the same p ro je c t  w i l l  be r e j e c te d  by the p r iv a te  
s ec to r  on the same discount ra te* This po in ts  to the f a c t  t h a t  a p r o je c t  
which/
1. In te rv iew  with Bozkurt Bender lioglu .  SPO, Ankara, 1969.
2, See Sec t ion  IX,
3o The so c ia l  eva lua t ion  of the p ro je c t  a t  14 pe rcen t  d iscount  r a t e  has 
given us a b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  of 2.05.
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which i s  not p r o f i t a b l e  and accep tab le  from the p r iv a t e  ev a lua t ion  po in t  of 
view, could e a s i l y  q u a l i f y  fo r  s e l e c t io n  when i t  i s  appra ised  and evaluated 
from the s o c i e t y ' s  p o in t  of view.
Second, the Caycuma Paper P ro jec t  would have been excluded from the ov e ra l l  
investment programme i f  i t  was evaluated  on the  b a s i s  of p r iv a t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  
But i t  has been shown t h a t  the  P r o jec t  i s  an admissible  one in  terms of so c ia l  
eva lua t ion  which takes  in to  account the  p r o j e c t ' s  c o n t r ib u t io n  to n a t io n a l  
income, balance of payments and employment.
Third,  c l e a r l y  p r iv a t e  eva lu a t io n  of p r o je c t s  both in  terms of i n t e r n a l  r a t e  
of r e t u r n  ru le  and p re sen t  value(PV) r u l e  can lead to mis leading a l l o c a t i o n  
of investment resources  when market r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  does not equal marginal 
p r o d u c t iv i t y  of c a p i t a l  and a l so  when general  e f f e c t s  of the p ro je c t  on the 
economy are  not taken in to  account.
Fourth ,  i t  has a lso  been shown t h a t  the  choice of the  p r o j e c t  i s  very s e n s i t i v e  
to the  discount  r a t e  adopted in  the PV computations.  This i s  so both from 
p r iv a t e  and publ ic  ev a lu a t io n  viewpoint.  This implies t h a t  the Planning 
Agency should be very  c a r e fu l  in  the de te rmina t ion  of an appropr ia te  d iscount  
ra te*
F i n a l l y ,  the  SPO's d e c i s io n  to apply p resen t  value ru le  based on soc ia l  
eva lua t ion  method has been an extremely usefu l  exerc ise  in  channel l ing  i n v e s t ­
ment funds to  the  b e s t  p r o j e c t s  ava i lab le*
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XI. F inal Assessment of the Paper M ill P ro ject
In the previous s e c t io n s  of t h i s  chapter I have analysed  the various asp ects  
of the SPO's p ro jec t  ev a lu a t io n  technique adopted for  the Caycuma p r o je c t .
I t  was im possib le  to go in to  d e t a i l s  of each asp ect  of the eva lu a tion  method 
both t h e o r e t i c a l l y  and p r a c t i c a l ly .  My s tu d ies  have been confined to some 
of the various a sp e c ts  of the paper p ro jec t;  consequently  some problems have 
rece ived  more a t t e n t io n  than others which were simply touched upon. For 
example, to go in to  the d e t a i l s  of how to determine (a) a shadow fore ign  
exchange r a te ,  (b) a shadow wage ra te  or (c )  a s o c ia l  d iscount r a te ,  to  
mention a few, in v o lv es  ex ten s iv e  th e o r e t ic a l  and em pirica l work which by 
i t s e l f  can be a su bject  for  separate study. B es id es ,  lack  of data a t  
nation a l as w e ll  as reg ion a l l e v e l  did not permit me to pursue such important 
is s u e s  fu rth er  than has been done in  t h i s  chapter»
Nonetheless,  one c o n so la t io n  in  t h i s  kind of p r a c t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  i s  t h a t  an
investment eva lua to r  i s  not supposed to do a l l  the work necessary  fo r  c o s t -  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s .  He w i l l ,  of course,  be obl iged or have no a l t e r n a t i v e  
o ther  than  to accept var ious  c o e f f i c i e n t s  and v a r i a b l e s  of o ther  exper ts  who 
are  r e spons ib le  fo r  t h e i r  e s t im at ion .  Thus, what i s  reasonable  in t h i s  con­
t e x t  i s  perhaps to take these  c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  shadow p r i c e s  -  i . e .  Z = 0,555, 
w = 0 , 50 , i  = 12 p e rc en t ,  as a f i r s t  approximation and see whether with  more
informat ion  and Imowledge they could be improved in  any way. This i s  what
I have at tempted to do in  t h i s  chap te r .
Apart from the q u estion  of d er iv a tio n  of various c o e f f i c i e n t s  for s o c ia l  
pro jec t  ev a lu a t io n , an eq u a lly  important problem i s  whether to confine the 
p roject  a n a ly s is  to  a s in g le  investment c r i t e r io n  on ly .  For a sound in v e s t ­
ment d e c i s io n ,  a p ro jec t  should be evaluated on the b a s is  of other c r i t e r i a ,  as 
w ell  s in ce  various p a r t ia l  a sp ects  may be of some s ig n i f ic a n c e  and n e c e s s i ta t e  
t h i s .
With (hLs in  mind, I have t r ie d  to examine the Caycuma Paper M ill by other  
p a r t ia l  eva lu a tion  d e v ic e s .  Borne of them were carr ied  out in the previous  
se c t io n s  but some of them w i l l  be introduced below l a t e r .
I t  may be re levan t to mention here the question  of  eva lu a tin g  a p r o je c t ,  not  
on i t s  own but with other a l t e r n a t iv e  p r o je c ts .  Since we do not have any 
a lt e r n a t iv e  p ro jec t  in  a s im ila r  l in e  of production as the Caycuma Paper M il l ,  
the only p o s s ib le  way to  form an idea on. the l a t t e r ' s  s e le c t io n  i s  to compare 
i t  w ith other p ro jec ts  included in  the paper in dustry .
I n /
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In  var ious  s ec t io n s  of t h i s  chap te r ,  a f t e r  de r iv ing  the  p re sen t  value of the 
b e n e f i t s  and cos t  streams with  the a id  of s u i t a b l e  c r i t e r i a ,  I  have passed 
some judgment upon the  a d m i s s i b i l i t y  of the Paper Mill P r o j e c t ,  Tpe r e s u l t s  
which are  obtained on the b a s i s  of var ious  c r i t e r i a  can be summarised as in  
the  following Table (Table 15).
TABLE 15
SWIARY OF TEE PALMER PROJECT'S RATE OF
RETURNS AND BENEFIT-COST RATIOS
1, Simple "Rate of Return"
(a) Net P r o f i t / ï o t a l  Investment
(b) Gross P r o f i t / T o t a l  Investment
2,  Foreign Exchange B e n e f i t s - t o - I n p u t  Ratio 
(Foreign Exchange Component)
of Inve s tment
3* Foreign Exchange Benef i t s - to - Inves tm en t  
Rat io
4.  Employment E f fe c t
-  C api ta l  per  worker
5. I n t e r n a l  Rate of Return "y ie ld"
6. Rat io of PV of B ene f i t s  and Costs ( i  = 12^ 1)
7. D ifference  of PV of Benef i t s  and Costs (NPV)
( i  = 12^:)
8. Dif ference  of PV of Benef i t s  and Costs (NPV)
' ( i  = 14^)







424 ,393»100 T.L, 
307, 561,400 T.L,
Note t All  these  r e tu rn s  and r a t i o s  are  compiled 
from the r e s u l t s  obta ined in  t h i s  chapte r.
As can be seen from the Table simple r a t e  of r e tu r n  of the  p r o j e c t  i s  the 
r a t i o  between p r o f i t s  (net  or g ross)  and t o t a l  investment out lay  of the 
p r o j e c t .  The simple r a t e  of r e tu r n  of the Paper Mill  i s  found to be 8,4 
pe rcen t  and 13.0 percen t  depending on whether n e t  p r o f i t s  or gross p r o f i t s  
a r e /
are  taken in to  account
277
1
Much has been s a id  on the c r i t e r i o n  of annual accounting p r o f i t a b i l i t y
(Chapter 6) which has been app l ied  by SEIÎA in  the ev a lua t ion  of the p r o j e c t .
This method simply r e l a t e s  the  be fo re - tax  earnings  or a f t e r - t a x  earn ings to
the  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  of the  p l a n t .  These and o ther  v a r i a n t s  of the simple
r a t e  of r e t u r n  however have the disadvantages  t h a t  they normally involve the
use of more or l e s s  a r b i t r a r y  d e p re c ia t io n  formulae and a lso  they f a i l  to
take proper account of the  impact of t a x a t io n  and investment incen t ives  
2provided .
Though t h e i r  accuracy could be improved they would s t i l l  be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
because n e i t h e r  method pays s u f f i c i e n t  regard  to the est imated t imings of
3
r e tu rn s  . The use of conventional  methods fo r  c a l c u l a t i n g  the r a t e  of r e tu r n  
l i k e  use of pay-back c r i t e r i a ,  i s  o f ten  l i k e l y  to  lead  to  wrong investment 
d e c i s io n s ,  being made. They should not be used fo r  f i n a l  eva lua t ion  and 
ranking of publ ic  investment p r o j e c t s ;  though t h i s  does not mean th a t  they 
should not be c a lc u l a t e d  a t  a l l *  On the con t ra ry ,  by provid ing  an idea of 
the simple p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of p r o j e c t s  they can be used as a "screening" device 
in  the  s e l e c t i o n  of p r o j e c t s ,  and consequently may avoid waste of time on the 
p a r t  of p lanners  who undertake  p r o j e c t  a p p r a i s a l .
The fo re ig n  exchange b e n e f i t s - t o - i n p u t  r a t i o  could be u se fu l  in  in d ic a t in g  
the e f f e c t  of the  p r o j e c t  on the balance of payments s ince  i t  considers  the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s /
1, The annual account ing p r o f i t a b i l i t y  (or simple r a t e  of r e tu rn )  i s
the r a t i o  between p r o f i t s  and t o t a l  investment .  From the formula
B -  C -  D 
p = ------- Y—  ;
Pi = 32.700 X 100 = 8,4  percent (ne t  p r o f i t )
385.335
P2 ” 50.307 X 100 = 13,0  percent  (gross  p r o f i t )3 8 5 . 3 3 5
Gross p r o f i t s  here inc lude "co rpora t ion  tax" paid by the P lan t  which 
i s  in  the order of 35 p e rcen t .  For net  and gross  p r o f i t  f ig u re s  see 
Chapter 6 and Value Added Table in  Chapter 7#
2o See N.E.D.C. -  Investment Appra isa l ,  Great B r i t a i n ,  National  Economic
Development Council,  N.E.D.C., I 967 , p . 3»
3» Ib id ,  p . 3 . The pay-back method, on the o ther  hand, does not give an
adequate in d i c a t i o n  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  nor does i t  take in to  account 
t iming of r e tu r n s  during the pay-back per iod  and the  r e tu rn s  a f t e r  
the  pay-back p e r iod .  For i t s  disadvantages  see N.E.D.C., Investment 
A ppra isa l ,  National  Economic Development Council ,  Great B r i t a i n ,  196?, 
p . 3», and I.M.D. L i t t l e  and A .J .  M ir r lees ,  Manual of I n d u s t r i a l  P ro jec t  
Analysis  in  Developing Countr ies ,  V o l . l ,  Methodology and Case Etudies ,
O.E.C.D., Development Centre Stud ies ,  P a r i s ,  I 968 , p . 135-137.
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r e la t io n s h ip s  between fo re ig n  exchange earnings and expenditures r e su lt in g  
from the p r o je c t .  The fo re ig n  exchange ea rn in g s -to - in p u t  r a t io  of the 
Paper P ro ject  i s  1 .32  which in d ic a te s  that i t s  e f f e c t  on the balance of pay­
ments i s  q u ite  favourab le . This p o s i t iv e  r a t io  i s  perhaps due to the fa c t  
that the Caycuma Paper P lant i s  an im p o rt-su b st itu t in g  industry  and more 
im portantly , because i t s  demands for  raw m ater ia ls  and a u x i l ia r y  m ater ia ls  
are provided d o m est ica lly  which e n t a i l s  a s u b s ta n t ia l  amount of fore ign  exchange 
savings during i t s  op eration .
Because fo re ig n  exchange sav in gs /earn in gs  are not the only o b je c t iv e s  of the  
economy i t  can be argued th at t h i s  c r i t e r io n  may lead  to wrong investment  
d e c is io n s  and th e r e fo r e ,  an evaluator has to in v e s t ig a t e  the t o t a l  e f f e c t s  of 
the investment on other economic goa ls  as a whole, i . e .  value added, employaient 
etc  •
A separate appendix was attached to Chapter 4, in  order to d isc u ss  the l im i ­
ta t io n s  of the balance of payments e f f e c t  and employment e f f e c t  c r i t e r i a .
I t  would be rep eating  ou rse lves  i f  we mention them again  here^. However, i t  
could be remarked that the Caycuma Paper P roject  does not contr ibu te  much in  
terms of d ir e c t  employment e f f e c t ,  though i t  might have d if fu sed  in d ir e c t  em­
ployment e f f e c t s  in  other s e c to r s .  This , however, can be considered a ty p ic a l  
c h a r a c te r i s t ic  of c a p i t a l - in t e n s iv e  p ro jec ts  which have a very low labour-  
absorption r a t io .
Internal rate  of return ru le  was t h e o r e t i c a l l y  d iscu ssed  and compared with i t s
c h ie f  r i v a l ,  present va lue ru le  at some con siderab le  length* However, two
important p o in ts  can be made c le a r  here: F i r s t ,  the in tern a l rate of return of
any p ro jec t  should be c a lc u la te d  in  order to provide scru t in y  among investment
proposa ls .  Second, though use of in tern a l ra te  of return  i s  e x te n s iv e ly
2
challenged  both in  theory and p ra c t ic e  , i t  could s t i l l  be u se fu l  for  the 
planners in  determining the s o c ia l  d iscount rate  which should be based on the 
in tern a l  ra te  of return of the marginal p ro ject  of the investment budget.
In other words, the s o c ia l  d iscount ra te  wliich i s  required for  I-V c a lc u la t io n s  
c o u ld /
1. See Chapter 4, Appendix A,
2 . The u se fu ln e ss  of the in tern a l rate of return c r i t e r io n  i s  s ev ere ly
lim ited  by i t s  f a i lu r e  to  d is t in g u is h  the b est  a l t e r n a t iv e  among
mutually e x c lu s iv e  p ro jec ts  and i t s  f a i lu r e  to ; roduce a s in g le  
in te r n a l  rate  of return . B es id es ,  in tern a l rate  of return a lso  f a i l s  
to  take account of s iz e  and s ca le  of the investment -  i t  ranks a 20 
percent rate  of return on say £100 higher than a 13 percent rate  of  
return on £1 ,000 .  At p r a c t ic a l  l e v e l  too ,  i t  loads to ted ious t r i a l  
and error c a lc u la t io n s  which makes it.m ore d i f f i c u l t  ti:an TV c r i t e r io n .  
For a f u l l  d isc u s s io n  on Internal Hate of Hetucn and Present Value 
C r ite r ia ,  See Myles M. Dryden, Capital Budgeting: Treatment of Uncer­
t a in t y  and Investjiient C r i te r ia ,  S .d .P .H .,  V o l . I I ,  F eb .1964, pp*238-241.
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could be decided, in  the l i g h t  of so c ia l  opportuni ty  co s t  of c a p i t a l  -  t l ict  
i s  the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of the r e t u r n  of the marginal p r o j e c t .  As I.M.D. L i t t l e ^  
emphasised, even fo r  t h i s  purpose i n t e r n a l  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  of var ious  p ro je c t s  
should be c a l c u l a t e d .
Probably the  b e s t  r e s u l t  and investment choice can be obtained, through the 
a p p l i c a t i o n  of the PV ru le  which I have expounded throughout t h i s  s tudy. 
Although s u f f i c i e n t  in format ion  has been given on i t s  formula t ion ,  a p p l i c a t i o n  
and advantages as compared to o ther c r i t e r i a -  i t  may be convenient to s t r e s s  
some of i t s  m e r i t s .
There has been some ex tens ive  a ttempt to  keep the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  
i n t a c t  by using a number of r a t u e r  complex m odif ica t ions  which r e s u l t  i n  the 
e l im in a t io n  of i t s  o r i g i n a l  v e r s io n .  But a l l  these  a t tem pts  which involve 
considerab le  t e s t s  and ted ious  s ide  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a re  in  e f f e c t  noth ing more 
than an improving of the a p p l i c a t i o n  of the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e t u r n  to be 
c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  the PV c r i t e r i o n .
This r e s i s t a n c e  to give up the i n t e r n a l  r a t e  method can be explained by the 
f a c t  t h a t  over a wide range of p o s s ib le  cases the two c r i t e r i a  may lead to the 
same investment d e c i s io n .  I t  i s  genuinely accepted t h a t  under l im i t ed  assump­
t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  compet it ive  c a p i t a l  markets,  completely d i v i s i b l e  p ro­
j e c t s  and no in te rdependencies  among the  p r o j e c t s ,  the  two c r i t e r i a  lead  to the 
2same choice . But i t  i s  needless  to add th a t  a l l  these  rigorous  assumptions 
a re  not r e a l i s t i c  and e s p e c i a l l y  in  r e sp ec t  to the  f i r s t  assumption developing 
cou n t r ie s  a re  f a r  removed from these  s t r i c t  co n d i t io n s .  Consequently the two 
approaches a re  concep tua l ly  d i f f e r e n t  and the  norms of c a p i t a l  theory  c l e a r l y  
i n d ic a te  the  s u p e r i o r i t y  of the p re sen t  value(PV) c r i t e r i o n ^ .
Thé general  conclusion on t h i s  top ic  i s  t h a t  the most v a l i d  method i s  t h a t  of 
p re sen t  value r e l a t i v e  to investment c o s t ,  a f t e r  a proper choice of the r a te  
of d iscoun t .
As I have d iscussed  in  va r ious  con tex ts ,  the PV ru le  can be used in  two 
d i f f e r e n t /
I.M.D. L i t t l e  and A .J .  M ir r lees ,  Manual of I n d u s t r i a l  P r o je c t  Analysis  I
in  Developing Countr ies ,  V o l . l ,  O.E.C.D., P a r i s ,  1968, p . 120. \
See Myles D. Dryden, Capi ta l  Budgeting: Treatment of Uncer ta in ty  and |
Investment C r i t e r i a ,  o p .c i t . ,  p . 241, \
1
Ib id .  p . 241. M erre t t  and Sykes are  in  favour of i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of |
r e tu r n  and recommend i t  as the bes t  c r i t e r i o n .  They s t a t e  t h a t  " fo r  
the v a s t  m a jo r i ty  of simple c a p i t a l  budgeting dec i s ions  . . . .  we consider  
t h a t  y i e l d  ( i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn )  i s  both t e c h n i c a l l y  and p r a c t i c a l l y  
super io r  to ne t  p re sen t  va lue" ,  o p c i t . ,  p . 148. Their  reason i s  t h a t  
" i t  i s  more e a s i l y  understood, and accepted by bus iness  men" and. t h a t  
" i t  has tiie advantage of obvia t ing  needless  d ispu te  about a f i r m 's  
cos t  of c a p i t a l " ,  op .c i t . ,  p . 149? 156.
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d i f f e r e n t  forms. Having derived the PV of b e n e f i t  and cos t  streams, one 
can,  w i th  the a id  of a s u i t a b le  c r i t e r i o n ,  pass some judgment upon the p r o j e c t .  
Here the p resen t  va lue  from the p r a c t i c a l  po in t  of view i s  expressed e i t h e r
( i )  the r a t i o  of the PV of b e n e f i t  and cost  streams or ( i i )  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e .  
The former i s  Imown as b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  and the l a t t e r  as Net Present  Value 
(NPV). The choice w i l l  of course depend on the number of p r o j e c t s  to be
considered .  There i s  no element of choice in  the  case of the Caycuma P ro jec t
s ince i t  i s  the only p r o j e c t  concerned with  the production of k r a f t  paper and 
has no o ther  a l t e r n a t i v e  e i t h e r  in  a loca l  sense or in  production s i z e .  Now, 
s ince the re  i s  only one p r o j e c t ,  a l l  t h a t  i s  r equ i red  i s  some measure of the 
ex ten t  to which the b e n e f i t s  exceed the cos ts  and fo r  t h i s  obviously e i t h e r  of 
the two c r i t e r i a  above would be t h e o r e t i c a l l y  accep tab le ,
1In p r a c t i c e ,  however, the r a t i o  i s  in  f a c t  p r e fe r r e d  fo r  the simple reason 
th a t  the  f ig u re  of 424.393*1 T.L, ( a t  i  = 12 percen t)  Table 15) fo r  the 
d i f f e r en c e  in  the PV of b e n e f i t s  and cos ts  i s  l i k e l y  to  be o p e ra t io n a l ly
meaningless.  For the Caycuma Paper P lan t  the  r a t i o  i s  2.4 a t  the d iscount
r a t e  of 12 percent and 2.05 a t  the  d iscount  r a t e  of 14 percent (See T^ble 15)*
But i f  the  s i t u a t i o n  i s  one where the re  i s  a s e r i e s  of p ro j e c t s  competing fo r
s e l e c t io n  w i th in  a cons t ra ined  budget, i t  may be wrong to consider  only the 
r a t i o  of PV of b e n e f i t s  and PV of cost  streams. In t h i s  case ,  fo r  a r a t i o n a l  
investment dec i s ion  i t  i s  important t h a t  spec ia l  emphasis i s  given to the NPV 
th a t  i s ,  the d i f f e r en c e  between PV of b e n e f i t s  and cos t  st reams.
Therefore ,  one can conclude th a t  in  th e  case of the  Caycuma Paper P lan t ,  both
v a r i a n t s  of the  PV ru le  can be important and the f i n a l  choice should be based
both on the r a t i o  and the I7PV where the l a t t e r  form might be usefu l  to in d ica te
2the c o n t r ib u t io n  of the p r o je c t  to the n a t io n a l  income .
F o r /
1. According to the PV ru le  ranking can be done on the bas is  of 
minimum ( c u t - o f f )  r a t i o  which is  decided beforehand. In order 
to rank p ro je c t s  above the c u t - o f f  r a t i o ,  the net  p resen t  value 
index i s  r eq u i red .  This index is  the r a t i o  between PV of cash 
flows and PV of investments .  P ro jec t s  with  p o s i t i v e  PV and 
above the minimum r a t i o  are  included and the p r o j e c t s  with  the 
h ighes t  PV index w i l l  be accepted.  Then s e l e c t  those p ro j e c t s  
which have the h ig h es t  B , u n t i l  the  budget i s  exhausted.
I
2, The I'DPV of a p r o je c t  i s  the  sum of the p resen t  va lues  of the cash 
flows fo r  a l l  years  during the p ro je c t s  l i f e .  I f  the NPV of a 
p ro j e c t  i s  g r e a t e r  than zero,  then the b e n e f i t s  a re  expected to be 
more va luable  than the  out lays  on the p r o j e c t  and to tJiat ex ten t  
the p r o j e c t  i s  worthwhile.
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For a comprehensive and exact dec is ion ,  o ther  c r i t e r i a  should be taken in to  
account f o r  sp ec ia l  reasons  which may seem s i g n i f i c a n t  from a p a r t i a l  aspec t  
v iewpoin t.  The NPV of the  Caycuma P ro jec t  i s :  424.393*1 T.L. a t  12 percen t
d iscount  r a t e  and 307*561.4 T.L. a t  14 percent  d iscount  r a t e  (See Table 15)*
How does the  Caycuma Paper P r o jec t  compare with  the  Return  earned on o ther  
paper p r o j e c t s ?  The only study I have found in  t h i s  f i e l d  i s  the one 
c a r r i e d  out by Mr. T. Kivanc who i s  a Planner a t  the  SPO. He has evaluated 
two a l t e r n a t i v e  paper p r o j e c t s  from the S o c ie ty ' s  po in t  of view^.
2A l te r n a t iv e  I ,  a f t e r  provid ing a "press ing"  process on raw m a te r i a l s  which 
are  to  be imported,  w i l l  produce "laminated paper sh ee t" .  Tj e^ A l t e rn a t iv e  
II  i s  to  import these  raw m a te r i a l s  in  non-impregnated form and to produce 
"impregnated and laminated paper sh ee t s " .  Mr. T. Kivanc 's  f ind ings  fo r  the  
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bource : T, Kivanc, yahrim P r o j e l o r in in  Ekonomi Yonunden 
Degerlendiri lf î iesi  -  A l t e r n a t i f  P r o j e t e r  Aris inda  
Bir Secim Calismasi DPT A p r i l ,  1965» Table 12, 
p p .40, 42, 43» 46 .
1. Tlie lo c a t io n  of the  two a l t e r n a t i v e  p ro je c t s  i s  Bolu.
2. Ij-^ e raw m a te r i a l s  to be imported are  overlay,  decor,  k r a f t  paper,  
ba lance paper e t c ,  ( to  be imported in  the form of impregnated papers)
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From v a rio u s  a sp ec ts  h is  f in d in g s  have sh o w  th a t  A l te rn a t iv e  I I  i s  more 
a t t r a c t i v e  and accep tab le  than A lte rn a t iv e  I .
As can be seen from the  Table l6 ,  the in te rn a l  r a te  of r e tu r n  of Alterm.Dive 
I  i s  14 p e rcen t  and 21 pe rcen t in  A l te rn a t iv e  I I .  The r a t i o  of PV of bene-
f i t s  and c o s ts  i s  1.24 and 1.65 re s p e c t iv e ly .
For the Caycuma Paper P ro je c t  the  r a te  of r e tu rn  i s  12 pe rcen t which is  a
f ig u re  con s id e rab ly  lower than the  ’’y i e l d s ” in  the  above p r o je c t s .  But the
r a t i o  of PV of b e n e f i t s  to  c o s ts  in  the Caycuma p ro je c t  i s  2.4 which does
2compare q u i te  favourab ly  w ith  the  o ther  two p ro je c ts  . I t  may be concluded 
th a t  the Caycuma Paper M ill P ro je c t  i s  an accep tab le  one both in  terms of 
NPV c a lc u la t io n s  and PV of b e n e f i t s  and cost r a t i o .
Before we complete t h i s  s e c t io n ,  i t  may appear a p p ro p r ia te  to  remark on the 
accuracy of the assumptions employed in  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s i s .  As we have seen 
in  the e a r l i e r  s ec t io n s  in  re s p e c t  to time, t h e o r e t i c a l l y  the b e n e f i t s  and 
c o s ts  fo r  each and every year of the p l a n t ' s  l i f e  should, be c a lc u la te d .
This, however, may cause so la rge  an a d d i t io n a l  work th a t  the  is su e  in  
p ra c t ic e  i s  simply solved by assuming th a t  the  b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  would remain 
constan t throughout the  l i f e  of the p r o je c t .  An e v a lu a to r  should, however, 
in v e s t ig a te  to  see whether th e re  a re  good reasons fo r  not assuming th a t  the  
b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  remain c o n s ta n t .
The/
1. I t  should be noted th a t  Mr. T, Kivanc has used a d iscoun t r a te  of 
10 pe rcen t in  h is  PV c a lc u la t io n s .
2. The a n a ly s is  method used in  the  p ro je c t  can be expressed by the 
f o i l  offing f  0 rmul a :
B enefit-C ost R ati1 o = .
^  VA 4' (Zg " Ze)f ( ip  -  sp)Qu
^  Id + I f  ( l  + f )  
i * T l  (1 + i ) ^
where v = value  added (ou tpu t valued a t  c . i . f .  p r i c e ) ,  Zg = fo re ign
exchange savings due to  import s u b s t i t u t io n ,  Zq = fo re ig n  exchange 
expenditu re , f  = fo re ig n  exchange premium ( r a t i o  of the d if fe ren c e  
between shadow exchange r a te  and o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e  over the 
o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e ) ,  ip  = u n i t  s e l l in g  p r ic e  before  tue fa c to ry ,  
Sp = u n i t  s o i l in g  p r ic e  of the fa c to ry ,  Qu, volume of p roduction  in  
n y e a rs ,  Id , domestic component of investm ent, 1 fo re ig n  exchange 
component of investm ent.
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The d i f f i c u l t i e s  here a re  of two k inds; f i r s t ,  nobody could fo re c a s t  w ith  
g re a t  accuracy what the  changes would be in  the demand fo r  paper p roduc ts ,  or 
changes in  s e l l i n g  cond itions  or in  opera ting  c o s t s ,  i . e .  changes in  wages, 
s a l a r i e s  and co s ts  of raw m a te r ia l s ,  or the expected movements in the p r ic e  
ob ta inab le  fo r  the  goods produced in  r e l a t i o n  to p o ss ib le  movements in  p r ic e s  
in  g e n e ra l .  I t  i s  extremely d i f f i c u l t  to fo re c a s t  what the growth would be
in  a l l  these  c o s t  and revenue elements twenty years  hence.
Secondly, even i f  t h i s  growth of demand and sa le s  i t  may not have a p ro p o r t io n a l
e f f e c t  on b e n e f i t  and c o s t  streams due to  i t s  unknown fu tu re  e f f e c t  upon
o p era ting  c o s ts .
I t  should, be noted t h a t  the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the p ro je c t  should be assu red  
d e sp i te  a l l  these  changes in  the assumptions in  fo re c a s t in g  p r ic e s  and c o s t s .  
G enera lly  speaking, a red u c t io n  in  ne t earnings may occur due to unfavourable 
s e l l i n g  co n d itio n s  or inc reased  opera ting  c o s t s .  P r o f i t s  w i l l  f a l l  and a lso  
the  PV of the p ro sp ec tiv e  y ie ld .
In the  Caycuma P r o je c t ,  as w ith  almost a l l  p ro je c t  e v a lu a t io n s ,  i t  i s  th e re fo re  
assumed th a t  the  b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  would remain cons tan t throughout the  l i f e  
of the p r o je c t .
I t  fo llows th a t  in  the case study of the  Caycuma Paper M ill th e re  has been no 
mention of r i s k  and. u n c e r ta in ty .  I t  must be s t r e s s e d  th a t  a l l  investment 
p ro je c ts  involve r i s k  s ince  fu tu re  events can never be p re d ic ted  w ith  complete 
c e r t a in t y .  There w i l l  u su a l ly  be a wide range of p o s s ib le  cash flows which 
could r e s u l t  from a p a r t i c u l a r  p ro je c t  because th e re  a re  l i k e ly  to  be severa l  
d i f f e r e n t  e s tim ates  of f a c to r s  determ ining the cash flow, such as the  i n i t i a l  
c a p i t a l  c o s ts ,  fu tu re  demand fo r  the  p roduct, the a c t io n s  of com petitors 
(p r iv a te  or p u b l ic )  and o pera ting  co s ts  over the l i f e  of the p ro je c t^ .
The trea tm en t of the  r i s k s  involved in  a p ro je c t  w i l l  depend on a number of
2c o n s id e ra t io n s .  These a re  : the range of p o ss ib le  unknowais from the p ro je c t ,
the s ize  of the e n te r p r i s e ,  the general r i s k in e s s  of the  e n t e r p r i s e ' s  opera tions  
and investment programme, the a t t i t u d e s  of the  managers of S ta te  Economic 
E n te rp r ise s  o
P r o f e s s o r /
1, Investment A p p ra isa l ,  GB. N.E.D.C., p . 12,
2. Investment A p p ra isa l ,  Ib id ,  p . 12.
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P ro fesso r  A.H. P re s t  lias pointed out t l ia t  the same r i s k s  and. u n c e r ta in t ie s  
a re  a p p l icab le  to pub lic  e n te r p r i s e s  as w ith  p r iv a te  p r o je c ts ^ .  A rough 
approach in  r e sp e c t  to  u n c e r ta in ty  and r i s k  involved i s  to  es tim ate  the 
most l i k e l y  cash flow and to  re q u ire  th a t  th i s  should give a r a te  of r e tu rn  
w ith a s u f f i c i e n t  r i s k  premium in  a d d i t io n  to the  e n te r p r i s e s  co s t  of finance 
( i n t e r e s t  ch arg e) .  In  t h i s  case i t  is  reasonable  to p lace  a lower value on 
u n c e r ta in  fu tu re  earn ings than  on c e r t a in  ea rn ings . In  t h i s  method of course , 
a h igher r a te  of r e tu r n  would be req u ired  from r i s k i e r  investm ents as opposed 
to  r e l a t i v e l y  safe  investmentso
A second method probably i s  to  vary the  d iscount r a te  w ith  the r i s k in e s s  of
the p ro je c t . .  This i s  sometimes t r e a te d  as an a r b i t r a r y  way of d ea ling  w ith
?
r i s k  and u n c e r t a i n t y ' .  T h ird ly , i t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  p re fe ra b le  to see how the
outcome would be a f fe c te d  by changes in  a number of the  more important
assumptions made about c o s t s ,  s a le s  revenue, p r ic e s  rece ived  fo r  ou tpu t, and
3the l i f e  of the p ro je c t  .
For a more accu ra te  a n a ly s is  i t  i s  f e a s ib le  to  make some estim ate  of the 
p o ss ib le  outcomes and of the  l ik e l ih o o d  of t h e i r  o ccu rr ing . With p ro je c ts  
th a t  c o n s t i tu t e  a f a i r l y  small p ro p o r t io n  of a f i r m 's  t o t a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i t  
i s  necessa ry  to weight the NPV's (o r r a t e s  of r e tu rn )  of the d i f f e r e n t  po ss ib le
4
outcomes by the p ro b a b i l i ty  of these  outcomes o ccu rr in g .
I f  the  weighted NPV of a p ro je c t  i s  g r e a te r  than zero (o r  the  weighted average
r a t e  of r e tu r n  i s  g r e a te r  than the  f i r m 's  -  or the SPO's d iscount r a te  -  co s t
of f inance)  the  p ro je c t  i s  accep tab le  and where th e re  i s  a choice between
a l t e r n a t iv e  p r o je c t s ,  the  p ro je c t  w ith  the h ig h e s t  weighted average J/JPV should 
5
be chosen . The reason ing  behind th i s  approach i s  th a t  i t  i s  of course in  
the  i n t e r e s t s  of p r iv a te  or pub lic  e n te r p r i s e s  to have the  balance of proba­
b i l i t i e s  running in  t h e i r  favour.
B u t /
1. A,II. P r e s t  and R. Purvey, po in t out th a t  " the re  i s  no reason  to 
argue th a t  pub lic  investment p ro je c ts  are  f ree  of u n c e r ta in ty "  
and they add th a t  allowances fo r  u n c e r ta in ty  can be made -
i )  in  the assessment of annual le v e ls  of b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts ,
i i )  in  the  assumption about len g th  of l i f e ,  and ( i i i )  in  the 
d iscoun t r a t e .  See t h e i r  "C ost-B enefit  A nalysis ; A Survey".
E .J .  December, 1965, p p .699
2. Investment A ppraisal o p .c i t . , p . 15.
3. See Investment A p p ra isa l ,  G.L., N .F.D.C., 196?, p . 13, P ro f .  A.K. P re s t  
and Ii. Purvey f e e l  t h a t  t h i s  method i s  v.iost a p p ro p r ia te  i f  the r i s k  of 
d is p e r s io n  of outcomes (o r  in p u ts )  i s  i r r e g u la r ly ,  r a th e r  than regu­
l a r l y ,  d i s t r i b u t e d  w ith  time o p . c i t . , . p.699*
4. Investment A p p ra isa l ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 13.
5 . Investment A p p ra isa l ,  Ib id  , , p . 13*
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But, on the o th e r  hand, i f  p ro je c ts  are  la rge  in  r e l a t i o n  to the public  
companies' s i z e ,  or i f  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r i s k y ,  a c lo s e r  examination of th e  r i s k s  
involved may be n ecessa ry .  In such cases la rge  p ro je c t s  should be considered  
in d iv id u a l ly  and the r i s k s  c a r e f u l ly  analysed^. In  p r a c t i c e ,  managers of 
both public  and p r iv a te  e n te r p r i s e s  should t ry  to a sse ss  the f a c to r s  which 
make the outcome u n c e r ta in  and the r e l a t i v e  importance of these  fa c to r s  
causing u n c e r ta in ty .  In case a p a r t i c u l a r  p ro je c t  p re se n ts  some considerab le  
r i s k in e s s  the  whole of the  e n t e r p r i s e ' s  investment programme needs to be r e ­
ap p ra ised .  This f a c to r  may not be very  important in  the  case of in d iv id u a l  
p ro je c ts  of average r i s k in e s s  or w ith  p ro je c ts  which c o n s t i tu t e  a small seg­
ment of the pub lic  e n te r p r i s e  bu t ,  i d e a l ly ,  investment programmes and th e i r
2finance  and r i s k in e s s  should be considered  as a whole .
The main source of r i s k  and u n c e r ta in ty  sometimes l i e s  in  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of
obsolescence. The adjustm ent fo r  u n c e r ta in ty  in  t h i s  case can be made by
3shorten ing  the l i f e  period of the P lan t  . The l i f e  of the  Paper M ill P ro je c t
as noted  from the  PV c a lc u la t io n s  i s  twenty years  which appears to  be a
4f a i r l y  reasonable  l i f e s p a n  fo r  these  kinds of i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  . Never­
th e le s s ,  i t  would be very  convenient to adopt more than one l i f e  period , 
p o ss ib ly  two, because th e re  i s  always a danger of o v e res tim ation  of l i f e s p a n s  
of a s s e t s  e s p e c ia l ly  in  developing c o u n tr ie s .  For t h i s  purpose, PV c a lc u ­
l a t io n s  should be made on the b a s is  of a s h o r te r  l i f e s p a n  in  order to see the 
e f f e c t  of t i l l s  assumption on the s e le c t io n  of the p r o je c t .
Furthermore, as 1 have mentioned e a r l i e r ,  another approach to  a llow  fo r  
u n c e r ta in ty  and r i s k  i s  to vary  the  d iscount r a te  ap p lied  fo r  p r o je c t s .  To 
convert b e n e f i t  and cost streams to the p resen t-day  va lues  one needs an 
ap p ro p ira te  r a t e  of s o c ia l  d isco u n t .  This, however, i s  not an easy ta sk .
As 1 have po in ted  out in  S e c t io n V ^ i t  i s  necessary  to co n s id e r  no t only the  
8TP r a te  but a lso  the  s o c ia l  opportun ity  cos t  of c a p i t a l .  The choice of a 
d is c o u n t /
1. Ib id .  p . 13» In decid ing  on the  r i s k in e s s  of p ro je c t s  the  p lanners
should bear in  mind a lso  the  r e la t io n s h ip  of the  p ro je c t s  w ith  the 
pub lic  e n t e r p r i s e s '  o the r  investment a c t i v i t i e s .
2o For a fu r th e r  d iscu ss io n  on the Treatment of Risk and U ncerta in ty  see 
A .J .  M errett and A. Sykes, Finance and i lna ly s is  of C ap ita l  P ro je c ts ,  
Longmans, 1966; a lso  Myles M. Dryden, C ap ita l Budgeting: Treatment
of U n cer ta in ty  and Investment C r i t e r i a ,  in  S c o t t ish  Jou rna l of 
P o l i t i c a l  Economy. V o l .11, Feb. 1964, p . 247-259»
3. A,it. P re s t  and Turvey s t a t e  th a t  t h i s  method i s  re le v a n t  when th e re  
may be the p r o b a b i l i t i e s  th a t  b e n e f i t s  suddenly d isappear or cos ts  
soar ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .6 9 9 «
4. For e x . ,  o p e ra t io n a l  l i f e  of a cement p lan t  i s  taken as 20 y e a r s . ,  
and PV c a lc u la t io n s  are  made on t i i is  b a s is ,  see l.M.D, L i t t l e  and
A .J .  M ir r le e s ,  V o l . l ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 302.
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d iscoun t r a t e  has led  to  much con troversy  and i t  i s  need less  to  devote more 
time to a l l  the t h e o r e t i c a l  is su e s  involved, s ince  I have a lready  in troduced  
a pu re ly  ex p o sito ry  note in  S ec tion
I t  follows from the  above th a t  i t  w i l l  be q u i te  p la u s ib le  to c a lc u la te  the 
FV of b e n e f i t s  and c o s ts  streams by applying more than one d iscoun t r a t e .  
E sp e c ia l ly  t h i s  po in t becomes more re le v a n t  in  underdeveloped co u n tr ie s  where
th e re  i s  an im perfec t c a p i t a l  market which r e s u l t s  in  la rg e  v a r ia t io n s  in  the
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  charged. Thus, i t  i s  not p la u s ib le  to conduct the PV a n a ly s is  
on the  b a s is  of a s in g le  d iscoun t r a t e  in  these  c o n d i t io n s .  V/ith t h i s  in  
mind I  have th e re fo re  ap p lied  two d iscoun t r a t e s ,  one of 12 percen t which was
a lre ad y  chosen by the SPO and the o ther of 14 percen t which approximately
corresponds to  the  s o c ia l  opportun ity  co s t  of c a p i t a l .  The r e s u l t s  of the 
PV c a lc u la t io n s  based on both d iscoun t r a te s  a re  g iven in  S ec tion  IX.
The r a t i o  of the  PV of b e n e f i t s  to the  p resen t value of c o s ts  in  the Caycuma 
P lan t i s  very  s e n s i t iv e  to the choice of a d iscoun t r a t e ,  where the r a t i o  
drops from 2.4 to 2 ,0  when the r a te  of d iscoun t r i s e s  from 12 percen t to 14 
p ercen t (See Section  IX ).
F in a l ly ,  i t  should be s t r e s s e d  w ithout any h e s i t a t i o n ,  th a t  the SPO's p ro je c t  
e v a lu a tio n  method i s  f a r  from being complete due to  i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  and 
p r a c t i c a l  l im i t a t i o n s .  Most of the  shortcomings stem from the c o n tro v e rs ia l  
a sp ec ts  of s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  which has no t gained a general form 
and from the f a i l u r e  of the  SPO p lanners  to  t r e a t  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  in  a 
more comprehensive way.
Probably by changing v a rio u s  assumptions of the  Caycuma p ro je c t ,  i . e .  p r ice  
of ou tpu t,  wage r a t e s ,  fo re ig n  exchange r a t e s ,  d iscoun t r a t e s ,  l i f e s p a n  of 
the p r o je c t ,  a more s a t i s f a c to r y  r e s u l t  could have been ob ta ined . Without 
such co n s id e ra t io n s  taken in to  account i t  i s  hard  to  be l iev e  th a t  some e r ro r s  
have no t been committed in  t h e i r  p ro je c t  a p p ra i s a l s .  I t  would be a usefu l 
ex erc ise  to c a r ry  out some kind of s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s is  by changing the given 
assumptions in  the paper p r o je c t s .  I t  must be r e a l i s e d  th a t  small e r ro rs  in  
these  assumptions e n ta i l  considerab le  e r ro rs  in  the PV of b e n e f i t s  and cost 
streams and in  tu rn  the p r o j e c t ' s  a d m is s ib i l i ty .  Yet the method adopted by 
the SPO however im perfect i s  always b e t t e r  than the  method app lied  by the 
SEILAl O rgan isa tion  which i s  i t s  execu tor.
The/
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The f in a l  judgment on c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  should be based upon i t s  a b i l i t y  
to help  reach meaningful conc lu s ions . In t h i s  r e sp e c t  i t  may seem p e r t in e n t  
th a t  the  Caycuma Paper M ill should be compared w ith  o th e r  a l t e r n a t iv e s ,  
in s te a d  of e v a lu a t in g  i t  in  i s o l a t i o n .  The more d e ta i l e d  the p ro je c ts  and 
the  more a l t e r n a t iv e s  to choose from, the b e t t e r  would be the  investment choice
One may conclude by saying tha t '  the  a n a ly s is  of the Caycuma P r o je c t ,  d e sp i te  
a l l  i t s  im p erfec tio n s ,  has perhaps fu r th e r  in d ic a ted  to us th a t  a p ro je c t  
which may seem u n p ro f i ta b le  from the  p r iv a te  f i r m 's  viewpoint and in  terms of 
i t s  own c r i t e r i a  may not n e c e s s a r i ly  be u n p ro f i ta b le  i f  i t  i s  evaluated  from 
s o c ie ty 's  p o in t of view. Thus, so c ia l  ev a lu a tio n  of p ro je c ts  in  Turkey is  
l i k e l y  to improve the  s e le c t io n  of p ro je c ts  and fo rm ula tion  of Development 
Programmes.
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APPENDIX A TO ClbU>TER 8
Regional M u lt ip l ie r  fo r  the  Zonguldak Region and M u lt ip l ie r  
E f fe c t  of the Paper M ill P lan t
I -  i t  must be s t r e s s e d  a t  the o u ts e t  th a t  th e re  i s ,  to my knowledge, no 
d e f in i t i o n  or d iv is io n s  of reg ions  in  Turkey to  he lp  one to  conduct such an 
a n a ly s is  a t  reg io n a l  l e v e l ,  I s h a l l ,  th e re fo re ,  suppose th a t  the Zonguldak 
reg ion  w i l l  comprise th re e  major c i t i e s  which a re  Zonguldak, Kastomonn, and 
Bolu. The l a s t  two toims are  the  ones providing the raw m a te r ia ls  (tim ber 
and wood) to the  paper m i l l .  Since the la rg e r  the reg ion , the more s i g n i f i ­
can t i s  the m u l t ip l ie r ^ ;  I  f e e l  t h i s  i s  a p la u s ib le  s tep  to  ta k e .
Secondly, the  fo llow ing  c o e f f i c i e n t s  in  connection w ith  marginal p ro p e n s i t ie s  
to  leak  ( s ,  t  and m) w i l l  be assumed to  be v a l id .  These a re :
( i )  the marginal p ro p en s ity  to save out of personal d isposab le  income 
( a t  N ational Level) i s  found to  be l6 ,9  pe rcen t , I have c a lc u la te d  t h i s  
p ro p en s ity  fo r  the F i r s t  P lan Period 1962-6?. Though th i s  i s  a marginal 
p ro p en s ity  to  save a t  n a t io n a l  le v e l  i t  may seem reasonab le  to assume th a t
i t  could a lso  be v a l id  fo r  the  Zonguldak reg io n .  This assumption im plies  th a t
out of every 100 T ,L ira  in c rease  in  income, 16,9 T .L ira  w i l l  leak  as saving
in  the reg io n ,
( i i )  The second assumption one needs to make in  t h i s  con tex t i s  in  connection 
w ith  the marginal p ro p en s i ty  to pay d i r e c t  and in d i r e c t  ta x e s .  From the 
f ig u re s  g iven in  the  Second Five Year P lan , 1968-72, the  f ig u re s  fo r  t o t a l  
taxes and gross n a t io n a l  product have been compiled. Total taxes  (d i r e c t  
and in d i r e c t )  c o n s t i tu t e  18 percen t of GNP during the  p e r io d  1967-71 (See 
Tables 1 and 2 ) .  This means t h a t  the  average p ro p en s ity  to pay taxes in  
r e l a t i o n /
* I  am g r a te f u l  to Mr. K .J .  A llen  in  the Department of Soc ia l and
Economic Research fo r  h is  guidance and h e lp fu l  comments during
the e s t im a tio n  of the  Regional M u l t ip l ie r .
1. The sm aller  the  reg ion , the h igher the leakages and in  tu rn  the
sm aller  the  m u l t ip l i e r  w i l l  be. Thus, fo r  a very  small reg ion ,
the m u l t ip l i e r  becomes m eaningless.
2, The r e l a t io n s h ip  between the p r iv a te  d isposab le  income and savings can 
be estim ated  in  the fo llow ing way; Disposable p r iv a te  income i s  found 
by deducting taxes  p lus  pub lic  revenue from the GNP and by adding 
c u rre n t  account d e f i c i t .  Then p r iv a te  saving i s  derived  by deducting 
p r iv a te  consumption from d isposab le  p r iv a te  income. Thus, the marginal 
p r iv a te  sav ing , on average, i s  found to be 16,9 p e rcen t  fo r  the period 
1962- 67 , See the p re sen t  a u th o r 's  M.A. Thesis; A Study of the  I 963-67 
Turkish Five-Year Plan fo r  Economic Development w ith  Special Reference 
to Investment D ecisions and Resource A llo c a t io n .  Durham U n iv e rs i ty ,  
England, May, I 966 , p . 128,
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r e l a t i o n  to the GNP i s  18 p e rc e n t .  But fo r  the e s tim ate  of reg io n a l 
m u l t ip l i e r  what one needs i s  not the average , bu t r a th e r  the  marginal p ro­
p e n s i ty  to  pay ta x e s .  Of course , the marginal r a t e s  of ta x a t io n  a re  h igher 
than the  average r a t e  and t h i s  i s  a lso  the  case in  a reg io n .  In the absence 
of f ig u re s  to c a lc u la te  marginal p ro p en s ity ,  the average f ig u re s  ( a t  aggre­
gate l e v e l )  w i l l  be used fo r  t h i s  simple e x e rc is e .
In aggregate  terms I have c a lc u la te d  the  marginal p ro p en s ity  to pay taxes as 
21 p e rcen t  (see Table l ) .  The marginal p ro p en s ity  to  pay taxes  fo r  1968 
and 1969 i s  found to be almost 24 pe rcen t and 23 pe rcen t r e s p e c t iv e ly .  But, 
i f  the average marginal p ro p en s i ty  to pay taxes  fo r  the pe riod  1967-70 i s  
taken , the f ig u re  s e t t l e s  a t  21 p e rc en t .  I t  must be s t r e s s e d  however, th a t  
i f  the above i s  c a lc u la te d  on the  b a s is  of p r iv a te  personal income the r a te  
might be expected to be well above 21 p e rcen t .  However, fo r  t h i s  study the 
marginal p ro p en s ity  to pay taxes  w i l l  be taken as 21 percen t fo r  the Zonguldak 
reg io n . This compares well w ith  the  marginal p ro p en s ity  to pay taxes in  
Scotland which has been estim ated  to be 35 p e rcen t^ .  As can be seen from 
Table 2, i n d i r e c t  taxes  in  Turkey c o n s t i tu te  70 p e rcen t  of the t o t a l  taxes 
which p o in ts  to  the  f a c t  th a t  the marginal p ro p en s ity  to  pay in d i r e c t  taxes  
i s  h ig h e r  than  the marginal p ropens ity  to  pay d i r e c t  taxes*
TOTAL TAXES
TABLE 1 
AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP AND
M/iRGINAL PROPENSITY TO PAY TAXES ( B i l l .  T .L .)
Average Marginal
Total P ropensity P ropens ity
Years G N P Taxes t/ gnp At/ a GNP
1967 85.1 14.9 17.5 -
1968 91.1 15.8 17.3 15
1969 97.4 17.3 17.8 23.8
1970 104.3 18.9 18.1 23.2
Average Marginal Propensi ty  to Pay Taxes 20,7
Notes : GNP and Total Taxes f ig u re s  are from DPT,
Kalkinma P la n i , Ik in c i  Bes Y il 1968-1972 , Ankara,
1967, p p .22- 23 . Average and Marginal p ro p e n s i t ie s
to pay taxes a re c a lc u la te d acco rd ing ly .
1. See K .J .  A llen , The Regional M u l t ip l ie r :  Some Problems in  E s tim ation ,
o p . c i t .  p . 92 , I am a lso  to ld  by Mr, A llen  th a t  though in  ills a r t i c l e  
33 percen t i s  given as r e p re se n ta t iv e  of the marginal p ro p en s ity  to pay 
d i r e c t  tax es ,  t h i s  f ig u re  should be understood to include in d i r e c t  
taxes  too . He has a lso  suggested to me th a t  the marginal p ropens ity  
to pay taxes in  Southern I t a l y  v a r ie s  between 17 and 20 p e rcen t .  How­
ever, he f e e l s  th a t  t h i s  does not include in d i r e c t  ta x e s .  Therefore , 
my assumption of p ro p en s i ty  to pay taxes seems reasonable  one, For 
I t a l i a n  f ig u r e s ,  see F, P i l lo to n ,  E f f e t t i  M o l t i p l i c a t i v i , Degli Inves ti-  
menti, Delia  "Casa per I I  Mezzogiorno, G iu ff re" ,  Roma I 96U, p . 71.
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TABLE 2
DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP
Years D ire c t  Taxes In d i r e c t  Taxes Total Taxes
1967 5 .3 12.2 17.5
1968 4.9 12.4 17.3
1969 5.1 12.6 17.8
1970 5.3 12.8 18.1
Source : DPT. Kalkinma P la n i ,  I k in c i ,  Bes Y i l ,
1968- 72 , p . 23 .
( i i i )  The t h i r d  assumption requ ired  fo r  reg io n a l m u l t ip l i e r  i s  the marginal 
p ro p en s i ty  to import goods from o ther reg ions and abroad. This involves 
an es tim ate  of imports of food and consujner goods by the Zonguldak reg ion . For 
t h i s  we need to know the imports as a percentage of Zonguldak personal consump­
t io n .  This, in  tu rn ,  w i l l  g ive us an in d ic a t io n  of the s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  in  
consumer goods in  the Zonguldak reg io n .  Furthermore, one ought to  know the 
ex ten t  to  which i t  i s  necessa ry  fo r  the Zonguldak reg ion  to  import raw m a te r ia ls  : 
and sera i- f in ished  products  s ince  t h i s  involves payments going to  o th e r  reg ions ( 
in  the  form of an expenditure  le ak .
I t  i s  reasonable  to  assume th a t  the  Zonguldak reg ion  i s  a small reg ion  and 
r e l i e s  considerab ly  on purchases of goods from o th e r  reg ions  and abroad. I t  
i s  o f ten  suggested th a t  the sm aller  the s iz e  of the reg ion  the  la rg e r  the 
marginal p ro p en s ity  to  im port. P ro fe sso r  T. Wilson^in h i s  a r t i c l e  s t a t e s  
t h a t  the s iz e  of the marginal p ro p en s ity  to import (ra) v a r ie s  no t only w ith  
the i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c tu r e s  of d i f f e r e n t  a reas  r e l a t i v e l y  to the p a t te rn s  of 
t h e i r  expenditure  but a lso  w ith  the s iz e  of the a r e a s .  He goes on to  suggest 
t h a t  o th e r  th in g s  being equal, the marginal p ro p en s ity  to  import w i l l  be 
sm aller and the m u l t ip l i e r  th e re fo re ,  la rg e r  in  an a rea  big  enough to s u s ta in  
a reasonably  d iv e r s i f i e d  range of i n d u s t r i e s .  The rev e rse  i s  t ru e  fo r  small 
reg ions where i n d u s t r i a l  s t ru c tu re  i s  not complex and d iv e r s i f i e d .  This i s ,  
o f /
See To V/ilson, Tpe Regional M u l t ip l ie r ,  -  A C r i t iq u e .  0 ,E .P , V o l.20, 
November, I 968 , p p ,388-389, and a lso  D.B. S te e le ,  Regional M u lt ip l ie r s  
in  Great B r i t a in ,  C.E.P. V o l.21, J u ly ,  1969, No.2 . ,  p. 258-274
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of course , an im portant and re le v a n t  po in t in  e s t im a tin g  the reg io n a l  
m u l t i p l i e r .
Thus, t o t a l  leak  through imports would in v e rs e ly  a f f e c t  the reg iona l m u l t i ­
p l i e r .  Here, a f ig u re  i s  needed to  in d ic a te  the  p ro p o r t io n  of the value of 
Zonguldak regioris income which is  leaked v ia  im ports. Marginal p ro p en s ity  
to import from abroad i s  found to be 20 pe rcen t fo r  the  n a t io n a l  economy for 
the  year I 966 (See Table 3 ) .  Let us assume th a t  t h i s  marginal p ro p en s ity  
to  import i s  a lso  the case in  the Zonguldak reg io n .  To be more acc u ra te ,  
however, to th i s  leak ,  the  marginal p ro p en s ity  to import from o ther reg ions  
must be added. Because th e re  i s  no inform ation  on in te r - r e g io n a l  trade  
f ig u r e s ,  fo r  Turkey, one has to  apply some kind of ru le  of thumb in  view of 
the  i n d u s t r i a l  s t ru c tu re  p re v a i l in g  in  t h i s  reg io n . Zonguldak i s  one of the  
depressed a reas  in  Turkey where the in d u s t r i a l  s t r u c tu r e  i s  no t a d iv e r s i f i e d  
one to  make i t  a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  in  c a p i t a l  goods or raw m a te r ia l s .  Mining 
and s t e e l ,  and i ro n  in d u s t r ie s  are  the  basic  in d u s t r i e s  in  t h i s  reg io n .  I t  
has a la rg e  pocket of unemployment and a g r ic u l tu re  i s  not a s a t i s f a c to r y  
f i e l d  to  make i t  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  in  food and o ther consumer goods.
Very roughly , I s h a l l  assume th a t  t o t a l  leaks due to  imports from abroad and 
o the r  reg ions  w i l l  be 30 p e rcen t  on marginal p ro p en s i ty  term s. This im plies  
th a t  out of every 100 T.L. in c rease  in  reg iona l income 30 T.L, w i l l  be spent 
on imports from abroad and o ther reg io n s .
TABLE 3
AVERAGE AND M/\EGINAL PROPENSITY TO IMPORT
Years
GNP 
B i l l io n  T.L.
Imports 
X M i l l io n ( l )
Imports 







1964 69.9 537.4 4.8 7 «
1965 73.1 572.0 5.1 7 9.4
1966 79.5 718.0 6.4 8 20.3
Average Marginal P ropensity  to Import 15
Source ; C alcu la ted  from the  f ig u re s  given in  the Second 
Five Year P lan -  Kalkinma P lan i -  Ik in c i  Bes Y il 
1968- 1972, Ankara, 196?^ p . 4.
Note Î ( 1 ) These f ig u re s  are  converted in to  T .L ira  on 
the b a s is  of 1 /  = 9 T.L.
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Taking in to  account a l l  these  leaks  the reg iona l m u l t ip l i e r  which i s  
in v e rse ly  r e l a t e d  to  t o t a l  leaks becomes:
1
') s  H- t  + m
k^ =
,17 + .21 + .30
k.f = J L  
.68
k^ = 1.47
This r e s u l t  im plies  th a t  the t o t a l  leak  out of every 100 T.L. Increase  in  
income w i l l  be 68 T .L ira s .  Total leak  fo r  Scotland on the b a s is  of marginal 
p ropensity  to leakages was found to be £66 out of £100 which gives a reg io n a l 
m u l t ip l i e r  of 1 ,5^ . The reg io n a l  m u l t ip l i e r  in  Zonguldak reg ion  is  lower 
than in  Scotland and t h i s  i s  l i k e l y  to  be due to  a r a th e r  h igh p ro p en s ity  to 
import from o ther  reg ions  and abroad. This a lso  in d ic a te s  th a t  Scotland has 
a h igher  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  in  c a p i t a l  and consumer goods than Zonguldak.
So f a r ,  I have d e a l t  w ith  reg iona l m u l t ip l i e r  from the Zonguldak reg ion  view­
p o in t ,  bu t m u l t ip l i e r  a n a ly s is  can be used a t  s e c to r  as well as p ro je c t  l e v e l .  
I t  can be m aintained th a t  some s e c to rs  w i l l  have a g r e a te r  impact than o thers  
on reg io n a l  income and employment through t h e i r  expansion or c o n tra c t io n .
Therefore , i t  may be u se fu l  to know the  income m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  of p a r t i c u -
2
l a r  s e c to rs  and in d u s t r i e s  . This i s  what I s h a l l  a ttem pt to  do in  the  
subsequent s e c t io n s .  As I have mentioned e a r l i e r  the Caycuma Paper P lan t by 
i t s  o p e ra tion  w i l l  genera te  an a d d i t io n a l  income through i t s  m u l t ip l i e r  e f f e c t .  
Since i t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  to  es tim ate  the employment m u l t ip l i e r  of the  p ro­
j e c t  I s h a l l  confine  ray study to  an estim ate  of income e f f e c t  both a t  the 
P lan t  and in  the timber in d u s t r ie s  lo ca ted  in  Bolu and Kastomonu.
I t  should, however, be noted th a t  t h i s  w i l l  be a rough es tim ate  s ince the 
marginal p ro p e n s i t ie s  worked out fo r  the Zonguldak reg io n  above, w i l l  be used. 
The/
lo See K .J . A llen , The Regional M u l t ip l ie r :  Some Problems in  E s tim ation ,
o p . c i t .  in  "Regional and Urban S tudies  -  A Socia l Science Approach", 
ed. by J .B , Cullingwurth and S.C. Orr, George A llen  & Unwin L td . ,  
London, I 969 , p . 89.
2. K.J. Allen, Ib id , ;  l i .82 .
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The marginal p ro p e n s i t ie s  to leak  in  any reg ion  w i l l  vary  according to 
se c to rs  and in d u s t r i e s .  In o the r  words, each in d u s try  w i l l  have d i f f e r e n t  
marginal p ro p e n s i t ie s  to  le ak ,  but fo r  our example I  s h a l l  assume th a t  ihe 
p ro p e n s i t ie s  I have found above a re  a lso  v a l id  f o r  the  paper p ro je c t .
I t  must be noted t h a t  the  Paper M ill P ro je c t  w i l l  have two income e f f e c t s ,  
one a t  the P lan t  and the o th e r  in  the timber in d u s t ry .  Let us estim ate  
these  in  tu rn ;
A -  fo r  t h i s  purpose the f i r s t  th ing  to  do i s  to  examine the  value added 
per annum c re a te d  by the Paper M il l .  The Value Added Table inc ludes the 





OF THE PALMER MILL
Thousand L ira
1. S a la r ie s  and wages
2. I n t e r e s t
3. D ep rec ia tion
4. Taxes (D irec t  and in d i r e c t )
5. Rents
6. P r o f i t s
7  . Oth e r s______________________





32 .700.000  
1 . 036.000
98.443.000
Note ; For the f ig u re s  see Chapter 7, Table 2.
The next s tep  i s  to  in v e s t ig a te  which of the items inc luded  in  the value 
added ta b le  may p o ss ib ly  leak  from the Caycuma and Zonguldak reg ion .
I t  may seem reasonable  to assume th a t  because the Paper M ill P lan t i s  a 
government P la n t ,  a l l  items of the value added w i l l  leak  to  o ther reg io n s ,  
the only exception  being " s a la r i e s  and wages". In o ther  words, i n t e r e s t ,  
d e p re c ia t io n ,  taxes  and p r o f i t s  w i l l  leak from the reg io n  in  one or another 
way. P r o f i t s ,  fo r  in s ta n ce ,  w i l l  go to the government or S ta te  Economic 
E n te rp r ise  (SEJ3) to  be used out of the reg ion  fo r  some o th e r  purpose. I t  
i s  no t l i k e l y  th a t  the government w i l l  spend t h i s  money in  the reg io n  i t s e l f .  
O th e r /
294
Other items by t h e i r  na tu re  cannot be assumed to remain in  the reg ion  as 
w e l l .
Now, we a re  l e f t  w ith  s a l a r i e s  and wages. As can be seen from Table 4, 
s a l a r i e s  and wages amount to 9,700,000 T .L iras  and they  c o n s t i tu te  9 .8 per 
cent of the t o t a l  va lue  added of the  Paper P la n t .  Tlie small percentage of 
s a l a r i e s  and wages in  the  t o t a l  value added might seem q u i te  s t r i k i n g ,  but
th i s  may be expected from the paper p ro je c t  which i s  n a tu r a l l y  a c a p i t a l
in te n s iv e  in d u s t ry .
The m u l t ip l i e r  e f f e c t  a r i s i n g  from the  payments to workers w i l l  be k times 
the amount of wages and s a l a r i e s :
= k X 9,700,000 T.L.
= 1.47 X 9 , 700,000
= 14,259,000 T.L.
The p r in c ip le  here  i s  th a t  the income of the workers by i t s  expend itu re , 
genera tes  a d d i t io n a l  income and th i s  by i t s  expenditure  genera tes  fu r th e r  
income. So the m u l t ip l i e r  could be considered fo r  i n f i n i t e  rounds, but to 
avoid t h i s  what i s  needed i s  simply to m u ltip ly  the i n i t i a l  money in je c te d  
in  the Zonguldak reg ion  (wages and s a l a r i e s )  w ith  k . I t  should be s t r e s s e d  
t h a t ,  when wages and s a l a r i e s  are  in je c te d  in to  the Zonguldak reg ion  not a l l  
of i t  w i l l  be spent th e re .  Some goes out in  the form of leakages, i . e .  
sav ings , taxes  and im ports . But, these  leaks  a re  a lre ad y  taken in to  account 
in  the magnitude and value of the m u l t ip l i e r  (k = 1 .4 7 ) .  Thus, (k x wages 
and s a l a r i e s )  w i l l  give us the income generated  v ia  the m u l t i p l i e r .  Tj e^ 
income e f f e c t  of the  Paper P la n t  P ro je c t  a t  the P lan t w i l l  amount to
14,259,000 T .L ira s .
B. In  a d d i t io n  to the income e f f e c t  generated  a t  the  P lan t  the  p ro je c t  a lso  
genera tes  an a d d i t io n a l  income in  the  timber in d u s t r ie s  lo ca ted  in  Bolu and 
Kastomonu, ( s u p p l ie r s  of raw m a te r ia ls  to  the Paper M i l l ) .
For t h i s  purpose, we must in v e s t ig a te  the Paper M i l l ' s  expenditure  on the 
purchase of raw m a te r ia ls  and a u x i l i a r y  raw^  m a te r ia l s .  These can be found 
from the  "annual o p e ra ting  co s ts"  of the Paper P la n t  (See Table 5). The 
Expenditure on raw m a te r ia ls  a re :
(1) Raw m a te r ia ls  50^627.^000 T.L.




The expenditure  on raw m a te r ia ls  and a u x i l i a r y  m a te r ia ls  (62,407,000 T .L .) 
w i l l  c o n s t i tu t e  the  income fo r  the tim ber in d u s t r i e s  which are  lo ca ted  in  
Bolu and Kastomonu. Again, t h i s  income, through i t s  expend itu re , w i l l  lead  
to  f u r th e r  income through the  working of the m u l t i p l i e r .  We have no i n f o r ­
mation on the  s t r u c tu r e  of the  timber in d u s try  in  Turkey to enable us to see 
what p ro p o r t io n  of t h i s  va lue  added w i l l  be spent on workers as wages and 
s a l a r i e s .  The timber in d u s try  in  Turkey, beyond any doubt, i s  a labour-  
in te n s iv e  s e c to r ,  though th e re  has been some co nside rab le  improvements in  
i t s  m echanisation . The labour inpu t in  t h i s  in d u s try  i s ,  of course , s tro n g ly  
su b jec t  to  the  degree of m echanisation. But, to  s im p lify  t h i s  study i t  may 
be assumed th a t  the  t im b e r- indust r y  i s  la b o u r - in te n s iv e  and out of 62,407,000 
T .L iras  income genera ted  in  the timber in d u s t r ie s  through th e  s a le s  of raw 
m a te r ia l s ,  50 pe rcen t i s  devoted to  workers as wage payments. This is  a 
r a th e r  a r b i t r a r y  assumption, but in  the absence of reg io n a l  da ta  in  Turkey 
one has to  in troduce  some kind of rough assumption.
Accordingly, the amount of income which the workers in  the timber in d u s try
w i l l  re ce iv e  becomes;
62 ,407 , 000/2  = 51 , 205,500 T .L ira s .
Hie expenditure  of 31,203,500 T.L. by workers in  the  tim ber in d u s try  w i l l  
c re a te  a d d i t io n a l  income through the m u l t i p l i e r .  This e f f e c t  w i l l  be in  
the magnitude of
k X 31 , 203,500 T .L ira ,  Thus,
= 1 . 4 7  X 3 1 , 2 0 3 , 5 0 0
= 45 , 869,145 T .L iras
C -  Total income e f f e c t  of the paper m ill  p ro je c t  due to  the  m u l t ip l ie r  
w i l l  be the  sum of p r o j e c t ’s value added + income e f f e c t  a t  the P la n t  + 
income e f f e c t  a t  the  timber in d u s try .
98.443.000 T.L.
14.259.000 T.L.
45 , 869,145 T.L.
158,571,145 T.L.
Thus, t o t a l  income e f f e c t  of th e  Caycuma Paper P ro je c t  amounts to




COST OP TEE CAYCUMA PIAP^ 'T
(At F u ll  Capacity)
Th. T.L.
1 . Haw M ate ria ls 50.627
2. A u x il ia ry  Raw M ate ria ls 11,780
3 . T ransport of Raw M ate r ia ls 4,150
4. A u x il ia ry  M ate r ia ls 2,500
5. Fuel, energy and Water 16,183
6. Labour 6,711
7. S a la r ie s  and Wages 3,025
8. D ep rec ia tion 21,700
9 . A dm in is tra tive  Costs 1,206
10 Insurance and Others 1,036
11 I n t e r e s t 15,789
12 S e l l in g  Costs 880
AMMJAL OPERATING COST TOTAL 125.597
Source ; Bozkurt B enderliog lu , P lanner a t  
the  SPO. A P r iv a te  l e t t e r ,  
December, I 969 . Ankara, p . 3
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Because the  m u l t ip l i e r  i s  a f ig u re  in d ic a t in g  the  r e la t io n s h ip  of f in a l  




kg = 1 .6 l
Conclusion:
The income m u l t ip l i e r  of the paper p ro je c t  does no t seem to be high since  
the  P la n t  i s  merely a c a p i t a l  in te n s iv e  p r o je c t ,  employing only a small 
number of workers (755 p eo p le ) .  Besides, i t s  raw m a te r ia l s ,  a u x i l i a r y  raw 
m a te r ia ls  and chemicals re q u ired  in  the  k r a f t  paper p roduc tion , a re  obtained 
from o th e r  towns and i n d u s t r i e s .  C lea rly  the  h igher  the  leakages the sm aller 
the m u l t ip l i e r  and likew ise  the  sm aller the leakages the h igher the m u l t i ­
p l i e r  becomes. F u r th e r ,  i t  should be emphasised th a t  the income m u l t ip l ie r  
of l , 6 l  i s  an approximate f ig u re  dependent on the aggregate  assumptions of 
p ro p e n s i t ie s  to leak  in  the Zonguldak reg ion . I t  can be argued th a t  the 
marginal p ro p e n s i t ie s  to  save, to  pay taxes and, to  import may be markedly 
d i f f e r e n t  fo r  the Paper P r o je c t .
F in a l ly ,  I  have only taken  in to  account the income e f f e c t  of the payments of 
s a l a r i e s  and wages. In a c tu a l  f a c t ,  I have om itted the o th e r  value added 
items which su re ly  may genera te  an a d d i t io n a l  income and thus inc rease  the 
magnitude of the m u l t ip l i e r  fo r  the  Paper P la n t ,
The f a c t  th a t  the  reg io n a l  m u l t ip l ie r  i s  low im plies  t l ia t  the  s o lu t io n  of 
reg io n a l  problems w i l l  be more d i f f i c u l t  because of the  h igher leaks th a t  
go with a low m u l t i p l i e r ,  A low reg iona l m u l t ip l i e r  means th a t  so lv ing  a 
reg io n a l  problem ( i . e .  in  terms of low incomes a n d /  h igh unemployment) i s  
l i k e ly  to be a long p rocess^ . P u tt in g  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  a high le v e l  of 
t a x a t io n  and a high le v e l  of in te r - r e g io n a l  trade  may render the re s o lu t io n  
of reg io n a l  problems very  d i f f i c u l t .
Second, a low reg io n a l  m u l t ip l i e r  may c re a te  some problems not only in  the 
depressed a reas  but a lso  fo r  the n a t io n .  For in s ta n ce ,  the idea of in je c t in g  
money in to  a reg ion  and the  high leaks from th a t  reg ion  n a tu r a l ly  means tn a t  
much of the purchasing power goes in to  o ther reg io n s .  This in  tu rn  may 
c r e a t e /
1. K.J.  Al l e n ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 94.
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c re a te  excess demand and in f l a t io n a r y  p r ic e  in c rease s  in  the l a t t e r  reg io n s .  
The f a c t  th a t  k = 1,47 fo r  Zonguldak reg ion  im plies  th a t  68 T ,L iras  out of 
every 100 T ,L iras  in c rease  in  th e  reg io n  leaks to o th e r  re g io n s .
Third, the reg io n a l  m u l t ip l i e r  could a lso  provide some in d ic a t io n  of the 
consequences of v a r io u s  types of p o l ic y  and may a t  l e a s t  give a rough approx­
im ation . I t  may a lso  in d ic a te  new l in e s  fo r  reg io n a l  p o l ic y ,  i . e .  tax  
rem issions could be an ins trum ent to cu t down on the  la rg e  and autonomous 
leaks from ta x a t io n ^ .
F in a l ly ,  the  m u l t i p l i e r  might be used as u base fo r  i n d u s t r i a l  in cen t iv es  to  
firm s moving in to  development a reas  -  by providing l a r g e r  in cen t iv e s  to 
in d u s t r ie s  w ith  a high m u l t ip l i e r .  I t  a lso  g ives support to  the  idea of 
i n t e r - r e l a t e d  in d u s try  complexes in  the con tex t of reg io n a l  development.
N ev erth e le ss ,  the reg io n a l  m u l t ip l i e r  a n a ly s is  i s  no t w ithout some th e o r e t i c a l  
and p r a c t i c a l  l im i t a t i o n  in  i t s  uses as a guide fo r  reg io n a l  p o l i c i e s .
D espite  the f a c t  th a t  i t  i s  considered as an im portant concept i t  can sca rc e ly  
be a so le  b a s is  fo r  fo re c a s t in g  or p o l ic y  e v a lu a tio n .  The m u l t ip l i e r  an a ly ­
s i s  dea ls  w ith  sh o r t  term problems, y e t  th e re  a re  more long term asp ec ts  which 
ought to  be taken  in to  account and in  p a r t i c u l a r  the a c c e le r a to r  e f f e c t  of
p a r t i c u l a r  developments. In  o ther words, the m u l t ip l i e r  a n a ly s is  does not
2consider investment a r i s i n g  from a p a r t i c u l a r  in j e c t io n  of money . For 
in s ta n ce ,  i f  we conside r a highway programme, the m u l t i p l i e r  (k) would only 
take account of the  income generated  by b u ild ing  the road and not the indus­
t r i a l  development which may follow  as a consequence, of the  p ro v is io n  of 
t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s .  Nor the  in d u s t r i a l  investment which may follow  from 
increased  income a r i s in g  from i t s  c o n s tru c t io n .
Though a number of reg io n a l  m u l t ip l i e r  s tu d ie s  have been made in  Great 
3
B r i ta in  , th e re  i s  s t i l l  a con s id e rab le  doubt about the s ig n if ic a n ce  of such 
analyses  fo r  p rovid ing  some g u id e lin e s  to c e r t a in  p o l ic y  measures. P ro fe sso r  
T, V/ilson"^ has drawn our a t t e n t io n  to  the  danger of designing  reg io n a l p o l ic y  
on the  b a s is  of re g io n a l  rau lt i} d ie r  s tu d ie s .  He p o in ts  to the f a c t  th a t  a 
r e g io n a l /
1, Ib id ,  p . 95
2, Ib id ,  p . 95
3. For tJie reg io n a l  m u l t ip l i e r  s tu d ie s  in  Great B r i t a in ,  see G.C. 
A rch iba ld , Regional M u lt ip l ie r  E ffec ts  in  the U.K., O.H.P, V o l.19, 
March, 196?, N o .l ,  p p .22-39j D.B. S tee le ,  Regional M ulti]>liers in  
Great B r i ta in ,  O.F.P. V o l.21 ., du ly , 1969, No.2 . ,  p p .268-289.
4. See Tc Wilson, The Regional M u lt ip l ie r  -  A C r i t iq u e ,  Ü .E .P ., V o l.20, 
November, 1968, p p .374-393.
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reg io n a l p o l ic y  pursuing in d u s t r i a l  development along l in e s  th a t  would 
r e s u l t  in  a h igher reg io n a l m u l t ip l i e r  could be q u i te  m islead ing .
As can be in fe r r e d  from the m u l t ip l i e r  formula one way of r a i s in g  k i s  to 
r a i s e  the  marginal p ro p en s ity  to consume and th i s  could be expected to fo llow  
from a choice of la b o u r - in te n s iv e  in d u s t r i e s .  In  such in d u s t r ie s  a la rg e r  
share of payments to f a c to r s  w i l l  accrue to  labour and le s s  to  c a p i t a l  w ith 
the r e s u l t  of a loafer p ropens ity  to save and la rg e r  m u l t i p l i e r ,  provided 
o ther th ings  a re  equal .
I t  could be argued th a t  i t  i s  a wrong p o licy  to e s t a b l i s h  in d u s t r ie s  in  l in e
w ith  reg io n a l m u l t ip l i e r  e f f e c t  in  development a re a s .  The key reason fo r
supporting  la b o u r - in te n s iv e  in d u s t r ie s  in  the development a reas  i s  the b e l i e f
th a t  by doing so a more e f f i c i e n t  use w i l l  be made of scarce  f a c to r s .
N everthe le ss ,  t h i s  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  problem from wanting to  have lab o u r- in ten s iv e
2in d u s t r i e s  fo r  the  sake of a la rg e  m u l t ip l i e r " .  Therefore , reg iona l m u lt i ­
p l i e r  can provide l i t t l e  guidance as to  the k ind of i n d u s t r i a l  s t ru c tu re  th a t  
development p o l ic y  might seek to  encourage. Consequently, the idea of
favouring investment p ro je c ts  w ith  a la r g e r  m u l t ip l i e r  should be t r e a te d  with
. . .  3some scep tic ism .
Apart from i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  l im i ta t io n s  i t  may be m isleading  and in c o r re c t  to 
r e ly  on reg io n a l  m u l t ip l i e r  e s tim ates  because i t  i s  based on simple assump­
tio n s  th a t  marginal p ro p en s i ty  to  save, marginal p ro p en s i ty  to pay taxes and 
marginal p ro p en s ity  to  import w i l l  remain cons tan t th roughout. Needless to 
remark, these  c o e f f i c i e n t s  may vary from year to year  and from in d u s try  to 
in d u s try  and t h i s  l im i t s  the  p o licy  value of m u l t ip l i e r  ex erc ise s  such as the 
one in troduced  above.
1 , P ro fesso r  T, Wilson s t a t e s  th a t  "would i t  be sen s ib le  to  t r y  to 
e n t ic e  in d u s t r ie s  of t i i is  kind to the development a reas  by means 
of l a r g e r  f in a n c ia l  inducements or to compel them to go there  by 
s t e r n ly  using  c o n tro ls  of t h i s  end? I t  i s  hard to  b e liev e  th a t  
such a p o l ic y  would r e a l l y  make sense". Ib id .  p . 387 ,
2 , Ib id .  p . 3 8 7 .
3 , To quote P ro fesso r  T, Wilson; " . . .  whether the reg io n a l m u l t ip l ie r  
a ffo rd ed  any guidance as to  the kind of i n d u s t r i a l  s t i 'u c tu re  th a t  
development p o licy  might seels: to f o s t e r .  Is  i t  s en s ib le  to favour 
p ro je c ts  l i k e ly  to have a la rge  m u l t ip l ie r  e f f e c t?  The answer has 
been in  the n eg a t iv e" .  Ib id .  p . 392. For a good d iscu ss io n  on the 
l im i ta t io n s  of Regional M u l t ip l ie r  S tud ies ,  See T. Wilson, The 
Regional M u l t ip l ie r  -  A C r i t iq u e ,  O.E.P. V o l.20, November, I 968 ,
p p . 3 7 4 - 3 9 2 .
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CHAPTER 9
No.2 CASE STUDY; KEMN IDTDRO-EIECTRIC PROJECT 
. NS. THERIIAL ALTERNATIVE
1, In t ro d u c t io n : The I 96I  Report "Northwest A na to lia  Power
P r i o r i t y  Study" in v e s t ig a te d  4 h y d ro - e le c t r ic  p ro je c t s  s e le c ted  hy the 
E . I .E .  ( E le k t r ik  I s l e r i  Etud Id a re s i )^ ^ ^  as the  most promising f o r  e a r ly  
development. Among th ese  p ro je c t s  Kehan and Ciceroz were recommended.
Kehan which i s  on R iver E i r a t  (Euphrates) has been f u l l y  in v e s t ig ­
a ted  from the  g e o lo g ica l  s tan d p o in t  and i t  was found t h a t  i t  had s u f f i c i e n t  
h y d r o - e le c t r ic  p o t e n t i a l .  Keban i s  45 km. northw est of E la z ig .  The 
Murat and E i r a t  (Karasu) main t r i b u t a r i e s  merging to g e th e r  about 10 km, 
upstream of the  Keban Dam s i t e  make up the  r i v e r  E i r a t ,
The purpose of the  Keban hydro dam i s  to s to re  and re g u la te  w ater 
as the  key f a c i l i t y  on R iver E i r a t  and generate  e l e c t r i c i t y .  The Keban 
p ro je c t  when developed to  i t s  f u l l e s t  w i l l  produce 5 b i l l i o n  and 890 m i l l io n  
k i lo w a tt /h o u rs  o f  power (w ith 8 g enera to rs)
The t o t a l  generated  power w ith the  i n t i i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  of 5 gener­
a t in g  u n i t s  of 155 each, w i l l  be 4 b i l l i o n  and oJO m i l l io n  kwh - per 
annum, where 205 m i l l io n  kwh, w i l l  be transfo rm er and transm iss ion  l in e  
lo s s e s ,  le av in g  a n e t  a v a i la b le  power of 3 b i l l i o n  and 865 m i l l io n  kwh. in  
1970. VThen the fo u r th  155 EW u n i t  i s  added in  1970, annual power g enera tion  
w i l l  reach  5 b i l l i o n  and 450 m i l l io n  kwh., but a f t e r  a llow ing  f o r  t r a n s ­
m ission  lo s se s  i t  w i l l  leave a n e t  a v a i la b le  power of 5 b i l l i o n  and I 60
( 3)m i l l io n  kwh.^
I t  i s  po in ted  out in  the General Report th a t  th e re  i s  no hydro­
s i t e  in  Turkey th a t  combines the  h y d ro - e le c t r ic  p o t e n t i a l ,  th e  advanced s tage
/  *1 ^
"  isiori-hT'-i na l Research and P lanning u n i t  of the  M in is try  of
p. 3Q0- fo o tno te  ( 3) should continue a s ;
Ib i s  s u rp r i s in g  to  see t h a t  the  Keban Power P la n t  with 
8 u n i t s  w il l  genera te  an annual e l e c t r i c  power th a t  i s
a l i t t l e  more than i t  genera tes  with 4 u n i t s ,  I  have
re-checked the  source and found th a t  the  f ig u re s  quoted
in  the  th e s i s  a re  c o r re c t .  The only exp lana tion  given
in  the source in  t h i s  r e sp e c t  i s  th a t  one o f  th e  8 gener­
a to r s  w i l l  be kept f o r  reserve  during th e  o p e ra t io n  of 
the  power p la n t .  See Ib id ,  pp. 3. 4 .
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of g eo lo g ica l  s tudy , and the proxim ity  to  the  load c e n tre s  t h a t  would provide 
a p la u s ib le  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  the  Keban p r o j e c t . I t  i s  a lso  s ta te d  in  the  
Report t h a t  no combira t io n  of h y d ro - e le c t r i c  p ro je c ts  was considered as an 
economic a l t e r n a t i v e  to  Keban nor was such comparison undertakeno
Consequently, the  o n ly ' a l t e r n a t iv e  proposed to  the  Keban hydro­
e l e c t r i c  was the  "Thermal e l e c t r i c  p ro je c t"  w ith a  resource  as la rg e  as Keban 
p ro jec to  The Thermal a l t e r n a t i v e  was supposed to  re q u ire  a number of 
sm alle r  p la n ts  a t  v a r io u s  load c e n t r e s .  Of course , annual power g enera tion  
of Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e  i s  assumed to  be s im i la r  to  Keban w ith  a ne t  a v a i la b le  
power of 5 b i l l i o n  and 160 m il l io n  kw h.. (For t h i s  energy the Thermal w i l l  
a lso  involve 4 g en era t in g  u n i t s ) .
The General Report has poin ted  out th a t  110 MW of e l e c t r i c  power 
w i l l  be developed “in' Keban-Elazig area  by 1973. As a p a r t  of a l t e r n a t iv e  
Thermal p lan , in  o rder to  meet such a lo c a l  load , a  therm al s t a t i o n  ( o i l -  
burning) co n ta in in g  2 u n i t s  each w ith 60 MW was to  be i n s t a l l e d  a t  E laz ig  a t
( 2)the  same time as  the  Keban i n i t i a l  c o n s tru c tio n .^   ^ The remaining a l t e r n a t iv e  
thermal c ap ac ity  was a lso  considered to  be o i l -b u rn in g ,  but lo ca ted  somewhere 
on the sea  c o a s t .  For the  lo c a t io n  of thermal a l t e r n a t i v e  c i t i e s  Mersin ,
( 3)Izmir and Izrait were in v e s t ig a te d ,  '  but the  u l t im a te  d e c is io n  was p laced  on 
Izm it as an accep tab le  lo c a t io n  f o r  the  remaining therm al c ap ac ity .
As f a r  as the transm ission  system i s  concerned, i t  was found th a t  
the  Keban a rea  would need a transm iss ion  system extending  to  Elazpg and beyond 
to  o ihe r  load c e n t r e s .  I t  was assumed th a t  the  lo c a l  a l t e r n a t iv e  p la n t  would 
be i n s t a l l e d  a t  E la z ig  and the transm iss ion  l in e  between Keban and E laz ig  
would not be re q u ire d .  T herefo re , the  cost  of th i s  l in e  has been charged
(^^Besides Keban, p ro je c ts  such as Karakaya dam, Keferge dam and Karababa dam 
were a lso  considered but a l l  these  a l t e r n a t iv e s  did not re p re se n t  as high 
p o te n t i a l  as Keban. See E .I .E .  E l e c t r i c  Power Resources Survey and Develop­
ment. M in is t ry  o f  In d u s try  f o r  Engineering and Economic F e a s i b i l i t y  of 
Keban Dam and H y d ro -e le c t r ic  P ro je c t  of the R iver F i r a t  Development. Ebasco 
S erv ices  Inco rp o ra ted ,  New York, October I 963 , p p .79-80°
(^^ Ib id ,  p . 81
( 3) ^ /Since Gukurova region which inc ludes  Mersin w i l l  be conside rab ly  s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t  a t  the time Keban i s  completed, th e re  w i l l  be no need f o r  t r a n s ­
m ission  l in k  from Keban to  Mer: s in .  Thus Mer s in  was not considered as l o c a t ­
ion f o r  an a l t e r n a t iv e  Thermal, Izm ir, by the same token, was r e je c te d  as 
a lo c a t io n .  Ib id ,  pp.61-82.
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( l )  'a g a in s t  Keban p ro je c t  in  a l t e r n a t iv e  co s t  comparisons.
Secondly, no tran sm iss io n  c o s ts  a re  req u ired  f o r  therm al cap ac ity  
a t  Izm it s ince  i t  would be lo ca ted  on the  l in e  Is tanbul-G iceroz-A nkara  wh_ch 
would be b u i l t  s im ultaneously  wi"^ the  Giceroz p ro jec t*
Whereas Keban h y d r o - e le c t r ic  p ro je c t  would re q u ire  a second c i r c u i t  
Is tanbu l-A nkara , and a double c i r c u i t  Ankara-Keban w ith  s u b s ta t io n ,  sw itch ing
( 2)and c a p a c i t iv e  f a c i l i t i e s .  Thus in  comparison w ith  the therm al a l t e r n a t i v e ,
tran sm iss io n  c o s ts  charged a g a in s t  Keban are  two c i r c u i t s  Keban-Ankara; 
a s in g le  c i r c u i t  A nkara-Is tanbu l and a s in g le  low er-vo ltage  c i r c u i t  Keban- 
E la z ig .
I I .  ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE KEBAN HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT 
AND THERMAL ALTERNATIVE AS PRESENTED BY THE E .I .E .
This s e c t io n  w i l l  be confined to  the  e x p o s i t io n  of comparative 
e v a lu a t io n  o f  the  two a l t e r n a t i v e s  aS worked out by the  E . I . E . ,  which i s  the  
Research and P lanning Agency f o r  the M in is try  o f  Energy and N a tu ra l  Resources, 
The economic e v a lu a t io n  of the  two e l e c t r i c  p ro je c t s  has been conducted on 
the  b a s is  o f  4 g en era t in g  u n i t s  as w ell as on 8 g e n e ra t in g  u n i t s  (each u n i t  
w ith  155 MW),
Since c a p i t a l  investm ent f ig u re s  a re  broken down between fo re ig n  
and domestic c a p i t a l  only  in  the  Report given f o r  4 g en era t in g  u n i t s ,  and s ince  
the  economic e v a lu a t io n  method adopted on 4 and 8 g e n e ra t in g  u n i t s  i s  b a s ic a l ly  
s im i la r ,  I  have decided to  co n cen tra te  on the economic e v a lu a t io n  c a r r ie d  out 
on the  b a s is  o f  4 u n i t s  in  each a l t e r n a t i v e .  T here fo re , economic ev a lu a tio n  
based on 8 g e n e ra t in g  u n i t s  w i l l  no t be d e a l t  w ith  in  t h i s  c liap ter .
Before p re sen t in g  the  p lan n e rs '  p r o je c t  e v a lu a t io n  procedure, i t  
may be u s e f u l  to  c i t e  below the main p r in c ip le s  they have adopted. As endorsed
(^ ^ E .I .E . E l e c t r i c  Power Resources Survey and Development. Engineering and 
Economic F e a s i b i l i t y  of Keban Dam and H ydro -E lec tr ic  P r o je c t  of the R iver 
F i r a t  Development. N. York, October I 963, p . 81
(^ ^ I b id ,  P P 0 8 I-8 2
( 3)'^^A ll  o th e r  low er-vo ltage  tranra ission  th a t  hay be req u ire d  to  d e l iv e r  power 
to  load cen tre s  was assumed to  be common to  e i t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  Ib id ,  p .82, 
The therm al u n i t s  were i n s t a l l e d  in  accordance w ith the  growth system load , 
having more o r  l e s s  the  same percentage of re se rv e  cap ac ity  as would be 
a v a i la b le  in  the  hydro -p lane . But hydro a l t e r n a t i v e  included a lso  an 
a d d i t io n a l  amount o f  c ap a c i ty  to  provide f o r  the  lo s se s  on peak th a t  would 
occur because of the  len g th  of t ransm iss ion  to  load centreso
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in  the  General Report -  Power Resources P r i o r i t y  Study, Volume th ese  a re :
( i )  In  economic comparison of a l t e r n a t iv e s  the  t a r g e t  to  he met hy 
one plan would a lso  he met hy th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p lan .
( i i )  I t  i s  assumed th a t  h y d ro -p ro jec ts  w i l l  have a 50 y e a r  l i f e  
and thermal p ro je c t s  a 35 y e a r  l i f e .
( i i i )  Transm ission l in e s  and s u b - s ta t io n s  a re  a l s o  to  have a 
50-y e a r  l i f e .
( iv )  The procedure adopted i s  c a p i ta l - r e c o v e ry  f a c t o r  in c o rp o ra t in g  
s in k in g  fund d e p re c ia t io n  method.
(v) I n t e r e s t  r a t e  charged on fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  and domestic c a p i t a l
( 2 )w i l l  be 3& pe r  cent and 6 per cen t r e s p e c t iv e ly .
(v i )  F in a l ly ,  economic comparison of a l t e r n a t iv e  p ro je c ts  w i l l  
be undertaken  on the b a s is  of "w ithou t" and "with" taxes  and d u t i e s .  Such 
comparisons a re  u s u a l ly  req u ired  by the  f in an c in g  ag en c ie s .
( i )  KEBAN HYDRO-ELECTRIO PROJECT:
a -  CAPITAL INVESTMENT OF KEBAN; On the b a s is  of 4 e l e c t r i c  g enera ting  
u n i t s ,  Keban p ro je c t  would re q u i re  a c a p i t a l  o u t la y  of /315»955 million, do lla r^^^  
Out o f  t h i s  t o t a l ,  domestic investm ent w i l l  r e p re s e n t  214*948 m il l io n  d o l l a r s ,  
and foreign-exchange component 100,985 m il l io n  d o l l a r s  (see Table l ) . Again, 
q,s can be seen from the  Table, Generating S ta t io n  w i l l  re q u ire  a domestic 
c a p i t a l  o f / I 85 .O7O m il l io n  and Transmission System a domestic c a p i t a l  of 
029.878  m i l l io n .  T o ta l  fo reign-exchange, on the  o th e r  hand, i s  d i s t r ib u te d  
between the g e n e ra t in g  s t a t i o n  and tran sm iss io n  system as 049*915 m il l io n  and 
051,070  m i l l io n  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
(^^ E .I .E , General Report -  Power Resources P r i o r i t y  Study, V o l . l ,  Dec. I 967 .
Stone and Webster, Appendix 2, p p .2-3*
( 2 )
 ^ /See Keraal Arkun, P r iv a te  typed document, E . I .E .  Feb. 1969» Ankara, p . l .
A f te r  th e  fo u r th  u n i t  i s  i n s t a l l e d  the i n t e r e s t  r a t e  on foreign-exchange 
component w i l l  be 6.5  per c e n t .  Ib id ,  p . l .
( 3 )The f ig u r e s  a re  a l l  g iven on d o l l a r  b a s i s .
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Table 1 . CAPITAL INVESTMENT OP KEBAN
0000
t---  — — '
0000'
l o . G enerating S ta t io n
(a) Foreign-exchange 49.915
(b) Domestic currency 185.070
2 . Transm ission System
(a) Foreign-exchange 51.070
(b) Domestic currency 29.878
Source: P r iv a te  typed document obtained from E . I . E . ,
Ankara, June I 968, p . l .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  domestic component of c a p i t a l  o u t la y  c o n s t i tu te s  
68 per cen t of the  t o t a l ,  while foreign-exchange component i s  32 pe r  c e n t .
This p o in ts  to  the  f a c t  th a t  Keban h y d ro - e le c t r ic  p ro je c t  i s  h eav i ly  dependent 
on domestic c a p i t a l  and l e s s  on fo re ig n  c a p i t a l .
h -  ANNUAL COST: The c r i t e r i o n  app lied  by the  E . I .E ,  p lanners  i s
"Total annual cost"  r u le  which c o n s is t s  of ( l )  e q u iv a len t  annual cost of 
f ixed  investm ent (Fixed Charges) and ( 2 ) annual o p e ra t in g  and maintenance c o s t .
The "equ iva len t annual cost of f ix e d  investment" which comprises 
s in k in g  fund d e p re c ia t io n  method can be w r i t t e n  as fo llow s:
1 (1+i)^R
(l-i'i)n —1
p ( c . r . f . )
where p denotes i n i t i a l  investm ent, i  r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  and n 
l i f e  period  of the  p r o je c t .
A. FIXED CHARGES; By app ly ing  the c a p i ta l - re c o v e ry  f a c to r  to  the  
Keban p r o j e c t ' s  f ix ed  investm ent, "equ iva len t annual co s t"  of the  f ix ed
( 1)By t h i s  formula investm ent can be converted in to  a s e r i e s  of eq u iv a len t 
annual payments. Using t h i s  formula the payment of am o rtiza t io n  and i n t e r e s t  
r a te  can be considered as a s in g le  annual item . The f a c to r  ( c . r . f . )  i s  
• known as the  c a p i t a l  recovery  f a c to r  which i s  always equal to  the s ink ing  
fund f a c to r  p lus the i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  For Sinking Fund Method, see Ul'î - 
Manual on Economic Development P r o je c t s .  N. York 1958, p p .198-200; and 
a lso  Vo G. Iî*-3Son & E. L. Grant, P r in c ip le s  of Engineering  Economy, The 
Ronald P ress  Corap., New York, I 964, PP.45-46°
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investm ent can be c a lc u la te d .  Annual f ixed  charges a re  computed s e p a ra te ly  
f o r  domestic c a p i t a l  and f o r  fo re ig n  exchange component o f  investm ents s ince
the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  charged f o r  the  former i s  6 pe r cen t and the l a t t e r  3s per
c en t ,
a) The annual f ixed  charges on the  fo re ig n  exchange component 
o f  c a p i t a l  o u t la y  i s  worked out by m u lt ip ly in g  the fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  by the  
c a p i ta l - r e c o v e ry  f a c to r  which corresponds to  3s p e r  cent i n t e r e s t  r a t e  and 
to  50-year l i f e .  The c a p i ta l - r e c o v e ry  f a c t o r  i s  O.O4263. Thus:
PC£ «= 49*915 ( c . r . f ,  -  3%  ^ -  50 y ea rs)
PCp = 49.915  (0 .04265)
« 2.128(1)
b) S im ila r ly ,  annual f ix ed  charges on domestic c a p i t a l  i s  
computed by m u lt ip ly in g  the  domestic c a p i t a l  with the  c . r . f .  f o r  6 per cent 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  and f o r  50-y eq r  l i f e  period :
POj = I 85 .O7O ( c . r . f .  -  6^ 0 -  50)
= I 85 .07O (0 . 06344)
= 11 . 741^^^
c) Annual f ix ed  charges on transm iss ion  system are  a lso  c a lc u la te d  
on th e  same b a s is  by d i s t in g u is h in g  domestic c a p i t a l  from fo re ig n  exchange 
component:
FCf = 51.070 ( 0 .04263)
FCf = 2 . 177,
and
FO^ = 29*878 (0 . 06344)
1.895
( 1)The a c tu a l  f ig u re  i s  2.127*8, For c a p i ta l - re c o v e ry  f a c to r  see W. G. I re so n ,  
and E. L. Grant, P r in c ip le s  of Engineering Economy, 4th  e d i t io n .  The 
Ronald P ress  Comp,, N. York, 1964» PP*545» Table E-8 .
( 2 )' 'The a c tu a l  f ig u re  i s  11 .740.8 , f o r  c . r . f . ,  see again  Ib id ,  Table E-8.
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B. OPERATION AHP MAINTENANCE COST: ^574.000
O perating  and maintenance cos t  o f  the  Keban p ro je c t  amounts to  
0574 thousand pe r  annum. This item  inc ludes  expend itu res  on labour and 
m a te r ia l  and r e p a i r s  both on gen era t in g  s t a t i o n  and tran sm iss io n  system.
Taxes are  no t included in  o p e ra t io n  and maintenance c o s ts  s in ce  the  compar­
ison  between the two a l t e r n a t i v e s  was c a r r ie d  out on the  b a s is  of "w ithout 
taxes"o
I f  annual f ix e d  c o s ts  A (a+b+c) and annual o p e ra t in g  and maintenance 
c o s ts  (b ) a re  taken to g e th e r ,  t h i s  w i l l  g ive us the  t o t a l  annual c o s t  of 
Keban p r o j e c t .  As can be seen from Table 2, t o t a l  annual co s ts  of Keban 
amount to  018.515 thousand. The comparison of the  two a l t e r n a t iv e s  by the  
E . I .E ,  i s  p resen ted  in  Table 2.
Table 2. Keban H y d ro -E lec tr ic  P ro je c t  -  D irec t  Comparison 
w ith  Thermal A lte rn a t iv e  (w ithout TaxesV
0000 '
Keban HE p ro je c t  
4 U nits  of 155
A lte rn a t iv e  Thermal 
4 U nits  a t  150 MV/
G enerating S ta t io n
1. Foreign  Exchange 49.915 55*500
2. Domestic Currency 185.070 25.000
Transm ission System
1. Foreign  Currency 51.070 -
2. Domestic Currency 29*878 -
ANNUAL COST
A -  FIXED CHARGES 17.941 4.261
G enerating S ta t io n
a) Foreign Exchange 2.128 2.675






B -  OPERATION AJiD MAINTENANCE 
G enerating S ta t io n
m
a) Labour and m a te r ia l 250 635
b) Fuel 21.672
Transmission System
a) Labour and m a te r ia l _  324
TOTAL AMUAL COST 18.515 26*568
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B en efit -C o st R atio  == = 1.3718•515
Source; E . I .E .  P r iv a te  typed document, Ju ly  1968* Ankara, p . l*
( i i )  THERMAL ALTEMATIVE; T o ta l  c a p i t a l  o u t la y  of the  Thermal 
a l t e r n a t i v e  amounts to  ^ 76.$00 thousand, comprising ^ 53*500 thousand in  
fo re ig n  exchange and J^23.000 thousand in  domestic currency (see  Table 2 ) ,
Annual f ix ed  charges of the Thermal p r o je c t  have a lso  been computed
on the  same b a s i s .  Fixed charges on foreign-exchange component are  found by 
m u lt ip ly in g  the  l a t t e r  w ith  th e  c a p i ta l - re c o v e ry  f a c t o r  ( c . r . f . )  corresponding 
to  i n t e r e s t  and to  55 y e a r - l i f e  p e r io d .
PGf = 53.500 X (0 . 05000)
FO^ = 2.675  thousand d o l la r s
1?GJ «  23.000 (0 , 06897)
FG^ = 1.586 thousand d o l la r s
The c a p i ta l - r e c o v e ry  f a c t o r  f o r  fo re ig n  exchange component i s  O.050OO and 
f o r  domestic component o f  c a p i t a l  i s  0.06897*^^^
Transm ission system in  t h i s  a l t e r n a t iv e  does no t involve  any c o s t
since the  Thermal, as we po in ted  out in  the " In tro d u c tio n "  does no t r e q u ire
tran sm iss io n  l i n e s .  The reason f o r  t h i s  i s  th a t  the  f u e l - o i l  burning 
thermal s t a t io n s  would be b u i l t  in  the  load cen tre  o f  Izm it  and I s ta n b u l  
reg io n .  I t  i s  d iscovered  th a t  the e x i s t in g  tran sm iss io n  system can meet
( 2)the  tran sm iss io n  requirem ents  o f  the  Thermal a l t e r n a t i v e .  ^
O peration and maintenance item  appears to  be extrem ely  h i ^  due to  
the  f a c t  th a t  the thermeil a l t e r n a t iv e  would be burn ing  f u e l - o i l  which i s  r a th e r  
expensive. There i s  no in fo rm ation  to  suggest th a t  f u e l - o i l  w i l l  be imported 
from abroad. Since Turkey i s  more or l e s s  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  in  re sp e c t  to  f u e l -  
p i l  p roduc tion , I  s h a l l  in  the  subsequent a n a ly s is  assume t h a t  a l l  fu e l  o i l  
i s  provided do m est ica l ly .  Expenditure on f u e l - o i l  w i l l  amount to  ^21,672 
thousand d o l l a r s .  Labour and m a te r ia l  req u ired  fo r  g e n e ra t in g  s t a t i o n  i s
(^^For c a p i ta l - re c o v e ry  f a c to r  f ig u r e s ,  see W. G. I re so n ,  and E. L. Grant, 
o p .c i t . ,  p . 545» Table E-8; and p . 550» Table S - I 3 .
( 2) ^ ^Kema! Arkun, Engineer and p lanner a t  E . I .E .  - A p r iv a te  typed document,
Feb. 1969, Ankara, p . 3*
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com paratively  very  sm all; though i t  i s  s t i l l  more than  double the corresponding 
f ig u re  in  the  Kehan h y d r o - e le c t r i c  p ro je c t . (S e e  Table 2 ) .
Fixed charges and th e  op e ra t io n  and maintenance c o s ts ;  taken 
to g e th e r  these  would give t o t a l  annual c o s t  o f  the  therm al a l t e r n a t iv e  which 
amounts to  ^ 26.568 thousand.
( i i i )  BENEFIT-COST RATIO: As can be seen from Table 2, the b e n e f i t -
c o s t  r a t i o  i s  taken to  be the  r a t i o  between the  annual c o s t  of thermal over 
the  annual c o s t  o f  Keban, i . e .  1.37*
The lo g ic  behind t h i s  e v a lu a t io n  i s  t h a t  the  two a l t e r n a t iv e s  
w ith  t h e i r  ^ -g e n e ra t in g  u n i t s  w i l l  produce the same amount o f  e l e c t r i c  power; 
and th e re fo re  the a l t e r n a t i v e  w ith  the  l e a s t  c o s t  i s  considered more econom­
i c a l .  Thus, Keban h y d r o - e le c t r i c  i s  s e le c te d  s ince i t  i s  1.37 times cheaper 
than the  therm al p r o je c t .
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APPRAISAL OF THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION METHOD OF THE E . I . E . :
Keban h y d r o - e le c t r i c  and the thermal a l t e r n a t iv e  have been evalua ted  
and compared on the  b a s is  of "uniform annual cost"  c r i t e r i o n  s ince  the  two 
p r o j e c t s 'b e n e f i t s  a re  assumed to  be i d e n t i c a l .
However, i t  must be pointed out th a t  the  grounds on which the  
E . I .E ,  p la n n e rs '  investm ent r u le  depended can be d ispu ted  from v arious  a sp e c ts .
1) F i r s t  o f a l l ,  investm ent d e c is io n  based on annual b e n e f i t - c o s t  
r a t i o  i s  a m is lead ing  one so long as the  a l t e r n a t iv e s  have d i f f e r e n t  l i v e s .  
Given the  f a c t  th a t  Keban involves a 50-y ea r  l i f e  and the thermal p ro je c t
a 35 y e a r  l i f e ,  "annual co s ts"  corresponding to  t h e i r  a c tu a l  len g th  of l i f e  
period  cannot form a sen s ib le  base fo r  comparison. Therefore , l i f e - p e r io d s  
of a l t e r n a t iv e  p ro je c ts  must, f i r s t ,  be equated as to  give equal years  of 
s e rv ic e ,
2) Second, in  the  a p p l ic a t io n  of "uniform annual cos t"  r u le ,
c a lc u la t io n s  a re  made on the  b a s is  of market p r ic e s  r a th e r  than s o c ia l  p r i c e s .
For in s ta n c e ,  f ix ed  c a p i t a l  o u tlay  as comprising fo re ig n  exchange component 
and domestic c a p i t a l  component are  g iven on market p r i c e s .  W hereas,for a 
sound economic ev a lu a t io n  which takes  in to  account the  im perfec tions  in  the  
market mechanism, a l l  market p r ic e s  (o r  measurable ones) should be s u b s t i tu te d  
w ith  s o c ia l  p r i c e s .  T herefo re , as we argued f o r c ib ly  in  the  previous papers , 
c o r re c t io n s  w i l l  be needed on:
a) fo re ig n  exchange component of c a p i t a l  o u t la y ,
b) fo re ig n  exchange component of transm iss ion  investm ent,
c) fo re ig n  exchange component of v a r ia b le  c o s ts  (o p e ra t in g
and maintenance c o s t ) ,
d) market wage payments to u n sk i l le d  workers,
e) i n t e r e s t  r a t e  which i s  taken  on market p r i c e s .
The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  shcuLd be co rrec ted  upwards so as to r e f l e c t  the 
i n t r i n s i c  value of c a p i t a l .  As can be seen from Table 2 and o th e r  a v a i la b le  
in form ation , E . I .E ,  p lanners  have not in troduced  fo re ig n  exchange c o r re c t io n  
nor c o r re c t io n  on the  p a r t  of wage payments made to  u n s k i l le d  v/orkers. Since 
the  two a l t e r n a t iv e  p ro je c t s  are of c a p i t a l - in te n s iv e  c h a ra c te r  they do not 
involve a la rg e  labour c o s t ;  and th e re fo re  c o r re c t io n  on wage r a t e s  would not 
l i k e ly  have a d ec is iv e  e f f e c t  on the  choice of p r o j e c t s .  But the  same th in g  
cannot be sa id  f o r  the  c o r re c t io n  requ ired  on fo re ig n  exchange component of
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c a p i t a l  o u t la y .  Foreign  exchange c o r re c t io n  has to  be in tro d u ce d ,s in ce  t h i s  
c o n s t i tu te s  a very h igh  p ro p o r t io n  in  c a p i t a l  investm ent and s ince  o f f i c i a l  
r a t e  may o v e rs ta te  the  value of n a t io n a l  currency .
In  our subsequent a n a ly s is  we s h a l l  th e re fo re  in troduce  only 
fo re ig n  exchange c o r re c t io n  on the  fo re ig n  exchange components of c a p i t a l  in  
both p r o je c t s .  The wages item in  the  two a l t e r n a t iv e s  a re  not broken down 
between te c h n ic a l  personnel, a d m in is t ra to rs ,  and s k i l l e d  and u n sk i l le d  workers. 
I t  i s  thus not p o s s ib le  to  c o r re c t  f o r  the wages paid to  u n s k i l le d  workers* 
C orrec tion  on wages w i l l  be omitted throughout our a n a ly s is  due to  t h i s  
d i f f i c u l t y .
3) Th ird , though the  two a l t e r n a t iv e s  have d i f f e r e n t  l i f e - p e r io d s ,  
p re sen t  value (pv) c a lc u la t io n s  have not been a p p l ie d .  Consequently t o t a l  
co s ts  and annual co s ts  e s t im a te s  have not been reduced to  the  p resen t v a lu e s .  
The r i g h t  c r i t e r i o n  to  apply , as we s t ro n g ly  argued in  the previous ch ap te r ,  
i s  the  p re sen t  value (pv) ru le  which takes  in to  account the  p resen t  value of 
t o t a l  c o s ts  (Fixed c o s t  + v a r ia b le  co s ts )  and t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  ( d i r e c t  and 
in d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s ) .  I t  has been one of our conclusions throughout th i s  
study th a t  pv i s  s u p e r io r  to  o th e r  knom  investm ent c r i t e r i a  ( i . e .  i n t e r n a l  
r a t e  o f  r e tu r n ,  p a y -o ff  p e r iod , e t c . )  and i s  the  most a p p ro p r ia te  ru le  to  
apply i n  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is
4) Fourth , i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  app lied  in  the  "annual cost"  computations 
a re  market r a t e s  which were 6 per cent f o r  domestic c a p i t a l  and 3g por cent 
f o r  fo re ig n  c a p i t a l .
I t  i s  f a i r  to  argue t h a t  the  investment funds obta ined  from domestic 
and fo re ig n  sources do re p re se n t  a h ig h e r  r a t e  of r e tu r n  than the a c tu a l  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  would su g g es t .  There a re  convincing reasons to argue th a t  
the  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  charged on domestic c a p i t a l  i s  taken very  low as the  S ta te  
Investment Bank’s lend ing  r a t e  s tands to be minimum 6 per cent and opportunity
( 2 )c o s t  of c a p i t a l  in  genera l  over 10 per cen t.
( ^ ^ I t  must however be noted th a t  pv ru le  i s  app lied  to  the  economic comparison 
based on 8 gen era t in g  u n i t s  in  the two a l t e r n a t i v e s , s ince  c a p i t a l  ou tlay  and 
o p e ra t io n  and maintenance co s t  are i r r e g u l a r l y  d isbursed  over the f i r s t  10 
years* Comparison on 8 g en e ra to rs ,  however, w i l l  not be examined in  t h i s  
c h ap te r .
( 2 ) See, Gaycuma paper p r o je c t .  The S ta te  P lanning O rgan isa tion  has app lied  
12 p e r  cen t d iscoun t r a t e  in  the  pv computations of i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c t s .  
There i s  no reason  why th i s  rauO should not be app lied  in  e l e c t r i c  p r o je c t s .
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I t  i s  t ru e  t h a t  in  u t i l i t y  p ro je c ts  i t  i s  a common ru le  to  apply 
r e l a t i v e l y  a lower d iscoun t r a t e , s i n c e  most p u b l i c - u t i l i t y  p ro je c ts  are  over­
whelmingly c a p i t a l - in te n s iv e  and they  a lso  genera te  d if fu se d  in d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  
to  the  o v e ra l l  economy which a re  not included in  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is .
But one may th in k  f o r  a country  l ik e  Turkey where th e re  i s  an acute  
shortage  of c a p i t a l  funds and a lso  severe r a t io n in g  on c a p i t a l  a v a i l a b le ,  the 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  to  apply should r e f l e c t  the  o p portun ity  co s t  of c a p i t a l  which 
i s  measured by the r a t e  o f  r e tu rn  in  the  marginal p ro je c t  of the investm ent 
programme o
As f a r  as fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  i s  concerned, the same argument may apply ,
though not to  the  same s t r e n g th .  I t  can be argued th a t  the  fo re ig n  c a p i t a l
involved i s  p r o j e c t - t i e d  and i t  does not have any oppo rtu n i ty  c o s t .  In
o th e r  words, i f  th e  fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  i s  only granted  to  those  s p e c i f ic  p r o je c t s ,
i . e .  Keban h y d r o - e le c t r i c ,  then one may not be in  a p o s i t io n  to  apply "shadow"
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  But f o r  our f u r th e r  a n a ly s is ,  I  s h a l l  take i t  t h a t  the fo re ig n
c a p i t a l  i s  not p r o j e c t - t i e d  and i t  has an o p portun ity  co s t  as h ig h e r  than  i t s  
( 1 )
a c tu a l  r a t e .^
5) F i f t h ,  the  b e n e f i t s  s ide  i s  not d e a l t  w ith  in  the  economic 
ev a lu a t io n  of Keban and Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e s .  The primary b e n e f i t s  a re  assumed 
to  be i d e n t i c a l  and the  p ro je c t  w ith the  lowest annual c o s t  i s  considered 
acceptable*
But a n a ly s is  c a r r ie d  out on the  b a s is  o f  only primary e f f e c t s  
cannot be complete o r  a s u f f i c i e n t  base fo r  lo g ic a l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is .  
E sp e c ia l ly  when th ese  investm ents happen to  be in  p u b lic  u t i l i t y  s e rv ic e s .
No- doubt, Keban h y d ro - e le c t r i c  p ro je c t  w i l l  provide a s u b s ta n t i a l  amount of 
i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  in  r e s p e c t  to i r r i g a t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s ,  f lo o d -c o n t ro l ,  navig­
a t io n  e f f e c t s  and tech n o lo g ica l  s p i l lo v e r s  ( e x te rn a l  e f f e c t s )  upon the nearby 
lo ca ted  mining in d u s t ry .
In  the  e v a lu a t io n  of Keban e l e c t r i c  p ro je c t  most of the  in d i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  of the  investment are  mentioned in  a "P r iv a te  Report" prepared on
 ^ ^In our s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s is  an opportunity  c o s t  of 6 per cent i s  considered 
f o r  fo re ig n  c a p i t a l ;  but t h i s  r a te  i s  l a t e r  inc reased  to  8 pe r  cent and 
10 per cen t as th e re  i s  no reason  why the opp. co s t  o f  fo re ig n  c a p i t a l  
should not be as  h igh  as the  opp, cost of domestic c a p i t a l .
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( l )E ng ineering  and Economic F e a s ib i l i ty  o f Keban Dam and H y d ro -e le c tr ic  P ro je c t ,  
bu t th e re  has been no a ttem p t to  quantify these  b e n e f i ts  and in c lu d e  them in  the  
b e n e f i t - c o s t  e s tim a te s . The in d i r e c t  b e n e f i ts  which a re  considered  in  the  
Report are  as fo llow s:
INDIRECT /g \
BENEFITS; a) I r r ig a t io n  b e n e f i t s : Dr. R u st,  ^  ^ has prepared a Report to  show
the  p o te n t ia l  b e n e f i ts  to  th e  a re a  which could r e s u l t  from an i r r i g a t i o n  system 
of which Keban Ram would be the  i n i t i a l  s te p . In  t h i s  re p o r t  i t  i s  s ta te d  
t h a t , i f  an adequate scheme of i r r i g a t io n  i s  co n stru c ted  f o r  th e  Lower F i r a t -  
b a s in  (E u p h ra tes), th e re  would be an in c re a se  in  the n a tio n a l income frpm
( 5)a g r ic u l tu re  of 1443 m illio n  T L irq s , per a n n u m . I t  i s  a lso  rep o rted  th a t  
t o t a l  a re a  s u i ta b le  f o r  i r r i g a t io n  w i l l  be in  th e  Lower F i r a t  b a s in  and th i s  
would be to  th e  e x te n t o f 1 .028.780 h e c ta re s ,
As f a r  as Keban p ro je c t  i s  concerned th e re  i s  no scheme proposed 
f o r  d iv e r t in g  any w ater from th e  Keban re s e rv o i r  fo r  i r r i g a t io n  purposes*
I  was to ld ,  du ring  th e  in te rv iew  I  had w ith  Kemal A r k u n , o n e  of 
the  E .I .E ,  p la n n e rs , th a t  th e re  can be no d ir e c t  i r r i g a t i o n  b e n e f it  from Keban 
Dam, s in ce  p la in s  which can b e n e f i t  from i r r ig a t io n  a re  s i tu a te d  25O-3CO km. 
downstream from Keban. In  o th e r  words, the reg io n  which could be i r r ig a te d  
i s  the  Lower F i r a t  b asin  which in c lu d es  M hlatya, H ardin , K iz i l te p e , Ceylon- 
p in a r , V ira n se h ir  and U rfa ,
Even downstream th e  R iver F i r a t  flows 200 m etres below the  i r r ig a b le  
land ; and th e re fo re  i t  w il l  be necessary  to  b u ild  an o th er hydro-dam in  the 
Lower F i r a t  to  provide i r r i g a t io n  f a c i l i t i e s .  For th i s  purpose 2 hydro-dam 
a l te r n a t iv e s  a re  co n sid ered , one in  Karababa and th e  o th e r  in  Karakaya.
 ^ ^Report to  E . I .E , ,  E le c t r ic  Power Resources Survey and Development, Engineering 
and Economic F e a s ib i l i ty  of Keban Dam and H y d ro -e le c tr ic  P ro je c t o f the 
F i r a t  R iver Development, Ebasco S erv ices I n c . ,  N. York, October 1963» 
pp. 98-100.
( 2)'  'D r . Rus^ Dept, of A g-ricu ltu re , Univ. o f M innesota, i b i d . ,  p .87
(^^Report to  E . I .E , ,  Ib id , p .87
(^^A more r e a l i s t i c  f ig u re  fo r  i r r ig a b le  land i s  given as 900*000 h e c ta re s . :
Ib id , p .93
( 5)'  'A p r iv a te  in te rv iew  w ith  Kemal Arkun, Feb. 1969» Aixkara.
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• For a l l  th ese  reas.ona, no monetary value has been ass ig n ed  to  th e  
Keban h y d ro -p ro je c t as i r r i g a t io n  b e n e f i ts .  But i t  can be argued th a t  the  
ex is ten c e  o f  p h y s ica l and economic in terdependence between Keban and o th e r 
Lower F i r a t  hydro-dams ( i . e .  Karababa o r Karakaya) cannot be ru le d  o u t.
The l a t t e r  be ing  b u i l t  on the  same r iv e r  w il l  be dependent on the w ater flow  
which can be re g u la ted  upstream  by Keban p r o je c t .  For in s ta n c e , the  Keban 
Hi) can s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in c re a se  th e  flow  of the  R iver during  the  i r r ig a t io n  
season and thus can a s s i s t  any p re sen t and fu tu re  dovmstream d iv e rs io n s  fo r  
i r r i g a t io n  purposes.
Thus Keban Dam by re g u la tin g  w ater flow  o f the  r i v e r  can h av e 'a  
co n sid e rab le  e f fe c t upon the  i r r i g a t io n  c a p a c it ie s  o f p ro sp ec tiv e  lower stream  
hydro-dam s. But so long  as Karababa hydro-dam i s  n o t com pleted, such in d ir e c t  
e f f e c t s  cannot a r is e  to  be a t t r ib u te d  to  Keban Dam.
Moreover, when upstream  Keban s ta t io n  has re s e rv o ir s  o f w ater 
s to rag e  th i s  i s  l ik e ly  to  a f f e c t  w ater flow s downstream and hence th e  g en era tin g  
p a t te rn  of s ta t io n s  in  th a t  a rea .^^ ^  I t  i s  reasonab le  to  draw such lin k ag es  
to  the  a t te n t io n  of th e  economic évaluai o r ' as th e se  p ro sp e c tiv e  b e n e f its  
can be a sc rib ed  to  Keban p r o je c t .
b) N av igation  and Flood C o n tro l; In  the  same R eport i t  i s  po in ted  
out th a t  th e  only s iz e a b le  c i ty  lo ca ted  on the  R iver F i r a t  i s  M alatya. By the  
e s tab lish m en t o f long re s e rv o ir s  in  th ese  v a lle y s  movement o f sh ip s  can be 
provided; bu t i t  i s  added th a t  th e re  w il l  be no m arkets fo r  goods and farm 
products along th e se  bodies o f w a te r . The conclusion  has been th a t  use of I
th ese  r e s e rv o ir s  f o r  shipm ent of goods w i l l  be n e g lig ib le  because o f n av ig a tio n  
d i f f i c u l t i e s .
As f a r  as flo o d  c o n tro l i s  in  q u e s tio n , i t  i s  s ta te d  th a t  "alm ost |
no b e n e f i t  from re d u c tio n  o f flo o d s  in  the  Lower F i r a t  can be c re d ite d  to  the  |
(  2 )  IKeban Dam and b y d ro -e le c tr ic  p ro je c t" ,  since th e re  a re  no c i t i e s  o r v i l la g e s  1
lo c a ted  a long the  low er reaches of F i r a t .  Thus flood  c o n tro l has not en te red  ;
the  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is .  j
( 1 ) !
/P re s t  and Turvey m ain ta in  th a t  i f  te ch n o lo g ica l in terdependence of th is  kind i
i s  not in te rn a liz e d  by having  both types o f s ta t io n s  under one a u th o r i ty , 1
i t  may have to  be n ecessa ry  to  have compensatory arrangem ent, i f  re so u rce  1
m isa llo c a tio n  is  to  be cu t domi. See A. R. P re s t  and R. Turvey, j
C ost-B en efit A n a ly sis : A Survey, E .J . ,  Dec. I 965» p .710 , I
( 2 ) IThe R eport, o p .c i t . ,  p .98
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However, i t  i s  a lso  po in ted  ou t in  th e  R eport th a t  " the  e f f e c t  of 
th e  Kehan p ro je c t  w i l l  he to  re g u la te  the flow  of the r i v e r ,  minimize a l l  h u t 
th e  most severe  flo o d s  and in  g en e ra l enhance the p ro sp ec t o f n av ig a tio n  in  
co u n trie s  downstream" From th is  second s ta tem en t one can conclude th a t
Keban p ro je c t  w i l l  have some in d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  by av o id in g  flo o d s  in  the  down­
stream  p la in s .
The m ajor b e n e f i ts  which can stem from th e  h y d ro -p ro je c t would be 
the  lo s se s  av e rted . Losses can be in  re fe re n ce  to  d i f f e r e n t  types o f a s s e ts ,  
i . e .  p ro p e rty , farm crops and l iv e s .  In  p r in d p le , the  flo o d  c o n tro l e f f e c ts  
o f the p ro je c t  w i l l  be estim ated  on the  b a s is  o f m athem atical ex p ec ta tio n  of 
annual damage r e s u l t in g  from frequency of flood  le v e l s .  T o ta l damage would 
be the  maximum annual amounts people would be w il l in g  to  pay f o r  flood  c o n tro l 
and p ro te c t io n .
( 2 )G enera lly  speaking th e  b e n e f its  inc lude  th e  fo llow ing :^  '
1) The lo s s  of income v ia  damage to  crops and p ro p e rty ,
2) Avoidance of deaths by drowning,
5) Avoidance of tem porary c o s ts ,  e .g .  evacua tion  of flood
v ic tim s , emergency sandbag work, r is k s  of s a n i ta r ia n  break­
downs, ep idem ics, e tc .
Keban h y d ro -p ro je c t, by re g u la tin g  w ater flow s, can be a f i r s t  s te p  
to  a v e r t flo o d s  in  th e  Lower F i r a t  b a s in , though no t in  th e  upstream . I t  i s  
reasonab le  to  suggest th a t  a g r ic u l tu r a l  crops could be prone to  a considerab le  
damage and the  c o s t o f th i s  can, r ig h t ly ,  be a t t r ib u te d  to  Keban p r o je c t .
0 ) R ecrea tio n  and f i s h e r i e s : I t  i s  very  r ig h t ly  po in ted  out in  th e
Report th a t  the c o s t o f equipment req u ired  fo r  w a te rsp o rts  o r o th e r r e c re a t io n ­
a l  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  so h igh  th a t  they  a re  beyond the reach  o f the average worker^^^
(^ ^ Ib id , p . 98
( 2 ) ^ 'S ee  A. R, P re s t  and R. Turvey, B en efit-C o st A nalysis : A Survey, E . J . ,
Leo. 1965» pp.708-709* The p r in c ip le  here i s  sim ply to  estim ate  w illin g n e ss  
to  pay fo r  flood  p ro te c tio n  by the  communities in  q u e s tio n . This i s  a 
roundabout device of m easuring such b e n e f its  s in ce  m arket p r in c ip le s  do no t 
provide a s h o r t-c u t s o lu tio n .
('^^8 ee , The R eport, o p ,c i t . ,  p .99
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The f a c t  i s  th a t  w ater sp o rts  o r o th e r r e c re a t io n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  have 
not even developed to  a n o tic e a b le  e x te n t a t  the  sea s id e  r e s o r t s  by the  T urk ish  
high-incom e groups* I t  i s  p la u s ib le  to  argue then th a t  use o f Keban r e s e rv o ir  
f o r  r e c re a t io n a l  purposes may rem ain minimal f o r  many y ears  to  come.
The Keban r e s e rv o i r ,  however, can have a la rg e  p o te n t ia l  economic 
value as a f is h in g  ground fo r  the  lo c a l p o p u la tio n . But th e re  has been no 
a ttem pt to  e s tim ate  the amount of f i s h  the  r e s e rv o i r  m ight p rovide in  th e  
fu tu re*  This e f f e c t  could only be estim ated  a f t e r  th e  com pletion of Keban 
Lam re s e r v o i r .  This q u estio n  no doubt c a l l s  fo r  an in te n s iv e  re sea rc h  in  
o rd e r to  e n te r  b e n e f i t - c o s t  an a ly sis*
d) M ining and M e ta llu rg ic a l developm ent; The te ch n o lo g ica l e x te rn a l 
e f f e c t s  of th e  Keban e l e c t r i c  p la n t can be very  s ig n i f ic a n t  on the  copper- 
m ining in d u s try , which i s  s i tu a te d  in  th e  a rea  of E rg an i, n ea r Keban. The 
ou tpu t from th e se  mines are  processed  by an e s ta b lis h e d  sm elte r in  Maden .
A s u b s ta n t ia l  in c re a se  in  the  ou tpu t o f th e se  mines can be provided by f a c i l ­
i t a t i n g  ore c o n ce n tra tio n  and re f in in g  w ith  the  low c o s t e l e c t r i c  power 
provided from Keban h y d ro -e le c tr ic  p la n t .
I t  i s  q u ite  lo g ic a l  to  suggest th a t  copper m ining could enjoy 
tremendous expansion in  ou tpu t due to  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f e l e c t r i c  supply*
This i s  a c le a r  example o f te ch n o lo g ica l s p i l lo v e r s^ ^ (e x te rn a l e f f e c ts )  
which can be measured by th e  increm ental in c re a se  in  p h y s ica l ou tpu t o f copper- 
raining which are ob ta ined  from th e  in p u ts  (e le c tr ic - s u p p ly )  o f Keban hydro­
e l e c t r i c  p la n t .  Thus th e  increm en tal in c re ase  in  the p roduction  of copper 
ore should be a sc rib e d  to  the  Keban p ro je c t  as te c h n o lo g ic a l e x te rn a l b e n e f i ts .
I t  i s  g e n e ra lly  acknowledged th a t  measurement should allow  fo r  
m ajor e x te rn a l e f f e c t s  o f th e  te ch n o lo g ica l v a r ie ty ,  -  th a t  i s  the  v a r ie ty  
which a l t e r s  the  p h y s ica l p roduction  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f o th e r  producers* I f  
th e se  e f f e c t s  can be p r ic e d , they  should be computed and added to  the b e n e f i ts
 ^ ^Technological s p i l lo v e r s  are  those  which a f f e c t  the  p h y s ica l ou tpu ts th a t  
o th e r  p roducers can g e t from t h e i r  p h y s ica l in p u ts ; and a lso  uncompensated 
e f f e c t s  on the  s a t i s f a c t io n  th a t  consumers can g e t from t h e i r  in p u ts .
For T echnolog ical and Pecuniary  S p il lo v e rs , see R. N. McKean, E ffic ien c y  
in  Government Through Systems A nalysis . J .  Wiley & Sons I n c . ,  R, York,
1958, p p .134- 146.
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of th e  p ro je c t  in  q u e s tio n . I t  must a lso  be noted th a t  the  value  of the  
increm en tal o u tp u t, no t th e  increm ental va lue  o f th e  in d u s t r y 's  to t a l  out])ut, 
i s  what c o u n ts .
F u r th e r , one of th e  r ic h e s t  d e p o sits  o f chrome ore i s  e x tra c te d  in  
the E as t o f E laz ig .^^^  At p re sen t th i s  m inera l i s  only  e x p lo ite d  to  a sm all 
e x te n t .  The chrome ore i s  exported  to  be p ro cessed . With a s u b s ta n t ia l ly  
low c o s t o f e l e c t r i c  supply  from Keban p la n t 'I t irk e y  could in c rease  the va lue  
o f ore by p ro cess in g  i t  d o m estica lly . Consequently th i s  could e x e r t  a  
co n sid e rab le  in c re ase  in  th e  fo re ig n  exchange e a rn in g s .
I t  i s  a lso  rev ea led  in  the  R eport th a t  from copper m ining, c o b a lt 
and zinc a re  produced; from c o p p e r-re f in in g , su lp h u ric  ac id  i s  produced as a 
by-product which could be used in  the  p roduction  of superphosphate f e r t i l i z e r s  
which in  tu rn  could be b e n e f ic ia l  to  a g r ic u l tu re .
Because i t  has not been th e  p ra c tic e  in  any o th e r  p ro je c t  to  
c a lc u la te  in d i r e c t  e f f e c t s ,  th e re  has been no a ttem pt in  t h i s  p ro je c t  e i th e r  
to  measure te c h n o lo g ic a l s p i l lo v e r s .
One may, th e re fo re , s t r e s s  th e  im portance o f d e ta i le d  a n a ly s is  needed 
on mine re se rv e s  and q u a l i t i e s ,  dom estic and fo re ig n  m arket p r ic e s ,  c o s ts  of 
p ro d u c ts , s a le s  c o n d itio n s , e tc .
The q u estio n  of b e n e f i ts  does n o t end h e re . As f a r  as n a tio n a liz e d  
in d u s tr ie s  a re  concerned, p r ic in g  p o lic y  has been th e  su b je c t of an ex ten s iv e  
co n tro v ersy  among econom ists . The q u estio n  asked very  o fte n  i s  th a t  how f a r  
the  p r ic e s  a c tu a l ly  charged r e f l e c t  t h e i r  tru e  s o c ia l  va lue  o r co s ts  to  the 
economy. I t  i s  sometimes asked; should th e re  be an a ttem p t to  d isco v e r how 
much u se rs  would be w il l in g  to  pay i f  f u l l  c o s t p r ic in g  was adopted? P r ic e  
e l a s t i c i t y  o f demand can be a u se fu l device to  apply  in  such c ircum stances.
On th ese  q u estio n s  econom ists a re  moving in  surroundings where a r ith m e tic  
can be ap p lied  but where th e  tem pta tion  to  take su b je c tiv e  value judgements 
a re  m u ltip ly in g  ra p id ly . I t  i s  in  th is  f i e ld  th a t  the  economic e v a lu a tio n  
"must seg reg a te  in to  se p a ra te  boxes those c o s ts  and b e n e f i ts  to  which a 
monetary value may be ^ sc r ib e d , those which cannot be measured by money but
(^^The R eport, o p .c i t . ,  p . 100
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to  which some num erical magnitude can be a t t r ib u te d ,  and those (empty boxes) 
where th e  a ttem pt to  impute any economic v a lu a tio n  a t  a l l  must be renounced .., 
C le a rly , th e se  boundary l in e s  may be a fu n c tio n  of the  natu re  of the p ro je c t ,  
the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of in fo rm atio n  and d a ta  and a lso  th e  te c h n ic a l cap ac ity  : f  
the  econom ist.
The purpose of c o s t-b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  i s  to  measure the e f f e c t  o f 
the p ro je c ts  on th e  o v e r - a l l  economy so f a r  as p ra c t ic a b le .  Some co sts  and 
b e n e f its  a re  more amenable to  measurement than  o th e rs  and th i s  r a is e s  the 
problem of v a lu a tio n .
But as f a r  as Keban h y d ro -e le c tr ic  p ro je c t  i s  in  q u e s tio n , c o s t-  
b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  i s  no t used to  t h e i r  maximum l im i t  as to  exp ress  a fo re ­
mentioned in d ir e c t  b e n e f i ts  in  monetary v a lu e s . For in s ta n c e , i f  adequate 
d a ta  were made a v a ila b le  by means of ex tensive  re se a rc h , Keban hydro-dam’s 
e f f e c t s  on flo o d  c o n tro l, f is h in g  and copper and chrome ore m ining could have
( 2 )been estim ated  on p r a c t ic a l  assum ptions.^
The b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  o f Keban a l te r n a t iv e ,  in  c o n tra s t ,  has 
been lim ite d  to  only prim ary, economic e f f e c ts  and in d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  are  l e f t  
o u ts id e  the  scope of the  t e s t .  T herefo re , the l im i ta t io n  of coverage in  the  
Keban ev a lu a tio n  may re p re se n t a d ep artu re  from a comprehensive b e n e f i t-  
c o s t a n a ly s is .
■m
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS;
, In  the  fo llo w in g  s e c tio n , I  s h a l l  f i r s t  assume th a t  the
"eq u iv a len t annual co st"  c r i t e r io n  th a t  i s  app lied  by the  p lanners  i s  the  
co rrec  
i s  no t
( 3)c t  one,  ^ but th e  choice of in t e r e s t  r a te s  app lied  in  the  com putations
Li)
(^^See N. S c o tt,  Some Problems of C ost-B enefit A nalysis of S o c ia l Investm en ts , in  
"UN-Cost-Benefit A nalysis o f S o c ia l P ro je c ts ,  Rep.No.7, Geneva, A p r i l ,1966, p . 52 ,
(^^B esides, i f  in d ir e c t  b e n e f its  a re  added to  the h y d ro -e le c tr ic  p la n t, t o t a l  
b e n e f i ts  of Keban HE w il l  g re a t ly  exceed the t o t a l  b e n e f i ts  of the  Thermal 
p la n ts ,  and consequently  the l e a s t  annual c o s t comparison would have been 
m eaninglesso
( 3) ^ 'T h a t i s ,  economic comparison on the  b a s is  of t h e i r  re sp e c tiv e  l iv e s  i s  the  
c o r re c t  one.
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As we have po in ted  ou t e a r l i e r ,  investm ent funds obtained  from 
dom estic and fo re ig n  sources may re p re sé n t a h ig h e r r a te  of re tu rn  than  the  
a c tu a l  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  would su g g es t. An op p o rtu n ity  c o s t e q u iv a len t to  8 
p e r c en t and 10 per cen t may seem an a p p ro p ria te  approxim ation fo r  the  
borrowed funds. This im p lies  th a t  a r a te  of re tu rn  o f th i s  le v e l should be 
considered  m arginal i f  h y d ro -e le c tr ic  and therm al a l te r n a t iv e s  are to  be 
econom ically  e f f i c i e n t .
For th e  purpose o f ev a lu a tin g  a l te rn a t iv e  p lan s  we f i r s t  impute 
an i n t e r e s t  r a te  o f 6 per cen t fo r  fo re ig n  currency  component (as , compared 
to  i t s  p rev ious r a te  o f 3s p e r cen t)  and 8 per cen t f o r  th e  dom estic c a p i t a l .  
L a te r the  imputed i n t e r e s t  r a te  on th e  dom estic component o f c a p i ta l  o u tlay  
w il l  be taken  as 10 p er cen t w hile in t e r e s t  r a te  on fo re ig n  component rem ains 
c o n s ta n t.
These two comparisons w i l l  in d ic a te  to  us how f a r  the c o s t d a ta  o f  
the  planners* w i l l  be a l te r e d  as a  consequence o f s o c ia l  i n t e r e s t  ra te s*
I  s h a l l  here  omit the  e f f e c t  o f th e  shadow fo re ig n  exchange c o rre c tio n  on th e  
f i n a l  choice o f a l t e r n a t iv e s .
A -  WITHOUT CORRECTING FOR LIFE-PERIOLS
Given the above-mentioned s im p lif ie d  assum ptions, th e  s e n s i t iv i ty  
a n a ly s is  on th e  Keban HE and the  Thermal p ro je c ts  can be c a r r ie d  ou t in  th e  
fo llow ing  manner:
KEHAN HE: At 8 p e r cen t
^000*
1. Fixed Investm ent 315*953
a) Domestic c a p i t a l ^ 214*948
b) F oreign  e x c h a n g e ^ 100. 985
I I .  E q u iv a len t Annual Cost of the
Fixed Investm en t: (At i_j = 8^, ip  = 6yo)
A. Fixed Charges (Domestic) = 214*948 ( c . r . f . - 8^ - 50)
= 214.948 (0 .08174)(5)
= 17*569 17.569
B, Fixed Charges (F oreign) = 100.985 ( c . r . f . - 6^ - 50)
= 100.985 (0 .06344)(4)
S= 6.406  6.406
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(I I I .  O peration  and M aintenance C o sts ; ^  0 .574
(-Labour, m a te r ia l and o th e rs )
in  G enera ting  S ta t io n  and Transm ission 
L in es .
IV. T o ta l Annual C ost: II(A+B) + I I I  =
17.569  + 6,406  + 0,574  
= 24.549 24.549
N otes: ( l )  Domestic C ap ita l in c lu d es  investm ent in  g e n e ra tin g  s ta t io n
and Transm ission system .
( 2 ) Foreign exchange component a lso  in c lu d es  investm ent in  
G enera ting  S ta tio n  and Transm ission system .
( 5) 0,08174 i s  th e  c a p ita l- re c o v e ry  f a c to r  which corresponds 
to  8 p e r cen t i n t e r e s t  and to  50 y e a r - l i f e .
(4 ) 0.06344  i8  th e  c a p ita l- re c o v e ry  f a c to r  which corresponds 
to  6 per cen t in t e r e s t  and to  50-y e a r  l i f e .
( 5) Taxes a re  n o t in c luded  in  o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance c o s ts .
THERMAL ALTERNATIVE: At 8 p e r cen t
^000*
I .  Fixed C ap ita l Investm ent . 76,500
a) Domestic Currency 23.000
b) Foreign  Currency 53*500
I I .  E q u iv a len t Annual Cost of the  Fixed 
Investm en t;
A. F ixed Charges (Domestic) = 23.000 ( c . r . f . -8^-35) 
i j  = 80
= 23,000 (0.08580)
-  1975.4
Bo Fixed Charges (F o re ign) = 53.500 ( c . r . f . -60-35)
ip  = 60
-  55.500 (0.06897)
<= 3689.8
I I I .  O peration  and M aintenance C o sts : 23*307 
(Labour, M a te ria l and F ue l)
IV. T o ta l Annual C o st; = II(A+b ) + I I I
= 1973.4  + 3689.8 + 23.307 
-  27.970
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From the above com putations i t  fo llow s th a t  i f  th e  "eq u iv a len t 
annual c o s t"  ru le  i s  ap p lied  on th e  b a s is  o f a shadow i n t e r e s t  r a te  of 8 p e r 
cen t fo r  dom estic c a p i ta l  and 6 per cen t fo r  fo re ig n  exchange component, th e  
Keban a l te r n a t iv e  w i l l  s t i l l  remain more economical than  the  Thermal a l t e r ­
n a tiv e  as th e  annual c o s t o f th e  form er i s  024*549 thousand d o l la r s  and o f the  
l a t t e r  i s  027*970 thousand d o l la r s .
But when th e  Same c r i t e r io n  i s  ap p lied  a t  the  i n t e r e s t  r a te  of 10 
p e r cen t f o r  dom estic c a p i ta l  and 6 per cen t f o r  fo re ig n  exchange component, 
th e  choice between th e  two a l te r n a t iv e s  w i l l  change in  fav o u r of the Thermal 
p r o je c t .  The com putations o f the  t o t a l  annual c o s ts  o f both  p ro je c ts  a t  
10 per cen t i n t e r e s t  r a te  a re  p resen ted  below (See Table 3 and 4)*
Table 3* T o ta l Annual Cost o f th e  Keban HE p ro je c t :  At 10 p e r cen t
I .  Fixed Investm ent
a) Domestic Currency
b) Foreign  Exchange
11» E qu ivalen t Annual Cost o f the Fixed 
Investm ent;
A, Fixed Charges (D om estic): 214*948 (c rf-1 0 0 -5 0 )




= 2 1 4 * 9 4 8  ( 0 . 1 0 0 8 6 ) ( l )
= 21,679
B. Fixed Charges (F o re ig n ): 100,985 (c rf-6 0 -5 0
i f  = 60
= 1 0 0 . 9 8 5  ( 0 . 0 6 3 4 4 )
= 6.406
I I I .  O peration  and M aintenance;
(Labour, m a te r ia l and o th e rs )
.IV . T o ta l Annual Cost = II(A+B) + I I I




( l ) p o r  c a p ita l- re c o v e ry  f a c to r s ,  see E. L. Grant and I re so n , W.C., P r in c ip le s  
of E ng ineering  Economy, 4 th  e d i t io n .  The Ronald P ress  Comp., N. York, I 964 
Table E-16,p. 552.
(^^Ibid , Table B-13, p. 550.
3 2 1
Table 4* T o ta l Annual Cost o f th e  THERMAL A lte rn a tiv e : At 100
0000'
I • F led C ap ita l Investm ent 76.500
a) Domestic Currency 23*000
b) F oreign  Exchange 55*500
I I .  E q u iv a len t Annual Cost o f Fixed Investm ent
A. Fixed Charges (Dom estic) = 23*000 (c rf-1 0 0 -3 5 )
i j  « 10 p.Co
= 23*000 (0 . 10369)
= 2384.8
B. Fixed Charges (F ore ign) = 55*500 ( c r f - 6 0 - 3 5 )  
i f  « 6 p . c .
= 55.500 (0.06897)
-  3689*8
I I I .  O peration  and M aintenance Costs 22.307 
(Labour, m a te r ia l and fu e l  o i l )
IV. T o ta l Annual Cost = II(A h-B) + I I I
= 2384.8 + 3689.8 + 22.507 
=  28.380
As can be seen c le a r ly  from Table 3 and 4 » a t  10 p e r cen t in t e r e s t  
r a te  t o t a l  annual c o s t o f the  Keban HE amounts to  28.659 thousand d o l la r s ,  
w hile th e  annual c o s t o f the  Thermal a l te rn a t iv e  amounts to  28.380 thousand 
d o l la r s .  I t  fo llow s th a t ,  so long  as th e  shadow i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i s  assumed 
to  be 10 p e r c e n t, the  Thermal p ro je c t  becomes more econom ical,
I t  can a lso  be in fe r re d  th a t  g e n e ra lly  a t  h ig h e r i n t e r e s t  r a te s  
the  a l te r n a t iv e  w ith  sm all i n i t i a l  c a p i ta l  o u tla y  and w ith  a h ig h er annual 
cost^^ ) becomes more adm issib le  th an  the  o th e r a l te r n a t iv e  w ith  the  la rg e r  
i n i t i a l  c a p i ta l  and w ith  low er o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance c o s t .
B. PRESENT WORTH RULE; V/HEN TWO ALTERNATIVES HAVE DIFFERENT LIVES
"E quivalen t annual co st"  c r i t e r io n  which i s  based upon the  
a p p lic a t io n  of th e  c a p ita l- re c o v e ry  f a c to r  method o f com putations may be
^Annual c o s t here  r e f e r s  to  o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance c o s t ,  and n o t to  the  
annual f ix e d  charges.
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considered  to  be an accep tab le  r u le ,  b u t I  am more in c lin e d  to  use the  pv r u le ,  
which i s  g e n e ra lly  considered  to  be th e  most a p p ro p ria te  one fo r  b e n e f i t - c o s t  
an a ly siso  In  th i s  s e c t io n , I  s h a l l  be in tro d u c in g  p re sen t value c a lc u la tio n s  
by co n v ertin g  th e  l i f e  p e rio d s  o f th e  two a l te r n a t iv e s  to  an equal l i f e - p e r io d .  
The methods needed fo r  th i s  conversion  w i l l  be d iscu ssed  and ap p lied  to  the 
economic com parison o f the  Keban HE and the  Thermal p la n t .
But i t  must be added th a t ,  in  th i s  s e c tio n  to o , I  s h a l l  assume 
away the  c o rre c tio n  needed on th e  fo re ig n  exchange component o f c a p i t a l .  In  
o th e r  words, shadow fo re ig n  exchange r a te  w i l l  be tak en  up in  tlie l a s t  s e c tio n  
o f t h i s  paper, aa in co rp o ra ted  w ith  the  c o rre c t io n  on th e  d iscoun t r a te  which 
may seem re a so n a b le .
In  what fo llow s I  s h a l l  c a rry  ou t pv c a lc u la t io n s  on the b a s is  of 
d i f f e r e n t  s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a t e s ,  such as 6 per c en t, 8 p e r cen t and 10 per 
c e n t, I  have a lre ad y  mentioned th a t  the  low in t e r e s t  r a t e  ap p lied  by the  
E .I .E .  does not r e f l e c t  the  s o c ia l  o p p o rtu n ity  c o s t o f c a p i ta l  invo lved .
As can be remembered, th e  d isco u n t r a te  ap p lied  by th e  SPG fo r  the economic 
e v a lu a tio n  o f th e  "Gaycuma paper and c e llu lo se  p ro je c t"  was 12 per cen t.^^^
This i s  th e  r a te  which i s  ap p lied  to  a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  which a re  under­
taken  by th e  S ta te  Economic E n te rp rise s*  Because dom estic c a p i ta l  i s  provided 
by the  same f in a n c in g  agency, th a t  i s  th e  S ta te  Investm ent Bank, i t  i s  ev id en t
th a t  a n ^ p l i c a t i o n  o f a  d isco u n t r a te  as h igh  as 10 p er cen t and even 12 p er
( 2 )cen t appears to  be re a so n a b le , '
V/hen p re sen t v a lu e  ru le  i s  used f o r  economic e v a lu a tio n  of in v e s t­
m ents, a comparison of th e  s h o r t- l iv e d  and lo n g -liv e d  p ro je c ts  cannot make 
sense u n le ss  th e  two d i f f e r e n t  l i f e  perio d s  a re  converted to  the  s im ila r  
number o f years  of s e rv ic e .
T here fo re , th e re  a re  two d i s t in c t  methods f o r  u n d e rtak in g  such 
com parison. a ) The f i r s t  method ap p lied  in  comparing investm ent a l te r n a t iv e s  
w ith  d i f f e r e n t  l iv e s  i s  to  f in d  the  l e a s t  common m u ltip le  of the estim ated
(^^8ee the  Gaycuma paper p ro je c t .  C hapter 7
( 2)'Though th e re  a re  arguments in  favour o f u s in g  a low er d isco u n t r a te  f o r  p u b lic  
u t i l i t y  p ro je c ts  ( i . e .  USA uses a 6 per cen t d isco u n t r a t e ) ,  Turkey w ith  
i t s  d iso rgan ized  c a p ita l-m a rk e t and a r a th e r  h igh  o p p o rtu n ity  c o s t of 
c a p i ta l  cannot adhere to  such a low d isco u n t r a t e .
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l iv e s  o f th e  two p r o je c ts .  For in s ta n c e , i f  one p ro je c t  had a 10 y ea r l i f e  
and th e  o th e r  25 y e a r  l i f e ,  i t  would be necessa ry  to  co n sid e r a 50 y ear p e riod  
w ith  5 l i f e  cy cles  f o r  one a l te r n a t iv e  and 2 l i f e  cy c les  fo r  th e  o th e r .
b) The second method i s  to  ca rry  out th e  p re se n t w orth study fo r
a p e rp e tu a l p e r io d . P re se n t worths fo r  an assumed p e rp e tu a l period  of
( 2)se rv ic e  are re fe r re d  to , in  p r a c t ic e ,  a s  "c a p ita l iz e d  c o s ts " . '
A convenient sim ple assum ption adopted in  both methods i s  t h a t  
replacem ent a s s e ts  w il l  re p e a t the  co s ts  th a t  have been fo r e c a s t  fo r  the 
i n i t i a l  c o s t .
Given th i s  assum ption, in  what fo llow s I  s h a l l  be u sin g  th ese  
two methods in  o rd e r to  make the  Keban HE comparable w ith  the  Thermal 
a l te rn a t iv e *  I  s h a l l  apply  the  f i r s t  method by u s in g  d i f f e r e n t  r a te s  o f 
in t e r e s t  in  o rd e r to  see how f a r  th e  choice i s  s e n s i t iv e  to  a chosen r a te  
o f i n t e r e s t .
a) Comparison o f Keban HE p ro je c t  w ith  the Thermal A lte rn a tiv e  
by Using th e  Lowest Common M ultip le  Method;
There i s  no p o in t in  co n v ertin g  two or more a l te r n a t iv e  cash flow  
s e r ie s  in to  p re sen t worth and comparing the  p re sen t w orths u n le ss  the  cash 
flow  s e r ie s  a re  r e la te d  to  the  same number o f y e a rs .
For th i s  purpose I  s h a l l  assume th a t  the  low est common m u ltip le  
fo r  th e  l iv e s  o f both p ro je c ts  i s  100 y e a rs . But i t  must be po in ted  out 
th a t  th i s  low est common m u ltip le  does not correspond to  an ex ac t f ig u re ;  
i t  i s  an approxim ation , s in ce  Keban w il l  be renewed tw icew ith in  th i s  100-year 
pe riod  and th e  Thermal p ro je c t  s l ig h t ly  le s s  th an  th re e  tim es. C lea rly , 
the"Therm al p la n t w il l  n e c e s s i ta te  105 y ears  fo r  th re e  tim es of rep lacem ents. 
However, f o r  th e  sake o f s im p lify in g  ray a n a ly s is ,  I  have assumed th a t  100-year
( 1 ) ^ 'The low est common m u ltip le  ru le  i s  no t always as easy  as th a t  s in ce  the  l iv e s  
o f a l t e r n a t iv e s  do no t sometimes lend them selves to  an evenly  d iv is ib le  
f ig u r e .  For in s ta n c e , ta k in g  our a c tu a l example of Keban w ith  50 y ears  and 
the Thermal w ith  55 y e a rs , they  would re q u ire  a l i f e  period  of 550 y ears  
u n t i l  they  bo th  give equal y ears  of s e rv ic e . This im p lies  th a t  th e  Keban 
p ro je c t  would re q u ire  7 l i f e  cycles and the  Thermal 10 l i f e  c y c le s .
( 2)'See W. G, I re so n  and E. L, G rant, P r in c ip le s  o f E ng ineering  Economy,
The Ronald P ress  Comp,, N, York, I 964 , ppo99-100.
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p erio d  i s  the  low est common, m ultip le#  B esides, as we s h a l l  see l a t e r  du ring  
the  a p p lic a t io n  o f th e  second method, th e re  w i l l  he no s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe re n c e  
between re p e a tin g  c o s ts  fo r  100 years  o r forever*
Table 5* P resen t Value o f Keban BE P ro je c t:
At i  = 6 p . c . ,  and n = 100 y ears
1. F i r s t  C a p ita l  C o st
2 .  pw o f  f i r s t  d isb u rsem en t f o r  ren ew a l  
i n  5 0  y e a r s ;  5 1 5 .9 3 3  (p w f -^ 6- 5 0 ) ( l )
= 3 1 5 ,9 3 3  (0 .0 5 4 3  
“ 1 7 ,1 5 5
3 . pw o f  a n n u a l o p e r a t in g  and m a in ten a n ce  
o v e r  100 y e a r s :
= 574 ( s e r i e s  p v/f-60-lO O )
= 574 ( 1 6 .6 1 8 ) ( 2 )
-  9 5 3 8 ,7









pw f i s  th e  p re se n t va lue  fa c to r  which corresponds to  s in g le  payments,
16,618 i s  th e  s e r ie s  p re sen t value f a c to r  which corresponds to  6 per 
cen t i n t e r e s t  and to  100 y e a rs .
I f  th e re  i s  any scrap  value a f t e r  100 y ears  pw of the  a s s e ts  should be 
deducted from th e  t o t a l  pw o f d isbursem ents so as to  a r r iv e  a t  th e  pw 
o f n e t d isbursem ents fo r  100 y e a r s . Throughout our a n a ly s is  scrap  
value i s  assumed away*
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T a b le  6 . P r e s e n t  V a lu e  o f  Therm al A l t e r n a t iv e :  
a t  i  = 6  p er  c e n t ,  n = 1 0 0  y e a r s
1 .  T o ta l  F ix e d  In v e s tm e n t
2 . pw o f  f i r s t  d isb u rsem en t f o r  ren ew a l  
i n  35 y e a r s  = 7 6 , 5 0 0  (p w f* -6 0 - 3 5 )
= 7 6 , 5 0 0  ( 0 . 1 3 0 1 )
= 9,952
3 . pw o f  seco n d  d isb u rsem en t f o r  ren ew a l 
i n  7 0  y e a r s
= 7 6 , 5 0 0  ( p w f - 6 0 - 7 0 )
= 7 6 , 5 0 0  ( 0 . 0 1 6 9 )
= 1,292
4 .  pw o f  a n n u a l o p e r a t in g  + m a in ten a n ce  c o s t  
o v e r  100 y e a r s :
*= 2 2 , 3 0 7  ( s e r i e s  p w f-60-lO O )
= 22,307 ( 16. 618)
= 570,697
5 . T o ta l  pw o f  c o s t s  o f  Therm al o v er  







From th e  above pv c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  i t  becom es c l e a r  t h a t  on th e  b a s i s  
o f  6 p er  c e n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  th e  c h o ic e  w i l l  be i n  fa v o u r  o f  Keban HE p r o j e c t .  
As can be s e e n  from  th e  ta b u la te d  r e s u l t s  (T a b le  5 and 6 ) ,  pv o f  t o t a l  c o s t s  
o f  Keban a re  0 3 4 2 .6 2 6  th o u sa n d  d o l la r s  a s  compared to  0 4 5 8 * 4 4 1  th ou sand  
d o l l a r s  in  Therm al a l t e r n a t i v e .
I t  i s  a l s o  e v id e n t  t h a t  th e  c h o ic e  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s e n s i t i v e  to  
th e  e s t im a te d  c o s t  o f  th e  ren ew a l a s s e t s  i n  Keban p r o j e c t .  E ven i f  d i s ­
b ursem ent f o r  th e  r e n e w a l a s s e t  5 0  y e a r s  h en ce sh o u ld  be d o u b led , th e  t o t a l  
p r e s e n t  w orth  o f  Keban w ou ld  o n ly  be in c r e a s e d  by 0 3 4 * 3 1 0 ; th u s  Keban h y d ro ­
e l e c t r i c  p r o j e c t  w ould s t i l l  be more ec o n o m ic a l th a n  th e  Therm al p r o j e c t .
I t  can  be co n c lu d ed  t h a t ,  on th e  b a s is  o f  pw r u le  w hich  i s  a p p lie d  
to  c o v e r  1 0 0 -y e a r  p e r io d ,  th e  Keban p r o j e c t  i s  a d m is s ib le  so  lo n g  a s  we a p p ly  
a d is c o u n t  r a t e  o f  6 p er  c e n t .
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I t  i s  a common p ra c tic e  in  p ro je c t  a n a ly s is  to  express t o t a l  pv 
disbursem ents in  terms o f annual c o s ts ; thus the  t o t a l  p re sen t va lue  of Keban 
and tlie Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  can be converted in to  annual c o s ts  by m u ltip ly in g  
them by the  c a p i t a l  recovery  f a c to r  ( c . r . f , )  corresponding  to  6 per cen t ;nd 
to  100 y e a r s .
l )  Annual C ost, Keban: 0342,626 (crf-60-lO O )
= 0542,626 (0 . 06018)
2) Annual C ost, Thermal = 0458,441 (crf-60-lO O )
= 0458,441 (0 .06018)
As f a r  as annual c o s ts  are  concerned, Keban p ro je c t  would s t i l l  
be more a t t r a c t iv e  than  th e  Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e .  In c id e n ta l ly ,  i t  must be 
remembered th a t  the  choice o f a l te r n a t iv e s  would be the same whether the 
choice has been taken  on th e  b a s is  o f t o t a l  pw of c o s ts  o r annual c o s ts  as 
long  as the  same d isco u n t r a te  i s  ap p lied  in  both  com putations fo r  the same 
period  o f l iv e s .
I I .  Now, as f a r  as 8 per cen t d iscoun t r a te  i s  chosen f o r  the  pw c a lc u l­
a tio n s  f o r  th e  two a l te r n a t iv e s ,  the r e s u l t  would become as p resen ted  below:
Table 7* P resen t Worth of Keban P r o je c t : At 80 D iscount Rate
i  = 8 p . c . ,  n » 100 y ra .
Keban 0000’
1. Fixed Investm ent 315,933
2,,pw  of f i r s t  disbursem ent f o r  renew al in
50 y e a rs :
= 315.933 (pwf'-e?^-5o)
= 315,933 (0 .0213)
= 6,729 6,729
3 . pw o f annual d isbursem ents over 100 y r s , :
= 574 % ( s e r ie s  pwf- 8 0^- 100)
= 574 X ( 12 , 494)
= 7,71 — M i l
4 . T o tal pw o f c o s ts  of Keban .3.29.,.8^
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Table 8 , P re sen t Worth o f Thermal P r o je c t : At gf per c en t D.R,
i  = 8 P.O., n = 100
Thermal 0000'
1 . Fixed Investm ent y6,500
2. pw o f f i r s t  disbursem ent fo r  renewal 
in  35 y r s . :
= 76,500 X ( s in g le  p w f - 80- 55)
-  76,500  (0 . 0676)
= 5,171 5,171
3. pw of second disbursem ent f o r  renewal 
in  70 y r s . :
= 76,500  ( s in g le  p w f -80-70)
-  76,500 X (0 .0046)
= 0,351  0,351
4 . pw o f annual d isbursem ents over 100 y r s . :
= 22,307 X ( s e r ie s  pwf-80-lOO)
« 22,307 ( 12 . 494)
-  278,703 278,703
5 . T o ta l pw o f c o s ts  o f Thermal
over 100 y r s . :  360,725
Again, as can be seen from th e  pw c a lc u la tio n s  based on an 8 per
cen t d isco u n t r a t e ,  th e  Keban HE p ro je c t  s t i l l  rem ains more accep tab le  than
th e  Thermal p r o je c t .  The t o t a l  pw of c o s ts  of Keban a re  0329.833 thousand 
d o lla r s  as compared to  th e  t o t a l  pw of c o s ts  o f Thermal o f 03^0.725 thousand 
d o l la r s .
The t o t a l  pv o f c o s ts  o f Keban and th e  Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  can,
ag a in , be converted  in to  annual c o s ts  by m u ltip ly in g  th e se  above f ig u re s  by
the  c a p ita l- re c o v e ry  f a c to r  fo r  8 per cen t in t e r e s t  and f o r  100 years* Thus;
1. Annual C ost, Keban HE: 0329,833 ( e r f -80-100)
= 0329,833 X (0,08004)
= i^26,399
2, Annual C ost, Thermal; 0560,725 x (crf-80-lO O )
= 360,725 (O.O8OO4 )
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I t  i s  ev id en t th a t  a t  80 d isco u n t r a t e ,  on annual b a s is  to o , the 
Keban p ro je c t  i s  more econom ical and must be se lec ted *
I I I ,  However, i t  i s  very  in te r e s t in g  to  n o tic e  th a t  when the  p resen t
value  com putations are  c a r r ie d  out a t  10 p e r cen t d isco u n t r a te  the choice 
changes in  favou r o f Thermal and n o t the  Keban p ro je c t  any lo n g e r.
The r e s u lt s  of our pw ca lcu la tio n s at 10 per cent di:iCount rate  
and 100 years are presented below:
Table 9* PW o f Keban HE p ro je c t :  At 100 D iscount Rate
n *= 100
0000’
1. Fixed Investm ent 315,933
2. pw of f i r s t  d isbursem ent f o r  renewal
in  50 y e a rs :
« 315>933 X (s in g le  p w f '-10 i^?-50)
-  315,933 (0.0085)
= 2685.4 2,685
3 . pw o f annual d isbursem ents (o+m)
over 100 y ears :
“ 574 (pw f-100-100)
-  574 ( 9 . 999)
= 5,739
4 . T o ta l pw o f c o s ts  o f Keban HE
over 100 y r s . :
Table 10. PW o f Thermal A lte rn a tiv e : A t. 10 per c en t D iscount Rate , n '  }po
0000’
1. Fixed Investm ent 76,500
2. pw o f f i r s t  d isbursem ent f o r  renewal 
in  35 y r s . :
= 76,500 ( s in g le  pwf’-lC^0-35)
= 76,500 (0 , 0556)
= 2,725  2,725
5 . pw o f second disbursem ent fo r  renewal 
in  70 y ea rs :
= 76,500 ( s in g le  pwf' - 10 0^- 70)
= 76,500 (0 .0013)
= 99.4  99
4 . /
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Table 10 (c o n td .)
4* pw of annual d isbursem ents (o + m) 
over 100 y r s . :
= 22,307 ( s e r ie s  pwf'.-lO^-lOO)
= 22,507 ( 9 . 999)
“ 223,047
5. T o ta l pw of c o s ts  of Thermal 302,369
I t  must be noted th a t  the  choice i s  r e l a t i v e ly  in s e n s i t iv e  to  the 
estim ated  c o s t o f th e  renewal a s s e t  in  Thermal p r o je c t .  For in s ta n c e , i f  
the  estim ated  disbursem ent f o r  th e  renewal a s s e t  35 y ears  and JO y ears  hence 
should be doubled, th e  t o t a l  p re sen t worth fo r  Thermal would be in c reased  
by only  05,644; and the  Thermal p ro je c t would s t i l l  be co n sid erab ly  more 
economical - than th e  Keban HE p ro je c t .
When t o t a l  pw o f c o s ts  o f Keban and the Thermal a re  converted  in to  
annual c o s t b a s is  the r e s u l t  s t i l l  favours th e  Thermal p ro je c t .
1 . Annual C ost, Keban: 0324,357 (crf-lO ^-lO O )
= ^ 324. 55Yx(0 . 10001)
= 9:32,438
2. Annual C ost, Thermal: 0302,36? (orf-lO ^-lO O )
= 0302,369 (O.10001)
In  th e  nex t s e c t io n , f o r  i l l u s t r a t i v e  purposes, I  s l ia ll  in troduce  
the second method which i s  u s u a lly  c a lle d  " c a p ita liz e d  c o s t"  and m ostly  used 
by eng ineers  in  p u b lic  u t i l i t y  p ro je c ts .
b) THE "CAPITALIZED COST" METHOD IN COMPARING TWO ALTERNATIVES WITH 
DIFFERENT LIVES:
Tv/o a l te r n a t iv e  p ro je c ts  each w ith d i f f e r e n t  l i f e  span can a lso  be 
compared by computing p re se n t worth of p e rp e tu a l se rv ic e  fo r  both p ro jec ts*
(^^See Ire so n  & G rant, p p .101-102
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This i s  an assum ption commonly used in  o rd er to  p rov ide  com parison.
Follow ing th i s  method we can now c a lc u la te  the  p re sen t worths o f 
Keban HE p ro je c t  and the Thermal a l te rn a t iv e *  I  s h a l l  compute the  " c a p ita l is e d  
c o sts"  o f the  "hfo p ro je c ts  by u s in g  a 10 per cen t d iscoun t r a t e .  Tliis w il l  
show us i f  th e re  i s  any co n sid erab le  d if fe re n c e  between th e  " c a p ita l iz e d  co st"  
method and th e  low est common m u ltip le  method we have used b e fo re .
Table 11. PW o f Keban p ro je c t :  At 10 p e r cen t
0000»
1. F ixed Investm ent 315,933
2. pw o f i n f i n i t e  s e r ie s  o f renew als: 1
*= 315,933 ( s f f - 1 0 0 -5 0 ^  0 .10
-  315,933 (0 .0 0 0 8 6 )( l) jL  0.10
i
:l
« 271. 7 ?  0.10 2,717 I
5 . pw o f annual d isbursem ents:
= 5 7 4 ?  0 .10
-  5740
4* T o ta l C ap ita lize d  Cost 324,390
i
.
Table 12. C ap ita liz e d  Cost of Thermal a l te r n a t iv e :  At 100 f
0000 »
1. Fixed Investm ent 76,500
2. pw o f i n f i n i t e  s e r ie s  of renew als
-  76,500 ( s f f - 100-35)-^ 0.10
= 76,500 (0 .00569)-“  0 .10
= 2 8 2 .2 f  0 .10 2,822
3* pw o f annual d isbursem ents
= 22, 3074- 0 .10
» 223,070 223,070
4 . T o ta l C ap ita liz e d  Cost .302,192.
................ - .................... - ................ ■ , f
re p re se n ts  s in k in g  fund f a c to r ,  and can be expressed  as ^ » see ,
U nited N atio n s-iiin u a l on Economic Development P ro je c ts ,  New York, 1953,p p l32- 36d
3 ^O  J .
As can be n o ticed  from Tables 11 and 12, " c a p ita l iz e d  cost"  method which 
tak es  in to  account the  p e rp e tu a l s e rv ice  of bo th  p ro je c ts  g ives a s im ila r  r e s u l t  
to  the  above-m entioned "low est common m u ltip le"  method, where a t  10 per cen t 
d isco u n t r a te  the Thermal p ro je c t  is  more economical and a cc e p tab le .
I t  must be noted th a t  th e  f ig u re s  fo r  th e  p re sen t w orths o f p e rp e tu a l 
s e rv ic e  in  Keban and Thermal are  only  very  s l ig h t ly  g re a te r  than  the  previous 
f ig u re s  fo r  th e  p re sen t w orths of 100 y e a r s ’ s e rv ic e . As a m a tte r  of f a c t ,  
the 021,998 advantage f o r  Thermal p lan  in  c a p ita l iz e d  c o s t i s  not much more 
than the  021,988 advantage in  p re sen t w orth of 100 y e a r s ' s e rv ic e .
I t  can a lso  be concluded th a t  from the v iew poin t o f p resen t worth 
the  d iffe re n c e  between 100 y e a rs  and fo re v e r  ( i n f i n i t e  renew al) i s  very  sm all.
What i s  done in  th i s  method i s  th a t  076,500 thousand d o lla r s  a t  the  
end of 55 y e a r  p e riod  i s  m u ltip lie d  by th e  s in k in g  fund f a c to r  ( s . f . f . )  to  
convert i t  to  0282,2 , a uniform  annual f ig u re  throughout the  35 y ear p e rio d .
Thus 076,500 thousand a t  the  end o f every  35th y ea r i s  eq u iv a len t to  0282,2 a 
y ea r fo re v e r . The p re sen t worth o f th i s  i n f i n i t e  s e r ie s  in  Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  
i s  then  0282^2 4  0.10 => 02 ,822 .
The choice between the  Lowest Common M u ltip le  method and the 
C ap ita lize d  Cost method would depend on circum stances th e  investm ent e v a lu a tio n  
would fa c e . I f  i t  i s  easy  to  compute the  low est common m u ltip le  o f l iv e s  of 
a l te r n a t iv e  p r o je c ts ,  t h i s  method would s u f f ic e .  But because o f d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in  f in d in g  th e  low est common m u ltip le  fo r  the l iv e s  of a l t e r n a t iv e s ,  i t  i s  
sometimes ad v isa b le  to  r e s o r t  to  " c a p ita liz e d  co st"  method which we have ap p lied  
above.
.■:v
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS; As C orrection  on Foreign-exchange and D iscount Rates
are Introduced
In. t h is  s e c t io n  I s h a ll  brin g  in to  the a n a ly s is  the so fa r  om itted  
fa c to r , th a t i s  the shadow p r ic e  o f fo r e ig n  exchange co rr ec tio n  as app lied  on 
the fo re ig n  exchange component o f f ix e d  investm ents in  both a lt e r n a t iv e s .
The fo re ig n  exchange co rr ec tio n  incorporated  w ith  the co rr ec tio n  on the d iscou n t
(^^Throughout th ese  a n a ly se s , I have assumed th a t Turkey has s u f f i c ie n t  dom estic  
fu e l  resou rces to  meet the fu e l  demand o f the Thermal s t a t io n s .  T herefore, 
Thermal's op eratin g  and maintenance c o s ts  do not in v o lv e  imported f u e l - o i l  
fo r  the op era tio n . I was not ab le to  fin d  any in form ation  to  reverse  th is  
©ssumption*
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r a te  can te  q u ite  i l lu m in a tin g  in  in d ic a t in g  how f a r  the  choice between the
Keban and the  Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  i s  s e n s i t iv e  to  v a r ia t io n s  in  the two
param eters*
In  s e c tio n  I I I  I  have c a r r ie d  out the s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s is  on the
b a s is  of m arket p r ic e s ,  th e  ohly excep tion  being the  s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a t e .
But here I  s h a l l  f i r s t  c o r re c t fo r  the fo re ig n  exchange components by u s in g  a 
s o c ia l  p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange o f 0 ,53  per cen t above the  o f f i c i a l  ra te .^ ^ ^  
This i s  th e  fo re ig n  exchange p en a lty  which i s  g e n e ra lly  ap p lied  by the SPG in  
a l l  in d u s t r ia l  p ro je c ts  ( i . e .  the  Gaycuma paper p r o je c t ) .  I t  i s  th e re fo re  very  
a p p ro p ria te  to  examine f i r s t  the  e f f e c t  of th i s  s o c ia l  p r ic e  of fo re ig n  exchange 
on the  choice between a l te r n a t iv e s  K and T,
Secondly, i t  must be added th a t  the v a r ia t io n s  used in  th e  param eter 
o f s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a te  w i l l  again  be 6 per c en t, 8 per cen t and 10 p er c e n t, as 
we ap p lied  in  the  p reced ing  s e c t io n s . As we argued elsew here the s o c ia l  
d iscoun t r a te  to  be ap p lied  should be ra is e d  a t  l e a s t  to  10 p er c en t or even 12
per cen t so as to  m ain ta in  u n ifo rm ity  in  the  o v e ra ll  investm ent p ro je c ts ,  I ’or
the  sake o f conducting  s e n s i t iv i ty  analyses on the a l te r n a t iv e s  I  am d iscu ss in g ,
( 2 )I  in ten d  to  use th e se  th re e  s e ts  o f s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a t e s ,  ^
T h ird , th e  method I  s h a l l  apply  in  the  economic comparison w il l  be
the  p re sen t value based upon "the  low est common m ultip le  method" by assuming 
again  a 100-year period  f o r  the two a l te r n a t iv e s .
I t  w i l l  be shown th a t  the s o c ia l  v a lu a tio n  o f th e  a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  of 
e i th e r  a l te r n a t iv e  depends on th e  values a ttach ed  to  a number of param eters 
which come from value judgem ents, s o c ia l  p o lic ie s  and beh av io u ra l p a tte rn s  
observed in  the e n t i r e  economy. Thus, th e  e s tim atio n  of th e se  param eters l i e s  
o u ts id e  the  scope o f th e  p ro fe s s io n a l a c t i v i t i e s  of an in d iv id u a l p ro je c t
 ^ ^E .I,E , p lanners  have n o t in troduced  fo re ig n  exchange c o rre c tio n  in  th e i r  
economic ev a lu a tio n  since  th i s  has not been the  common p ra c tic e  followed by 
them. See the  p r iv a te  typed document from E .I .E . by K, Arkun, I’eb, 19^9» 
Ankara,
' I t  i s  re c e n tly  s ta te d  in  the "Typed Report" I  obtained from the E .I .E . th a t  
new hydro and therm al e l e c t r i c  p ro je c ts  w il l  be evalua ted  on the b a s is  of 
6 per cen t d iscoun t r a t e .  P r iv a te  typed re n o rt by Kamal Arkun, Eeb, 1969, 
Ankara, p .4 .
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fo rm u la to r. This i s  no t s u rp r is in g  because in  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  
a l l  th e  c o s ts  and b e n e f i ts  a re  evalua ted  in  term s of t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on the 
o b je c tiv e s  and th e  w e lfa re  o f the  whole s o c ie ty . T h e re fo re , in fo rm ation  
about th e  s o c ia l  o b je c t iv e s , perform ances of th e  vario u s  sca rce  re so u rces  in  
th e  economy, th e  governm ental p o l ic ie s ,  e tc ,  should be b rought in to  the fu tu r e .
In  the  fo llo w in g  s e c tio n  th e  s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s is  w i l l  be c a rr ie d  
out w ith  re s p e c t to  th e  fo llo w in g  param eters: the  s o c ia l  r a te  o f d isco u n t i ,
th e  shadow p r ic e  of fo re ig n  exchange z , and the  l i f e  of th e  p ro je c t  n®
T he-p resen t va lue  w i l l  be computed fo r  the  fo llo w in g  v a r ia t io n s  
in  th e  param eters;
i  = 0 . 0 6 , 0 .0 8 , 0.10
z = 0 . 35 , 0 . 50, 0 , 60 , 0 ,8 0 , 1.00
h = 50 , 55 .
A ll p o ss ib le  com binations of th ese  param eter v a lu es  can be c a lc u la te d  Î
f o r  pv and s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s is ,  bu t th i s  would involve unnecessary  work fo r  I
r e s u l t s  which may not be in te r e s t in g .
T h ere fo re , I  have chosen only the above v a r ia t io n s  in  the  param eters
ih  o rder to  in d ic a te  th e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f investm ent choice to  v a r ia t io n s  in  th e  j
s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a te  i ,  and v a r ia t io n s  in  th e  shadow p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange |
as rang ing  from 55 p e r cen t to  100 per c e n t, |
1) F i r s t ,  the  fo re ig n  exchange component of c a p i ta l  o u tlay  in  th e  j
two a l te r n a t iv e s  i s  c o rrec ted  on th e  -basis of a shadow fo re ig n  exchange r a te  |
o f 33 p e r cen t above the  o f f i c i a l  r a t e .  In  oher words, when th i s  s o c ia l  p r ic e  
I^
o f fo re ig n  exchange i s  a p p lie d , exchange r a te  w i l l  in c re a se  to  ^1 = 12 T urkish  ?
l i r d s  as ompared to  i t s  a c tu a l r a te  o f ^1 =■ 9 T .L , |
V/hen a shadow p r ic e  of 0 .53  i s  used fo r  c o r re c t in g  the fo re ig n  I
Ï
exchange components o f p ro je c t  K and T, to t a l  c a p i ta l  investm en t of Keban w i l l  É
in c re a se  to  349«257 thousand d o lla r s  and of Thermal to  94«155 thousand d o l la r s  [
(see  Tables 15 and I 4 ) » I
2) Second, by app ly ing  now the  s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a te  o f 6 per c en t,
8 p e r cen t and 10 per cen t the  pv o f t o t a l  co sts  of th e  two a l te r n a t iv e s  i s
computed* The pv o f t o t a l  c o s ts  of Keban and the Thermal as c a lc u la te d  on th e
b a s is  of 6 per c e n t, 8 per cent and 10 p e r cent a re  p resen ted  in  the  Appendix
to  th i s  c h a p t e r H o w e v e r  the  r e s u l t s  of the above pv com putations are
ta b u la ted  in  Table I 5*
T iy  "  r  — --------
See, Appendix A*
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Table 15. Keban P ro je c t  -  C ap ita l Investm ent as C orrected  
For Foreign  Exchange 0.55
k-...
A. G enerating  S ta tio n ^000 '
1 . Domestic Investm ent 185,070
2. F oreign  Currency 49,915
a) 0 .55  % (F oreign  exchange) 16,471
B. T ransm ission System
1. Domestic Currency 29,878
2, Foreign  exchange 51,070
a) 0 .55  X (fo re ig n  exchange) 16^ ^
TOTAL INVESTMENT
Table 14# Thermal A lte rn a tiv e : C ap ita l Investm ent as C orrected
f o r  Foreign  Exchange z = 0.55
A. G enerating  S ta tio n ^000*
1. Domestic Currency 25,000
2. Foreign Exchange 53,500
a) 0 .55  X (F oreign  exchange) 17,655
B. Transm ission System
1. Domestic Currency
2. Foreign  Currency -
TOTAL INVESTMENT
Table 15 . P re sen t Value of T o ta l Cost Comparison o f Keban and 
the  Thermal A lte rn a tiv e
f o r  i ,  and z .
gfooo '
IŒBAN HE TIDiîRMAL ALTERNATIVE











As can be seen  from Table 15, when pv c a lc u la t io n s  a re  based on th e  
g e n e ra lly  accep ted  shadow p r ic e  of fo re ig n  exchange (0 ,53 p . c . ) ,  the fo llo w in g  
conclusions can be d ram ;
( i )  F i r s t ,  i f  a  s o c i a l  d is c o u n t  r a t e  o f  6 p er  c e n t  i s  u sed  in  pv  
c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  th e  Keban HE p r o j e c t  would s t i l l  q u a l i f y  f o r  s e l e c t i o n  a s  th e  t o t a l  
pv o f  c o s t s  o f  Keban would be 0 5 7 7 /7  th ou san d  d o l l a r s  a s  compared t o  th e  
T h erm a l's  0 4 7 8 ,6  th ou san d  d o l l a r s .  As f a r  a s  in v e s tm e n t  c h o ic e  i s  co n cern ed  
th e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  b etw een  a p p ly in g  th e  m arket exch an ge r a t e
o r  s o c i a l  ex ch a n g e r a t e ,
( i i )  Second, a t  a s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a te  o f 8 per cen t the  Keban HE 
would s t i l l  be more econom ical, bu t no t as much as b e fo re , s ince  the gap between 
th e  pv o f t o t a l  c o s ts  of Keban and th e  Thermal narrows c o n sid e rab ly , (Compare 
K eban's 0565.8 thousand d o lla r s  w ith  the  T herm al's 0379«6 thousand d o l la r s ) ,
( i i i )  A t a  10 p er  c e n t  s o c i a l  d is c o u n t  r a t e ,  Keban HE l o s e s  i t s  
a d v a n ta g e  so  a s  t o  g iv e  way to  th e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  th e  Therm al p r o j e c t .  Compare 
K eb an 's pv o f  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  0 3 5 7 ,9  th ou sand  d o l l a r s  w ith  th e  T h erm a l's  052O_,6 
th ou sand  d o l l a r s .  I t  m u st, h ow ever, be p o in te d  o u t t h a t  th e  Therm al w i l l  be  
th e  c h o ic e  ev en  i f  z i s  ta k en  a s  th e  o f f i c i a l  ex ch a n g e r a t e .  B ut th e  a d v a n ta g e  
o f  Therm al becom es la r g e r  when z i s  ta k en  a s  0 .5 5  p er  c e n t  (on  o f f i c i a l  exch an ge  
r a t e  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  b etw een  th e  two t o t a l  c o s t s  w i l l  be 022  th ou san d  d o l l a r s ,  
w h ile  i f  z = 0 ,5 3  ta k e n  a s  a p r ic e  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  w i l l  be 0 5 7 ,3  thousand  d o l l a r s ) ,
( i v )  One may th e n  c o n c lu d e  th a t  tlie  c h o ic e  b e tw een  th e  Keban HE and 
th e  Therm al i s  q u i t e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  th e  ch o sen  s o c i a l  d is c o u n t  r a t e  a s  w e l l  a s  to  
th e  s o c i a l  p r ic e  o f  f o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e .
The e f f e c t  o f  th e  l a t t e r  p aram eter on t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  w i l l  be more 
n o t i c e a b le  when we com pute pv f o r  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  in  z .
T ables r e la te d  to  fo re ig n  exchange c o rre c t io n  in troduced  on the 
c a p i ta l  investm ent f o r  v a rio u s  va lues of z and the pv comparisons o f both  
a l te r n a t iv e s  as corresponding  to  d i f f e r e n t  z va lues a re  p resen ted  in  th e  
Appendix a t  th e  end o f th i s  ch ap te r .
H ow ever, th e  ran ge o f  v a r i a t i o n s  in  pv o f  th e  p r o j e c t s  due to  ch a n g es  
i n  i  and z a r e  sum m arized and shown in  th e  f o l lo w in g  T a b le s  (T a b le s  l 6  and 1 7 ) ,  
F ig u r e s  1 and 2 p r e s e n t  th e s e  r e s u l t s  in  a d iagram m atic  fo rm . Each l i n e  in  a 
diagram  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  v a r i a t i o n s  in  pv due t o  ch a n g es in  a f o r  a p a r t i c u la r  
v a lu e  o f  i .
Table 16,
3 3 6
P resen t Value C a lcu la tio n  of T o ta l Cost o f Keban HEt 
fo r  v a rio u s  va lues of i  and z
0000 '
X 1.0 1.53 _lo30 lo 60 1.80 2.0
0.06 342,6 577,7 593,8 406,3 427,8 449.0
0.08 329,8 363,8 581,4 591,7 412,5 452,9
0.10 324,5 537,9 573,2 383,4 403,8 426,2
Table 17« P rese n t Value C a lcu la tio n  o f T o ta l Cost o f the Thermal 





1.0 1*33 1.30 1,60 1.80 2.0
0.06 438,4 478,6 489,1 493,2 507,3 319,8
0,08 560,7 379,4 389,4 393,1 406,6 418,0
0.10 502,5 520,6 350,1 553,6 546,7 337,8
R esu lts  a re  se lf -e x p la n a to ry ,, bu t a sh o r t  summary of th e  r e s u l t s  
may be h e lp fu l*
1 , As can be seen from Tables 16 and 17 a t  6 per cen t and 8 per cent
r a te  o f d isco u n t Keban i s  more econom ical, b u t as soon as th e  s o c ia l  r a te  o f
d isco u n t r i s e s  to  10 per cen t Keban p ro je c t lo se s  i t s  a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  and th e  
Thermal p ro je c t  w ith  a sh o r te r  l i f e  and sm alle r i n i t i a l  c a p i ta l  becomes more 
economicalo
A h igh  r a te  of d isco u n t makes th e  pv o f c o s ts  of a p ro je c t  w ith  a
d is ta n t  fu tu re  (Keban HE) appear le s s  a t t r a c t iv e  as compared to  the  s h o r t - l i f e
p ro je c t .(T h e rm a l) . In  o th e r  words, the  h ig h e r th e  s o c ia l  r a te  o f d isco u n t the 
more a t t r a c t iv e  the  Thermal p ro je c t becomes. And th e  lower th e  s o c ia l  d iscoun t 
r a te  th e  more th e  Keban HE becomes a t t r a c t i v e .
2, The s o c ia l  r a te  o f d isco u n t a f f e c t s  the  choice a lso  tlirough i t s  
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  shadow p r ic e  of foreign-exchange z . G enera lly , the 
h ig h e r shadow p ric e  o f fo re ig n  exchange the more a t t r a c t i v e  th e  Thermal a l t e r ­
n a tiv e  appears to  be . This i s  because Keban HE invo lves a la rg e r  amount of 
sca rce  fo re ig n  exchange f o r  g en e ra tin g  s ta t io n s  and tran sm iss io n  netw orks.
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One can s ta t e  c a te g o r ic a l ly  t h a t ,  i f  th e  s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a te  i s  
8 per cen t and provided  th a t  a i s  n o t over 60 per c e n t,th e  Keban HE is  a d m iss ib le . 
But as soon as a i s  in c reased  to  0 .80  p er c e n t, Keban w i l l  no t q u a lify  fo r  
s e le c t io n ,
The Thermal a l te rn a t iv e ,-  on the  o th e r liand, i s  no t q u a lif ie d  fo r  
s e le c t io n  i f  the s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a te  i s  6 per c en t and 8 per c en t, excep t 
when 2 happens to  be tak en  h ig h e r than 60 per c e n t, Eor in s ta n c e , i f  the  
s o c ia l  p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange z i s  80 per cent above th e  o f f i c i a l  r a te  when 
8 p e r cen t d isco u n t r a t e  i s  used , th e  Thermal w il l  be 5 ,7 thousand d o lla r s  
cheaper than  th e  Keban p ro je c t  fo r  th e  same v a lu e s . Hence, z = 1,60 i s  th e  
c u t-o f f  p o in t fo r  the  s u p e r io r i ty  of th e  Keban p ro je c t  as f a r  as 8 p e r c en t 
r a t e  of d isco u n t i s  chosen.
5. At 10 per cen t d isco u n t r a te  Keban HE w i l l  be r e je c te d  fo r  any
value  o f s o c ia l  p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange z, IVhereas th e  Thermal a l te r n a t iv e
w il l  be em inen tly  q u a l i f ie d  fo r  s e le c t io n  fo r  any value o f  z . (Compare the 
pv o f the  two a l te r n a t iv e s  f o r  any value given to  z ) .  I t  can a lso  be concluded 
th a t  w o rth iness o f the Keban p ro je c t  i s  n e g a tiv e ly  c o r re la te d  to  th e  s c a r c i ty  
of fo re ig n  exchange.
I f  we take  in to  account the  fo re ig n  exchange va lue  adopted by the 
SPO in  p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n  ( i . e .  z = 0 .33 per c e n t) , we n o tic e  th a t  the T herm al's 
pv o f t o t a l  c o s ts  w i l l  be 37,3 thousand d o l la r s  lower than  the  Keban p ro je c t ,
4 . The p re see n t va lue  pv, o f th e  Keban HE i s  more s e n s i t iv e  to  
v a r ia t io n s  in  th e  shadow p r ic e  of fo re ig n  exchange z than  to  the r a te  o f s o c ia l  
d isco u n t r a t e  i .
The Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e ,  on th e  o th e r hand, i s  le s s  s e n s i t iv e  to  the
p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange and more s e n s i t iv e  to  in c re a s in g  i .
For example, when z = 1,50 the  pv o f the  Keban p ro je c t  w il l  drop 
from 395f8 thousand d o l la r s  to  375,3 thousand d o l la r s ,  p rovided i  in c re a se s  from 
6 p er cen t to  10 per c e n t. Whereas f o r  the  same value  o f z , the pv o f the  
Thermal w i l l  drop from 489.1 thousand d o l la r s  to  330,1 thousand d o l la r s .  The 
drop in  the  pv of the  Keban HE w il l  be 20,6 thousand d o l la r s  w hile the  drop 
in  the  pv of th e  Thermal w il l  be 159^0 thousand d o l la r s  (Compare T a b le .16 w ith
1 7 ).
 ^ 'As  may be remembered, th i s  i s  co n tra ry  to  the  r e s u l t  we ob tained  in  the
prev ious a n a ly s is  where a t  8 per cen t (w ithout c o rre c tio n  fo r  z ) , Keban was 
more a t t r a c t iv e *
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I t  can be concluded th a t  f o r  a given value  of z th e  pv o f Keban 
i s  only  s l i g h t ly  s e n s i t iv e ,  when th e  s o c ia l  r a te  of d isco u n t in c re a se s  from 
6 to  10 p e r cen t; and f o r  a given value o f i  the  pv o f Keban i s  extrem ely  
s e n s i t iv e  to  in c re a se  in  z .
The c o n tra ry  i s  tru e  fo r  th e  Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e .  For a given 
value  of 2 th e  pv o f the  Thermal i s  q u ite  s e n s i t iv e  when the  s o c ia l  r a te  o f 
d isco u n t in c re a s e s ;  and f o r  a given value o f i ,  th e  pv o f th e  Thermal i s  
r e l a t iv e ly  le s s  s e n s i t iv e .  (Compare the  p re sen t v a lues in  Table 17, v e r t i c a l ly  
and h o r iz o n ta lly )*
KET BENEFITS: Tables 16 and 17 show th e  pv com putations o f t o t a l
c o s ts  of Keban and the Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  fo r  a 100-year l i f e  period  and 
f o r  v a rio u s  v a lues in  param eters i  and z . Table 18 and F igure  3» on the  o th e r  
hand, in d ic a te  the n e t b e n e f i ts  o f Keban in  term s o f the  c o s ts  of the  Thermal 
a l t e r n a t iv e .
In  a c tu a l f a c t  th e  t o t a l  co sts  o f the Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  can be 
lo g ic a l ly  assumed to  be th e  b e n e f i ts  ob tained  by not u n d e rtak in g  the t o t a l  c o s t 
of the  Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e .  Under th i s  lo g ic a l assum ption, n e t b e n e f its  o f the  
Keban HE w il l  be sim ply the  pv o f t o t a l  co st of Keban minus the  pv of t o t a l  
c o s ts  of the Therm al.
Table 18, Net B en e fits  of the  Keban HE; a t  v a rio u s  va lues fo r  z and i
0000 '
i 1.0 1.33 ...1.50 1.60 1,80 2,0
0.06 +115,8 +100^9 +93,3 +88,7 +79,7 +70^8
0.08 + 30,9 + 15,8 + 8,0 + 3,4 - 5,7 - 14,9
0.10 - 22,0 - 37,3 -45,1 -49,8 -59,1 - 68,4
I t  i s  g e n e ra lly  accepted  p r in c ip le  to  measure b e n e f i ts  by the c o s t-  
sav ing  re a l iz e d  by not having b u i l t  an a l te rn a t iv e  s t a t i o n . T h u s ,  a sim ple 
comparison of the  two c a p i ta l  co sts  and o p e ra tin g  co sts  w i l l  g ive us th e  r ig h t  
answer so long as  th e  le v e l  and th e  time p a tte rn  o f the  e le c tr ic -p o w e r o f each 
a l te r n a t iv e  i s  the same. This s tandard  way of m easuring b e n e f i ts  has been 
sim ply adapted to  our case s tu d y , as can be seen in  Table 18 and F igure  3*
^^^See A.R. B re s t and H, Turvey, B en efit-C o st A nalysis: A Survey. E . J . ,
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The fo llo w in g  conclusions a re  q u ite  c le a r  from F igure 3*
F i r s t ,  a t  6 per cen t s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a te  n e t b e n e f i ts  of Keban 
d ec lin e  sh a rp ly  as th e  s o c ia l  p r ic e  of fo re ig n  exchange in c re a s e s . Second, 
a t  8 per cen t r a te  o f d isco u n t n e t b e n e f i ts  o f Keban d im in ish  as soon as z 
approaches 1.80 and th e r e a f te r  th e  Thermal p ro je c t  becomes the  cho ice . T h ird , 
a t  10 p er cen t of d isco u n t r a te  th e  Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  q u a l i f ie s  fo r  s e le c tio n  
fo r  any value of s o c ia l  p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange z* The h ig h e r z, th e  more 
a t t r a c t iv e  th e  Thermal becomes as compared to  th e  Keban HE,
yMJonclusion In  the p reced ing  a n a ly s is  I  have taken c e r ta in  v a lu es  fo r  th e
param eters i  and z . These e s tim a te s  were based on th e  a v a ila b le  em p irica l 
d a ta  as w e ll as on some guesswork. Because we cannot r e ly  very  much on th e se  
e s tim a te s , i t  i s  worthw hile to  experim ent w ith  a l te r n a t iv e  v a lu es  of th ese  
param eters . Such experim en ta tions perhaps re v e a l th e  r e la t iv e  im portance o f 
th ese  param eters on the  r e s u l t s  o f t h i s  e v a lu a tio n .
I f  a l i t t l e  v a r ia t io n  in  the  value o f some param eter, say the 
shadow p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange ( z ) ,  makes a g re a t d if fe re n c e  to  the e v a lu a to r 'è. 
conclusion  about the  p ro je c t ,  then  one might be ve ry  c a re fu l  about e s tim a tin g  
th i s  param eter. On th e  o th e r  hand, i f  r e s u l t s  a re  f a i r l y  in s e n s i t iv e  to  the 
v a r ia t io n s  in  some param eter, the e v a lu a to r ' can f e e l  co n fid en t about h is  
conclu sio n , even i f  th e re  i s  room fo r  doubt about the  ex ac t va lue  o f th i s  
e s tim a te .
Though on c e r ta in  assum ptions, by app ly ing  th e  pv ru le  we were ab le  
to  compare the tifo a l te r n a t iv e  p ro je c ts  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  l i v e s ,  the investm en t 
d e c is io n  and choice o f p ro je c ts  should no t be based m erely on such c a lc u la t io n s .
The qu estio n  here  i s  to  co n sid er what may happen a f t e r  the end of the 
l i f e  of the  s h o r te r - l iv e d  a l te r n a t iv e .  G enerally  speaking , a fo re c a s t  th a t  
the replacem ent s t ru c tu re  in  the second 35 y ears  ( i . e .  see Thermal) p ro je c t  w il l  
have much h i ^ e r  annual c o s ts  than  the i n i t i a l  s tru c tu re  i s  favourab le  to  
p ro je c t  w ith  longer l i f e  ( i . e .  Keban HE),
B ut, i f  th e re  i s  a p ro sp ec t th a t  a replacem ent s t ru c tu re  w ith  much 
lower annual c o s ts  w il l  be a v a ila b le  th is  should be g iven  w eight in  th e  p re sen t 
choice as a f a c to r  fav o u rin g  p ro je c t  w ith  s h o r te r  l i f e  (T herm al),
In  o th e r  words, p ro sp ec ts  fo r  p r ic e  in c re a se s  and fo r  e x tra  co sts  
in c id e n t to  replacem ent a re  favourab le  to  the s e le c t io n  of lo n g e r- liv e d  a l t e r ­
n a tiv e , On the  o th e r hand, p ro sp ec ts  fo r  te ch n o lo g ica l improvements, changes 
in  s e rv ic e  requ irem ents and p r ic e  red u c tio n s  a re  fav o u rab le  to  th e  s e le c t io n  of 
s h o r te r - l iv e d  a l te r n a t iv e  (T herm al).
APPENDIX A
C ap ita l Investm ent as c o rre c te d  fo r  th e  Shadow Exchange R ate , Z<
AND
P rese n t va lue  comparison o f both a l te r n a t iv e s  on the  b a s is  o f 
d i f f e r e n t  v a lu es  o f shadow-exchange r a te  Z, and S o c ia l D iscount
r a t e ,  i .
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TABLE 1 « Keban h y d ro -e le c tr ic  p ro je c t ;  c a p i ta l  investm ent as co rre c ted  
fo r  shadow exchange r a t e ,  Z,
X 000 '
C ap ita l O utlay Foreign-exchangeP en a lty
C ap ita l investm ent 
as c o rrec ted  fo r  Z
Domestic Foreign^^) Z A dditionalPremium T otal


























(1 ) Foreign c a p i ta l  i s  th e  sum. o f the  
ments in  G enerating S ta tio n  and
foreign-exchange components of in v e s t -  
tran sm issio n  l i n e s .
TABLE 2 -  Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e :  c a p i ta l  
shadow exchange r a t e ,  Z.
investm ent as c o rre c te d  fo r
^  000
C ap ita l Investm ent Foreign-exchange
P en a lty
C ap ita l investm ent 
as  co rre c ted  f o r  Z
Domestic Foreign-exch . Z A dditiona l
Premium
T otal


























NOTE: Item  5» to t a l  c a p i ta l Investm ent f ig u re s  which a re  oorracted fo r  the
va rio u s  v a lu es  of shadow foreign-exchange r a t e ,  a re  used fo r  the 
PV com putations needed to compare econom ically the  Keb@n p ro je c t 
w ith  the Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e .
3 4 1
TABLE 3 -  P resen t va lu e o f  t o t a l  c o st  o f  Keban H.B.
For v'l = 100 i  = 0 .0 6  Z = 0 .33
9
^ 000'
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent 349*237
2. PW o f f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  50 y e a rs ;
349*257 (pwf* -  &fo -  50)
« 349*257 (0 .0543)
= 18.964 18.964
3. PW of Annual c o s t (O+M) over 100 y e a rs :
574 ( s e r ie s  pwf -  6^ -  lOO)
-  574 ( 16, 618)
= 9.538 9.538
4* T o ta l PW o f co s t o f Keban H.E. 377*759
TABLE 4 -  P resen t va lue  o f t o t a l  co s t o f Keban H.E, 
For N = 100 i  = 0 .06  2 = 0.50
^  000 '
1 . T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 366.425
2 . PW o f f i r s t  replacem ent in  50 y e a rs :
366.425 (p w f -  6^ -  50)
« 366.425 (0 . 0543)
= 19.896 1 9 * 8 9 6
3* PW o f annual co s t (Op+M.ain) over 100 y e a rs : 
« 574 ( s e r ie s  pwf -  Qfo -  lOO)




T otal PW of c o s t o f Keban H.E, ; 3 9 5 . 8 5 9
TABLE 3 " P resent va lu e o f  to ta l  c o st  o f  Keban H.E.
Forn  = 100 i  = 0 .0 6  Z = 0 .60
^ 000
1 . T o tal f ix e d  investm ents 376.524
2. PW of f i r s t  rep lacem ent in  50 y e a rs : 
= 376.524 (p w f -  6# -  50)
« 376.524 (0 . 0543)
= 20.445 20.445
3. PW of annual c o s t (Op+M) over 100 y e a rs :
« 574 (pwf -  6^ -  100)
» 574 (16.618)
= 9538 9.538
4 . T o ta l PW of co s t o f Keban 406.507
TABLE 6 « P resen t value o f t o t a l  c o s t o f Keban H.E, 
For (rx = 100 i  = 0.06 Z»0.80
 ^000
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent
2 . PW o f  f i r s t  replacem ent in  50 y ea rs :
-  396.721 (p w f -  6% -  50)
« 396.721 ( 0 . 0543)
-•= 21.541
3* PW of annuàl c o s t over 100 y e a rs :
-  574 (pwf -  6/0 -  100)
= 574 (16, 618)
= 9.538






TABLE 7" P resent value o f  to ta l  co st o f  Keban H.E,
P orn  = 100 i  « 0 ,0 6  Z = 100
^ 000'
r'*'*— — —" ---------
X. T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 416.918
2. PW of f i r s t  replacem ent in  50 y e a rs : 
"  416.918 (p w f -  6% e;50)
= 416.918 (0 .0543)
"  22.638 22.638
3* PW o f annual c o s t over 100 y e a rs : 
574 (pwf -  6^ -  100)
« 574 (16,618)
= 9.538 9.538
4 . T o tal B7 o f c o s t o f Keban H.E. 449.094
TABLE 8 « P resen t va lue  o f to t a l  co st o f Keban H.E.
P o r n  = 100 i  » 0 .08  2 = 0.33
^  000 '
i o T otal f ix e d  investm ent 349.257
2. PW of f i r s t  replacem ent in  50 y e a rs :
-  349.357 (pwf’ -  8^ -  50)
= 349.257 (0.0213)
“ 7.439 7.439
3. PW o f annual c o s t over 100 y e a rs : 
~ 5 7 4 (se rie s  pwf ~ 8^ -  lOO)
= 574(12,494)
= 7.171 7.171
4* T otal PW of c o s t o f Keban H.E. 363.867
3 4 4
TABLE 9 -  P resent va lu e o f  to ta l  c o s t  o f  Keban H.E,
E orn  M 100 Z = 0 .50
^  000'
r —
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent ■ 366.425
2« PW o f f i r s t  replacem ent in  50 y e a rs : 
= 366.425 (pw f’ - 8^ - 50)
« 366.425 (0 . 0213)
sa 7,804 7*804
3. PW o f annual c o s t over 100 y e a rs :
=574 ( s e r ie s  pwf -  8^  -  lOO)
= 574 (12,494)
-  7ol71 7U71
4. T o ta l PW o f  c o s t o f Keban H.E. 361.400
TABLE 10 -  P resen t va lue  o f to t a l  c o s t o f  Keban H.E.
Eor n *a 100 i  « 0 .08  Z 0.60
X 000'
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent 376.524
2. PW, o f f i r s t  rep lacem ent in  50 y e a rs :
= 376.524 (p w f -  -  50)
= 376.524  (0 . 0213)
8.019 8.019
3. PW of annual c o s t over 100 y e a rs : 
w 574 ( s e r ie s  pwf ~ 8% -  100)
= 574 (12 , 494) 1
=7.171 7.171
4* T o ta l PW of c o s t o f Keban H.E. 391.714
3 4  5
TABLE 11 -  P resen t va lue o f  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  Keban H.E.
8^. Z = 0 ,8 0For n = 100 1 »
^ 000'
1 , T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent .
2# PW of f i r s t  rep lacem ent in  50 years; 
« 396,721 (pw f’ - 8 ^ - 5 0 )
« 396. 721(0 . 0213)
= 8.450
3.  PW o f annual c o s t over 100 y e a rs :
*= 574 ( s e r ie s  pwf -  &fo -> 100)
= 574 (12 , 494)
= 7.171





TABLE 12 -  P re se n t va lue  o f  to ta l  c o s t o f  Keban H.E.
For n = 160 i  = 0 .08 Z = 1.00
 ^ 000 '
1 . T otoal f ix e d  investm ent
2. PW o f f i r s t  rep lacm ent in  50 years:
= 416.918 (p w f - 8^ - 50)
= 416.918( 0 . 0213)
= 8880.3
3. PW of annual c o s t over 100 years: 






4 . T otoal PW of c o s t o f Keban H.E. 432.969
a 4 6
TABLE 13 " Present va lu e o f t o t a l  c o s t  of Keban H.E.
For n = 100 i  = 0 .1 0  z = 0 .5 3
f  000'
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent
2 .  PV o f  f i r s t  r e p la c e m e n t  i n  50 y ea r s ;
“ 3 4 9 .2 5 7  ( p w f  -  1 0 ^  -  50)
= 3 4 9 .2 5 7  (0 .0085)
=  2.968
3. PV o f  annu a l c o s t  o v e r  100 y e a r s :
= 5 7 4  ( s e r i e s  pwf -  1 0 ^ -  1 0 0 )
-  574 ( 9 . 9 9 9 )
= 5 .7 3 9
3 4 9 .2 5 7
2.968
5 .7 3 9
4* T o ta ll  PWi.of co s t o f Keban H.E. 3 5 7 .9 6 4
TABLE lA "  P resen t va lue  o f t o t a l  c o s t of.Keban H.E.
For n = 100 i«  0 .10 z g  0,50
^  000 '
1 . T o taP lfix ed  investm ent 366,425
2. PW o f f i r s t  rep lacem ent in  50 y e a rs : 
= 366.425 (pw f' -  10^  -  50)
= 366.425 (0 .0085)
3.114 3.114
3. PW o f annual c o s t over 100 y e a rs : 
= 3 7 4  (p w f- 10^ - 100)
“ 574 ( 9 . 999) 5,739
4. T o tal PW of co st o f Keban H.E. 375.278
3 4-7
TABLE 15 -p resen t va lu e o f  t o ta l  c o s t  o f  Keban H.E.
For n = 100 i  = 0 .1 0  a = 0 .6 0
^  000'
ii.i
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent 376.524
2. PW o f f i r s t  rep lacem ent in  50 y e a rs : 
« 376.524 (p w f -  10^ -  50)
« 376*524 (0 ,0085)
= 3.200 3.200
3. PW of annual c o s t over 100 y e a rs :
= 574 (pwf -  lOfo -  100)
574 ( 9. 999) 5.739
4 . T o ta l PW o f c o s t o f Keban H.E. 385.463
TABLE l6  -  p re sen t va lue  o f to a l c o s t o f  Keban H.E.
For n * 100 i  = 0*10 z »= 0.80
L X 000*
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent
2. PW o f f i r s t  replacem ent in  50 y e a rs :
« 596.721 (p w f -  lO/a -  50)
« 596.721 (0 .0085)
- 5 .5 7 2
3. PW of annual co s t over 100 y e a rs :
= 574 (pwf -  10^ -  100)
» 574 ( 9 . 9 9 9 )  
= 5 .7 3 9
4. T o ta l PW o f c o s t o f Keban H.E.
396.721
3 .3 7 2
5 .7 3 9
405.832
3 4  8
TABLE 17 -  PV of to t a l  c o s t o f Keban H.E.
For n « 100 i  = 0.10 1.00
^  000*
1 . T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 416.918
2o PW o f f i r s t  rep lacem ent in  50 y e a rs :
= 416.918 (pwf* -  lOfo -  50)
« 416.918 (0 . 0085)
= 3.545 5.543
3 . PW of annual co st over 100 y ears  :• 
= 574 (pwf -  lOfo " 100)
= 574 ( 9 . 999)
= 5.759 5*739
4 . T o ta l PW of c o s t o f Keban H.E. 426*200
TABLE 18 -  p re sen t va lue  o f t o t a l  c o s t o f Thermal P ro je c t 
For n = 100 i  = 0 .06  z = 0 .33
^  000’
1 . T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent 94*155
2. PW of f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  replacem ent in  55 y e a rs :
= 94.155 (S in g le  pw f -  6/. -  35)
“  94.155  (0 . 1501)
= 12.249  12.249
3 . PW o f second d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y ea rs :
=94.155 (S in g le  pwf* -  6/0:. -  70)
= 94.155  ( 0 . 0169) ■ ,
= 1,5912  1.591
4 . PW o f annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
= 22.507 ( s e r ie s  pwf -  6 '^  -  100)
= 22.307 (16 .618)
370.697 379.697
5 . T o ta l PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 478.692
3 4 0
TABLE 19 PV o f t o ta l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
For n = 100 i  « Efo z» 0*50
f  000 '
lo  T o tal f ix e d  investm ent
2o PW of f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  35 y e a rs : 
® =s 103,250  .(s in g le  pwf’ -  6% -  35) 
« 103.250  ( 004301)
= 13.4328
3 . PW o f seconddisbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y e a rs :
m 103.250  ( s in g le  p w f -  6/0 -  70) 
= 103.250  ( 0 . 0169) 
= 1.7449
4 .  PW of annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
« 22,307 (pwf -  6% -  100) 






5. T o ta l PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 469.123
3  5-0
TABLE 20 -  FV o f  t o t a l  cost, o f  Thermal
For n « 100 i  « 6^ z = 0,60
^ 000'
1* T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 108,600
2. PW o f f i r s t  d isbursem ent f o r  renewal ine35 y ears :
« 108.600 ( s in g le  pwf’ - 6 ^ - 5 5 )
m 108.600 (0 . 1301)
=  14,128  14*128
3 . PW of second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y e a rs :
= 108.600 ( s in g le  pwf’ -  6^ -  70)
= 108.600  ( 0 . 0169)
=1.8333  1,835
4 . PW of annual disbursem ent over 100 y e a rs :
« 22.307 t-pwf -  6/0 -  100)
« 22.307 (16.618)
= 370.697 370.697
5. T o tal PW of c o s ts  o f Thermal 495*260
-  . 3  5.1
TABLE 22 « PV o f  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  Thermal p ro jec t
ïh r  n « 100 1 = 6^ z = 0*80
X 000
lo  T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 119*300
2* PW o f f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  35 y e a rs :
« 119.300 ( s in g le  p w f -  6/0 -  35)
= 119.300 (0 . 1301)
« 15,5209 15,520
3, PW of second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  JO y ea rs :
= 119,300 ( s in g le  pwf» -  6^ -  JO)
= 119,300 ( 0 . 0169)
= 2.016 2.016
4 , PV/ of annual d isbursem ents over 100 y ea rs :
= 22.307  (pwf -  6% -  100)
=22,307 (16.618)
=  3 7 0 .6 9 7  3 7 0 . 6 9 7
5, T o tal PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 507*533
TABLE 22 -  PV of t o t a l  c o s t of Thermal p ro je c t
For n *= 100 i  « 6^  z = 1.00
^ 000*
'v ................. " .........
1 . T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 150.000
2. PV of f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  55 y ea rs : 
« 150.000 ( s in g le  pwf» -  ^  -  55)
= 150.000 ( 0 . 1501)
« 16,915 16,915
5# PV o f second d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  ?0 y e a rs : 
« 150.000 ( s in g le  pwf» -  6% -  70)
« 150.000 (0 . 0169)
-  2,197 2.197
4. PV of annual disbursem ent over 100 y e a rs :
= 22,507  (pwf -  6^ -  100)
= 22.507 (16,618)
» 570.697 ; 570.697
5i; T otal PV o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 519,807
TABLE 25 -  FV o f t o ta l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
For n *= 100 i. ^  z * O. 55
^  000
1 . T o tal f ix e d  investm ent
2, PW o f f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  55 y e a rs :
» 94.155(single-pw f» -  8^ 8 55)
« 94*155 (0 . 0676)
= 6.5648
5. PW of second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y e a rs : 
« 94*155 ( s in g le  pwf' -  8^ -  70)
« 94*155 (0 . 0046)
» 0.4551
4 . PW of annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
22,507 ( s e r ie s  pwf -  8^ -  lOO)






5. T o tal PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 579.655
-TABLE 24 -  FV o f  to ta l  co st, o f  Thermal
For n « 100 i » 8 %  z « 0 .50
^ 000'
1 , T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 105.250
2o PW o f f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  55 y ea rs :
= 105.250 ( s in g le  p w f -  8^ Ô 55)
= 105.250 (0 . 0676)
« 6.979  6.979
5o PW o f second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y ears :
= 105.250 ( s in g le  pwf* -  8^ -  70)
= 105.250  ( 0 . 0046)
« 0,4749 0.474
4 . PW o f annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
= 22.507 (pwf « 8^ « 100)
=22.507  ( 12 . 494)
«  278.705  278.705
5. T o tal PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal ■ 589*406
-  13 & 5
TABLE 25 " PV o f t o t a l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
n ~ 100 i  *= z  “ 0*60
^ 000'
1* T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 108.600
2. PW of f i r s t  d isbursem tn  f o r  renewal in  35 y ears :
w 108.600 ( s in g le  pw f -  8^ -  35)
« 108,600 (0 ,0676)
= 7.3413 • 7.341
5 , PW of second disbursem ent f o r  renewal in  70 y e a rs :
= 108,600 ( s in g le  p w f « 8^ -  70)
= 108.600 ( 000046)
= 0,4991 0,499
4 . PW of annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
- 22.307 (pwf -  8^ -  100)
-  22.307 (12 . 494)
=  2 7 8 . 7 0 3  , 2 7 8 . 7 0 3
5. T o tal PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 395*143
" s  5-6
TABLE 26 -  PV of to M l c o s t o f Theiroal
Por u -  100 i  = 8% z = 0.80
^ 000'
lo  T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 119,300
j.
2 . pw of f i r s t  disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  35 y e a rs :
« 119.300 ( s in g le  p w f -  8^  -  55)
-  119*300 (0 . 0676)
= 8.0646  8,064
3. PW o f second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y e a rs :
» 119.300  ( s in g le  p w f -  8^ -  70)
« 119*300 ( 0 . 0046)
» 0.548 0.548
4 . PW of annual d isbursem ent over 100 y e a rs :
= 22.307 (pwf -  8^ -  100)
= 22.307 ( 12 . 494)
= 279. 703 278.703
5. T otal PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 406.615
“ 3^5
TABLE 27 -  PV o f t o t a l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
For n « 100 , i  = 8^ z = 1 .0 0
X/ooo
1. T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 130.000
2. PW of f i r s t  d isbursem tn  fo r  renewal in  35 y e a rs :
“ 130*000 ( s in g le  pwf* -  8^ -  35)
-  I 3O0OOO (0 . 0676)
-  8*788 8*788
3# PW of second d isbursem tn fo r  renewal in  70 y ea rs :
= 130.000 ( s in g le  pwf* -  85^  -  70)
-  150.000 (0 . 0046)
-  0.598 0.598
4 . PW o f annual co st (o & m) over 100 y e a rs :
« 22*307 (pwf « 8^ -  100)
-  22*307 (12 . 494)
= 2 7 8 .# 3  278*703
5* T o ta l PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 418.089
"3^5 8
TABLE 28 -mPV o f to ta l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
For n « 100 i  *= 10% z = 0 .3 3
% 000'
1* T o ta l fix e d  investm ent . 94*155
2» PW of f i r s t  d isbursem ent fo r  renewal in  35 y ea rs :
= 94*155 ( s in g le  pwf* -  10% -  35)
= 94.155 (0 .0356)
“ 3.3519 ‘ 5.351
3o PW o f second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y e a rs :
“ 94,155 ( s in g le  p w f -  10% -  ?0)
= 94.155 (0 . 0013)
= 0.1224  0 .122
4 , PW o f annual d isbursem tns (o & m) over 100 y e a rs :
= 22. 307 ( s e r ie s  pwf -  10% -  lOO)
= 22.307 ( 9 . 999)
=  2 2 3 . 0 4 7  2 2 3 , 0 4 7
5* T o tal PW of c o s ts  o f Thermal 320.675
3 5 3
TABLE 29 -  FT o f  to ta l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
For n -  100 i  = 10% z = O.5O
X 000'
lo  T o tal f ix e d  investm ent 103*250
2. PV o f  f i r s t  d isbursem ent f o r  renewal in  35 y ea rs :
-  103,250  ( s in g le  p w f -  10% -  35)
« 103.250  ( 0 . 0356)
= 3.675  3.675
3. PW o f second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y ea rs :
= 103.250  ( s in g le  p w f -  10% -  ?0)
» 103.250  ( 0 . 0013)
= 0.1342  0.134
4* PW o f annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
« 22. 30?(pwf -  10% -  100)
« 22. 307 ( 9 . 999)
=  2 2 3 . 0 4 7  2 2 3 , 0 4 7
5, T o tal PW of c o s ts  o f Thermal 330.106
TABLE 30 « BA o f  t o ta l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
For n « 100 i  -  10% z = 0*60
% 000
lo  T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent 108*600
2. FW^df f i r s t  disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  55 y ea rs ;
= 108.600 ( s in g le  p w f -  10% -  $5)
-  108.600 (0 . 0556)
= 5.666 3,866
3o PW o f second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y ea rs :
« 108.600 (s in g le  p w f -  10% -  ?0)
« 108.600 (0 . 0013)
« 0.141 0.141
4 , PW o f annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
= 22*307 (pwf -  10% -  100)
= 22.307 ( 9 . 9 9 9 )
= 223,047 223.047
5* T o ta l PW o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 355.654
3 “0 1
TABLE 51 -  PV o f  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
Por n 100 i  « 10% z« 0 .80
% 000'
lo  T o ta l f ix e d  investm ent
2o) PW o f f i r s t  disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  55 y ears :
. -  119.500  ( s in g le  pwf* « 10% -  35)
= 119.500  ( 0 . 0356)
-  4 , 2 4 7
3 . PW o f second disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y e a r s 1
= 119,300 ( s in g le  pwf* -  10% -  70)
* 119,300 ( 0 . 0013)
« 0.155
4 , PW of annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
= 22.307 (pwf -  10% -  100)






5, T o ta l PW of c o s ts  o f Thermal 346.749
3 6  3
TABLE 32 -  PV o f  to ta l  c o s t  o f  Thermal
Por n = 100 i  = 10% z = 1 .00
^ 000'
1 . T o tal f ix e d  investm ent
2o PW o f f i r s t  disbursem ent fo r  renewal in  35 y e a rs : 
= 130.000  ( s in g le  p w f -  10% -  35)
= 130.000  (0 . 0356)
“  4.628
3, PW o f seconddisbursem ent fo r  renewal in  70 y e a rs : 
-  150,000  ( s in g le  p w f -  10% -  ?0)
« 130.000  ( 0 . 0013)
= 0.169
4# PW of annual d isbursem ents over 100 y e a rs :
« 22.307 (pwf -  10% -  100)






5o T o tal P\'/ o f c o s ts  o f Thermal 557.844
3  6  3
Appendix B.
lETEHNAL RATE OP RETIMT OP THE 
KEBAB , Al^ D THE THERim ALTEMATIVE
In tro d u c tio n :
As was po in ted  out in  Chapter 9» to ta l  b e n e f its  of th e  two a l te r n a t iv e s  a re  
n o t g iven , nor are  they b rough t in to  the  economic ev a lu a tio n  o f th e se  p ro je c ts .  
B en e fits  being id e n t i c a l ,  the  E .I .E , p lan n ers  have confined  th e i r  ev a lu a tio n  
method to the  comparison o f to t a l  annual c o s ts  o f the two a l te r n a t iv e s .  Simply,
the  l e a s t  c o s t ly  p ro je c t  was s e le c te d  fo r  im plem entation.
Annual g ross revenue and n e t p r o f i t  d a ta , a re  only g iv en , as e s tim a te s , 
in  one of th e  p re lim in a ry  brochures pub lished  by D .S .I . in  I 964* I t  i s  s ta te d  
in  th i s  document th a t ,  i f  1962 s e l l in g  p r ic e ,  th a t  i s  8 ,94 kurus -, per/kwh, 
i s  taken as th e  e le c tr ic -p o w e r  s e l l in g  r a te  a t  consumer c e n tr e s ,  the  annual 
g ro ss  revenue w ill  amount to  461,820,000 T, l i r a .  Annual n e t  p r o f t ,  which i s  
ob ta ined  by deducting o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance c o s t, and d e p re c ia tio n  from the  
g ro ss  revenue, w ill  amount to  272,557,000 T. L, ( l )
B ut, th e re  i s  h e re  a very  im portâ t p o in t which needs to  be made c le a r ,  
before  we s t a r t  computing the in te rn a l  r a te  o f  re tu rn  o f  th e  Keban p ro je c t .
That i s ,  the  accoun ting  Bet P r o f i t  given above (272,557,000 T .L .) i s  a wrong 
concept to  employ in  in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  c a lc u la t io n s . In  d e riv in g  
accounting  n e t p r o f i t ,  d e p re c ia tio n  i s  in c lu d ed  in  th e  annual c o s t o f  th e  P ro je c t ,  
I t  i s  however, wrong to  in c lu d e  d e p re c ia tio n  in  c o s ts , s in ce  t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  
c o s t i s  a lre ad y  f u l l y  allow ed f o r  by coun ting  the i n i t i a l  investm ent as a nega­
t iv e  cash flow a t  the time i t  tak es  p la c e , (2)
T h erefo re , fo r  in te r n a l  r a te  of r e tu r n ,  we cannot take  th e  accounting 
p r o f i t  o f the Keban as re p re se n tin g  cash flow s s in ce  i t  in d ic a te s  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  
d e p re c ia tio n . Thus, what we need fo r  in te rn a l  r a te  o f r e tu rn ,  i s  th e  annual 
cash flow  v/hich i s  sim ply g ross revenue minue annual o p e ra tin g  co st and main­
tenance . From the T able, p resen ted  in  Chapter 9 , we know, th a t ,  o p e ra tin g  and 
m aintenance cost o f  the Keban H .E ., i s  % 574*000 d o l la r s .  I f  t h i s  sum, i s
( 1 ) This p re lim in a ry  p r ic e ,  i s  perhaps, changed now, but fo r  s im p lify in g  my 
a n a ly s is ,  I  s h a l l  assume th a t ,  the above p r ic e  i s  v a l id .  For the  gross 
Annual Revenue and n e t p r o f i t  f ig u re s ,  see , DSI, keban Hydro-Dam and 
E le c t r ic  P ro je c t ,  I 964 , p . 3*
( 2) For th e  trea tm en t o f  D eprecia tion  in  In te rn a l Rate o f R eturn , see ,
P.Dç Henderson, B otes on P ub lic  Investm nnt C r i te r ia  in  th e  IJ.Ko, B u lle tin  
o f th e  Oxford U n iv e rs ity  I n s t i t u t e  o f Economic S t a t i s t i c s ,  Vol. 27, Feb, 
1965 , p. 59; a ls o , see A .J. M erre tt & A. Sykes, The fin an ce  and A nalysis 
o f C ap ita l P ro je c ts ,  Longmans, I 965. ,  P* 43* He S ta te s :"C ash  r e c e ip ts ,  o r 
p o s it iv e  cash flow s, comprise the  increm ental cash in  flow s, such as p r o f i t
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converted  in to  Turkish  l i r a  ( a t  1 % = 9 T .L ,) ,  we o b ta in  5.166,000 T.L. as 
o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance costs#
On the  assum ptions th a t  the Gross annual revenue i s  461.820.000 T.H. 
and o p e ra tio n  and M aintenance co st i s  5*166.000 T .L . annual cash flows 
( r e c e ip ts )  becomes;
AGP = 461.820.000 -  5.166.000 T.L .
AGP = 456. 654.000 T. L ira
This i s  the annual cash  flow  o f th e  p ro je c t which we need to  use in  th e  
in te r n a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  c a lc u la t io n s .
Because the  Thermal p ro je c t and Keban H.E, have id e n t ic a l  e l e c t r i c a l  
c a p a c i t ie s ,  i t  i s  f a i r l y  lo g ic a l  to  assume th a t  the annual g ro ss  revenue of 
the Thermal w il l  be s im ila r  to  th a t  o f the Keban H y d ro -E lec tric  P ro je c t ,  But 
i t  must be po in ted  out th a t  annual ne t cash flows o f the  Thermal w il l  depend 
on the  annual co s t which in c lu d es  o p e ra tio n  and m aintenance c o s t .
The fo llow ing  assum ptions need to  be made in  th e  com putations of in te rn a l  
r a te  o f re tu rn :
lo F i r s t ,  the  above-mentioned f ig u re  (456.654*000 T .L .) ,  w il l  be taken  
as re p re se n tin g  the re le v a n t annual cash flow s;
2. Second, annual cash flow s w il l  be assumed to  rem ain constan t
throughout th e  l i f e  o f the  p ro je c t;
3 . T h ird , as was po in ted  ou t in  the e a r l ie s  c h a p te rs , (C hapters 3 and
6 ) , f o r  in te rn a l  r a te  of r e tu rn  com putations, market p r ic e s  w il l  be used and 
not s o c ia l  p r ic e s  as co n tra ry  to  the case in  so c ia l  p re sen t v a lu e '( SPY) r u le .  
S im ila r ly , the  c a p i ta l  investm ent o f the re sp e c tiv e  a l te r n a t iv e s  ought to be 
taken , on the  b a s is  o f in c o rre c te d  m arket p r ic e s . Thus foreign-exchange 
c o rre c tio n  which I  have in troduced  on the foreign-exchange component of t o t a l  
investm ent w il l  no t be necessa ry  here .^^^
As can be remembered, the r a te  o f re tu rn  of any P ro je c t i s  the d iscoun t 
r a te  a t  which the p re sen t value of n e t cash flow  i s  zero . This r a te  w il l  be
( 3) This i s  a w idely-used assum ption taken in  PV and in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  
c a lc u la t io n s ,
( 4 ) As can be seen, I  am concerned here with the p r iv a te  in te rn a l  r a te  of 
re tu rn  and n o t so c ia l in te rn a l  r a te  of re tu rn .
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c a lc u la te d  by a t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r  method,
I  -  KEBAB HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT: IBTERNAL RATE OP RETTJRB,
I t  must be noted  th a t ,  to  f in d  the in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  of a 
p ro je c t ,  i t  i s  f i r s t  n ecessa ry  to  estim ate  the  t r i a l  DCP r a te  ^ F r e q u e n t l y  
a sim ple in sp e c tio n  o f the  cash flow  s e r ie s  w ill  t e l l  us w hether to  s t a r t  by 
guessing  a f a i r l y  low r a te  o r a f a i r l y  high one. In  g e n e ra l, i t  i s  
necessa ry  to  take the  average of th e  annual n e t cash flow s and use th i s  average 
to  work out the  t r i a l  DCP r a te  as i f  the  p ro je c t were an an n u ity .
But in  our Case Study, th e  average  w i l l  no t be needed, since  the 
annual n e t cash flows a re  c o n s ta n t. Then, the simple ru le  i s  to  d iv ide  th e  
c a p i ta l  co st of the p ro je c t by the  annual n e t cash flow  and f in d  from the 
p re sen t worth f a c to r  T a b l e s , t h e  n e a re s t  DCP ra te  to  be used fo r  i n t e r -  
p o la tin e  method; Thus, in  our Case Study:
C ap ita l Cost I  X 515.933.000 x 9 (?)
Annual Cash Plow B 456,654.000
I  „ 2.843.397.000
B 456 , 654.000 = 6 ,2
The n e a re s t DCP r a te  f o r  a 50 y ear annu ity  o f 6 .2 , i s  I 6 p e r cen t; 
the p re sen t w orth f a c to r  of which i s  6 ,2462(9 ). Hence, I 6 p e r cent should 
be used as the  f i r s t  t r i a l  d iscoun t r a te  and th i s  is  done in  Table 1 and 
2 where the  n e t p re sen t value (BPV), i s  found to  be + 6*123.96O T*L.
(See Table 2)
This suggests  th a t  the  DCP r a te  should be somewhat h ig h e r than I 6 per c en t. 
T herefore , the  o th e r t r i a l  d iscoun t r a te ,  to  be on the  sa fe  s id e , w ill  be 
taken  as 18 p er c e n t.
( 5) DCP ra te  is  no th ing  but in te rn a l  r a te  of r e tu rn . This well-known confusion
must be av e rted  now.
(6) Por s e r ie s  p re sen t worth f a c to r  (pwf) ta b le s ,  see M erre tt & Sykes, The Finance
and A nalysis of C ap ita l p ro je c ts ,  Longmans., I 963 Appendix B
( 7 ) The c a p ita l  c o s t of the Keban p ro je c t which i s  g iven  in  U^S, %, i s  converted
in t6  T,L. a t  o f f i c i a l  exchange r a te  of 1 % = 9 T.L,
(B) See Appendix Table B, in  M erre tt & Sykes p. 160.
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Bow, th e  in te r n a l  r a te  of re tu rn  com putation can he c a r r ie d  out in  th e  
fo llow ing  manners
A. The Bet P re se n t Value o f the  Keban H.E. a t  16% d isco u n t r a te ;
1) P resen t va lue  o f annual n e t cash  flow s;
“ 456 , 654,000 X (pwf -  16% " 50)
= 456 , 654,000 ( 6 , 2462)
PV = 2 , 849 , 520,960 T* l i r a  
1
2) C ap ita l investm ent o f th e  Keban p ro je c t  which i s  g iven  as % 
315, 933, 000 , must be converted  to  T. l i r a  because the annual b e n e f its  
a re  given in  T. l i r a .
I  = 315, 933,000  X 9 
I  = 2 ,843,397,000 T . l i r a
3) The n e t p re se n t va lue  (BPV) o f th e  Keban p ro je c t  a t  16% d iscoun t 
r a t e ,  w il l  be th e  FV of annual cash flows minus the c a p i ta l  investm ent 
I ,  th u s :
BPV « 2 , 849 , 520,960 -  2 ,843,397,000
BPV = 6 , 123,960  
i  ■* 16
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TABLE 1 -  FV of annual cash flow s o f the  Keban H.E, 
At i  « 16% and i  = 18%
:
T.L.
Years Annual n e t (a ) P re se n t worth PV of 
cash flow s f a c to r  (pwf) a t  cash flows 
T.L . i  -  16% i  = 16%
P resen t worth 
f a c to r  (pwf) 
i  = 18%
PV of 
cash flow s 





456. 654.000 (pwf -  16%
456 . 654.000 -  50)
(pwf -  16%
-  50) 
( 5 , 5541)
50 456, 654,000 X ( 6 , 2462) = 2 , 849 , 520,960 2 , 534, 429,700
TOTAL 2 ,849 ,520 ,960 2 ,534 ,4 2 9 ,7 0 0
B ote: a) The annual cash flow f ig u re s  of each y ear need to  be m u ltip lie d  by
the  re sp e c tiv e  s in g le  p re sen t worth fa c to r s  (pwf) fo r  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  o f 
16% and 18%o B ut, s in ce  annual cash flows are  re g u la r  s e r ie s ,  the  PV o f 
annual cash flow s over 50 y ea rs  w il l  simply be
annual cash flow s m u ltip lie d  by the  s e r ie s  pwfs. T h is , i s  6,2462 fo r  
16% in te r e s t  and 5,5541 fo r  18% in te re s t*  For th e  pwfs, see th e  T ables, 
in  Appendix Table B, in  M erre tt & Sykes, op. c i t .  p . I 60*
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I
B* -  B et P resen t Value (BPV) of the Keban p ro je c t  a t  i  = 18%:
1) P resen t value (PV) o f annual cash flows over 50 y ears  and a t  18%
disco u n t r a te :
= 456,654,000 (pwf -  18% -  50)
= 456,654,000 (5 ,5541)
PV = 2 , 554, 429,700 T. l i r a
2
2) The i n i t i a l  c a p i ta l  investm ent of the  Keban H.E. p ro je c t :
I  » 2 ,845,397,000 T . l i r a
3) The n e t p re sen t va lue  (NPV) o f the  p ro je c t  a t  i  = 18%
BPV = 2 , 534, 429,700  -  2 ,843,597,000
BPV = -  308, 967,500 
i  = 18
The above PV com putations exp la in  th a t  the DCP re tu rn  l i e s  between l6% and 1 ^ .  
As i s  seen, I  have c a lc u la te d  above, the  PV of the n e t cash flows a t  both r a te s  
and su b tra c te d  the  i n i t i a l  c a p i ta l  c o s t of 2,845,397,000 T. l i r a ,  to  f in d  th e  
BPV8 o f the p ro je c t  a t  th e se  two r a t e s .  The r e s u l t s  o f th e se  FV c a lc u la t io n s , 
a re  ta b u la te d  in  Table 2*
TABLE 2 -  PV of cash flow s of the Keban H .E .: a t  i  » 16% and i = 18%





S erie s  p re sen t 
worth f a c to r  
(pwf)
Discounted l&fo 
Cash Flows S e rie s  p re sen t 




a t  i  = 18%




« 2 , 843 , 397,000
456. 654.000
456 . 654.000
“ 2,843,397,000 "  2,843,397,000
•
(6,2462)(*)
(5,5541)(^) 2, 534, 429,700
50 456, 654,000 2, 849, 520,960
B et P resen t Value -i- 6 ,123,960 -  308,967,300
B o te : (a ) S e rie s  p re sen t worth f a c to r  (pw f), which co rre sp o n d s .to  16% in te r e s t
and to  50 y ears  l i f e  p e rio d .
(b) S e rie s  pwf fo r  18% in te r e s t  and f o r  50 y ear l i f e  p e rio d . Appendix 
Table B, in  M erre tt & Sykes, op. c i t .  p. l60«
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G. -  INTERPOLATIONMETHOD TO WORK OUT DCF RATE
At the c o rre c t DCP r a t e ,  th e  c a lc u la te d  n e t p re sen t va lue  i s  zero , but we
have one p o s i t iv e  n e t p re se n t value o f T .L ., + 6,123,960 and one n e g a tiv e  n e t
p re sen t value of T .L ., -  308,967,300. The c o rre c t in te rn a l  r a t e  o f r e tu rn  (o r  
DCP) i s  somewhat between 16% and 18% and th is  can be found by sim ple in te rp o la t io n ,
Net PV a t  16%: + 6,123,960
S u b trac t BPV a t  18%: -  308,967,300
D iffe ren ce  in  n e t p re se n t
value 315, 091,260
Thus, the c o rre c t in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  must l i e  the way
between 16% and 18%, so the in te r n a l  r a te  o f  re tu rn  becomes:
^1 = 16% +'
r i = 16% 4-
^1 = 16% +
^1 = 16.03
315,091,260
0 .0 3 8
11. -  THE THERMAL ALTERNATIVE: In te rn a l  Rate o f Return
Following the  above method, one can e a s i ly  compute the  in te rn a l  r a te  o f 
re tu rn  o f the Thermal A lte rn a tiv e*
As we have m entioned e a r l i e r ,  annual g ross revenue o f th e  Thermal, w il l  
be s im ila r  to  th a t  o f Keban H.E. s in ce  both  p ro je c ts  w i l l  be producing th e
( 9 ) In  c a lc u la t in  DCF re tu rn  we use sim ple p ro p o rtio n a l in te rp o la tio n *  S t r i c t l y  
speaking th i s  i s  n o t c o r re c t ,  but p ro p o rtio n a l in te rp o la t io n  g ives such an 
approxim ately  n e a r r e s u l t  th a t  i t  i s  g e n e ra lly  not worth th e  e f f o r t  to  be more 
a c c u ra te . I t  must be noted  th a t ,  fo r  i n te r e s t  r a te s  sep a ra te d  by 1% ( i . e .  3% 
and 4%) the p o ss ib le  e r ro r  from l in e a r  in te rp o la t io n  i s  r e l a t i v e ly  small* But 
th i s  e r ro r  can become la r g e r  when PVs a re  computed fo r  ra te s , sep a ra ted  by 5%
( i .e *  1^0 -  20%) 0 But e r ro rs  in tro d u ced  by a l in e a r  in te rp o la t io n  a re  too sm all 
to  have ap p rec iab le  in flu en c e  on th e  decision-m aking on investm ent p ro jec ts*
For more d e ta i l s  on In te rp o la t io n  Method, see W.G. Ireso n  and E.L . G rant,
"The P r in c ip le s  o f E ngineering  Economy,"op. c it*  pp 119-127; and A .J . M erre tt 
& A. S y k e s ,'C a p ita l Budgeting and Company Finance) Longmans, I 966 pp 10-16*
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same amount of e l e c t r i c  power and a lso  s e l l  a t  the  same r a te  per kwh* Thus, 
g ross annual revenue w il l  be 461,820,000 T. l i r a ,  as i t  was fo r  the  Keban 
H y d ro -E lec tr ic1 ^
But the annual cash flow o f the  Thermal w i l l ,  n a tu r a l ly  be d i f f e r e n t  than 
Keban H.E. because annual c o s t , com prising o p e ra tio n  and m aintenance c o s ts  
in  Thermal, i s  d i f f e r e n t .  In  o rder to  f in d  the annual n e t cash flow s (no t 
accounting  p r o f i t s ) ,  we must s u b tra c t annual o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance co st 
(O H- li) from th e  g ro s s  annual revenue o f 461,820,000 T* l i r a *  Annual o p e ra tin g  
and m aintenance c o s t o f Thermal i s  given as % 22,307,000, as can be seen from 
th e  Table in  Chapter Then, annual cash flow s of the  Thermal A lte rn a tiv e
becomes:
AGP » Gross annual revenue -  Annual co st (o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance c o s ts )
= 461 , 820,000 ( T . l . )  -  ^  22 , 307,000 X 9^^^^
« 461 , 820,000 ( T . l . )  -  200, 763,000 Tolo
AGP = 261, 057,000  To l i r a
This n e t annual cash flow  f ig u re , i s  what we need fo r  computing th e  PV o f cash
C13)flow s over a 35 y ear p e rio d . To a id  our in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  c a lc u la ­
t io n s ,  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  f in d  the t r i a l  DCP r a te  by d iv id in g  the  i n i t i a l  c a p i ta l  
co s t by the  average annual cash flow  of the Thermal.
T r ia l  DCP r a te  = I  = % 76,500,000 x 9
AGP 261,057,000
6 8 8.500 .000
awimnm «ii.ii m
261.057.000  
T r ia l  DCP r a te  « 2*63
(10) Inform ation  on the  Thermal p ro je c t  i s  q u ite  l im ite d , but the  above
assu p tio n  seems to  be a lo g ic a l  one to  allow  us to  compute i t s  annual cash flows
and consequently  i t s  r a t e  o f re tu rn *
(11) T o tal annual c o s t of the  Thermal i s  % 26,568,000, but t h i s  in c lu d es  fix ed  
charges, (d e p re c ia t io n ) ,  E*E*I., A P r iv a te  Typed Document, Ju ly , 1968. p . l .
(12) Annua], o p e ra tin g  and m aintenance co st i s  given in  U.S* d o lla rs  and should 
be converted  in to  T. l i r a  a t  the  o f f i c i a l  exchange r a te  o f 1 % = 9 T.l*
( 13) As may be remembered, th is  i s  the  l i f e s p a n  of th e  Thermal p ro je c t;  See 
Chapter 9*
( 14) C ap ita l investm ent o f the Thermal i s  converted in to  T.L. a t  o f f i c i a l
exchange r a te  o f 1 % = 9 T.L*
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This means th a t  the  t r i a l  r a te  o f d isco u n t can be taken to  be $8%, where th e  
p re sen t worth fa c to r(p w f) fo r  55 y ears  i s  2,6315
A -  Bet P resen t va lue  o f Thermal A lte rn a tiv e  a t  38% d isco u n t r a te :
1) PV of annual cash flow s over 35 y ears  a t  i  = 38%
= 261,057,000 X (pwf -  38% -  35)
= 261, 057.000 ( 2 , 6315)
= 686, 579,910 t . l .
2 ) PV of c a p i ta l  investm ent o f th e  Thermal
I  = ^  76, 500,000 X 9 
I  = 688, 500,000 t . l .
3 ) The NPV, which i s  the d if fe re n c e  between PV of annual cash flow s and 
c a p i ta l  c o s t:
BPV = 686, 579,910 -  688 , 500,000 
i  = 38
BPV = -  1 . 920.090 t . l .  
i  = 38 -
B -  In  o rder to  o b ta in  a p o s i t iv e  va lu e  fo r  th e  BPV of th e  p ro je c t ,  we must 
now, apply  a t r i a l  f a te  which i s  a l i t t l e  low er than  38%. L et us take 36%
BPV o f the  Thermal P ro je c t a t  i  = 36%:
1 ) FV of annual n e t cash flows over 35 y ea rs : 
i  261, 057,000 X (pwf -  36% -  35)
= 261, 057,000 ( 2 , 7777)
= 723, 127,890 T. l i r a
2) Investm ent co s t of th e  Thermal
I  » 688, 500,000 T . l .
3) The BPV of th e  Thermal A lte rn a tiv e  a t  ^6% r a te  o f d isco u n t, w ill  be 
the  p re se n t value PV, of n e t cash flow s minus the i n i t i a l  c a p i ta l  c o s t .  Thus,
BPV = 723,127,890  -  688, 500,000 
i  = 36
NPV = + 34 , 627,890 T . l .
i  = 3 6 __________ _____________________________________________________
(15) For p re sen t worth f a c to r ,  see , Appendix Table B, in  M erre tt & Sykes. 
"C ap ita l Budgeting and Company F inance", Longmans, 1965, P« I 64 .
(16 ) P resen t worth fao to r(p w f) fo r  36% in te r e s t  and f o r  35 y e a rs . See, Appeii' 
d ix  Table B in  M erre tt and Sykes o p .c i t .  p . I 64.
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0 -  INTERPOLATION METHOD: To f in d  DCP Rate
Now, we have one p o s i t iv e  n e t p re sen t value o f + 54,627,890 t . l * ,  and 
one n eg a tiv e  n e t p re sen t va lue  o f « 1,920,090 t* l*  The in te rn a l  r a te  of re tu rn  
o f th e  Thermal i s  then somewhat between 36% and 38% and th i s  can be computed 
by in te rp o la tio n *
NPV a t  i  = 36% -  + 34 , 627,890
NPV a t  i  = 38% = -  1 ,920,090
TOTAL 36 , 547,090
T herefo re , in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  o f the Thermal A lte rn a tiv e  becomes:
^2 » 56% + 34,627,890 (38% -  36%)36,547,980
^2 = 36% + 0.94  X (2)
= 36% + 1.88%
“^ 2 = 37. 88%
CONCLUSION:
1 ) I t  i s  w o rth s tre ss in g  th a t ,  th e  rem arkable d if fe re n c e  in  the in te rn a l  
ra te  o f re tu rn  o f th e  Keban H.E. and of Thermal A lte rn a tiv e  (l6% v. 37%), i s  
due to  the f a c t  th a t  the l a t t e r  has a s h o r te r  l i f e  than the  fo rm er and i t s  
i n i t i a l  co st i s  co n sid e rab ly  much low er than  of the Keban*
A sim ple comparison between in te rn a l  r a te s  of re tu rn  of p ro je c ts  w ith  
d i f f e r e n t  l iv e s  cannot be m eaningful, u n less  something i s  done to  bring  them 
to  a s im ila r  l i f e  period* Thus, the replacem ent o f th e  Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  
f o r  an o th er 15 years  ( to  b rin g  i t  to  50 year l i f e ) ,  should be taken  in to  
accoun t. I t  should be noted  th a t  th is  i s  no t an easy ta s k , w hile we are  
co n sid erin g  in te rn a l  r a te  of re tu rn  ru le*  This d i f f i c u l ty  o f comparing two 
m utually  ex clu siv e  p ro je c ts  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  l iv e s  i s  one o f  th e  m ajor o b je c tio n s  
ra is e d  a g a in s t the in te rn a l  r a te  of re tu rn  c r i te r io n *  Por th i s  reason  I  have 
used PV com putations as they  a re  a more h e lp fu l and m eaningful apparatus to 
app ly , .in  . p ro je c t  comparisons*
2) The above r e s u l t s  on in te rn a l  r a te s  o f r e td m  should n o t be taken a t  
face  v a lue; they should be accep ted  w ith some q u a lif ic a tio n s*  This stems from
î ^
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the  f a c t  th a t  the  two a l te r n a t iv e s  have d i f f e r e n t  l i f e  spans. With some 
re s e rv a tio n s  i t  can be concluded th a t  th e  Keban H.E. p ro je c t  w il l  a lso  be 
r e je c te d  on the  b a s is  o f in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  r u le .  B ut, i t  can a lso  be 
argued th a t ,  an in f r a s t r u c tu r e  p ro je c t  w ith  a high c a p i ta l  in t e n s i ty  should 
n o t be judged on ly  accord ing  to  i t s  d i r e c t  b e n e f it  flows* I f  the in d i r e c t  
b e n e f i ts  a re  estim ated  and found to  be an ap p rec iab le  compnent o f the  annual 
b e n e f i t  flow s, the Keban H.E. could perhaps emerge as an a t t r a c t i v e  p ro jec t*
As I  have emphasised in  Chapter 9, the  in d ir e c t  b e n e f i ts  of th e  Hydro- 
E le c t r ic  p ro je c t  a re  n o t in c lu d ed  in  th e  b e n e f i t-c o s t  a n a ly s is  o f E . I .E . , 
though some o f th e se  e f f e c t s  might have been q u ite  im portant*
3 ) I f  in d i r e c t  b e n e f i ts  a re  excluded from th e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is ,
on the  b a s is  o f d i r e c t  b e n e f i ts  a lo n e , the Keban H.E. appears to be an unaccep­
ta b le  p ro je c t ,  both o f PV and in té e rn a l  r a t e  o f re tu rn  c r i te r ia *
I t  i s  f a i r  to  conclude th a t  th e  Theimal i s  more p ro f i ta b le  on th e  b a s is  
of the  two c r i t e r i a  I  have co n sid ered , and i t  should have been s e le c te d  in  
p lace  o f the Keban H.E. p ro jec t*
4 ) I t  seems th a t  th e  S.P.O . p la n n e rs , have accep ted  th e  H y d ro -E lec tric  
p ro je c t  w ithout (even) m easuring the  in d i r e c t  b e n e f its  o f the  p ro je c t .  Perhaps 
th ese  e f f e c ts  were only  in d ic a te d  in  q u a l i ta t iv e  term s. T h is , however, can be 




As in  K eynes's words "w ithout theory  we a re  lo s t  in  the woods",
I  f e e l  th a t  th e  th e o r e t ic a l  investm ent c r i t e r i a  expounded in  the second 
p a r t  of th i s  th e s is  a re  no t i r r e le v a n t  in  the a l lo c a t io n  of investm ent 
re so u rce s  and in  the  s e le c t io n  o f investm ent p ro je c ts ,  programmes and 
plans*
N eedless to  add th a t  some conceptual and o p e ra tio n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s  
a re  in h e re n t in  a l l  th ese  c r i t e r i a  in  so f a r  as q u a n t i ta t iv e  p re c is io n  i s  
concerned* Various p r o l i f e r a t io n s  and sometimes rough assum ptions have 
got to  be made in  app ly ing  them to  a c tu a l c ase s . But even so , as guides 
to  investm ent p lann ing  d e c is io n s , they a re  much b e t te r  ru le s  than, ad hoc 
methods o f investm ent a l lo c a t io n  c u rre n tly  ap p lied  in  p lann ing  p ra c tice *
With the  economic p lann ing  technique ju s t  s ta r te d  in  Turkey, to  
achieve c e r ta in  goals th e re  i s  a s tro n g  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  economic c r i t e r i a
w i l l  be w idely ap p lied  to  va rio u s  investm ent d ec is io n s  th a t  have to  be made*
A fte r a l l ,  the  b e s t investm ent p lann ing  i s  th a t  which ach ieves o b je c tiv e s  
o f development p o lic y  w ith in  the c o n s tra in ts  and l im i ts  o f scarce  reso u rces  
and time* I t  has th e re fo re  been the  main o b je c t o f th is  study  to  f in d  out 
the  th e o re t ic a l  investm ent c r i t e r i a  adopted in  Turkey and c r i t i c a l l y  examine 
the  p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  technique pursued during  the  fo rm ula tion  o f the  
F i r s t  F iv e-y ear plan*
More s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  my purpose in  th is  study  was e s s e n t ia l ly  to  
provide answers to  the fo llo w in g  q u estio n s:
1) To see to  what ex ten t th e  p lann ing  teclm ique adopted in  Turkey
has been a f e a s ib le  one,
2) To what e x ten t d id  the d iscu ss io n  o f investm ent c r i t e r i a  produce any 
enlightenm ent as f a r  as Turkish  F i r s t  p lan  i s  concerned? .
3) To expose the  shortcom ings o f the  P ro je c t e v a lu a tio n  technique adopted 
in  Turkey, and a lso  to  in d ic a te  which c r i t e r i a  among a l l  those  d iscu ssed  i s  
the  most re le v a n t and s u ita b le  to  Turkish co n d itio n s .
4) To see i f  th e re  a re  fu r th e r  s t a t i s t i c a l  d a ta  problems fo r  a b e t te r  
p lann ing  technique and p ro je c t  évaluation*
( l )  By p ro je c t  i s  meant the sm a lle s t u n it  o f investm ent a c t i v i ty  th a t  
can be c a r r ie d  out independently  o f o th e r p ro je c ts ;  an investm ent 
programme i s  a coo rd ina ted  s e t  o f p ro je c ts ;  an investm ent p lan  i s  
an in te g ra te d  s e t  of programmes *
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I t  was shown in  P a r t I I  th a t  the  commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
c r i t e r io n  which i s  based on market p r ic e s  i s  im p erfec t and may lead  to  
m isa llo c a tio n  o f resources*  I t  was th e re fo re  concluded th a t  the p lann ir..$ 
agency re sp o n s ib le  fo r  investm ent a p p ra is a l  would need to  in tro d u ce  s o c ia .  
investm ent c r i t e r i a  th a t  a re  based on accounting  p r ic e s  r a th e r  than  market 
p r ic e s .  I t  was a lso  emphasized th a t  the  p r iv a te  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  
need to  be rep laced  by b e t te r  investm ent ru le s ,  in  so f a r  as ev a lu a tio n  
i s  to  be made from the s o c ie ty 's  p o in t o f view.
To th i s  end, I  have d iscu ssed  some o f the most common investm ent 
c r i t e r i a  in  g re a t d e t a i l ;  and some were only b r i e f ly  m entioned. The 
investm ent c r i t e r i a  I  have in tro d u ced  have inc luded  c a p ita l- tu rn o v e r  c r i t e r io n ,  
s o c ia l  m arginal p ro d u c tiv ity  (SMP) c r i t e r io n  and f i n a l ly  s o c ia l  p re sen t value 
(SPV) c r i t e r io n .  O ther c r i t e r i a ,  namely m arginal per c a p ita  re investm en t 
c r i t e r i a ,  m arginal growth c o n tr ib u tio n  and time s e r ie s  c r i t e r i a  are  no t 
analysed  in  d e t a i l  s in ce  they  a re  no t meant to  be form al c r i t e r i a  ( a t  l e a s t  
a t  m ic ro -le v e l)  and they  can be taken  care of by the  a p p lic a tio n  o f s o c ia l  
p re sen t value (SPV) ru le  by m an ipu la ting  the d isco u n t r a te  i t  r e q u ire s .
But the  form er s e t  of c r i t e r i a  a re  e x te n s iv e ly  analysed  and the 
co n d itio n s  in  which they  a re  a p p lic a b le  were po in ted  o u t. There i s  no need 
to  e la b o ra te  more on each in d iv id u a l c r i t e r io n  th a t  I  have c r i t i c a l l y  
surveyed in  the  t h e s i s .  However, th e re  a re  many im portan t is su e s  and 
im p lic a tio n s  which d e riv e  from each c r i t e r io n  and th e se , I  b e lie v e , could 
be a u se fu l guide fo r  p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n .
This i s  what P a r t I I  o f th i s  th e s is  has a ttem pted  to  ach ieve .
The b a sic  p r in c ip le s  d iscu ssed  in  P a r t I I  have p rovided  a complete frame 
in  the  l i g h t  of which I  have attem pted  to  conduct two Case S tud ies taken  
from the P u b lic  S ec to r (P a r t I I I ) .
A lthough Turkey has succeeded in  runn ing  the economy along  th e  l in e s  
p f planned economic development v ia  r a t io n a l  p lann ing  and government s te e r in g ,  
h e r  F i r s t  F ive-Y ear Plan. ( I 963- 67) was by no means in c lu s iv e  of every asp ec t 
o f n a tio n a l p lan n in g .
The com position o f an investm ent programme and i t s  p r io r i ty  system 
re v e a l the  futur?e developm ental needs o f Turkey which i s  on the verge o f 
tra n sfo rm a tio n , but i t  lack s  the  sy stem atic  a l lo c a t io n  o f  investm ent 
re so u rc e s .
D esp ite  the  f a c t  th a t  th e  SPO had attem pted  a t  th a t  time to
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prepare  an in p u t-o u tp u t model, t h i s  had c o n s ti tu te d  a g re a t challenge 
to  th e  p la n n e rs , and consequently  w ith  i t s  u n re l ia b le  d a ta  was no t 
taken  as a b a s is  fo r  s e c to ra l  p roduction  p ro je c tio n  o r investm ent 
d e c is io n  ( f o r  in p u t-o u tp u t a n a ly s is ,  see Chapter 5 ) . On the  c o n tra ry , 
investm ent d e c is io n s  were based on p e rso n al ex p erien ces, su b je c tiv e  judge­
ments and sep a ra te  s e c to r  s t u d i e s * T h e  approach in  sh o r t was sim ply 
a departm ental approach which was based upon the c o l le c t io n  o f p ro je c ts  
from various, sec to rs*  This approach, o f course, has f a i l e d  to  provide e i th e r  
a r a t io n a l  a l lo c a t io n  o f re so u rces  o r co n sis ten cy  among s e c to r  programmes.
There i s  some evidence to  suggest th a t  investm ent p ro je c ts  
inc luded  in  th e  p lan  a re  no t a l l  re -a p p ra ise d  and s e le c te d  accord ing  to  a 
form al investm ent p r io r i t y  system ; but the  SPO has taken  f o r  g ran ted  the 
d e c is io n  o f the  M in is tr ie s  in  o rd er to  j u s t i f y  the  in c lu s io n  o f p ro je c ts  
in  the Investm ent Plan*
There was a lso  no o v e ra ll  assessm ent o f th e  p r io r i t y  consid ­
e ra tio n s  th a t  w i l l  b r in g  out the  r e la t io n s h ip  e x is t in g  between the p ro je c ts  
and the  economy (th e  only  excep tion  being  the in d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  p resen ted  
by the  SEE)* The SPO, which should re -a p p ra ise  and s c r u t in iz e  investm ent 
p ro je c ts  has accep ted  th e se  p ro je c ts  on the  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of the in d iv id u a l 
government departm ents* I t  i s  a f a c t  th a t  many p ro je c ts  subm itted  by the  
in d iv id u a l m in is tr ie s  were inc luded  in  the  p lan , w ithou t being  ap p ra ised  and 
s e le c te d  acco rd ing  to  n a t io n a l  c o s ts  and b e n e f its  o r any investm ent p r io r i ty  
system which talces in to  account va rio u s  in te rd ep en d en c ies  between in d iv id u a l 
decisions*  The SPO l a t e r  had simp].y aggregated  the  in d iv id u a l p ro je c ts  
(th o se  which a re  based on d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a )  in to  s e c to ra l  and n a tio n a l 
p lan , w ithou t seek ing  some kind o f co n sis ten cy  among in d iv id u a l p ro jec ts*
F i r s t ,  i t  can be argued s a fe ly  th a t  proposed investm ent p ro je c ts  
may no t be m utually  c o n s is te n t and balanced or s tu d ie d  in  the  l ig h t  o f o v e ra ll  
rep e rcu ss io n s  on the  whole economy* The r e s u l t ,o f  cou rse , w il l  be a se r io u s  
balance o f payments d ise q u ilib r iu m  w ith  a heavy in f la t io n a r y  pressure*
Secondly, w ithout a g en era l and uniform  investm ent c r i t e r io n ,  
th e re  i s  a danger th a t  p lanners  a t  various government departm ents w il l  t r o t
(1) Y* Kücük, The Macro-model o f th e  Plan, in  "P lanning in  T urkey", 
M*S*T.U., pub * No.9, Ankara, I 967, pp*?8«79
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out t h e i r  p e t p ro je c ts  and schemes* The p lans as a r e s u l t  w il l  he uneven 
in  q u a l i ty  and based on a v a r ie ty  o f perhaps c o n f l ic t in g  c r i t e r ia *  The 
problem here  i s  m ainly one o f co n sis ten cy  among p ro je c ts  and e f f ic ie n c y  
in  the s e le c t io n  o f p ro je c ts*
Turkey, w ith  the  excep tion  o f in d u s t r ia l  p ro je c ts  proposed 
by the  has n o t u t i l i s e d  the modern investm ent c r i t e r i a ?  which I
have d iscu ssed  in  P a r t II*  The c r i t e r i a  adopted during  the  F i r s t  Plan 
p e rio d  v a r ie d  between th e  sim ple commercial p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r io n  (as 
used by SEîCâ in  Case Study h o d ) ,  s o c ia l  p re sen t value (SFV) (as 
in tro d u ced  by SPO) and "eq u iv a len t annual co st"  c r i t e r io n  (by E .I.E* in  
Case Study ho*2)o This p o in t w il l  be d iscu ssed  l a t e r ,  when re fe re n ce  
w i l l  be made to  the  weakness o f p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  techn ique adopted in  
th e  Case S tu d ies  1 and 2*
As f a r  as s e c to ra l  programming techn iques i s  concerned the  fo llow ing  
p o in ts  can be made:
(a ) The b a s ic  s t a t i s t i c a l  in fo rm ation  needed fo r  c o n s tru c tio n  of 
an in p u t-o u tp u t model was d isp e rse d  more than  sca rce ;
(b) The in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le  which was prepared  and p a r t i a l l y  ap p lied  
was a sim ple one, but a t  l e a s t  had shomi a co n sid e rab le  in terdependence 
among p roduction  s e c to rs  d e sp ite  Turkey^s heavy re l ia n c e  on imports*
Changes in  the  in p u t c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  l ik e ly  to  be g re a t over time 
because o f the  e stab lish m en t o f new in d u s t r ie s ,  the s u b s t i tu t io n  o f dom estic 
p roduction  f o r  im ports , the adoption  o f new techn iques and ra p id  changes
in  the  fu tu re  com position o f output* The im portance o f such fa c to r s  in  
fo rm u la tin g  an in p u t-o u tp u t model have become c le a r e r  in  the minds of 
p la n n e rs •
(c ) There i s  a  g re a t need fo r  fu r th e r  improvement in  the  q u a l i ty  and
q u a n tity  of a v a ila b le  d a ta  and s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  the p re p a ra tio n  o f a more
(1)complex in p u t-o u tp u t ta b le   ^ * By the  a p p lic a tio n  o f economic models the
(1) I t  i s  very  encouraging to  see th a t  the Second Five-Y ear P lan (1968-72) i s  
p repared  w ith  more s o p h is tic a tio n *  The macro-model was based on more 
r e l i a b le  d a ta  end was advanced by in c lu d in g  more v a r ia b le s ,  more scarce  
f a c to r s ,  ( i .e *  s k i l le d  laboirr) and more sec to rs*  A ll sec to r-p la n n in g  
was p repared  on the b a s is  of more complex in p u t-o u tp u t techniques* See 
J* Tinbergen, "M ethodological Background o f the P la n ,"  in "P lann ing  in  
Turkey", IvLEoToU* (E d ited  by S * Ilk in  and S* Inane, )F acu lty  of 
A d m in is tra tiv e  Sciences, pub* h o ,9, Ankara, 196?, p*77
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weaknesses in  a v a ila b le  s t a t i s t i c s  and d a ta  w i l l  come to  l i g h t  and th i s  might 
e n ta i l  continuous improvement o f them*
d) By and la rg e , i t  can be sa id  th a t  th e  programming technique 
was b a s ic a l ly  sim ple , bu t t h i s  s im p lic ity  was due to  n o n -a v a i la b i l i ty  of 
re q u ired  d a ta  and te c h n ic a l capacity*
At s e c to ra l  programming s tag e  some word must a lso  be sa id  about 
the  im portance of in te r - in d u s t r y  m atrix  an a ly sis*
In c o n s is te n c ie s  and im balances in  fo re c a s t in g  ou tpu t ta rg e ts  and 
investm ent ta rg e ts  can only  be avoided by r e s o r t in g  to  an advanced i n t e r ­
in d u s try  m a trix  model. This model should take in to  account not only i n t e r ­
in d u s try  flow s but a lso  r e la t io n s  among d i f f e r e n t  s to ck s  and between stocks 
and flo w s. Very b ro ad ly , such a model i s  u se fu l fo r  the  fo llo w in g  reasons:
( i )  such models in  development programming can provide the p lanners  
w ith  an accu ra te  t e s t  of adequacy o f a v a ila b le  re so u rces  and he lp s in  the  
a l lo c a t io n  o f re so u rces  f o r  th e  achievem ent o f the  d e s ired  p roduction  le v e ls*
( i i )  in te r - in d u s t r y  models can a lso  provide f o r  each s e c to r  
e s tim a te s  o f p roduction  and im port le v e ls  which a re  c o n s is te n t w ith  the 
e s tim a te s  of f in a l  demand,
( i i i )  they  are  a lso  u se fu l in  checking o v e ra l l  requ irem ents o f a 
given development programme a g a in s t th e  a v a i l a b i l i ty  o f  such fa c to rs  as man­
power, c a p i t a l  and fo re ig n  exchange*^^^
But i t  must a lso  be po in ted  ou t th a t  th ese  models too can have 
some se r io u s  shortcom ings which may b e l i t t l e  the whole p r a c t ic a l  u sefu lness*  
(see  C hapter 5)» These models may have l im ite d  a p p l ic a b i l i ty ,  i f  th e re  a re  
s t r u c tu r a l  changes in  technology, s h i f t s  in  the  s t ru c tu re  of in te rm ed ia te  
demand, s u b s t i tu t io n  of dom estic production  fo r  im ports and te c h n ic a l sub­
s t i t u t a b i l i t y  o f im ports needed fo r  the  p roduction  of th e  same commodity a re  
ta k in g  place*
In  o rd e r to  overcome th ese  l im ita t io n s  i n t e r - indust r y  r e la t io n s  
have to  be forrauJ.ated in  th e  more general framework o f l in e a r  programming,
(^^8ee H. B, Cheneiy and P . G, C lark , I n t e r - indust r y  Economics, John Wiley & 
Sons, I n c . ,  New York, 1962. Chapters 4» 5 and g (p p .8 1 - l6 4 ) .
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T his w i l l  a id  th e  p lanners  in  f in d in g  the  most economical way o f ach iev ing  
a given s e t  of o b je c t iv e s  and to  determ ine the e f f ic ie n c y  o f a l te r n a t iv e  
p r o g r a m m e s . I n  connection  w ith  production  techn iques and investm ent 
p r i o r i t i e s  a l in e a r  programming model can he lp  development p lan n ers  to  
inc lude  se v e ra l a l te r n a t iv e  techniques o f producing the  same commodity as 
w ell as a l te r n a t iv e  uses o f the  same re so u rce s .
I I .
In  what fo llo w s I  s h a l l  s t r e s s  th e  b a s ic  shortcom ings of the 
p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n  method ap p lied  in  Turkey d u ring  the  fo rm u la tio n  of th e  
F i r s t  Plan*
a . From th e  two case s tu d ie s  I  have d iscussed  in  P a r t  I I I  i t  can 
be seen th a t  d i f f e r e n t  e v a lu a tio n  system s and investm ent c r i t e r i a  were ap p lied  
in  Turkey. As can be remembered from the preced ing  ch ap te rs  (esp* ch ap te rs  
6 , 7 and 9) th e  S ta te  p lann ing  o rg a n isa tio n  (SPO) had re so r te d  to  th e  s o c ia l  
p re sen t va lue  (spv) c r i t e r io n  in  in d u s t r ia l  p ro je c ts  w hile o th e r  government 
p lann ing  agencies -  namely SEKA and E .I .E . app lied  "annual accounting  r a te  o f 
re tu rn "  and "eq u iv a len t annual cost"  c r i t e r io n  re s p e c t iv e ly .
I t  can be concluded th a t  th e re  has been no u n ifo rm ity  in  the  
a p p lic a tio n  o f investm ent c r i t e r i a  nor in  th e  p ro je c t e v a lu a tio n  technique*
The f a c t  th a t  each p lann ing  agency was l e f t  f r e e  to  choose i t s  own o p e ra tio n a l 
investm ent c r i t e r i a  can be regarded  as an exceed ing ly  m islead ing  approach 
fo r  reso u rce  a l lo c a t io n  and fo rm u la tion  of development programmes.
I t  can be argued th a t  the  SPO - C en tra l p lann ing  agency -  and o te r  
more s p e c ia l is e d  p lann ing  agencies ( i . e .  E .I .E .)  should cooperate  and in te g ra te
( l )' ' ' I n  a l in e a r  programming model two so lu tio n s  can be worked o u t. In  one
fo rm u la tio n , re so u rces  in c lu d in g  fo re ig n  exchange a re  g iven and n e t n a tio n a l 
product i s  to  be maximised. In  the o th e r fo rm u la tio n  ta rg e ts  f o r  expansion 
o f n a tio n a l income and l im ita t io n s  on i t s  com position are  s p e c if ie d . The 
maximum amount of fo re ig n  borrowing c o n s is te n t w ith  th e se  o b je c tiv e s  a re  taken 
as a t e s t  of e f f ic ie n c y . I f  p r a c t ic a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  l in e a r  models ( i . e .  
u n c e r ta in ty , n o n - l in e a r i t ie . i  and da ta  problem) can be overcome, b u ild in g  up 
a programming m a trix  and i t s  so lu tio n  can provide answers to  such q u estio n s  
as the  re s p e c tiv e  le v e ls  of investm ent and the r a te  o f growth of consumer 
and c a p i ta l  goods in d u s tr ie s ;  the  optimum com bination o f in d u s tr ie s  and 
maximum r a te  of expansion which corresponds to  the  goals  of development 
policy* I t  i s  an id e a l  so lu tio n  to  the  problem of economic development, 
bu t i t  i s  extrem ely  d i f f i c u l t .  .For l in e a r  programming techn ique see H, B. 
Cheneiy, Development P o lic ie s  and Programs, UN Economic B u lle tin  f o r  L a tin  
America, March 1956, PP»60-72. » H. B. Qhenery, Comparative Advantage and
Development P o licy  in  "Surveys of Economic Theory" -  Growth and Development, 
American Economic A ssoc, and the Royal Economic S o c ie ty , V o l.I I ,  M acmillan,
St„ M a r tin 's  P re s s , New York, 1965, p p .157-155, a lso  see H. B. Chenezy and 
P . G» C lark , In te r - In d u s t ry  Economics, o p ,c i t . ,  p p .82-155*
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t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  approaches to  p ro je c t e v a lu a tio n  in  o rd e r to  p reserve  c o n s is ­
tency  and improve th e  q u a li ty  of s e le c te d  p ro jec ts*
However, th i s  im portan t p o in t has no t been s u f f ic ie n t ly  considered  
by the SPO in  th e  F ir s t 'F iv e -Y e a r  Plan perio d , though some e f f o r t  was made 
l a t e ly  to  arrange a j o in t  conference by th e  SPO and S ta te  Investm ent Bank (SIB) 
in  o rd er to  d iscu ss  and co o rd in a te  the  v a rio u s  investm ent c r i t e r i a  app lied  
by d i f f e r e n t  government agencies and th e  s ta t e  economic e n te r p r is e s .
b . A nother weakness of th e  Turkish  p ro je c t  a p p ra is a l  technique i s  
the  in co n s is ten cy  between the  p ro je c t a p p ra is a l  techn ique  ap p lied  by the  
SPO and E .I .E .  The form er used "shadow" p ric e s  fo r  c e r ta in  in p u ts  such as 
fo re ig n  exchange and u n s k ille d  lab o u r w hile the l a t t e r  agency did not co n sid er 
"accounting  p r ic e s"  in  any way a t  a l l .  (See Keban HE p ro je c t  -  C hapter 9 ) .
A p a r t i a l  a p p lic a tio n  o f accoun ting  p r ic e s  may cause se r io u s  m isa llo c a tio n  
o f scarce  re so u rce s  among d i f f i c u l t  s e c to rs  and p r o je c ts .  I s  a r e s u l t ,  th e re  
w i l l  be a heavy d ra in  on scarce  reso u rces  where they  a re  underp riced  and le s s  
d ra in  when they  are  o v e rp riced *
In  a d d itio p  to  th e se , the  d iscoun t r a te  ap p lied  in  s o c ia l  b e n e f it
c o s t a n a ly s is  was not a u n if ie d  one. This p o in t can be seen from th e  f a c t
th a t  the SPO app lied  a  d isco u n t r a te  of 12 p er c en t in  the Gaycuma paper
p ro je c t ,  w hile th e  E .I .E .  ap p lied  a 6 per cen t r a te  o f d isco u n t in  the  Keban
h y d ro -e le c tr ic  p ro jec t*  There i s  some evidence which su g gests  th a t  th e
SPO had considered  v a rio u s  f a c to r s  in  determ in ing  th e  s o c ia l  d iscoun t r a te
(see  C hapter 8 ) , bu t th e  same cannot be sa id  f o r  th e  d isco u n t r a te  ap p lied
by the E .I .E .  p la n n e rs . The l a t t e r  p lann ing  agency, as evidence re v e a ls ,
used e n t i r e ly  th e  borrowing r a te  of i n t e r e s t  (m arket) w ithou t g iv in g  due
( 2)c o n s id e ra tio n  to  th e  s o c ia l  o p p o rtu n ity  co st of c a p i ta l .^  '
A choice of a u n if ie d  ra te  of d iscoun t i s  of v i t a l  im portance in  
s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is ,  and th i s  should have been i n i t i a l l y  solved by
^^^These conference le c tu re s  are  published  in  "DPT ve D evlet Y atirim  Bankasi 
O rtak Y ayini -  " Y atirim  P r o je le r in iu  H azirlanm asi ve D e ^ e r le n d ir i lm e s i"
G ilt  I ,  G il t  I I ,  ve G il t  I I I ,  SPO, Ankara, I 968 .
( 2 ) ^ ' I t  must however be added th a t  ad justm ents of b e n e f i ts  and co s ts  a re  necessa ry  
to  allow  f o r  ( l )  tim e, (2) r i s k  and u n c e r ta in ty  and ( 5) the s o c ia l  opportun­
i ty  c o s t of c a p i ta l  re so u rces  employed. Follow ing t h i s ,  b e n e f it  and c o s t 
stream s can be assessed  w ith the  a id  of a re le v a n t c r i t e r io n .
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the  SPO and government agencies u n d ertak in g  p ro je c t a p p ra is a l .  C lea rly , a 
v a r ie ty  o f i n t e r e s t  r a té s  may lead  to  the s e le c t io n  o f u n p ro f ita b le  and 
in f e r io r  p ro je c ts  ( a t  l e a s t  from s o c ie ty 's  p o in t of v iew ). T h is, in  f a c t ,  
has been dem onstrated in  our case  study No.2 (C hapter 9) where, liien d iscoun t 
r a te  i  was in c reased  to  10 per cen t th e  choice has become in  favour of 
Thermal p ro je c t  in s te a d  of Keban h y d ro -e le c tr ic .  The im portance of s o c ia l  
p r ic e s  in  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  was e x te n s iv e ly  d iscussed  in  P a r t I I  o f th i s  
th e s i s ;  th e re fo re  i t  seems unnecessary  to  reproduce th i s  p o in t here  once ag a in .
c . I t  i s  a common p ra c t ic e  in  s o c ia l  c o s t-b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  to  
co n sid er a lso  the  in d i r e c t  and secondary b e n e f i ts  and c o s ts  th a t  might a r i s e  
from a p a r t ic u la r  p r o je c t .
As f a r  as th e  Gaycuma paper p la n t p ro je c t  i s  concerned, some o f the  
in d ir e c t  b e n e f i ts  a re  included  in  the  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t-c o s t  a n a ly s is .  As may 
be remembered (see  C hapter 7) th ese  b e n e f its  included  b e n e f i ts  a r is in g  from 
fo re ig n  exchange sav in g s , b e n e f i ts  to  consumers in  term s of p r ic e  red u c tio n s  and 
b e n e f i ts  to  u n sk ille d  workers employed by th e  investm ent p r o je c t .
But e x te rn a l or sp illo v e r  e f f e c ts  of th e  Gaycuma paper p ro je c t  on 
o th e r s e c to rs  ( i . e ,  f o r e s t r y ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  cement e t c . )  have n o t been taken  in to  
account, nor have th ey  even been m entioned. S p il lo v e rs  have been defined  
by R. N. McKean as "im pacts of a c tio n s  by some decision-m aking  u n i t  upon the 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f o th e rs , im pacts which a re  n o t d i r e c t ly  f e l t  by the  f i r s t  group.
For such a case study only  those  which a l t e r  the community's p roduction  fu n c tio n  
a re  re le v a n t  and th i s  can u s u a lly  be taken as exclud ing  those due to r e l a t i v e  
p r ic e  changes. T herdbre, those  secondary b e n e f i ts  and c o s ts  whidi c o n s is t  
p r in c ip a l ly  of changes in  income (o r  ou tpu t) in  th e  f o r e s t r y  in d u s try  which 
w i l l  p rovide th e  req u ired  raw m a te r ia ls , and income in c re a se  in  t ra n s p o r t  and 
cement in d u s try  due to  u n u ti l iz e d  cap ac ity  e x is t in g  p re v io u s ly , should be 
given monetary c o n s id e ra tio n s .
This i s  a province o f s o c ia l  c o s t-b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  in  which Turkey 
has a long  way to  go. This charge a g a in s t p ro je c t  a p p ra is a l  becomes even more 
pronounced in  the  ev a lu a tio n  of th e  Keban h y d ro -e le c tr ic  p ro je c t  by the  E .I .E .
^^^See R, N. McKean, E ff ic ie n c y  in  Government Ttirough Systems A nalysis. 
John W iley & Sons I n c . ,  IO58, p .134
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Since th e  l a t t e r  p ro je c t  i s  a m u lti-pu rpose  p ro je c t ,  i t s  in d i r é c t  and 
secondary b e n e f i ts  become more s ig n i f ic a n t .  Yet i t  i s  s u rp r is in g  to  note 
th a t  the  s p i l lo v e r s  e f f e c t  of th e  Keban HE p ro je c t on f lo o d -o o n tro l, i r r i g a t io n ,  
n a v ig a tio n , f i s h in g  and te ch n o lo g ica l s p i l lo v e r s  on th e  nearby m ining in d u s try  
( in  Mad en) a re  com pletely  ignored and th e re ''h a s  been no attem pt to  e s tim a te  
any o f them. They a re  only  l i s t e d  in  a s p e c ia l  re p o r t  in  o rd e r to  provide 
q u a l i ta t iv e  judgem ent.
d. T o ta l b e n e f i ts ,  as com prising prim ary and in d i r e c t  b e n e f its  ( in  
Gaycuma paper p ro je c t)  a re  computed on s t a t i c  assum ptions such as no changes 
in  p r ic e s  o f in p u ts  used ( in c lu d in g  shadow p r ic e s ) ,  no changes in  p r ic e s  o f 
ou tpu t and no changes in  d iscoun t ra te s*  A ll th ese  assum ptions make th e  
economic e v a lu a tio n  o f th e  SPO a r a th e r  sim ple one. Changes in  a l l  th e se  
p r ic e s  in  th e  fu tu re  need to  be taken in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  f o r  a dynamic and 
more acc u ra te  e v a lu a tio n .
At l e a s t  s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s is  in  re s p e c t to  changes in  the  above 
param eters could be used as an e f f e c t iv e  and u se fu l e x e rc is e .  But such a 
technique has n o t been used by the  SPO nor by th e  E .I .E .
The tim e elem ent i s  very  im portan t in  p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n . T heore t­
i c a l l y ,  the b e n e f i ts  and c o s ts  f o r  each and every y e a r o f the p r o je c t ’ s l i f e  
should be c a lc u la te d . This in  p ra c tic e  poses so la rg e  an a d d it io n a l  work- 
e f f o r t  th a t  th e  is su e  i s  g e n e ra lly  reduced to  an in v e s t ig a t io n  of whether 
th e re  a re  any good reasons f o r  not assuming the  b e n e f i ts  and c o s ts  co n stan t 
th roughout th e  l i f e  o f the a s s e t .
For the  Case Study N o .l the s ig n if ic a n t  f a c to r  i s  whether the  
m arket o r demand f o r  paper and c e llu lo se  p roducts w il l  change over tim e as to
a f f e c t  the  sca le  o f p ro d u c tio n  and the  s e l l in g  p r ic e  of th e  Gaycuma paper p la n t ,
I
o r whether the  c o s t o f f a c to r s  o f p roduction  w i l l  show a s ig n i f ic a n t  upward or | 
downward tre n d . These are  f a c to r s  r e la te d  to  the fu tu re  and any attem pt to  [
e s tim ate  th e se  w il l  p re sen t as many in a cc u ra c ie s  as n e g le c tin g  i t  does s in ce  |
( l )  nobody i s  c e r ta in  what the  growth w i l l  be 20 y ea rs  hence and ( 2) even i f  j
they  were i t  does no t mean th a t  i t  would have a p ro p o r tio n a l e f f e c t  upon the  I
b e n e f i t  and co st stream s, due to  the m ainly unknown fu tu re  e f f e c t  upon o p e ra tio n -!
i
a l  c o s ts .
I t  i s  th e re fo re  on a p r a c t ic a l  le v e l  th a t  th e  problem i s  u su a lly  |
solved by assuming th a t  th e  b e n e f i ts  and co sts  rem ain c o n sta n t tliroughout the j
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l i f e  o f th e  p r o je c t .  C orrespondingly th i s  i s  what has been assumed in  both  
Gaycuma paper p ro je c t  and Keban h y d ro -e le c tr ic  p r o je c t .
e .  The p re sen t value method i s  more d e s ira b le  from a th e o r e t ic a l  
p o in t o f view in  th a t  i t  tak es  in to  account v a r ia t io n s  in  the  tim e p a th  of 
re tu rn s  from a c a p i ta l  in vestm en t. In  th e  p re sen t va lue  (pv) ru le  bo th  co sts  
and re tu rn s  over the  whole l i f e  o f the  investm ent a re  reduced to  a s in g le  
f ig u r e ,  the p re sen t day v a lu e . D iscounting  to  p re sen t day i s  based on the  
assum ption th a t  c a p i t a l  i s  productive* The r a te  of i n t e r e s t  used in  th i s  
method i s  not th e  r a te  o f i n t e r e s t  o b ta in ab le  a t  th e  lo c a l  commercial banks, 
in  th e  money market o r from lo c a l  m oney-lenders, bu t i s  a shadow p ric e  which 
in d ic a te s  th e  m arginal r a te  o f re tu rn  on c a p i t a l ,  i . e .  the  o p p o rtu n ity  co st 
o f c a p i t a l .
There has been a long  co n tro v ersy  over th e  use o f a p o s it iv e  r a te  
o f d isco u n t to  determ ine p re sen t day va lues (see  C hapter A ll th ese
argum ents, however, do no t ob v ia te  the  need fo r  r a te s  o f d isco u n t in  p lann ing . 
They can be used to  argue a g a in s t  adop ting  the r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  p re v a il in g  
in  the m arket w hatever th a t  might be*
As I  have argued th roughout th i s  th e s i s ,  the  b e s t  c r i t e r io n  to  apply 
in  T urk ish  co n d itio n s  i s  th e  s o c ia l  p resen t va lue  (spv) which can take  in to  
account a l l  in d i r e c t  and secondary b e n e f i ts ,  s o c ia l  p r ic e s  of ou tpu ts  and 
fa c to r  in p u ts  as w e ll as th e  p re sen t va lue  of th e  re tu rn s  on c a p i ta l  in v e s te d . 
I t  i s  a forw ard s te p  to  see th a t  the SPO has u t i l i s e d  the  spv c r i t e r io n  to  some 
lim ited  degree. But the  ev a lu a tio n  techn ique adopted in  the a p p lic a tio n  of 
th i s  c r i t e r io n  does n o t seem very  s a t i s f a c to r y .
(^^In  de term in ing  the  d isco u n t r a t e ,  i t  i s  necessa ry  to  take  in to  account the 
s o c ia l  time p re fe ren ce  r a t e , . b u t  a lso  to  co n sid e r th e  s o c ia l  o p p o rtu n ity  
c o s t 'o f  c a p i t a l .  B ut, u n fo r tu n a te ly , the market i s  not p e r f e c t  an d -th e " '' 
q u e s tio n  a t  what r a te  to  d isco u n t has led to  much co n tro v e rsy . Some of th e  
th e o r e t ic a l  is su e s  have been d iscussed  in  C hapter 8 o f th i s  th e s i s .  But 
fo r  a p r a c t ic a l  study  the com plexity leav es  one w ith  the choice o f assuming 
e i th e r  ( l )  th a t  th e  two r a te s  a re  in  r e a l i t y  eq u alled  but th a t  market im­
p e rfe c t io n s  do no t perm it of t h e i r  id e n t i f i c a t io n ,  o r ( 2) th a t  i t  i s  the  
m arket im p erfec tio n s  them selves which preven t th e  two r a te s  from being  
brought in to  e q u a li ty . I f  th e  l a t t e r  i s  th e  case , then  one i s  in  tro u b le  
fo r ,  in  a d d itio n  to  th e  problem of measurement, one has to  decide upon the  
b a s is  of a va lue  judgement which of th ese  two r a te s  to  ado p t. I f  i t  i s  th e  
f i r s t ,  then  a l l  th a t  has to  be done i s  measure th e  r a te  which i s  b e liev ed  to  
most c lo se ly  approxim ate to  th e  market ra te*
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The 12 p e r cen t d iscoun t r a te  th a t  i s  adopted by the  SPO i s  a 
minimum r a te  as f a r  as the  s o c ia l  o p p o rtu n ity  co st o f c a p i t a l  i s  concerned.
In  view o f th e  acu te  sho rtag e  of c a p i ta l  and d iso rg an ised  m arket co n d itio n s  
the  argument o f u s in g  s o c ia l  o p p o rtu n ity  co st o f c a p i ta l  becomes a s tro n g  one, 
and I  f e e l  th a t  the  d isco u n t r a te  should be ra is e d  a l i t t l e  h ig h e r in  o rd e r 
to  r e f l e c t  th e  m arg inal p ro d u c tiv ity  of c a p i ta l  in  th e  next b e s t investm ent 
o p p o rtu n ity . This i s  v e ry  im portan t since  t h i s  way only  very  p ro f i ta b le  
p ro je c ts  w il l  be s e le c te d  and in f e r io r  ones be r e je c te d .
B esid es, a f t e r  reducing  the  b e n e f i ts  and c a p i ta l  c o s ts  to  the  
p re sen t value', a b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  i s  formed and th e  a d m is s ib i l i ty  o f the  
Gaycuma p ro je c t  i s  decided upon t h i s  r a t i o .  As I  have po in ted  out in  the  
e a r l i e r  c h ap te rs , b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  alone could be d ecep tive  since i t  doe® not 
t e l l  us much about the  s c a le  o f c o n tr ib u tio n  o f th e  p ro je c t  in  q u estio n  to  
n a tio n a l income, balance o f payments and employment which a re  th e  major 
o b je c tiv e s  o f the  p la n .
The choice o f which c r i t e r io n  to  adopt has led  to  much th e o r e t ic a l  
co n tro v e rsy , b u t from a p u re ly  p r a c t ic a l  p o in t o f view th e  is su e  i s  much 
sim p ler and r e a l ly  rev o lv es  around the  choice to  be made between e i th e r  the  
r a t i o  of the p re se n t va lue  of b e n e f i ts  and c o s t stream s o r t h e i r  d if f e re n c e .
In  th e  Gaycuma paper p ro je c t  (C hapters 6-7) the  s p e c if ic  goals  and 
c o n s tr a in ts  must be taken  in to  account before  d ec id in g  which c r i t e r i a  to  app ly . 
In  o th e r words, i f  th e re  i s  no e f f e c t iv e  budget c o n s tr a in t  and th e  Gaycuma 
paper p ro je c t  i s  the  only  p ro je c t  ev a lu a ted , then  th e re  i s  no elem ent o f choice 
to  be made in  such a s i tu a t io n .  In  such a case , a l l  th a t  i s  re q u ired  i s  some 
measure of th e  e x te n t to  which the b e n e f i ts  exceed the c o s ts  and from th is  
obviously  e i th e r  of the two c r i t e r i a  would be th e o r e t ic a l ly  a cc e p tab le . At 
the  p r a c t ic a l  le v e l  th e  r a t i o  i s  in  f a c t  to  be p re fe rre d  f o r  th e  sim ple reason  
th a t  the  f ig u re  fo r  the  d if fe re n c e  in  the  pv o f b e n e f i ts  and c o s ts  i s  perhaps 
o p e ra tio n a lly  m eaningless.
(^^ In  p ra c t ic e ,  however, a c tu a l s tu d ie s  have e i th e r  avoided th e  is su e  ( th a t  
i s  the  co n tro v ersy  on d isco u n t r a te )  a l to g e th e r  by d isco u n tin g  a t  v a rio u s  
r a te s  o r havé adopted th e  average y ie ld  on long-term  government stock*
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But, in  norm al case s , c o s t-b e n e f i t  a n a ly s is  i s  concerned w ith  
the rank ing  o f a r e l a t iv e ly  la rg e  number o f d e s ira b le  p ro je c ts  and 
s e le c t io n  of th e  b e s t s e t  o f p ro je c ts  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  budget 
c o n s tr a in t .
S im ila r ly , i f  the  Caycuna P ro je c t i s  one o f th e  la rg e  number of 
proposed p ro je c ts  w ith in  the  given budget c o n s tr a in t ,  then  the  investm ent 
c r i t e r i a  should favour th e  n e t p re sen t v a lu e ,b y  which i s  meant the  p resen t, 
value o f b e n e f i ts  minus p re sen t value of c o s ts .  In  the  l a t t e r  case 
(which i s  p la u s ib le )  i t  seems more fe a s ib le  to  e s ta b l is h  d e ta i le d  ta b le s  
in d ic a t in g  v a rio u s  p r o je c t s ’ n e t p re sen t v a lu e , b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o ,  in te rn a l  
r a te  of r e tu rn  and se p a ra te  f ig u re  f o r  prim ary and in d i r e c t  e f f e c t s ,  e tc .
This e x e rc ise  could be ex trem ely  u se fu l in  the f i n a l  s e le c t io n  of investm ent 
p ro je c ts*  This may avoid h a sty  d ec is io n s  on the  s e le c t io n  o f p ro je c ts  
which could be harm ful to  the  fu lf i lm e n t of p lan  ta r g e t s ,
f )  The ev a lu a tio n  techn ique of the E .I.E * too i s  weak in  no t basing  
i t s  e v a lu a tio n  on s o c ia l  p re sen t value r u le .  The Keban HE p ro je c t  and i t s  
therm al a l te r n a t iv e  a re  compared m erely by "eq u iv a len t annual c o s t"  c r i t e r io n  
w ithou t having given n ecessa ry  c o n s id e ra tio n  to  s o c ia l  p r ic e s  o f in p u ts  and 
o u tp u ts .
B esides, s in ce  the two p r o je c t s ’ l i f e  span i s  d i f f e r e n t ,  a 
m eaningful comparison can only  be made by b rin g in g  them to  the same l i f e  
p e rio d . This re q u ire s  th a t  they  should be compared fo r  an i n f i n i t e  p e riod  
under some le g it im a te  assum ptions. This, however, can only be made by the 
he lp  of s o c ia l  p re sen t value (SPV) c r i t e r io n ,  where th i s  approach has been 
c le a r ly  dem onstrated w ith  Case Study, No.2 (C hapter 9)*
But th i s  does no t imply th a t  an ev a lu a tio n  should no t t e s t  the 
s e le c t io n  o f p ro je c ts  by app ly ing  d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a ;  on the c o n tra ry  fo r  
a sound ev a lu a tio n  th is  becomes n ecessa ry . For th i s  purpose I  have demon­
s t r a te d  in  C hapter 9 th a t  the  choice of Keban HE i s  a wrong ono, on the b a s is  
o f in te r n a l  r a te  o f r e tu rn  as w e ll. As f a r  as d i r e c t  b e n e f i ts  a re  concerned, 
I  have found th a t  the Keban HE p ro je c t  re p re se n ts  a 16 p er cen t and the 
therm al a l te r n a t iv e  a 57 per cen t r a te  of r e tu rn  ( in te r n a l  ra te )*  Thus 
on both  c r i t e r i a ,  namely the SPV and in te rn a l  r a te  o f re tu rn  c r i t e r i a ,  the 
Thermal P ro je c t becomes a t t r a c t i v e .  Thus, i t  can perhapsbe argued th a t  the 
E .I .E . chose the  Keban H y d ro -e le c tr ic  p ro je c t  on some " im p re s s io n is tic "  
b a s is  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f s t r i c t l y  economic co n sid era tio n s*
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(g) I t  i s  o f te n  necessa ry  to  b r in g  in  some kind of s e n s i t iv i ty  
a n a ly s is  in  s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  . a n a ly s is .
The p ro je c t  a p p ra is a l  technique in  Turkey does n o t seem to  be 
extended to  an e x ten t which would b rin g  such an a ly ses  in to  t h e i r  ev a lu a tio n  
system . This appears to  be a se r io u s  drawback in  the  T urk ig h p ro jec t 
e v a lu a tio n  method.
The im portance o f s e n s i t iv i ty  a n a ly s is  has been c le a r ly  shown 
in  Chapter 9» where the choice between the  Keban HE and the  Thermal p ro je c t 
has been found to  be extrem ely s e n s i t iv e  to  the  choice o f param eters 
invo lved  in  s o c ia l  p re sen t va lue  computations* For in s ta n c e , I  have 
found th a t  the  choice o f p ro je c ts  i s  f a i r l y  s e n s i t iv e  to  v a r ia t io n s  in  the  
s o c ia l  p r ic e  o f fo reign-exchange z , and soQ ial d isco u n t r a te  i .  At a 
d isco u n t r a te  o f i  = 0 .10  per cen t and s o c ia l  p r ic e  o f fo reign-exchange z = 
0*33 p er cen t the  Keban HE lo se s  i t s  a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  and th e  choice becomes in  
favour of the  Thermal a l te r n a t iv e  ^^^*
This p o in ts  to  the f a c t  th a t  s o c ia l  p r ic e s  o f in p u ts  ( i . e .  c a p i ta l ,
fo re ig n  exchange) must be determ ined w ith  g re a t care  b e fo re  a f in a l  d ec is io n
i s  reached* I t  i s  a lso  im portan t to  note th a t  s e n s i t iv i ty  a n a ly s is  can. be
extrem ely h e lp fu l to  p lan n ers  in  in d ic a t in g  to  them what w eight they should
a t ta c h  to  each param eter in  th e  s o c ia l  p re sen t va lue  c a lc u la tio n s*  These
param eters may be taken  to  inc lude  v a r ia t io n s  in  s o c ia l  d isco u n t r a t e ,  s o c ia l
p r ic e  o f fo re ig n  exchange, s o c ia l  wage r a te  and probably  changes in  the  l i f e
p erio d  o f the  p ro je c t*  I t  i s  a lso  p re fe ra b le  to  see how the  outcome
would be a f fe c te d  by changes in  a number o f the more im portan t assum ptions
made about c o s ts ,  s a le s  volume, p r ic e s  rece iv ed  f o r  ou tpu t and the  l i f e  of 
( 2 )the  p ro je c t  '
(h) A lte rn a tiv e  p ro je c ts  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  s c a le  o f p ro d u c tio n , 
w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  p ro d u c tio n  techn ique and w ith  d i f f e r e n t  lo c a t io n  have no t 
been made a v a ila b le  du rin g  the  F i r s t  p lan  period*
The Gaycuma p ro je c t  fo r  in s tan ce  i s  examined in  i s o la t io n  w ithou t 
comparing i t  w ith  o th e r  te c h n ic a l a l te r n a t iv e s  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  lo ca tio n *
(1) I t  must be emphasised th a t ,  i f  the v a r ia b le s  adopted by the  SPO to  the 
Gaycuma P ro je c t a re  taken as b a s is  -  i  = 12 p er c en t, and a = 0.33 the 
choice becomes even more in  favour o f the Thermal p ro je c t .
(2) On th is  p o in t see ; Investm ent A p p ra isa l, Great B r i ta in ,  N ational
Economic Development G ouncil, I 967 , p .13*
3 8 7
Though Keban HE p ro je c t  (Case Study Ho*2) has been compared w ith  the 
Thermal a l t e r n a t iv e ,  th e re  has h a rd ly  been p ro v is io n  o f a wide range of 
ch o ices . The Keban HE should have been compared w ith  a  number of te c h n ic a l 
a l te r n a t iv e s  p o ssib le*  For example, two sm a ll-sc a le  hydro-dams v s . Keban 
HE o r co a l-b u rn in g  therm al a l te r n a t iv e  v s . Keban HE, etc*
Such p la u s ib le  and u se fu l a l te r n a t iv e s  have n o t been considered , nor
are  brought in to  the  prov ince o f s o c ia l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  a n a ly s is  in  Turkey*
This i s  perhaps so, fo r  the  sim ple reason  th a t  the  SPO o r o th e r p lann ing
agencies d id  no t have a lread y  p repared  p ro je c t  designs a t  the  time of the F i r s t
p lan  o r th a t  th e re  was n o t a  s u f f ic ie n t  number of ex p e rts  to  conduct re sea rc h
( 1)on the p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f having  a l te r n a t iv e  p ro je c ts  '  '*
I t  i s  sa fe  to  argue th a t  sca rce  re so u rce s , p a r t i c u la r ly  c a p i ta l  and
fo re ig n  exchange,cannot be e f f i c i e n t ly  a llo c a te d  in  the  absence o f such
a l te r n a t iv e  p r o je c ts .  An u ltim a te  r e s u l t  would be a m isa llo c a tio n  o f re so u rce s ,
whereas i t  i s  a rguab le  th a t  a t  a h ig h e r le v e l  of decision-m aking , a la rg e
number o f a l te r n a t iv e  investm ents would widen the  a rea  o f choice and hence
( 2 )improve e f f ic ie n c y
There i s  a lso  no evidence to  in d ic a te  th a t ,  a t  p ro je c t  le v e l ,  
in te rd ep en d en c ies  among p ro je c ts ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  between p ro d u c tiv e  and s o c ia l  ' 
overhead p ro je c ts  have been given  adequate a t te n t io n .  This c r i t ic is m
(1) I t  i s  s ta te d  th a t  " a t the beginning  o f the planned p e rio d , th e re  d id  
n o t e x is t  a s u f f ic ie n t  number o f adequate p repared  investm ent p ro je c ts  
in c o rp o ra tin g  r e a l i s t i c  a l t e r n a t iv e s .  In  f a c t  in  1962 the la rg e  indus­
t r i a l  p ro je c ts  m entioned a b o v e ,. .d id  no t even e x is t  in  id ea  form and the 
p re p a ra tio n  of f e a s i b i l i t y  re p o r ts  had ju s t  begun to  be d iscu ssed " , and 
i t  i s  a lso  added th a t  "im plem enting the  P lan  and conducting p ro je c t  r e s ­
earch  a t  the  same time has e v id e n tly  proved to  be an exceed ing ly  d i f f i -  ' 
c u l t  ta s k , lead in g ,,to  freq u en t b o ttlen eck s  of v a rio u s  k in d s" . For th is  
S ta te m e n t;■see H. Olcen, (p lan n er a t  the SPO), A Follow-up study ; the 
Im plem entation o f the Investm ents fo reseen  in  the F i r s t  Five-Y ear P lan, 
in  "P lanning in  Turkey", I.I.E.T.U., June, I 967 , p p .279-287° I  was a lso  
to ld  by one of the  p lan n ers  a t  the SPO th a t  th e re  was an accu te  lack
of p ro je c t  designs and p rop o sa ls  a t  the time the  F i r s t  P lan  was fo rm ulated , 
A p r iv a te  in te rv iew  w ith  C. Cinaa:, SPO, Ankara, January I 969*
( 2 ) J ,  T inbergen has po in ted  out th a t  th e re  was an acu te  d i f f i c u l ty  in  
o b ta in in g  p r iv a te  p ro je c ts  as w ell as p u b lic  p ro je c ts*  He a lso  concludes 
th a t ,  d e sp ite  the  f a c t  th a t  sev e ra l hundred p u b lic  p ro je c ts  were c o l l ­
ec ted , th ese  d id  not p rov ide "a s u f f ic ie n t ly  re p re s e n ta tiv e  p ic tu re  of 
invest-raen t p o s s ib i l i t i e s " *  See J ,  T inbergen, M ethodological Background 
o f the  P lan , in  "p lanning  in  Turkey", M.E.T.U*, F acu lty  of Admin.
S ciences, Ihib* Ho,9, Ankara, I 967 , p . 76*
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becomes very s tro n g  when i t  i s  lea rn ed  th a t  only a few S ec to r P ro je c ts
were a v a ila b le  o r p repared  fo r  an economic e v a lu a tio n . D espite  the f a c t
th a t  investm ent a l lo c a t io n  was a p p ro p ria ted  to  the v a rio u s  s e c to rs ,  m.any
p ro je c ts  were n o t in  e x is ten c e  and thus they  were p repared  and ap p ra ised
sim u ltan eo u sly , so th a t  the  investm ent programme could be completed in  as
( I )sh o rt a time as p o ss ib le  '  '*  Nor d u ring  th is  f i r s t  comprehensive p lann ing  
experience in  Turkey was th e re  co n sis ten cy  and in terdependence  among the 
investm ent d e c is io n s  o f in d iv id u a l m in is tr ie s  and o th e r  government d e p a r t­
ments*
There i s  the problem of co o rd in a tio n  of d i f f e r e n t  p a r ts  of the  p lan
a t  th i s  s ta g e . For example, t o t a l  investm ent in  t r a n s p o r t  may be c o n s is te n t
w ith  a  range of d i f f e r e n t  m anufacturing  programmes* But when a p a r t ic u la r  
m anufacturing p lan  i s  c re a te d  some p a r t  of the o v e ra l l  t ra n s p o r t  b i l l  must 
be a llo c a te d  to  q u ite  s p e c if ic  tra n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  complementary to  the 
p a r t i c u la r  in d u s t r ia l  p ro jec t*
The ta sk  o f the  SPO p lan n ers  here i s  one o f co o rd in a tio n  and comm­
un ica tio n *  The SPO p lan n ers  can do two im portan t th in g s ; f i r s t  they  can 
ex p la in  as f u l l y  as p o ss ib le  to  the s e c to ra l  p lann ing  groups the  o v e ra ll  
s tra te g y  o f the  plan  and p lace  the p lann ing  of t h e i r  own s e c to r  in  p e rsp e c tiv e ;
second, they  can give d e ta i le d  g u id e lin e s  fo r  p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  and choice
( 2 )o f p ro je c ts  ^ *'* S e c to ra l p lan n in g  groups whose investm ents are  i n t e r ­
dependent should have jo in t  m eetings from time to  time to  ensure th a t
t h e i r  p lans a re  no t w idely d iv e rg e n t and a lso  minimise th e  amount o f e f f o r t  
needed l a t e r  in  re c o n c ilin g  d ivergences which may a r i s e .
( i )  N on-uniform ity in  p ro je c t  a p p ra is a l  has been an o th er se r io u s  
shortcom ing o f the F i r s t  Five-Y ear P lan . P r iv a te  s e c to r  investm ent p ro je c ts ,  
which c o n s t i tu te  more than 50 p e r cent of in d u s t r ia l  investm ent, have no t 
been ev a lu a ted  acco rd ing  to  the s o c ia l  investm ent c r i t e r io n .  In  o th e r words, 
th ese  p ro je c ts  were examined by a s p e c ia l  group a t  the  SPO (Encouragement 
and Im plem entation Commission) who had not ap p lied  accoun ting  p r ic e s  as was ' 
the  case w ith  the  p u b lic  in d u s t r ia l  p ro je c ts*  In s te ad  market p r ic e s  were 
ap p lied  as they  stood a t  the  time though th e re  was some estim ate  o f value 
added, fo re ig n  exchange savings or earn ings The p r iv a te  p ro je c ts  come
(1) A p r iv a te  In te rv iew  w ith G. G inar, P lanner a t  th e  SPO, Aniiara, Jan* I 969
( 2 ) BoVoArkadie, and 0*Frank, Economic Accounting and Development P lanning , 
Oxford Univ, P re s s , New York, I 966 , pp*371-372
( 5 ) A p r iv a te  in te rv iew  w ith  B* B en d erlio ^ lu , a p lan n er in  s e c to ra l  - 
programming a t  t h e ‘SPO, Ankara, 30th January , 1969*
T '
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to  the  SPO in  o rd er to  b e n e f i t  from the "Encouragement Measures" in troduced
by the  government* These measures in c luded , (a) investm ent a llow ances,
(b) customs duty  exemption which could vary  between 80 -  100 per cen t,
( l )o r (c) payments o f  customs d u tie s  on an in s ta lm en t b a s is   ^ '*
The e s s e n t ia l  q u a l i t i e s  re q u ire d  in  p r iv a te  p ro je c ts  were w hether
the  p ro je c t  was of im p o r t- s u b s t i tu t io n  n a tu re , w hether i t  was o f ex p o rt-
(2)prom oting n a tu re , w hether i t  was c re a tin g  com petition  '  '  o r w hether i t  was 
u t i l i s i n g  dom estic raw m a te r ia ls .  U ltim ate ly  the p r iv a te  p ro je c ts  which 
s a t i s f y  a l l  n ecessa ry  requ irem ents and which a re  approved by the SPO w ill  
re c e iv e  f i r s t  p r io r i t y  from the c r e d i t  and f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  However, 
one could no t expect th a t  a l l  good p ro je c ts  came b efo re  the  SPO fo r  economic 
e v a lu a tio n , s in ce  many of them belong to  the  p r iv a te  s e c to r
( j )  At th i s  f i n a l  s ta g e , th a t  i s  the p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  s ta g e , 
success has h e av ily  depended upon ex ten siv e  docum entation and s t a t i s t i c a l  
data* In  alm ost a l l  developing  c o u n trie s  the  c o l le c t io n  and s e le c t io n  of 
good p ro je c ts  i s  the most d i f f i c u l t  and d e l ic a te  problem any p lann ing  
bureau has to  fa c e . C o lle c tin g  d a ta  and in fo rm atio n  on p ro je c ts  re q u ire s  
the  co -o p e ra tio n  o f a number o f te c h n ic a l ex p erts  s p e c ia l is e d  in  d i f f e r e n t  
f i e ld s  such as g e o lo g is ts ,  en g in ee rs , s o c ia l  e x p e r ts , econom ists etc* I t  
i s  however the  econom ist who has to  ap p ra ise  and e v a lu a te  p ro je c ts ,  depending 
on the  s p e c if ic  d a ta  and in fo rm atio n  of the  o th e r experts*
Turkey was not exempt from a l l  these  d i f f i c u l t i e s  d u ring  the 
fo rm u la tion  o f the F i r s t  P lan . As T i n b e r g e n ,h a s  po in ted  o u t, most
(1). Ibid*
(2 ) I f  the p roduct i s  exported , ta x  re b a te  i s  su b tra c te d  from i t s  export 
value* Also p ro d u c tio n  tax es  a re  deducted i f  they  are  exported . 
However, t h i s  depends on th e  type of p roducts which a re  to  be 
produced by the  p r o je c t .  B. B enderliog lu , A P r iv a te  In te rv iew ,
SPO, Ankara, Jan* I 969*
( 3 ) Memoranda fo r  p ro je c t  p re p a ra tio n  were sen t to  both  p u b lic  and p r iv a te  . 
s e c to r s .  P ro je c t designs a re  re-exam ined during  the annual programmes. 
P ro je c ts  which a re  over 5 m illio n  TL. are  expected to  come back to  the 
SPO fo r  re -ex am in a tio n , o therw ise  they a re  ev a lu a ted  and adm itted  by
the investm ent agency in  question* A p r iv a te  in te rv iew  w ith
B. B enderliog lu , Jan . I 969.
( 4 ) See J ,  Tinbergen, M ethodological Background o f the P lan , in  "Planning
in  Turkey". M .E.T.U., pub. No.9, Ankara, I 967 , pp* 79, 76 , 77*
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f ig u re s  c o lle c te d  fo r  p ro je c ts  were n o t r e l i a b le  and d a ta  on c o s t and ou tpu t 
f ig u re s  were s c a rc e . To th e se , s c a rc i ty  of ex p erts  can a lso  be added. 
C onsequently, e a r ly  p ro je c t  a p p ra is a ls  were extrem ely  sim p le . T h erefo re , 
the  economic a p p ra is a l  cannot r e a l ly  be sa id  to  be r e l i a b le  and the rank ing  
o f p ro je c ts  w i l l  be g re a t ly  in flu en c ed ,
A good a p p ra is a l  and e v a lu a tio n  w i l l  re q u ire  (a ) a c o l le c t io n  of 
a l l  n ecessa ry  d a ta  and s t a t i s t i c s  w ith  g re a t  u n ifo rm ity , (b) the d a ta  c o lle c te d  
must be re le v a n t  to  those  a sp e c ts  of p ro je c ts  which a re  e s s e n t ia l  f o r  the  
f i n a l  d e c is io n  o f se le c tio n *
In  g en e ra l d a ta  needed fo r  p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n  w i l l  be of two k inds: 
f i r s t ,  th e  p lanners  - need to  have s u f f ic ie n t  d a ta  concern ing  the  o b je c tiv e s  of 
th e  development p o lic y  of th e  government. Second and e q u a lly  im p o rtan t, d a ta  
on sca rce  f a c to r s  of p roduction  a re  needed fo r  the e v a lu a tio n  of th e  p ro je c t 
in  q u e s tio n .
In  Turkey, p ro je c t  ev a lu a tio n  forms were p repared  and d is t r ib u te d
w ith  th e  id ea  o f o b ta in in g  in fo rm atio n  on th e  above f a c to r s  in  as uniform  a
way as p o s s ib le . Some o f th e se  d a ta  were obtained  from M in is t r ie s ,  S ta te
Economic E n te rp r is e s ,  Banks, Union of Chambers of Commerce and a lso  by a rran g in g
( l )v i s i t s  to  re g io n a l a re a s  in  o rd e r to  acqu ire  id e a s . But the in fo rm atio n
c o lle c te d  was n o t in  f a c t  adequate fo r  a re f in e d  e v a lu a tio n  of p ro je c ts .
As f a r  as th e  o b je c tiv e  i s  to  ev a lu a te  p ro je c ts  e f f e c t iv e ly ,  
in fo rm atio n  and d a ta  must be c o lle c te d  on reso u rce  requ irem ents (both  c o n stru c -
( 2 )t io n  and o p e ra tin g  s ta g e s ) ,  r e tu rn s ,  te c h n o lo g ic a l a l t e r n a t iv e s ,  m arket s iz e ,   ^
lo c a t io n  of p ro je c ts ,  methods and source of fin an c in g  the  investm en t, shadow
( 5)p r ic e s  o f p ro d u c tiv e  f a c to r s  and p ro d u c ts . A ll th e se  f a c to r s  need to  be
( 1 ) ^ ' J .  T inbergen, o p .c i t . ,  p .75; and B, B en d erlio g lu , A P r iv a te  In te rv iew ,
January  I 969 , Ankara,
(^^Bemand and supply  d a ta  in  va lue  and p h y sica l term s a re  re q u ire d  fo r  p ro je c t  
a n a ly s is .  C o s t-b e n e f it  a n a ly s is  c a l l s  fo r  the e s tim a te s  o f p resen t and fu tu re  
demand f o r  both commodities and serv ices*  This can be done by e x tra p o la t io n  
o f p a s t tre n d s , experience o f o th e r  c o u n trie s  o r by a n a ly s in g  the  economic 
v a r ia b le s  de term in ing  the  fu tu re  demand f o r  th e  commodity o r the se rv ic e  to  
to  be produced.
( 5)'  'The f i r s t  th in g  in  a p p ra is in g  a given p ro je c t  i s  to  work out the  in p u t- tim e  
curve fo r  a l l  k inds of in p u ts , i . e .  raw m a te r ia ls ,  la b o u r, f u e l ,  w ater e tc .
The main item s of in p u ts  must be d is tin g u ish ed  as d e l iv e r ie s  from dom estic 
p ro d u c tio n  and im ports*
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known beforehand fo r  a sound p ro je c t  evaluation*
The achievem ent of fu tu re  o u tp u t, income, employment and balance of 
payments ta r g e ts  w il l  depend on the  a c tu a l  e v a lu a tio n  method and a c tu a l implem­
e n ta t io n  o f the proposed p ro je c ts  a t  the planned tim e . I t  i s  need less to  remark 
th a t  sy stem a tic  and uniform  investm ent c r i t e r i a  w il l  enhance th e  q u a li ty  and 
accuracy  o f investm ent d ec is io n s  which, in  tu rn ,  w il l  determ ine the success of 
the o v e ra l l  investm ent programme and o v e ra l l  economic o b je c t iv e s . One can go 
a long  w ith  Chenery and Tinbergen to  a s s e r t  th a t  use of economic c r i t e r i a  w il l  
perhaps improve th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f development p lans and s e c to ra l  p ro je c tio n s  
and f i n a l l y  a p p ra is a l  o f p o lic y  a l te rn a t iv e s  in  p a r t i c u la r .  A p p lica tio n  of 
investm ent c r i t e r i a  in s te a d  of ad hoc investm ent d e c is io n s  can avoid th e  
e stab lish m en t o f an o v e ra l l  investm ent programme which could r e s u l t  in  major 
b o ttle n e c k s  such as i n f l a t i o n  and balance of payments d e f i c i t  o r both*
As f a r  as p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n  i s  concerned th e  s e c to ra l  p lann ing  
group should fo llow  the  fo llo w in g  p r in c ip le s :
( i )  F i r s t  th ey  should make a d is t in c t io n  between c a p i ta l  and 
re c u rre n t c o s t ,  fo re ig n  and dom estic c a p i t a l ,  lab o u r, in te rm e d ia te  product 
and o th e r  c o s ts  du ring  th e i r  p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n . ^
( i i )  Second, shadow p r ic e s  r a th e r  than  m arket p r ic e s  should be 
ap p lied  in  c a lc u la t in g  both  c o s ts  and r e tu r n s .  I f  e x is t in g  c o s ts  d a ta  w ithout 
the n ecessa ry  re finem ent and adjustm ent i s  used th e re  w i l l  be a heavy s t r a in
on the  re so u rces  which a re  u n d erp riced , w hile  overp riced  re so u rce s  ( i . e .  labour) 
w il l  be l e f t  id l e .  The u ltim a te  r e s u l t  o f non-adjustm ent in  c o s t elem ents 
i s  th a t  th e  agg regate  y ie ld  o f the  p ro je c t  w il l  f a l l  s h o r t o f the maximum th a t  
could have been ob ta ined  from th e  a v a ila b le  re so u rc e s . Thus, i t  i s  necessa ry  
to  a d ju s t  co s t d a ta  in  o rd e r to  r e s t r a in  th e  use of un d erp riced  f a c to r s  and 
encourage the  use of those  which a re  overpriced*
Here i t  i s  alwqys b e t t e r  to  have c a lc u la t io n s  in  term s of m arket 
p r ic e s  and a d ju s t in g  l a t e r  f o r  d if fe re n c e s  between m r k e t  and shadow p r ic e s . 
D is tin c tio n  between d i f f e r e n t  types of c o s ts  i s  u se fu l s in ce  the  shadow p r ic e  
r e l a t in g  to  c a p i ta l  c o s t i s  l ik e ly  to  be d i f f e r e n t  from the shadow p ric e  
r e l a t in g  to  re c u rre n t c o s ts .  Shadow p ric e  f o r  fo re ig n  exchange would n e c e s s i ta te  
an ad justm ent upward, w hile  shadow p ric e  f o r  u n sk ille d  labour downwards*
( i i i )  T h ird , g u id e lin e s  given by th e  SPO to  s e c to ra l  p lanners  should 
sp e c ify  th a t  bo th  monetary and non-monetary re tu rn s  to  va rio u s  p ro je c ts  should
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be consid ered . The tim e d is t r ib u t io n  of the expected b e n e f i ts  o f th e  p ro je c t  
over i t s  a n tic ip a te d  l i f e  and w ith in  th e  period  of th e  p lan  should be taken in to  
accoun t. For an adequate ev a lu a tio n  a given investm ent p ro je c t needs to  te  
analyzed in  th e  co n tex t o f i t s  w a itin g  p e rio d , growing p e rio d , s ta t io n a ry  ;e r io d ,  
d e c lin in g  p e rio d  and exhaustion  p e r i o d . T i m e  concepts a re  e s s e n t ia l  and 
t h e i r  c o n s id e ra tio n  in  p lan  p re p a ra tio n  w il l  avoid many unexpected events*
Non-monetary r e tu rn s ,  as a r u le ,  should no t be used to  j u s t i f y  any 
p ro je c t ,  bu t th ey  should be s ta te d  f a i r l y  s p e c i f ic a l ly .  Since they  a re  
d i f f i c u l t  to  e v a lu a te , th ey  could perhaps be l i s t e d  s e p a ra te ly  and described  
in  q u a l i ta t iv e  te rm s.
( iv )  F ourth , in  comparing p ro je c ts  w ith in  any s e c to r  a common b a s is
o f p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n  should be used . Id e a lly ,  th e  same method o f p ro je c t
e v a lu a tio n  should be used in  a l l  s e c to rs  to  enab le  p lan n ers  to  make a comparison
( 2 )o f p ro je c ts  amo.gg s e c to r s .  However, p r a c t ic a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  are  so g re a t
th a t  d i f f e r e n t  methods w i l l  have to  be used in  d i f f e r e n t  s e c to r s .
(v) F in a lly ,  i t  must be noted th a t  once an i n i t i a l  s e t  of p ro je c t 
p lans has been draim up, th e  p lann ing  process i s  no t com plete; re -v a lu a tio n  o f 
p ro je c ts  w il l  be necessa ry  fo r  s e v e ra l re a so n s . Checks f o r  o v e ra ll  co n sis ten cy  
must be c a r r ie d  out by the s ta t e  p lann ing  o rg a n isa tio n  (SPO). P ro je c ts  should 
be combined f o r  each s e c to r  to  see whether they  im ply a g re a te r  amount o f 
c a p i t a l ,  a g re a te r  amount of fo re ig n  exchange and s k i l le d  manpower than o r ig in a l ly  
expected a t  th e  i n i t i a l  s tag e  o f  a n a ly s is .  In  o rd e r to  c o rre c t th ese  im balances, 
e i th e r
(^ ) fn  co n sid e rin g  th e  ou tpu t (o r  b e n e f i t)  e f f e c t  of a g iven  investm ent one 
d isco v ers  5 d is s im ila r  bu t in te r r e la te d  time concepts* These a re :
a) w a itin g  p eriod ; p e riod  in  which th e  p ro je c t  y ie ld s  no re tu rn ;  b) growing 
p erio d ; p e riod  in  which y ie ld s  of tlie p ro je c t in c re a se  up to  i t s  maximum; 
c) s ta t io n a r y  p e rio d , period  d u ring  which th e  y ie ld s  r e s u l t in g  from th e  
investm ent a re  re ta in e d  a t  t h e i r  maximum le v e l  under re g u la r  m aintenance bu t 
no renew al; d) d e c lin in g  p e rio d , period  during  which the y ie ld s  of the  
p ro je c t a re  reduced to  n o th in g  tlirough wear and te a r ;  e) exhaustion  p e rio d , 
period  during  which th e  investm ent p ro je c t i s  re ta in e d  a t  i t s  zero le v e l  
r e tu rn s .
/ 2 \
 ^ ^The s o c ia l  p re se n t va lue  (spv) ru^e can even be used a t  s e c to ra l  le v e l in  the  
fo llo w in g  manner: l )  e i th e r  each s e c to r  p lann ing  group can be given a ta r g e t
in  term s o f va lue  added by th a t  s e c to r  to  be achieved by tiie end o f the  
p lann ing  p e rio d . They can be asked here to  m inim ise th e  c o s t ( i . e .  on annual 
b a s is  or p re sen t day v a lu es) o f ach iev in g  th a t  ta r g e t  r a t e  of value added.
Or, 2) each s e c to r  p lann ing  group can be a llo c a te d  a s p e c if ie d  amount of 
c a p i t a l ,  and then th ey  can be asked to  maximise t o t a l  n e t re tu rn s  ( i . e .  
r e tu r n s /
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a) t a r g e t  r a te s  of growth fo r  v a rio u s  s e c to rs  can he lowered to  
b r in g  about a b a lan ce , o r
b) shadow p r ic e s  o f those reso u rces  which a re  r e l a t i v e ly  scarce 
can be re -a d ju s te d  upwards and those  abundant can be ad ju sted  
downward.
In  e i th e r  o f th e se  cases s e c to ra l  p lann ing  committees w i l l  be re q u ire d  to  
re -e v a lu a te  t h e i r  p ro je c t  p lans in  th e  l ig h t  of new d ir e c t iv e s  from the  SPO,
By u sin g  h ig h e r shadow p r ic e s  on the  sca rce  re so u rces  th e  s e c to r  p lanners w i l l  
be asked to  economise on th e  use o f  sca rce  re so u rc e s . U ltim a te ly  a new s e t  of 
p ro je c t  p lan s  can perhaps in c lu d e  more p ro je c ts  which use le s s  of the sca rce  
re so u rces  and more o f abundant re so u rc e s . Thus, r e -e v a lu a tio n  under new 
g u id e lin e s  should continue u n t i l  a m utually  c o n s is te n t and optim al s e t  of 
p ro je c t  p lan s  have been reached*
I I I
So f a r  I  have co n cen tra ted  on the  v a rio u s  shortcom ings o f the 
p lann ing  methodology and p a r t i c u la r ly  the  p ro je c t  a p p ra is a l  mechanism ap p lied  
in  the  F i r s t  F iv e -y ea r P lan .
Though i t  had many d e fe c ts  the F i r s t  P lan  was th e  f i r s t  comprehensive 
p lann ing  approach adopted in  th e  co u n try . I t  has paved the  way fo r  a planned 
economic and s o c ia l  development in  Turkey,
E v a lu a tio n  o f in d u s t r i a l  p ro je c ts  on th e  b a s is  o f th e  s o c ia l  p re sen t 
va lue  ru le  can be considered  as a forward s te p  in  p lan n in g  experience in  Turkey, 
The method used a t  p ro je c t  s tag e  a t  th e  beginning’ was sim ple , but th e  p ro je c t  
ev a lu a tio n  method i s  no t s t a t i c ,  ra th e r  i t  is  p ro g re ss in g . Investm ent e v a lu a t­
io n  i s  be in g  improved by in tro d u c in g  more a l te r n a t iv e  p ro je c ts  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  
s c a le s  o f p ro d u c tio n , d i f f e r e n t  p roduction  techniques and d i f f e r e n t  lo c a t io n ,
(c o n td .)  re tu rn s  le s s  c o s ts  e i th e r  on annual b a s is  o r pv b a s is )  on th e i r  a l lo t t e d  
amount o f c a p i t a l .  The problem is  then  to  c a lc u la te  f o r  each p ro je c t the n e t 
b e n e f i t - c a p i t a l  co st r a t i o .  S e c to ra l p lann ing  groups can then maximise n e t 
re tu rn s  on a llo c a te d  c a p i ta l  by choosing p ro je c ts  which have high n e t b e n e f i t-  
c a p i ta l  c o s t r a t i o s ,
(^^Investm ent p ro je c ts  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  lo c a tio n s  and d i f f e r e n t  s c a le s  o f p roduction  
s ta r te d  re a ch in g  th e  SPO only in  the secondhalf of th e  F i r s t  P lan p e r io d .
Sincsa p ro je c t  design  and p re p a ra tio n  was a new concept in  Turkey, government 
investm ent agencies in  the  e a r l i e r  years  could not come up w ith  investm ent 
a l t e r n a t iv e s .  In  the  f i r s t  th re e  y ears  ( 1963- 65) most of th e  o r ig in a l  
p ro je c ts  were a l te r e d  and improved by 50 to  100 p er c e n t befo re  they  were 
f i n a l l y /
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t ; t
The comprehensive p lann ing  approach has a lso  paved the  way to  
c o l le c t io n  o f more uniform  and sy stem atic  da ta  req u ire d  fo r  s e c to ra l  prog­
ramming ( i . e .  in p u t-o u tp u t model) and p ro je c t a p p ra is a l .
The success o f subsequent F ive-Y ear P lans w i l l  la rg e ly  be a funcwion 
of p o l i t i c a l  independence o f the  s ta te  p lanning  o rg a n isa tio n  and a lso  a fu n c tio n  
o f the u n ifo rm ity  in  the  a p p lic a tio n  of s o c ia l  investm ent c r i t e r i a  in  p ro je c t  
a p p ra is a l .  For t h i s  purpose the  C en tra l P lanning  Agency w i l l ,  of course, 
need a la rg e  number o f q u a lif ie d  p lanners  who a re  empowered w ith  co n siderab le  
e x p e r tis e  and freedom in  investm ent e v a lu a tio n .
(c o n td .)  f i n a l ly  included* A f te r - I965 however, p ro je c t  p re p a ra tio n  has improved 
due to  p ro je c t  e v a lu a tio n  forms in troduced  by th e  SPO, B ozkurt, B end erlio g lu , 
A P r iv a te  In te rv iew , Ja n .-F e b . 1969, SPO, Ankara,
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